Jackson v. Hanlon et al

Filing 25

ORDER DISMISSING CASE - It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff Tarontae D. Jacksons failure to file a fully complete IFP application or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with t his Court' s February 15 and April 1, 2024 orders. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Tarontae Jackson wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing fee or apply for pauper status. Signed by Chief Judge Miranda M. Du on 5/10/2024. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - GA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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TARONTAE D. JACKSON,

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v.

Plaintiff,

ORDER

JARED HANLON, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case 3:23-cv-00243-MMD-CLB

I.

SUMMARY

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Pro se Plaintiff Tarontae Jackson brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated

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at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 8.) On February 15, 2024, this Court ordered Jackson to

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file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis for non-inmates (“IFP

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application”) or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before March 18, 2024. (ECF No. 21.)

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Shortly after entry of this order, Jackson filed notice that his address had changed. (ECF

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No. 22.) The Court thus considered alternatives to dismissal and entered an order setting

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a second deadline for Jackson to comply—May 1, 2024. (ECF No. 23.) The Court warned

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Jackson the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete IFP application

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for non-inmates or pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by the May 1, 2024,

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deadline. (Id. at 2.) That deadline expired, and Jackson has not filed a fully complete IFP

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application, paid the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. And

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the Court’s mail to Jackson has been returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 24.)

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II.

DISCUSSION

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District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the

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exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . .

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dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831

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(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court

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order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir.

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1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to

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keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.

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1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss

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an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in

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expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk

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of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

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merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine

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Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130).

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The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation

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and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Jackson’s

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claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal

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because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing

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a pleading ordered by the Court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542

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F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of

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cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

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The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can

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be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider

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dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining

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that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order

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does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th

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Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally

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dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v.

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Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this Court cannot operate without

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collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s compliance

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with rules and court orders, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting another

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deadline. But issuing a third order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the
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Court’s finite resources because Jackson ignored the second order. And without an

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updated address, the chance a third order would even reach Jackson is low. The fifth

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factor thus favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the

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Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on

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Plaintiff Tarontae D. Jackson’s failure to file a fully complete IFP application or pay the

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full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s February 15 and April 1, 2024 orders.

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The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

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No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Tarontae Jackson wishes to

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pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing

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fee or apply for pauper status.

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DATED THIS 10th Day of May 2024.

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MIRANDA M. DU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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