USA v. SEALED
Filing
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ORDER denying 7 Motion to Quash. Signed by District Judge Anne R. Traum on 11/22/2024. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - GA)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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USA,
Case No. 3:24-cv-270
Plaintiff,
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v.
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SEALED,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
PARTIALLY QUASH (ECF NO. 7)
Defendant.
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This case involves a U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division
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(“WHD”) investigation of RayCo Drywall for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
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Act (FLSA). In June 2024, U.S. Magistrate Judge Baldwin signed a warrant for
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the inspection of the establishment, which WHD executed a few days later. (ECF
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Nos. 4; 7.) RayCo filed a motion requesting that the Court partially quash the
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warrant or, in the alternative, suppress and return WHD’s review of RayCo’s
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privileged documents. (ECF No. 7.) WHD opposed the motion. (ECF No. 9.) For
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the following reasons, the Court denies RayCo’s motion to quash.
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I.
Facts
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In September 2023, WHD began investigating RayCo for FLSA violations.
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(ECF No. 9 at 3.) Between September 2023 and February 2024, WHD requested
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records from RayCo related to the investigation. (Id.) RayCo withheld some of
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these records and provided redacted or incomplete versions of others. (Id.) In part
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because of RayCo’s failure to produce documents, WHD applied for a warrant in
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June 2024, which this Court granted. (Id. at 4; ECF Nos. 3, 4.)
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The warrant provided that WHD could enter RayCo’s premises to inspect
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and investigate the workplace for violations of the overtime and recordkeeping
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sections of the FLSA. (ECF No. 4 at 2.) The warrant provided that methods of
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inspection would include “transcribing, copying, transferring, recording, and
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downloading (including removing for all such purposes) all relevant records and
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data in whatever form maintained” and listed the types of records that would be
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included as relevant. (Id. at 2-3.) Finally, the warrant provided that the inspection
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would be completed within five working days. (Id. at 4.)
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II.
Discussion
A. The Warrant is Sufficiently Particular.
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RayCo argues that the warrant should be quashed as overbroad and
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lacking particularity because it is not sufficiently limited to any date range. (ECF
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No. 7 at 6.) In its motion, RayCo relies on a single case from the Eastern District
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of Michigan to support its argument. In re Search of Recs., Info., & Data
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Associated with 14 Email Addresses Controlled by Google, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 3d
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771 (E.D. Mich. 2020). But as WHD points out, this case involved a criminal
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warrant and therefore is not instructive to the Court’s analysis of the
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administrative warrant in this case. (ECF No. 9 at 8-9.)
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In its reply, RayCo points to more cases that involved criminal search
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warrants and fails to explain why these should be persuasive in a case involving
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an administrative warrant. (ECF No. 10 at 5-8 (discussing United States v. SDI
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Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d
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992 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995)). In United
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States v. SDI Future Health, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that a doctrine
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applicable to administrative searches did not apply to the criminal search at issue
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in that case. 568 F.3d at 695.
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The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to “particularly describe the
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place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend
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IV. Administrative search warrants generally fall within the purview of the Fourth
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Amendment. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,
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534 (1967). However, administrative warrants do not require the same showing
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of probable cause as criminal search warrants. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton,
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608 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
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320 (1978). “For purposes of an administrative search [], probable cause
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justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence
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of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable or administrative
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standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a
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particular [establishment]’”. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v.
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Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
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The warrant here is sufficiently particular to satisfy the Fourth
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Amendment. The warrant was made pursuant to Section 111(a) of the Fair Labor
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Standards Act, which gives the Department of Labor broad authority to
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“investigate and gather data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions
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and practices of employment in any industry subject to this chapter” and
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authority to “enter and inspect such places and such records (and make such
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transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and investigate such facts,
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conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to
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determine whether any person has violated any provision of this chapter, or
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which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.” 29 U.S.C.
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§ 211(a). The warrant in this case specified the premises to be searched, the types
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of records to be searched, and the methods of inspection. (ECF No. 4 at 2.)
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RayCo’s assertions of overbreadth and particularity are insufficient to render the
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administrative warrant invalid.
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B. Privilege claims
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RayCo also claims that the warrant contains insufficient protections to
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prevent the review of privileged documents, and requests that the Court order
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WHD to permit RayCo to review the documents and prepare a privilege log of the
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document seized. (ECF No. 7 at 7-8.) RayCo fails to provide any authority or
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caselaw in its motion supporting this argument. (Id.)
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WHD argues that RayCo’s vague claims of attorney-client privilege fail to
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show that heightened protections beyond those contained in the rules of
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professional conduct are necessary. (ECF No. 9 at 9.) WHD explains that it gave
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RayCo the opportunity to provide WHD with a privilege log for the seized
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electronic records, but RayCo refused to do so. (Id. at 10.) RayCo contends that
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many of the documents seized were paper documents which it no longer has
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access to, and that WHD has not provided a link to review those documents. (ECF
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No. 10 at 8.)
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The party asserting the privilege is obliged by federal law to establish the
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privileged nature of the communications, and, if necessary, to segregate the
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privileged information from the non-privileged information. United States v.
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Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under federal law, the attorney-client
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privilege is strictly construed.” Id. RayCo has not identified with particularity
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which of the documents in WHD’s possession are within his claim of privilege.
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Furthermore, WHD has submitted declarations explaining that they gave RayCo
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multiple opportunities to identify the privileged information and provide a
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privilege log for the seized records during and after the execution of the search
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warrant. (ECF Nos. 9 at 10; 9-2 at 5; 9-3 at 2-4.) WHD has agreed to forgo
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reviewing the evidence obtained during the search warrant while the parties
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resolve their concerns over privileged information. (ECF No. 9-4 at 2.) The Court
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therefore finds that RayCo’s concerns over possibly privileged communications
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may be resolved by the parties and are not sufficient to warrant the relief
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requested in this motion.
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//
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III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES RayCo’s motion to partially
quash (ECF No. 7).
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Dated this 22nd day of November 2024.
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ANNE R. TRAUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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