Stewart v. Aranas, et al.

Filing 64

ORDER that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Baldwin (ECF No. 60 ) is adopted and accepted in full; Defendants' objection (ECF No. 62 ) is overruled; Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 47 ) is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Miranda M. Du on 3/9/2020. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - LW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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LEWIS STEWART

Case No. 3:17-cv-00132-MMD-CLB
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.
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ROMEO ARANAS, et al.,
Defendants.

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I.

SUMMARY

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Pro Se Plaintiff Lewis Stewart brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States Magistrate

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Judge Carla Baldwin (ECF No. 60) relating to Defendants’ 1 motion for summary judgment

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(“Motion”). (ECF No. 47.) Judge Baldwin recommends that this Court deny Defendants’

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Motion. (ECF No. 60 at 1.) Defendants have filed a partial objection (“Objection”) (ECF

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No. 62)2, challenging only Judge Baldwin’s finding that they are not entitled to qualified

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immunity. For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules the Objection and adopts the

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R&R in its entirety.

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II.

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff was formerly an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of

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Corrections (“NDOC”). (ECF No. 4 at 1.) Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Southern Desert

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Correctional Center (“SDCC”) during the time relevant to this action. (Id.) Defendants

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acknowledge that Plaintiff has a history of benign prostatic hyperplasia, also known as an

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1Defendants

are Romeo Aranas, James G. Cox, Francisco M. Sanchez, and Brian

E. Williams.
2Plaintiff

filed a response to the Objection. (ECF No. 63.)

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enlarged prostate. (ECF No. 47 at 3, ECF No. 47-2 at 1.) The Court incorporates by

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reference Judge Baldwin’s recitation of the factual and procedural background as provided

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in the R&R (ECF No. 60 at 1–3), which the Court adopts.

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III.

LEGAL STANDARD

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A.

Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

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This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

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recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party

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timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, then the Court is

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required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and

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recommendation] to which objection is made.” Id. Where a party fails to object, however,

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the Court is not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject

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of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also United States v.

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Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (“De novo review of the magistrate judges’

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findings and recommendations is required if, but only if, one or both parties file objections

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to the findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis in original); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, Advisory

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Committee Notes (1983) (providing that a court “need only satisfy itself that there is no

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clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation”).

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In light of Defendants’ Objection to part of the R&R, the Court conducts a de novo

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review to determine whether to adopt the rulings in the R&R to which Defendants object.

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Having reviewed the R&R, the underlying briefs, 3 and the accompanying exhibits, the

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Court agrees with Judge Baldwin and will adopt the R&R.

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B.

Summary Judgment Standard

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“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no

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dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18

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F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,

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the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show there is no genuine

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Court has also reviewed Plaintiff’s response to the Motion (ECF No. 55), and
Defendants’ reply (ECF No. 56).
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issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is

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a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the

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nonmoving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under

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the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). Where

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reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment

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is not appropriate. See id. at 250–51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a

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genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’

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differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th

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Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968)).

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In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences

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in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach

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& Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).

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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of

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material fact. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once

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the moving party satisfies Rule 56’s requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting

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the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings

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but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

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show that the dispute exists,” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.

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1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to

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the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere

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existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

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IV.

DISCUSSION

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Judge Baldwin recommends that the Court deny summary judgment for Defendants

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on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, which are two counts of Eighth Amendment deliberate
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indifference to serious medical needs. (See generally ECF No. 60, ECF No. 4.)

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Defendants object only to Judge Baldwin’s recommendation that they are not entitled to

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qualified immunity. (ECF No. 62 at 1.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Judge Baldwin

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erred in finding that they violated a clearly established constitutional right of Plaintiff. (Id.

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at 4.) Plaintiff counters that a reasonable official in Defendants’ positions would have

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known that Plaintiff’s treatment was unconstitutional. (ECF No. 63 at 5.)

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The Court conducts a two-step inquiry to determine whether Defendants are

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entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Groves v. City of Reno, Case No. 3:13-cv-00537-

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MMD-WGC, 2015 WL 5350099, *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 2015). First, the Court decides

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“whether the facts shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. If the Court

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finds a constitutional violation, the Court then decides “whether the constitutional right was

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clearly established as of the date of the alleged misconduct.” Id. (citations omitted).

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Defendants do not object to Judge Baldwin’s finding that a genuine issue of material fact

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exists regarding whether they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs.

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(ECF No. 62 at 2.) Therefore, the Court discusses only the second step.

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“A [g]overnment official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time

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of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every

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reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

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Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The

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Supreme Court has cautioned courts “not [to] define clearly established law at a high level

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of generality.” Id. at 742 (citations omitted). Yet, it is “clear that officials can still be on

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notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”

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Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

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Here, Defendants argue that Judge Baldwin erred by relying on Toguchi v. Chung,

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to find a clearly established constitutional right. (ECF No. 62 at 5–7); Toguchi v. Chung,

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391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). They contend that while Toguchi provides a general

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statement of the law defining deliberate indifference to medical needs, the case is not

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sufficiently analogous to put Defendants on clear notice that their treatment of Plaintiff may
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have been unconstitutional. (ECF No. 62 at 5–8.) Instead, Defendants contend that given

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the Ninth Circuit’s instructions that determinations of qualified immunity must be “fact

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specific” and “highly contextualized”, Hamby v. Hammond would be a more appropriate

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case to rely on. (See id. at 8–11); Hamby v. Hammond 821 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.

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2016). In Hamby, the court found that prison officials did not violate a clearly established

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constitutional right by denying plaintiff’s hernia surgery because “existing precedent [did]

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not place beyond debate the unconstitutionality of the course of non-surgical treatment

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pursued by the prison officials . . ..” Hamby, 821 F.3d at 1094. Similar to the court’s

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reasoning in Hamby, Defendants argue that because there is only one unpublished Ninth

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Circuit case that considers the treatment of prostatic hyperplasia, Defendants had no clear

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notice that their treatment of Plaintiff could be unconstitutional. (ECF No. 62 at 8.) The

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Court disagrees that the inquiry must be so narrow.

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Qualified immunity does not require the Court to find a case directly on point to

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determine that a law has been clearly established. See Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d

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1272, 1285–86 (9th Cir. 2001) (clarifying that qualified immunity does not require that a

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prior case prohibit the exact misconduct at issue in the case); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90

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F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (“For a right to be clearly established it is not necessary that

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the very action in question have previously been held unlawful.”). And even if this Court

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were to accept that Toguchi did not put Defendants on notice that their conduct may have

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been unconstitutional, case law clearly establishes that “[p]rison officials are deliberately

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indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally

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interfere with medical treatment.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Singleton v. Lopez, 577 F. App’x. 733, 735

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(9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a substantial delay in effectively treating plaintiff’s pain could

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amount to deliberate indifference, even where plaintiff had already received some

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treatment).

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Therefore, the Court adopts Judge Baldwin’s recommendation to deny summary
judgment for Defendants on the issue of qualified immunity.
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V.

CONCLUSION

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The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several cases

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not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and determines

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that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the issues before

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the Court.

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It is therefore ordered that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Baldwin (ECF No. 60) is adopted and accepted in full.

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It is further ordered that Defendants’ objection (ECF No. 62) is overruled.

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It is further ordered that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 47)

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is denied.
DATED THIS 9th day of March 2020.

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MIRANDA M. DU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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