Clausen v. Nevada Dept of Corrections et al
Filing
7
ORDER that a decision on Plaintiff's IFP Application (ECF No. 4 ) is DEFERRED; Clerk directed to file the Complaint (ECF No. 1 -1); Count I is DISMISSED, with leave to amend by 12/4/2018; Count II is DISMISSED, with prejudice; C lerk directed to send Plaintiff the approved form for filing a § 1983 complaint, instructions, and a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1 -1) (Mailed to P on 11/7/2018); a separate screening order will be done by the court if an amended comp laint is filed; if Plaintiff does not timely file a first amended complaint, the Court may dismiss Count I with prejudice without further notice. Signed by Judge Robert C. Jones on 11/6/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - LH)
1
2
3
4
5
6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
8
***
9
KEVIN CLAUSEN,
10
Plaintiff,
v.
11
12
3:17-cv-00522-RCJ-CBC
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
ORDER
13
Defendants.
14
15
Plaintiff Kevin Clausen, a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections
16
(“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an
17
application to proceed in forma pauperis. The matter of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred.
18
The Court now screens the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
19
I.
SCREENING STANDARDS
20
Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
21
entity or its officers or employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable
22
claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary
23
relief from an immune defendant. Id. § 1915A(b). This includes claims based on fantastic or
24
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). Also, when a prisoner
25
seeks to proceed without prepayment of fees, a court must dismiss if “the allegation of poverty is
26
untrue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A).
27
When screening claims for failure to state a claim, a court uses the same standards as under
28
Rule 12(b)(6). Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil
1
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
2
entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
3
upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). A motion to dismiss under Rule
4
12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency, N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581
5
(9th Cir. 1983), and dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant
6
fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, Bell Atl. Corp. v.
7
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
8
A court treats factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to
9
the plaintiff, NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986), but does not accept as
10
true “legal conclusions . . . cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d
11
1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must plead facts pertaining to his case making a violation
12
“plausible,” not just “possible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009) (citing Twombly,
13
550 U.S. at 556) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
14
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
15
alleged.”). That is, a plaintiff must not only specify or imply a cognizable legal theory (Conley
16
review), he must also allege the facts of his case so that the court can determine whether he has any
17
basis for relief under the legal theory he has specified or implied, assuming the facts are as he
18
alleges (Twombly-Iqbal review).
19
“Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on
20
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint
21
may be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896
22
F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Similarly, “documents whose contents are
23
alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically
24
attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” without
25
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d
26
449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). Also, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial
27
notice of “matters of public record” if not “subject to reasonable dispute.” United States v.
28
Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). Otherwise, if the district court considers
2
1
materials outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary
2
judgment. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001).
3
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) violation of a right secured by the
4
Constitution or laws of the United States (2) by a person acting under color of state law. West v.
5
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
6
II.
ANALYSIS
7
On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff attempted to send legal mail for his state habeas corpus case,
8
with the attached brass slip # 2138663. Defendant R. Jones accepted the mail and signed and dated
9
the brass slip but did not turn it in for processing, in violation of NDOC policies. On September 5,
10
Plaintiff sent a letter to the state court asking if his habeas corpus filing had been received. On
11
September 15, Plaintiff received a letter from the state court stating that his habeas corpus filing
12
had not been received. On October 21, Plaintiff filed an informal grievance regarding the issue.
13
On October 21, Plaintiff received a response from Defendant J. Dutton stating: “(See attached
14
copies from Legal Mail Log),” but no copies of the Legal Mail Log were attached. Dutton
15
knowingly failed to provide copies of the mail log in order to cover up Jones’ actions. Jones’ failure
16
to send Plaintiff’s legal mail “caus[ed] irreparable harm to plaintiffs Habeas Corpus proceeding
17
(State v. Clausen, # CR-15-0196) as plaintiffs [AEDPA] tolling has expired due to the pursuit of
18
this grievance in order to show the courts that ‘good cause’ exists in order to overcome any timebar
19
issues.” Plaintiff sues NDOC, Jones, and Dutton for violations of his right to access the courts and
20
his right to due process.
21
As an initial matter, the Court dismisses the claims as against NDOC, without leave to
22
amend. Plaintiff cannot sue the State of Nevada or its agencies in federal court absent a waiver.
23
U.S. Const., amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–15 (1890); NRDC v. Cal. Dep’t of
24
Trans., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
25
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 142–46 (1993)). The State of Nevada withheld its consent to suit in federal
26
court when it made a limited waiver of immunity to suit in its own courts. Nev. Rev. Stat. §
27
41.031. Section 5 (the enforcement provision) of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress
28
some power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment protection, and Congress immediately
3
1
did so via the Enforcement Act of 1871 (the genesis of § 1983), but the State of Nevada and its
2
agencies are not “person[s]” who can be sued under the meaning of that statute. Doe v. Lawrence
3
Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
4
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)). The Court will analyze the merits of the claims as against
5
Defendants Jones and Dutton.
