Hudson v. Dr. Michael J. O'Connell's Pain Center
Filing
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///ORDER granting in part as to Count IV and denying in part as to Count III 20 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.(dae)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Kaitlin Hudson
v.
Civil No. 11-cv-278-JD
Opinion No. 2012 DNH 012
Dr. Michael J. O’Connell’s
Pain Care Center, Inc. and
Dr. Michael J. O’Connell
O R D E R
Kaitlin Hudson brought state and federal claims against her
former employer, Dr. Michael J. O’Connell’s Pain Care Center,
Inc. (“Center”), and Dr. Michael J. O’Connell, arising from her
relationship with O’Connell and the conditions of her employment
at the Center.
Hudson’s claims for battery, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and sexual harassment have been dismissed.
The Center moves for judgment on the pleadings in its favor on
Hudson’s claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
Hudson objects.
Standard of Review
The standard for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that used for a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
Collins v. Univ. of N.H., --- F.3d -
--, 2011 WL 6350429, at *4 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 2011).
Under that
standard, the court “accept[s] all well-pleaded facts as true and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.”
Id.
“To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the complaint must plead facts that raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, such that entitlement to relief is
plausible.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Discussion
The Center contends that Hudson’s invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by
the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law under
RSA 281-A:8 and RSA 281-A:2, IX.
Hudson responds that her
invasion of privacy claim is based on her status as a patient,
not as an employee of the Center.
She contends that her
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not barred
by the exclusivity provision because the claim is based on the
same conduct that supports her constructive discharge claim.
In
its reply, the Center argues that Hudson should be judicially
estopped from asserting an invasion of privacy claim based on her
patient status and disputes Hudson’s theory as to her intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim.
In New Hampshire, “[a]n employee of an employer subject to
[the Workers’ Compensation Law] shall be conclusively presumed to
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have accepted the provisions of [workers’ compensation], and
. .
. to have waived all rights of action whether at common law or by
statute or provided under the laws of any other state or
otherwise: (a) Against the employer . . . .”
RSA 281-A:8, I.
The Workers’ Compensation Law covers injuries “arising out of and
in the course of employment . . . .”
RSA 281-A:2, XI.
The
Workers’ Compensation Law does not cover “a mental injury if it
results from any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job
transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or any similar action,
taken in good faith by an employer.”
Id.
The effect of the
cited parts of the Workers’ Compensation Law is that employees
cannot bring claims against their employers that arise out of
their employment, with certain exceptions, including a claim that
arises from a personnel action that was taken in good faith.
A.
Invasion of Privacy
Hudson alleges claims of invasion of privacy against
O’Connell and the Center.
In support, Hudson alleges that “[a]s
a patient of O’Connell, [Hudson] had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her medical records,” that “O’Connell and Pain Care
failed to properly safeguard [Hudson’s] medical records as
required,” and that “[her] privacy was invaded because her
personal medical information was not protected.”
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Am. Compl. doc.
no. 9, ¶¶ 68-70.
She alleges that she suffered injury related to
the disclosure of her medical records.
The Center contends that Hudson’s invasion of privacy claim
is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Law because her claim is
against her employer, arose in the course of her employment, and
does not fall within the exception for good faith personnel
actions.
Hudson responds that her claim for invasion of privacy
is based on her status as a patient of O’Connell and the Center,
not as an employee.
In support, Hudson points out that the
Center maintained her medical records because she was O’Connell’s
patient, not because she was an employee, and that the Center’s
employees were authorized to have access to her medical records
in relation to her medical treatment, not because she was an
employee.
The Center does not dispute that to the extent Hudson were
deemed to be a patient, rather than an employee, her claim would
not be barred by the Workers’ Compensation Law.
Instead, the
Center argues that Hudson should be judicially estopped from
relying on her status as a patient because she addressed the
invasion of privacy claim as an employee in her objection to the
defendants’ prior motion to dismiss.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel “generally prevents a
party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and
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then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another
phase.”
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Although no exact standard
applies,
[s]everal factors typically inform the decision whether
to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a
party’s later position must be ‘clearly inconsistent’
with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly
inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a
court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that
judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a
later proceeding would create the perception that
either the first or the second court was misled.
Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party’s later
inconsistent position introduces no risk of
inconsistent court determinations. A third
consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an
inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if
not estopped.
Id. at 750-51 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The doctrine does not apply unless the court relied on the
party’s position in making a ruling favorable to the party to be
Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 38 (1st
estopped.
Cir. 2009).
The defendants previously moved to dismiss Hudson’s invasion
of privacy claim based on the exclusivity provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Law and the definition of injury in RSA
281-A:2, XI.
Hudson objected to that part of the motion by
stating that an employee can bring claims against her employer
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for torts that cause injury after her employment has ended.
The
court denied the motion with respect to the invasion of privacy
claim because RSA 281-A:2, XI had been amended and the parties
had not addressed the amended version of the statute.
To the extent Hudson asserted that she was an employee for
purposes of objecting to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, she
did not prevail on that basis.1
The court did not rely on
Hudson’s status as an employee in denying the defendants’ motion.
Therefore, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply in
this situation.
B.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As was noted in the order on the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Hudson made only conclusory allegations in Count IV, her
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
The claim
was not dismissed, however, because she incorporated all of her
allegations in the complaint, which under the applicable standard
were sufficient to state a plausible claim.
In her objection,
Hudson clarifies that her intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim is based on allegations that O’Connell made sexual
1
In fact, Hudson merely responded to the defendants’
argument that she was an employee but did not assert that status
to oppose the motion.
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and other demands of her with a threat that her employment would
be terminated if she did not acquiesce and that she was
mistreated when she ended the personal relationship with
O’Connell.
The Center argues that Hudson’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim is barred by the Workers’ Compensation
Law because the claim arose in the course of her employment and
does not fall within the injuries excluded from workers’
compensation coverage.
In response, Hudson argues that her claim
is not barred because it is based on the same conduct that
supports her claim for constructive discharge.
She contends,
citing Porter v. City of Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 43 (2004), that
she can recover for emotional distress based on her constructive
discharge claim.
In Porter, the plaintiff sought emotional distress damages
under his constructive termination claim.
Id.
The case did not
address a separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
The court concluded that the plaintiff adequately
pleaded emotional distress damages as part of his constructive
termination claim and that such damages may be recoverable under
that claim.
Id. at 43-44.
Pertinent to this case, the court
held that the Workers’ Compensation Law barred the plaintiff from
recovering for any emotional distress that occurred while he was
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employed, that is in the course of his constructive discharge,
but did not bar him from recovering “for those injuries that
occurred after the constructive termination of his employment
relationship with the city.”
Id. at 44.
Because Hudson’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is based on injuries that occurred during her
employment at the Center, the claim is barred by RSA 281-A:8, I.
Her claim is not based on personnel action that was taken in good
faith and, therefore, does not fall within the exception provided
by RSA 281-A:2, XI.
Hudson’s claim for emotional distress
damages as part of her constructive discharge claim is not barred
to the extent her injuries occurred after her employment
relationship with the Center ended.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (document no. 20) is denied as to Count
III, invasion of privacy, and is granted as to Count IV,
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
January 18, 2012
cc:
William E. Christie, Esquire
John P. Sherman, Esquire
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