Mutual Real Estate Holdings, LLC d/b/a Re/Max Elite v. Houston Casualty Company et al

Filing 49

///ORDER granting 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Clerk shall enter judgment and close the case. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(gla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mutual Real Estate Holdings,
LLC, d/b/a RE/MAX Elite
v.

Civil No. 10-cv-236-LM

Houston Casualty Company

O R D E R
In a case that has been removed from the New Hampshire
Superior Court, Mutual Real Estate Holdings, LLC (“Mutual”)
petitioned for a declaratory judgment that it, and any agents
working for it, were entitled to coverage under insurance
policies issued by Houston Casualty Company (“Houston”) and
Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”).

By order dated

August 30, 2011, document no. 47, the court granted Lexington’s
motion for summary judgment.

Currently before the court is

Houston’s motion for summary judgment.

Mutual objects.

For the

reasons that follow, Houston’s motion for summary judgment is
granted.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).
Background
While Mutual’s memorandum of law in support of its
objection to summary judgment makes passing reference to
“genuine issues of material fact pertaining to the obligation to
disclose a specious complaint,” that memorandum does not
“incorporate a short and concise statement of material facts,
supported by appropriate record citations, as to which [Mutual]
contends a genuine dispute exists so as to require a trial.”
7.2(b)(2).

LR

Accordingly, all properly supported material facts

in Houston’s factual statement are deemed admitted.

See id.

So, notwithstanding Mutual’s passing reference to a factual
dispute precluding summary judgment, this case consists entirely
of questions of law to be decided in relation to the following
undisputed facts.
Mutual is a real estate agency.

In the summer of 2008,

Ronald and Deborah Desrosiers hired Laurie Norton, one of
Mutual’s agents, to serve as their buyers’ agent.

In July of

2008, Norton showed the Desrosiers a property that the
Desrosiers ultimately purchased.

2

In a letter dated July 8, 2009, the Desrosiers told Norton
that they thought she had misrepresented the condition of the
property they purchased and had “made statements that . . . were
not completely truthful.”
no. 30-3).

Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B (doc.

The Desrosiers also asked Norton to “advise [them]

of any liability insurance [she] may have personally and also
[Mutual] on the above issues.”

Id.

Within a week of receiving

the Desrosiers’ letter, Norton and Mutual, through counsel,
denied liability.

At the time of Mutual’s correspondence with

the Desrosiers, Mutual was covered by a miscellaneous
professional liability insurance policy issued by Lexington.
Mutual did not inform Lexington of the Desrosiers’ letter until
December of 2009, at the earliest, when it made a claim for
coverage based upon a lawsuit filed by the Desrosiers in
November.
On August 14, 2009, the Desrosiers filed a complaint
against Norton with the New Hampshire Real Estate Commission
(“Commission”).

Under cover of a letter Norton received on or

before August 30, the Commission provided her with a copy of the
Desrosiers’ complaint.
During August of 2009, Mutual was preparing an application
for professional liability errors and omissions insurance from
Houston.

That application was submitted on August 27.

3

On

September 3, Houston agreed to bind coverage, and on September
15, Houston issued a policy with: an Inception Date of August
31, 2009; an Expiration Date of August 31, 2010; a Policy Period
of August 31, 2009, through August 31, 2010; and a retroactive
date of August 12, 2004.
The application Mutual submitted to Houston contained the
following four questions:
17.

In the past (5) years, has any professional
liability claim or suit ever been made against
the Applicant or any of its predecessor firms if
any?

18.

Does any principal, owner, partner or employee
know of any incident, act, error or omission that
could result in a claim or suit against the
Applicant or any predecessor firms?

19.

Have all matters in Question 17. and 18. been
reported to the Applicant’s former or current
insurer(s) or to the former insurer of any
predecessor firm or former insurer of a current
member of the firm?

20.

Has any principal, owner, partner or employee for
whom coverage is sought been the subject of a
disciplinary complaint made to any court,
administrative agency or regulatory body?

Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Barbal Decl., Ex. B (doc. no. 33-12), at
10.

