H. v. Milford School District

Filing 17

ORDER denying 15 Motion for Reconsideration. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. (lt)

Hatch v. Milford School District

Doc. 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Steven E. Hatch, as parent of minor children, D.H. and J.H. v. Milford School District ORDER Steven Hatch, proceeding pro se, brought suit against the Milford School District in state court, alleging claims arising from his concerns about the education and environment the Milford School District ("Milford") had provided for his minor children, D.H. and J.H. Milford removed the case to this court, based on Milford then moved to dismiss Civil No. 10-cv-263-JD

federal question jurisdiction.

Hatch's claims on the ground that Hatch had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The court granted Milford's motion with

respect to the federal claims and remanded the case to state court. Hatch moves for reconsideration.

Following a final judgment, a motion for reconsideration, seeking relief from the judgment, is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides five specific grounds for relief and a "catch all" ground for "any other reason that justifies relief." See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 Hatch does not specify a ground for

F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2010).

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his motion, and the court concludes that reconsideration is not appropriate in this case. In his first paragraph, Hatch describes a meeting with the superintendent of schools and the school board, which may have addressed the incident of inappropriate sexual activity involving Hatch's daughter and another student. The meeting does not meet

the prerequisite that Hatch must exhaust administrative remedies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); see also Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2006). Similarly, Hatch's further

discussion of the incident of sexual activity, in paragraph 3, does not provide grounds for reconsideration. In paragraph 2, Hatch appears to argue that his suit should remain in federal court because he intended to amend his complaint to add a civil rights claim. Even if Hatch were to

amend, as he suggests, the subject matter of the claim would be based on a right provided under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). As explained in the previous order

granting, in part, Milford's motion to dismiss, because the IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme, the IDEA's exhaustion requirements apply to all claims for money damages raising rights protected under the IDEA. See Diaz-Fonseca, 451 F.3d at 28-29;

Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Committee, 276 F.3d 52, 61 (1st Cir. 2002). Therefore, in the absence of exhaustion, Hatch cannot 2

bring a civil rights claim based on the allegations in his complaint.

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (document no. 15) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge September 30, 2010 cc: Diane M. Gorrow, Esquire Steven E. Hatch, pro se

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