6
A.
Count I – Access to the Courts
7
Plaintiff alleges Jones denied Plaintiff access to the courts by failing to mail his state habeas
8
corpus filing. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518
9
U.S. 343, 346 (1996). This right “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation
10
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
11
assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). This right,
12
however, “guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the
13
capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before
14
the courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. It is this “capability, rather than the capability of turning pages
15
in a law library, that is the touchstone” of the right of access to the courts. Id. at 356–57.
16
To establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, a prisoner must establish that he
17
or she has suffered an actual injury, a jurisdictional requirement that flows from the standing
18
doctrine and may not be waived. Id. at 349. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to
19
contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a
20
claim.” Id. at 348. Delays in providing legal materials or assistance that result in actual injury are
21
“not of constitutional significance” if “they are the product of prison regulations reasonably related
22
to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 362. The right of access to the courts is limited to non-
23
frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, and § 1983 actions. Id. at 353 n.3,
24
354–55.
25
Plaintiff has not alleged having lost a non-frivolous civil claim, i.e., one or more claims in
26
his state habeas corpus case, due to Defendants’ actions. His allegations are unclear as to whether
27
he alleges the loss of his state habeas corpus proceeding, the loss of a federal habeas corpus
28
proceeding, or both. The action he identifies (Second Judicial District Court Case CR15-0196) is
4
1
a state court criminal action against him that was closed when he was sentenced in May 2015, not
2
a habeas corpus action by him. Perhaps Plaintiff means to allege that he attempted to file a habeas
3
corpus action in state court but that it was dismissed as untimely due to Defendants’ interference
4
with his mail. But he has not alleged the nature of any non-frivolous claim he meant to pursue,
5
which he must do so the Court can assess whether he has alleged harm under Lewis. Perhaps
6
Plaintiff means to allege that he had missed the time to file a state habeas corpus action due to
7
Defendants’ actions, and therefore did not bother trying to do so, and that the one-year bar under
8
AEDPA had run in the meantime such that he lost a potential federal habeas corpus claim. But
9
again, Plaintiff has not alleged the nature of any non-frivolous claim he meant to pursue. And
10
Plaintiff could have filed an unexhausted federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
11
and obtained a stay and abeyance while he exhausted his state habeas corpus remedies. The Court
12
takes judicial notice of its own docket, which indicates Plaintiff has never filed a § 2254 petition in
13
this Court. Plaintiff also could have filed—and presumably still could file—a federal habeas corpus
14
petition after defaulting on his state habeas corpus remedies, arguing that Defendants’ interference
15
with his mail constitutes cause and prejudice excusing the default. There appears never to have
16
been any judicial determination that a putative § 2254 petition is barred by AEDPA due to an
17
unexcused default in state court.
18
The Court dismisses this claim, with leave to amend. Upon amendment, Plaintiff must
19
clearly indicate the procedural history of any state or federal habeas corpus petitions he has filed,
20
as well as the nature of the underlying claim(s) in the state court habeas corpus petition he submitted
21
to Defendants that they failed to forward.
22
B.
Count II – Due Process
23
Plaintiff alleges Dutton violated Plaintiff’s due process rights when he knowingly failed to
24
attach the mail log to Plaintiff’s grievance response. Prisoners have no stand-alone due process
25
rights related to the administrative grievance process. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.
26
1988); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff fails to state a due process
27
claim against Dutton. Count II is dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
28
///
5
1
C.
2
Plaintiff may attempt to amend Count I. An amended complaint supersedes (replaces)
3
previous versions of a complaint, so an amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Lacey
4
5
Amendment
v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner
& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff must file the first amended complaint
6
7
8
9
on this Court’s approved prisoner civil rights form, and it must be entitled “First Amended
Complaint.” Plaintiff must file the first amended complaint within twenty-eight (28) days from the
date of this Order, or the Court may dismiss Count I with prejudice without further notice.
10
11
12
13
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a decision on the Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
(ECF No. 4) is DEFERRED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall file the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1).
14
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count I is DISMISSED, with leave to amend within
15
16
twenty-eight (28) days of this Order.
17
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Count II is DISMISSED, with prejudice.
18
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall send Plaintiff the approved form for filing
19
a § 1983 complaint, instructions, and a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff must use
20
the approved form and write the words “First Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint”
21
in the caption. The Court will screen the amended complaint in a separate screening order, which
22
may take several months. If Plaintiff does not timely file a first amended complaint, the Court may
23
24
25
26
27
28
dismiss Count I with prejudice without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: This 6th day of November, 2018.
Dated this 10th day of September, 2018.
_________________________________
ROBERT C. JONES
United States District Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?