On August 24, Mutual answered “no” to questions 17, 18, and

20, and answered “yes” to question 19.
The “Insuring Agreement” section of the policy Houston
issued Mutual provides as follows:

4

The Company [i.e., Houston] shall pay on behalf of the
Insured any Loss and Claim Expenses, in excess of the
Deductible subject to the Policy’s Limit of Liability,
as the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as a result of a Claim(s) made against the Insured for
a Wrongful Act(s) arising from Professional Services
as set forth by Endorsement to this Policy, provided
always that: (1) the Claim is first made against the
Insured and reported to the Company, in writing,
during the Policy Period . . . ; (2) the Insured has
no knowledge of such Wrongful Act prior to the
Inception Date of this Policy; and (3) such Wrongful
Act takes place on or after the Retroactive Date set
forth in the Declarations Page of this Policy and
prior to the end of the Policy Period.
Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Barbal Decl., Ex. E (doc. no. 33-15), at
3.

The policy further provides that Houston “shall have the

right and duty to defend any covered Claim(s) brought against an
Insured alleging a Wrongful Act(s).”

Id.

Mutual’s policy also contains the following relevant
definitions:
“Claim” shall mean a written demand received by an
Insured, including the service of suit or institution
of arbitration proceedings against an Insured, for
compensation of monetary damages for a Wrongful Act
allegedly or actually committed by an Insured.
A claim will be deemed to have been first made against
the Insured when any Insured first receives written
notice of the Claim.
“Claim Expenses” shall mean: (1) reasonable and
necessary fees charged by an attorney . . . and (2)
all other fees, costs or expenses incurred in the
. . . defense and appeal of a Claim . . .
. . . .

5

“Wrongful Act” shall mean any actual or alleged
negligent act, error or omission or breach of duty
committed or alleged to have been committed, or for
failure to render, such Professional Services as are
customarily rendered in the profession of the Insured
as set forth by Endorsement to this Policy.
Resp’t’s Mot. Summ. J., Barbal Decl., Ex. E (doc. no. 33-15), at
4, 6.
Finally, the policy also includes, among others, an
exclusion barring coverage “for any dishonest, criminal,
fraudulent, malicious or intentional Wrongful Act, error or
omission or intentional or knowing violation of the law
committed by or at the direction of the Insured.”

Resp’t’s Mot.

Summ. J., Barbal Decl., Ex. E (doc. no. 33-15), at 6.
Notwithstanding that exclusion, the policy provides that Houston
shall provide a defense to Claims alleging any of the
foregoing [fraudulent conduct] until there is a
judgment, final adjudication, adverse admission or
finding of fact against the Insured as to such conduct
at which time the Insured shall reimburse the Company
for all Claim Expenses incurred by the Company in
connection with the defense of such claim . . .
Id.
By letter dated October 30, 2009, counsel for the
Desrosiers contacted counsel for Mutual and asked whether Mutual
and Norton would be willing to waive formal service of a Writ of
Summons the Desrosiers were planning to file against them.
November 4, Mutual informed its insurance agent of the

6

On

Desrosiers’ impending suit.

Mutual’s insurance agent, in turn,

notified Houston.
Houston denied coverage, explaining that coverage was never
triggered under the policy’s Insuring Agreement because Mutual
“had knowledge of the alleged Wrongful Acts giving rise to the
Writ of Summons prior to the August 31, 2009 Inception Date of
the Policy.”

Pet. (doc. 1-1), at 14 (emphasis in the original).

As the basis for Mutual’s knowledge, Houston cited both the
Desrosiers’ July 8 letter and their August 17 complaint to the
Real Estate Commission.

In addition, Houston: (1) stated its

belief that the Desrosiers first made their claim against Mutual
in July of 2009, before the start of the Policy Period, and
reserved all rights it might have based on the date the
Desrosiers first made their claim against Mutual; (2) stated its
belief that Mutual had made misrepresentations in its
application for insurance and reserved all rights it might have
based on those misrepresentations; and (3) pointed out several
other potentially relevant policy provisions including the fraud
exclusion.
Based on the foregoing, Mutual filed a petition for
declaratory judgment.

