Schmitt v. Lyon County Sheriff et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting ECF No. 19 Motion for Summary Judgment; directing Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and close case. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 12/18/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KR)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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GREG SCHMITT,

Case No. 3:17-cv-00117-MMD-WGC
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.
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LYON COUNTY, et al.,
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Defendants.
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I.

SUMMARY

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Defendant Lyon County moves for summary judgment (“Motion”) on Plaintiff Greg

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Schmitt’s sole claim against it for alleged unlawful imprisonment and detention in violation

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of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 4, 19.) The Court will grant the

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Motion because Plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability. 1

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II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff originally brought this action only against the Lyon County Sheriff’s Office

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and Judge Michael Fletcher of the Walker Justice Court. (ECF No. 1-1; ECF No 19 at 3.)

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In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was transported to Lyon County Jail by a

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Lyon County sheriff deputy and was booked on an eight-year-old misdemeanor warrant.

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(ECF No. 1-1 at 3–4.) Plaintiff claims he received a suspended sentence of six months

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with forty-days credit for time served but was later advised that the statute of limitations

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barred his sentence. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a motion for modification of his sentence with Judge

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1Plaintiff

did not file a response. However, the Court considers the allegations in
the Amended Complaint as well as the relevant background recited below.

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Fletcher. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that an unidentified sheriff deputy with the Lyon County

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Sheriff’s Office told him that his motion for modification had been denied. (Id.)

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Plaintiff avers that on the thirty-fifth day of serving his sentence he was brought

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before Judge DeRiso. (Id.) He states that Judge DeRiso immediately released him,

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ordered all fees, fines, and restitution quashed, and apologized on behalf of the court and

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jail. (Id. at 3, 4.) Plaintiff provides that Judge DeRiso did so because the offense related

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to the warrant was barred by the statute of limitations and “the conviction was past legal

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limit.” (Id. at 4.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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against the Lyon County Sheriff’s Office and Judge Fletcher.

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In a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) to this Court, Magistrate Judge Cobb

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concluded that the Lyon County Sheriff’s Office is not a suable entity and that Judge

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Fletcher is entitled to dismissal based on absolute judicial immunity. (ECF No. 3 at 5–6.)

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Judge Cobb also granted Plaintiff leave to name Lyon County as a defendant. (Id. at 6.)

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This Court adopted the R&R in its entirety. (ECF No. 5.)

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Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”), asserting a single

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claim for unlawful imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment against Lyon County, and

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restating his allegations. (ECF No. 4 at 2–4.) He maintains that an unidentified Lyon

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County sheriff deputy informed him that his motion for modification had been denied. (Id.

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at 4.)

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Lyon County brought the instant Motion, arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish

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municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No.

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19.) Plaintiff was granted a requested extension to respond to the Motion by July 27, 2018.

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(ECF Nos. 21, 22.) To date Plaintiff has failed to file a response. Defendant filed a reply,

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requesting this Court consider its unopposed motion. (ECF No. 23.)

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III.

DISCUSSION

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A.

Legal Standard

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In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all

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inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v.
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Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). “The purpose of summary

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judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the

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court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

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materials on file, and any affidavits “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp.

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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary

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basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute

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is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of

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material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the

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moving party satisfies Rule 56’s requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the

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motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

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477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must

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produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show

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that the dispute exists,” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991),

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and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

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material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere

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existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

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Mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will liberally construe his filings in this
lawsuit. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

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B.

Analysis

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Under Monell, a plaintiff can only establish municipal liability by demonstrating that

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a county has a “deliberate policy, custom or practice that was the moving force behind the

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constitutional violation he suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667
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(9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95); see also

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Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“[W]e have required a plaintiff

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seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or

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‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); City of

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Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (requiring a Monell plaintiff to show “a direct

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causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional

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deprivation”).

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Plaintiff has alleged no facts in the Amended Complaint, or produced any evidence,

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from which the Court may infer a violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Lyon

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County policy or custom. Therefore, Plaintiff’s sole claim against Lyon County fails as a

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matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants Lyon County’s unopposed motion for summary

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judgment (ECF No. 19).

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several cases

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not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and determines

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that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the motion before

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the Court.

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It is therefore ordered that Lyon County’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
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The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

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DATED THIS 18th day of December 2018.

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MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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