Howard v. Wickham et al

Filing 48

ORDER - Respondents' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 29 ) is DENIED. Petitioner's motion for discovery (ECF No. 34 ) is DENIED. Respondents shall file an answer to the amended petition (ECF No. 21 ) by 6/10/2019. Reply due 30 days from service of the answer. Signed by Judge Howard D. McKibben on 4/11/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 9 10 11 12 13 LAMONT HOWARD, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) HAROLD WICKHAM, et al. ) ) Respondents. ) ) _________________________________ ) 14 This counseled habeas petition 3:16-cv-00665-HDM-VPC ORDER comes before the court on 15 respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.1 (ECF No. 16 29). Petitioner has opposed (ECF No. 43), and respondents have replied 17 (ECF No. 47). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable 18 tolling and has moved for discovery related to that claim. (ECF No. 19 34). Respondents have opposed (ECF No. 38), and petitioner has replied 20 (ECF No. 41). 21 Petitioner challenges his 2011 state court conviction for sexual 22 assault, kidnapping in the first degree, attempted sexual assault, and 23 two counts of battery with intent to commit sexual assault. 24 56).2 25 Petitioner thereafter filed a state postconviction petition for habeas (Ex. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. (Ex. 80). 26 27 28 1 Although the motion also sought to dismiss Ground 1 as unexhausted, respondents withdraw the argument in their reply. 2 The exhibits cited in this order, comprising the relevant state court record, are located at ECF Nos. 30-33. 1 corpus relief. 2 petitioner in those proceedings, and Mr. Story filed a supplemental 3 petition on petitioner’s behalf. 4 court denied relief, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. (Exs. 99 & 5 111). (Ex. 83). Robert Story was appointed to represent (Exs. 85 & 89). After the trial Remittitur issued on April 12, 2016. (Ex. 112). 6 Mr. Story retired from practice in 2016 – his petition to resign 7 from the bar was filed on March 24, 2016, and granted on September 12, 8 2016. 9 to indicate that Mr. Story ever moved to withdraw from petitioner’s 10 (ECF No. 9 at 31 & 34; ECF No. 44 at 5-7). There is nothing case or advised petitioner of his retirement. 11 On May 11, 2016, petitioner sent a letter to the Nevada Supreme 12 Court indicating that he had been unable to contact his attorney 13 because his phone number had changed without notice, and that he would 14 like to know the “status” of his case. (ECF No. 9 at 17). In response, 15 the Nevada Supreme Court sent petitioner a copy of the docket sheet, 16 showing that an order of affirmance had issued in his appeal. (ECF NO. 17 9 at 18-19). The docket sheet was printed out on May 19, 2016. (Id.) 18 There is no evidence to indicate that the court sent petitioner any 19 further information, including the order of affirmance. 20 On May 24, 2016, petitioner signed a motion to withdraw counsel 21 and for transfer of his case file, which was received by the trial 22 court on June 3, 2016, and granted on June 28, 2016. 23 8-14). 24 (ECF No. 9 at On August 11, 2016, petitioner wrote a letter, which was received 25 by the trial court on August 17, 2016. 26 letter, petitioner indicated that Mr. Story had not yet complied with 27 the court’s order directing him to transfer petitioner’s case file. 28 (Id.) 2 (ECF No. 9 at 15-16). In that 1 On September 14, 2016, petitioner filed a motion for contempt 2 with the state court, indicating that Mr. Story had still failed to 3 provide him with his case file. (ECF No. 9 at 21-24). 4 petitioner asserted that Mr. Story never communicated with him after 5 filing the postconviction notice of appeal, would not accept or 6 respond to any of petitioner’s letters or phone calls, and that his 7 phone number and address changed without notice. Petitioner asserted 8 that Mr. Story never informed him that the Nevada Supreme Court had 9 decided his appeal or issued remittitur and that petitioner has “never In the motion, 10 received any copy of said order or remittitur.” (Id.) 11 a response filed September 23, 2016, indicated that on information and 12 belief, Mr. Story was no longer practicing in Nevada and had in fact 13 left the United States with no plan to return. (Id. at 26). The State, in 14 Petitioner thereafter, on or about November 14, 2016, filed his 15 federal habeas petition, which respondents now move to dismiss as 16 untimely. 17 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 18 (“AEDPA”) established a one-year period of limitations for federal 19 habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. 20 period begins to run after the date on which the judgment challenged 21 became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 22 the time for seeking such direct review, unless it is otherwise tolled 23 or subject to delayed accrual. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The one-year limitation 24 As set forth in the court’s prior order, unless otherwise tolled 25 or subject to delayed accrual, the deadline for petitioner to file a 26 27 28 3 1 federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was September 29, 2016.3 2 (ECF No. 5 at 3). Petitioner filed his federal petition roughly 47 3 days later, on or around November 14, 2016.4 Petitioner concedes that 4 the petition was filed at least 30 days after September 29, 2016, 5 depending on when petitioner mailed his habeas petition, but asserts 6 that the limitations period should not have expired by that time due 7 to the application of equitable tolling. 8 Equitable tolling is appropriate only if the petitioner can show 9 that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some 10 extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely 11 filing. 12 tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 13 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), and “the threshold necessary to trigger 14 equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule,” 15 Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United 16 States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). The 17 petitioner ultimately has the burden of proof on this “extraordinary 18 exclusion.” Id. at 1065. He accordingly must demonstrate a causal 19 relationship between the extraordinary circumstance and the lateness 20 of his filing. 