In its petition, Mutual asks the court to

declare that the professional liability policy issued by Houston
was “in full force and effect at the time of the reported

7

incident,” and that the policy provides liability
indemnification for it and any agent working for it within the
scope of his or her affiliation.
Discussion
Under New Hampshire law, “[i]n a declaratory judgment
action to determine the coverage of an insurance policy, the
burden of proof is always on the insurer, regardless of which
party brings the petition.”

Brickley v. Progressive N. Ins.

Co., 160 N.H. 625, 627 (2010) (quoting Carter v. Concord Gen.
Mut. Ins. Co., 155 N.H. 515, 517 (2007)).
Houston moves for summary judgment, arguing that Mutual is
not entitled to coverage because: (1) Mutual had knowledge of
the Wrongful Act underlying its claim for coverage prior to the
Inception Date of the policy; (2) it made material
misrepresentations in its application for the policy; (3) the
Desrosiers’ claim against Mutual was not first made during the
Policy Period; (4) Mutual breached several of the conditions
precedent to coverage stated in the policy, including its duty
to provide timely written notice of claims against it; (5) the
Desrosiers’ claim for the return of fees and charges paid to
Mutual is not a covered loss under the terms of the policy; and
(6) the policy provides no coverage for dishonest or fraudulent
acts.

In its objection, Mutual raises four arguments: (1) it

8

did not have knowledge of any Wrongful Act at the time it
applied for the policy or on the policy’s Inception Date; (2)
the Desrosiers’ claim against it was first filed during the
Policy Period; (3) it did not fail to give Houston timely
written notice of the Desrosiers’ claim; and (4) the fraud
exclusion is waived as to Mutual, because the Desrosiers do not
claim that Mutual (as opposed to Norton) engaged in fraudulent
conduct and, as to both Mutual and Norton, the fraud exclusion
requires Houston to pay for a defense.
Houston is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
the undisputed factual record demonstrates that: (1) the
Desrosiers first made their claim against Mutual before the
start of the Policy Period, which means that, under clause one
of the Insuring Agreement, coverage was not triggered; and (2)
on the policy’s Inception Date, Mutual had knowledge of the
Wrongful Act underlying the Desrosiers’ claim, i.e., Norton’s
allegedly fraudulent conduct as the Desrosiers’ buyers’ agent,
which means that under clause two of the Insuring Agreement,
coverage was not triggered.

Because Houston is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law for both of the reasons noted above,
there is no need to address Houston’s other arguments for
summary judgment.

9

As previously stated, the parties have no factual dispute,
so resolution of this case depends upon construction of the
insurance policy at issue and application of the policy terms to
the undisputed factual record.

Accordingly, this section begins

with a brief discussion of the relevant principles of
construction and continues with discussions of the two policy
provisions that relieve Houston of any obligation to provide
coverage to Mutual.
A. Principles of Construction
With regard to the rules that guide the interpretation of
insurance-policy language, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has
recently explained:
We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the
policy’s words in context. Policy terms are construed
objectively, and when the terms of a policy are clear
and unambiguous, we accord the language its natural
and ordinary meaning. When an insurance policy’s
language is ambiguous, however, and one reasonable
interpretation favors coverage, we construe the policy
in the insured’s favor and against the insurer.
Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 161 N.H. 778, 781
(2011) citing Marikar v. Peerless Ins. Co., 151 N.H. 395, 397
(2004)).

When interpreting an insurance policy, a court should

“construe the language as would a reasonable person in the
position of the insured based upon a more than casual reading of
the policy as a whole.”

Brickley, 160 N.H. at 627 (quoting

10

Hartley v. Elec. Ins. Co., 154 N.H. 687, 688 (2007)).

Ambiguity

exists when “more than one reasonable interpretation is
possible,” id. (quoting Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Exec. Risk Indem.,
Inc., 151 N.H. 699, 701 (2005)), but courts should “not . . .
perform amazing feats of linguistic gymnastics to find a term
ambiguous,” id. (citation omitted).
B. Clause One: Claim Predating the Policy Period
Houston argues that Mutual is not entitled to coverage
because: (1) the Desrosiers first made their claim against
Mutual in July of 2009; (2) the Policy Period did not begin
until August 31, 2009; and (3) under clause one of the policy’s
Insuring Agreement, an insured is only entitled to coverage for
claims that are “first made against the Insured . . . during the
Policy Period.”

