Reed v. Cooke et al

Filing 6

ORDER - It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Winston Reed's failure to file his updated address and either pay the full filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis in compliance wi th the Courts June 14 and September 18, 2024, orders. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Reed wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing fee or apply for in forma pauperis status. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 11/21/2024., Case terminated. (For Distribution by law library.)(Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - GA)

1
2
3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5

***

6

WINSTON NAJEE REED,

Case No. 3:24-cv-00241-MMD-CSD
Plaintiff,

7

ORDER

v.
8
TASHEENA COOKE, et al.,
9
Defendants.
10
11
12

Plaintiff Winston Reed brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to

13

redress constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered while incarcerated at Ely State

14

Prison. (ECF No. 1-1.) On June 14, 2024, this Court ordered Reed to either pay the full

15

$405 filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis by August 13, 2024.

16

(ECF No. 3.) And on September 18, 2024, this Court ordered Reed to file his updated

17

address by November 18, 2024. (ECF No. 4.) But both deadlines expired and Reed has

18

not paid the filing fee, filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, filed his updated

19

address, moved for an extension, or otherwise responded to the Court’s orders.

20

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the

21

exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . .

22

dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831

23

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court

24

order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir.

25

1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to

26

keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th

27

Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining

28

whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the

1

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its

2

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition

3

of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re

4

Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

5

Malone, 833 F.2d at 130).

6

The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation

7

and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Reed’s

8

claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal

9

because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing

10

a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542

11

F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of

12

cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

13

The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can

14

be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider

15

dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining

16

that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order

17

does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th

18

Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally

19

dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v.

20

Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). This Court cannot operate without

21

collecting fees from litigants and this litigation cannot progress without Reed’s compliance

22

with the Court’s orders and the ability of the Court and parties to send Reed case-related

23

documents. So the only alternative to dismissal is to enter a second order setting another

24

deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the

25

inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. These circumstances do not

26

indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful

27

alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal.

28

Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they

2

1

weigh in favor of dismissal.

2

It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on

3

Winston Reed’s failure to file his updated address and either pay the full filing fee or file

4

an application to proceed in forma pauperis in compliance with the Court’s June 14 and

5

September 18, 2024, orders.

6

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

7

No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Reed wishes to pursue his

8

claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing fee or

9

apply for in forma pauperis status.

10

DATED THIS 21st Day of November 2024.

11
12
13

MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

3