Seacoast Motorcycles, Inc. v. North Hampton, Town of

Filing 17

ORDER re 12 Bill of Costs. Seacoast's application for costs and fees, doc. no. 12, is granted in full. NH CALM shall pay Seacoast $8,807.50. Upon notification by Seacoast that NH CALM has complied with this order, the clerk of the court shall close this case. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Landya B. McCafferty. (kad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Seacoast Motorcycles, Inc.
v.

Case No. 10-cv-532-LM

Town of North Hampton
and NH Citizens Against
Loud Motorcycles

O R D E R
Before the court is a verified application for costs and
fees, filed by Seacoast Motorcycles, Inc. (“Seacoast”), pursuant
to this court‟s Order of February 4, 2011.

NH Citizens Against

Loud Motorcycles (“NH CALM”), the intervenor that improvidently
removed this case, objects.

For the reasons that follow,

Seacoast is awarded attorney‟s fees in the amount of $8,807.50,
to be paid by NH CALM.
When determining the amount of an award of attorney‟s fees,
“[n]ormally, a district court begins with a lodestar analysis.”
De Jesús Nazario v. Morris Rodríguez, 554 F.3d 196, 207 (1st
Cir. 2009).
The “lodestar method” of calculating attorneys‟
fees awards requires the district judge to multiply
the number of hours productively expended by counsel
by a reasonable hourly rate. See De Jesus Nazario v.
Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 207 (1st Cir. 2009).

The resulting amount is presumptively reasonable,
Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992),
although the district court enjoys some discretion to
adjust the lodestar amount upwards or downwards, see
De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d at 207.
Burke v. McDonald, 572 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009).

“When the

district court arrives at the lodestar and completes its
consideration of possible adjustments, it ought to provide a
„concise but clear‟ explanation of its calculation of the
resultant fee award.”

Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 337 (quoting

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
“The party claiming attorneys‟ fees bears the burden of
proving the reasonableness of the hours it claims.”
F.3d at 63 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Burke, 572

“In crafting its

lodestar, the trial court may adjust the hours claimed to remove
time that was unreasonably, unnecessarily or inefficiently
devoted to the case.”
(citation omitted).

De Jesús Nazario, 554 F.3d at 207

Here, the court can discern no basis for

adjusting the number of hours Seacoast claims; a total of
twenty-seven hours to draft a motion to remand, and a reply to
an objection, seems appropriate.

Moreover, the court rejects NH

CALM‟s argument that Seacoast should not recover attorney‟s fees
for drafting a reply to its objection because all the authority
the court needed to remand the case was in Seacoast‟s motion to
remand.

If the grounds for remand were as clear as NH CALM now

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says they were, then NH CALM could have prevented Seacoast from
filing a reply by assenting to remand rather than objecting to
Seacoast‟s motion.

Finally, with respect to the hours claimed

by Seacoast, the court does not agree that the billing records
lack sufficient detail.

At this stage in the case, the only

issue being litigated was remand, which means that the court is
not faced with the job of distinguishing between hours spent on
tasks that qualify for an award of attorney‟s fees and hours
spent on tasks that do not.

In sum, Seacoast has carried its

burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours it
claims.
Turning to the second part of the lodestar, “[r]easonable
hourly rates will vary depending on the nature of the work, the
locality in which it is performed, the qualifications of the
lawyers, and other criteria.”

United States v. One Star Class

Sloop Sailboat Built in 1930 With Hull Number 721, Named “Flash
II”, 546 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Gay Officers Action
League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2001); United
States v. Metro. Dist. Comm‟n, 847 F.2d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir.
1988)).

A reasonable hourly rate is to be determined

“„according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community,‟ that is „those prevailing in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

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experience and reputation.‟”

Grendel‟s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749

F.2d 945, 955 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 895 & n.11 (1984)).

“[T]he court may take guidance from,

but is not bound by, an attorney‟s standard billing rate.”

Gay

Officers, 247 F.3d at 296 (citing Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d
488, 492-93 (1st Cir. 1993)).

NH CALM does not appear to

challenge the hourly rate Seacoast uses to calculate its
lodestar, and the court finds that rate to be adequately
supported by the affidavit of Elizabeth Leonard submitted in
support of Seacoast‟s application for costs and fees.
For the reasons given, Seacoast‟s application for costs and
fees, doc. no. 12, is granted in full.
Seacoast $8,807.50.

NH CALM shall pay

Upon notification by Seacoast that NH CALM

has complied with this order, the clerk of the court shall close
this case.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States Magistrate Judge

April 14, 2011
cc:

Gregory A. Holmes, Esq.
Matthew R. Serge, Esq.
Robert A. Shaines, Esq.

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