Mutual argues that the Desrosiers first made

their claim against it by filing their lawsuit in November of
2009, which was during the Policy Period.

In the alternative,

Mutual argues that the Insuring Agreement provision on which
Houston relies is unenforceable as a bar to coverage due to its
ambiguity.

The court does not agree.

Mutual’s first argument is that the Desrosiers did not make
a claim against it in either the July 8 letter or the complaint
they filed with the Real Estate Commission.

In other words,

Mutual relies on a construction of the policy term “claim” that

11

excludes the July 8 letter and the Commission complaint.

That

is not a reasonable interpretation of the policy.
The policy defines “claim” to mean “a written demand
received by an Insured . . . for compensation of monetary
damages.”

It goes on to say that the term “include[es] the

service of suit or institution of arbitration proceedings.”
But, the policy does not limit the term “claim” to the service
of a lawsuit or the institution of arbitration proceedings.
Rather, those are examples of written demands.
To be sure, in the context of regulatory construction, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court has held “that the term ‘including’
. . . limits the items intended to be covered by the rule to
those of the same type as the items specifically listed.”
Conservation Law Found. v. N.H. Wetlands Council, 150 N.H. 1, 6
(2003).

But, Mutual identifies nothing in the policy or

extrinsic to it, other than its own unsupported contentions, to
support its limitation of the term “claim” to written demands
that have the same formality as the service of suit or the
initiation of arbitration.

Beyond that, Mutual does not suggest

what other items might qualify under its construction, and the
court has trouble imagining any kind of written demand that
would have the formality of the service of suit or the
initiation of arbitration without actually being the service of

12

suit or the initiation of arbitration.

In any event, given the

well-understood function of a demand letter as a direct
precursor to litigation, see, e.g., New Canaan Bank & Trust v.
Pfeffer, 147 N.H. 121, 124 (2001), the court has no difficulty
concluding, as a matter of law, that for the purpose of
construing the term “claim,” a demand letter is the same type of
item as the service of suit or the initiation of arbitration.
Thus, there is no basis for construing the term “claim” to
categorically exclude items such as demand letters.
Accordingly, the dispositive question is whether the Desrosiers’
July 8 letter to Norton was “a written demand . . . for
compensation of monetary damages.”
In the July 8 letter, the Desrosiers began by saying that
the property they purchased “was misrepresented [by Norton] and
not properly disclosed with some major problems.”
Summ. J., Kutner Decl., Ex. 1 (doc. no. 33-3).

Resp’t’s Mot.

Then they stated

that they had commissioned a structural engineering study that
resulted in a recommendation that they undertake “Major
Structural repairs . . . which would require significant
resources and funds.”

Id.

They concluded this way: “We have

purchased a home we have been unable to reside in due to [its]
being structurally unsound [and] requiring a significant amount
of work and monies, which had we been informed up front [about]

13

we would not have made this purchase.”

Id.

Perhaps most

importantly, in the middle paragraph of their letter, the
Desrosiers expressly inquired about any liability insurance that
might cover either Norton or Mutual.

While the July 8 letter

does not bear the heading “Demand” or request a specific amount
of money, it identifies: (1) alleged wrongdoing by Norton; (2)
monetary damages incurred by the Desrosiers; and (3) a source of
compensation for those damages, i.e., any insurance that Norton
or Mutual may have.

On that basis, the July 8 letter qualifies

as a “written demand . . . for compensation of money damages,”
which makes it a “claim” for purposes of the Insuring Agreement
in Mutual’s policy.
Mutual’s argument that clause one of the Insuring Agreement
is ambiguous is unavailing.

For one thing, Mutual does not

specify what term or terms in that clause are ambiguous by
virtue of being susceptible of multiple reasonable
interpretations.

See Brickley, 160 N.H. at 627.

Presuming that

Mutual’s focus is on the term “claim,” there is no ambiguity.
For one thing, the term is defined in the policy.

Moreover, the

interpretation on which Mutual relies, i.e., the interpretation
that would entitle it to coverage, is not reasonable.

14

As best the court can tell, Mutual interprets clause one as
requiring the claim referred to therein to be “legitimate” or
“valid.”