21 2003). Accord Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 22 (9th Cir. 2007). Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Equitable E.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 The parties generally agree with the court’s calculation, though respondents assert the statute expired one day earlier. The difference, in the context of this case, is immaterial. 4 As the court previously noted, the petition is dated October 28, 2016, but the motion for appointment of counsel submitted with it is dated November 14, 2016. (ECF No. 1-1 & 1-2). The court finds it unnecessary to determine the exact date the petition was mailed because, as will be discussed, petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling through the date of filing the petition, even if it was not filed until November 14, 2016. 4 1 The Ninth Circuit has “adopted the ‘stop clock’ approach to 2 analyzing claims for equitable tolling. “[T]he statute-of-limitations 3 clock stops running when extraordinary circumstances first arise, but 4 the clock resumes running once the extraordinary circumstances have 5 ended or when the petitioner ceases to exercise reasonable diligence, 6 whichever occurs earlier.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 651 (9th Cir. 7 2015) (citing Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2014)). 8 Petitioner asserts he is entitled to equitable tolling based on 9 the abandonment by postconviction counsel and his lack of his case 10 file. 11 “Failure to inform a client that his case has been decided, 12 particularly where that decision implicates the client’s ability to 13 bring further proceedings and the attorney has committed himself to 14 informing his client of such a development, constitutes attorney 15 abandonment.” Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2014); see 16 also Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 283 (2012). Further, the complete 17 lack of a case file might, under some circumstances, justify equitable 18 tolling, see Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 19 2009); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002), if “the 20 hardship 21 extraordinary circumstance that caused” the untimely filing of his 22 federal petition. See Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. 23 caused by lack of access to his materials was an Petitioner asserts that discovery is necessary to prove his claim 24 of abandonment by counsel and lack of his case file. 25 court finds that the evidence in the record sufficiently supports the 26 petitioner’s claim such that discovery is not necessary. Considering 27 the parties’ arguments and the evidence that has been submitted, the 28 court finds that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled 5 However, the 1 through the filing of the pro se petition due to Mr. Story’s 2 abandonment of petitioner and petitioner’s lack of access to at least 3 part of his case file, including importantly and undisputedly, the 4 Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in his postconviction appeal. 5 Petitioner’s exhibits demonstrate both Mr. Story’s abandonment 6 of petitioner during the pendency of his postconviction appeal and 7 petitioner’s diligent efforts to learn the status of his case on his 8 own and obtain his case file so he could file his federal petition. 9 Respondents do not concede petitioner’s assertion that Mr. Story 10 abandoned petitioner but nor do they offer any persuasive argument or 11 evidence to counter it. They also offer no evidence or argument in 12 support of a contention that petitioner had in his possession, at any 13 time before filing the federal petition, a copy of the Nevada Supreme 14 Court’s decision in his postconviction appeal. It was not unreasonable 15 for petitioner to attempt to obtain a copy of this and the rest of his 16 file before submitting his federal habeas petition, which clearly 17 caused a delay of at least two months. It is further clear that 18 petitioner acted diligently once learning that he was not likely to 19 ever obtain his file from Mr. Story, who had left the country. 20 prepared and filed his federal habeas petition less than two months 21 after learning this information, which the court finds in the context 22 of this case to be diligent. 23 has 24 deadline 25 respondents’ arguments against application of equitable tolling in 26 this case are not persuasive. sufficiently due to The court further finds that petitioner established the He that extraordinary he missed the circumstances federal he filing faced. The 27 As the pro se petition is therefore considered timely and 28 respondents do not argue the operative amended petition is untimely 6 1 on any other grounds, i.e., that it does not relate back to the pro 2 se petition, the motion to dismiss the amended petition as untimely 3 will be denied. 4 Turning to petitioner’s motion for discovery, that motion too 5 will be denied. Petitioner’s sole basis for seeking discovery is to 6 bolster his claim of equitable tolling. 7 concluded that petitioner should be given the benefit of equitable 8 tolling in this case, there is no reason to allow further discovery 9 to support that claim. 10 11 12 13 Because the court has In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 29) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for discovery (ECF No. 34) is DENIED. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents shall file an answer to 15 the amended petition within sixty days of the date of this order. 16 Petitioner will have thirty days from service of the answer within 17 which to file a reply. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 DATED: This 11th day of April, 2019. 20 21 _________________________________ HOWARD D. MCKIBBEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7

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