According to Mutual:

There simply was no legitimate “claim” presented to
the insured until the lawsuit was copied to Attorney
St. George on November 4, 2009.
. . . From the perspective of the insured, a
valid claim was not made against the insured until the
lawsuit was presented to Attorney St. George on
November 4, 2009. . . . Attorney St. George
understood that there was not a legitimate claim and
he knew that Mr. and Mrs. Desrosiers were pursuing
their complaints with the New Hampshire Real Estate
Commission. [Neither a] lawsuit nor an arbitration
was . . . reasonably expected.1
Pet’r’s Mem. of Law (doc. no. 40-1), at 17-18.
The policy does not expressly limit the term “claim” as
“legitimate” or “valid” claims.

Moreover, the policy’s

definition of “claim” as a “demand . . . for compensation . . .
for a Wrongful Act allegedly or actually committed” is strong
intrinsic evidence against a requirement that a third party’s
claim against an insured must be “valid” or “legitimate,” i.e.,
based upon actual Wrongful Acts.
1

To similar effect is the fact

Mutual’s averment that a lawsuit was not reasonably
expected because the Desrosiers were pursuing a complaint
through the Real Estate Commission is substantially undercut by
Mutual’s acknowledgement that the Commission has no authority to
award monetary damages. Given the unavailability of damages in
a proceeding before the Commission, it is difficult to see how
it would be reasonable to conclude that the Desrosiers elected
to file a complaint with the Commission rather than, as opposed
to in addition to, pursuing civil litigation, where damages
would be available.
15

that the policy obligates Houston to pay not just losses, such
as damages assessed against the insured on a valid or legitimate
claim, but also obligates Houston to pay claim expenses, which
are defined as the fees and costs incurred in defending claims
without regard to the legitimacy or validity of those claims.
Given Houston’s obligation to defend all claims, not just those
that are legitimate or valid, it would not be reasonable to read
the Insuring Agreement as including a trigger of coverage that
is not activated unless and until a third party makes a
legitimate or valid claim against an insured.
For its part, Mutual does not say what it means by a
“legitimate” or “valid” claim.
as synonyms of “meritorious.”

It might be defining those terms
But Mutual does not indicate how

claims that were not meritorious when presented by letter in
July, before the start of the Policy Period, somehow became
meritorious when presented in a Writ of Summons in November,
during the Policy Period.

All Mutual points to is Attorney St.

George’s belief that the claim stated in the July 8 letter was
groundless, and that the Desrosiers had elected to seek a remedy
through the Real Estate Commission instead of seeking a remedy
through civil litigation.

In an ambiguity analysis, Attorney

St. George’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant.

What matters is

the way in which a reasonable person could read the insurance

16

policy.

Because there is no reasonable way to read clause one

of the Insuring Agreement as limiting the term “claim” to
“legitimate” or “valid” claims, there is no ambiguity in that
provision that may be construed in favor of providing coverage
for Mutual.
Based on the foregoing construction of the relevant policy
language, as applied to the undisputed facts of this case, the
court concludes that the Desrosiers first made their claim
against Mutual in July of 2009, before the beginning of the
Policy Period.

Because clause one of the Insuring Agreement

requires a claim to be made against an insured during the Policy
Period in order for coverage to be triggered, Houston is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mutual’s claim that
it is entitled to coverage from Houston.
C. Clause Two: Mutual’s Knowledge of the Wrongful Acts
Even if clause one of the Insuring Agreement was not a
sufficient basis for denying coverage, clause two of the
Insuring Agreement, properly construed, also supports a denial
of coverage.

Houston argues that Mutual is not entitled to

coverage because: (1) the Desrosiers’ July 8 letter and their
August 17 complaint to the Real Estate Commission gave Mutual
knowledge of Norton’s Wrongful Acts; (2) the policy’s Inception
Date was August 31; and (3) under clause two of the policy’s

17

Insuring Agreement, an insured is entitled to coverage only so
long as “the Insured has no knowledge of such Wrongful Act prior
to the Inception Date of this Policy.”

Mutual argues that

Houston is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
of an ambiguity in the policy language on which it relies.
Specifically, Mutual argues that: (1) the policy may reasonably
be interpreted as limiting the definition of “Wrongful Act” to
acts that are negligent; and (2) because Mutual’s counsel
believed that the Desrosiers did not state a meritorious claim
for negligence against Norton in their July 8 letter, Mutual did
not have knowledge of a Wrongful Act prior to the policy’s
August 31 Inception Date.

The court does not agree.

As noted above, the policy defines “Wrongful Act” to “mean
any actual or alleged negligent act, error or omission or breach
of duty committed or alleged to have been committed.”
added.)

(Emphasis

Mutual contends that the foregoing language is

ambiguous because the policy contains “no further definition to
help understand or to appreciate what is meant by a ‘negligent
act, error or omission or breach of duty, or for failure to
render such professional services as are customarily rendered.’”
Pet’r’s Mem. of Law, at 10.
Mutual is correct in observing that the policy does not
formally define the term “negligent act.”

18

But, it is flatly

incorrect to argue that the term “Wrongful Act” may reasonably
be construed: (1) to include only acts that would support
successful claims against the insured; or (2) to exclude acts
that, in the view of the insured, appear not to be actionable.
Mutual’s argument is refuted by the policy itself, which defines
“Wrongful Act” to include both actual negligent acts and alleged
negligent acts, and to include errors, omissions, and breaches
that have been committed as well as errors, omissions, and
breaches that have been alleged to have been committed.

Given

the policy’s unambiguous definition of “Wrongful Act” to include
both actual and alleged negligence, the various definitions of
negligence on which Mutual relies are irrelevant, as is Attorney
St. George’s assessment of the strength of the Desrosiers’
claims.

Based on the undisputed factual record and Mutual’s

policy, as properly construed, the court concludes that well
before the Inception Date of the policy, Mutual had knowledge of
the “alleged negligent act, error or omission or breach of duty”
described by the Desrosiers in their July 8 letter.

Thus, upon

receipt of that letter, Mutual had knowledge of a Wrongful Act.
Accordingly, under clause two of the Insuring Agreement, Mutual
is not entitled to coverage due to its knowledge of Norton’s
Wrongful Act(s) prior to the Inception Date of the policy.

19

Mutual’s argument that the term “Wrongful Act” is ambiguous
suffers from an infirmity similar to that suffered by its
argument about the purported ambiguity of the term “Claim.”

If

the conduct described in the July letter did not constitute a
Wrongful Act, then the identical conduct, as described in the
November lawsuit, could not have amounted to a Wrongful Act.
Norton did whatever she did in 2008.

The Desrosiers’ July

letter and its November lawsuit were based on the very same
conduct.

Between July and November of 2009, nothing about

Norton’s conduct in 2008 changed; all that changed was the
vehicle through which the Desrosiers sought redress from Mutual.
Claims that, according to Mutual, were baseless when stated in
the July 8 letter, became no less baseless when presented in the
form of a Writ of Summons.

Under Mutual’s theory of

construction, the only way it can have a valid claim for
coverage is for it to concede the merits of the Desrosiers’
claims, thus bringing Norton’s conduct within its definition of
a “Wrongful Act.”

Such an interpretation is not reasonable.

Based on the foregoing construction of the relevant policy
language, as applied to the undisputed facts of this case, the
court concludes that Mutual had knowledge of the Wrongful Act
underlying the Desrosiers’ claim it prior to the Inception Date
of the policy issued by Houston.

20

Because clause two of the

Insuring Agreement requires the insured to have no knowledge of
its Wrongful Act prior to the Inception Date in order for
coverage to be triggered, Houston is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Mutual’s claim that it is entitled to coverage
from Houston.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, Houston’s motion for summary
judgment, document no. 33, is granted.

The clerk of the court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the
case.

In the absence of any pending matter in this case, the

hearing scheduled for September 12, 2011, is cancelled.
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated:
cc:

September 6, 2011

Christopher H.M. Carter, Esq.
Sarah A. Kutner, Esq.
Aidan M. McCormack, Esq.
Mark D. Morrissette, Esq.
Danielle L. Pacik, Esq.
Ralph Suozzo, Esq.

21