General Linen Service, Inc. v. General Linen Service Co., Inc.

Filing 65

ORDER denying 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(gla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

General Linen Service, Inc.
v.

Civil No. 12-cv-111-LM
Opinion No. 15 DNH 195

General Linen Service Co., Inc.

O R D E R
General Linen Service, Inc. brings suit against General
Linen Service Company, Inc., asserting various state law claims
and a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (the “CFAA”).
Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s CFAA claim.
Plaintiff objects.

On October 5, 2015, the court heard oral

argument on defendant’s motion.
Standard of Review
A movant is entitled to summary judgment where he “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
[that he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

In reviewing the record, the court construes all

facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.

Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108,

115 (1st Cir. 2013).

Background
Plaintiff, General Linen Service, Inc., is a company
located in Newburyport, Massachusetts, which provides linen and
uniform rental services to the healthcare, restaurant, and
hospitality communities in New England.

For purposes of this

order, the court will refer to plaintiff as “GLN.”

Defendant,

General Linen Service Company, Inc., is a company located in
Somersworth, New Hampshire, which provides similar services in
New England.

The court will refer to defendant as “GLS.”

GLN maintains customer information in digital format, as
does GLS, and both companies use the same software vendor,
Alliant Systems, Inc. (“Alliant”).

In addition, GLN allows its

customers to access their accounts and transact business online,
through a “web portal.”
On April 1, 2010, one of GLN’s customers, 1640 Hart House
(“Hart House”), reported to GLN that it had received a sales
pitch from a GLS representative who, during the course of his
presentation, provided Hart House with a package of GLN’s
invoices.

GLN deduced that at least one of the invoices had

been obtained through the web portal.
GLN’s General Manager, Scott Van Pelt, learned through
Alliant that the web portal had been accessed on several
occasions by the username “admin.”

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Alliant explained to Van

Pelt that it had created the “admin” user account to allow for
maintenance and troubleshooting of GLN’s accounts.
On April 8, 2010, Van Pelt traced the “admin” user to an IP
address registered to GLS.

He then had Alliant change the

password for the “admin” username.

He worked “to determine how

the breach occurred, who was responsible and what information
may have been compromised.”

Van Pelt Decl. (doc. no. 58-2) at

¶ 5.
From April 1, 2010 (the date Van Pelt first learned that
there may have been a network intrusion) through the following
two weeks, Van Pelt dedicated himself “on a full-time basis” to
investigating the data breach.

See id. at ¶¶ 4-5.

In his

deposition, Van Pelt described himself as working “around the
clock” during this time period.
at 17.

Van Pelt Dep. (doc. no. 56-4)

The investigation “took valuable time away from [Van

Pelt’s] day-to-day responsibilities.”
¶ 5.

Doc. no. 58-2 at

Van Pelt also shut down the web portal for anywhere from

five days to two weeks during the investigation.
In addition, GLN’s sales manager, Jason Proulx, assisted
Van Pelt with the investigation.

Proulx also dedicated two

weeks “on a full-time basis” to investigating the data breach.
See id. at ¶ 8.

The work “took valuable time away from []

Proulx’s day-to-day activities.”

Id.

Van Pelt also met with

attorneys over the next several months “to assist in the
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investigation and (among other things) stop [GLS] from using
stolen information.”

Id. at ¶ 9.

Van Pelt states that he

dedicated a substantial amount of time during the year following
the breach to the investigation.

In answers to interrogatories,

GLN broke down Van Pelt’s and Proulx’s salaries into hourly
wages, excluding overtime, as follows: Van Pelt earned $24 per
hour and Proulx $19.25 per hour.

Pl.’s Resps. to Interrogs.

(doc. no. 56-10) at 5.
This action followed.

GLN asserts claims against GLS under

the CFAA, New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act, New
Hampshire’s Trade Secret Act, and New Hampshire common law.1

GLS

moves for summary judgment on the CFAA claim.
Discussion
GLS moves for summary judgment on the grounds that GLN did
not sustain a “loss” recognized by the CFAA and that, even if it
did, any loss did not amount to at least $5,000, as required
under the CFAA.

GLN objects, arguing that it has sustained an

actionable loss that exceeds the threshold amount.
The CFAA provides a private right of action for
compensatory damages and equitable relief to any person who
suffers damage or loss because another “intentionally accesses a

GLS, in turn, asserted counterclaims arising under the
Lanham Act, the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, and New
Hampshire common law.
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computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and
thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), a civil

action under the CFAA “may be brought only if the conduct
involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II),
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).”

Relevant to

this action, those factors include: “loss to 1 or more persons
during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in
value.”

§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).

The statute further provides

that:
the term “loss” means any reasonable cost to any
victim, including the cost of responding to an
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring
the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost,
cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service.
§ 1030(e)(11).2
GLS argues that CFAA loss must relate to interruption of
service.

GLS contends, simply, that GLN does not have evidence

that it sustained any such loss.

GLS further argues that, even

if GLN could recover for loss not arising out of the

The CFAA also provides a definition for the term “damage.”
See § 1030(e)(8) (“the term ‘damage’ means any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or
information”). Here, GLN has alleged that it incurred “loss”
under the CFAA, not “damage.”
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interruption of service, GLN cannot show loss of at least
$5,000.
In response, GLN concedes that it does not claim loss
arising out of an interruption of service.3

GLN argues, however,

that the CFAA does not limit loss to costs arising out of an
interruption of service.

It contends that loss under the CFAA

can be established by showing costs incurred while responding to
or investigating a violation, regardless of an interruption of
service.

GLN further argues that evidence in the record shows

that it sustained loss of at least $5,000 in responding to and
investigating the CFAA violation.
I.

Interruption of Service
As the parties acknowledge, there is a split of authority

as to the proper interpretation of the definition of “loss” in
§ 1030(e)(11).

A number of courts hold that loss applies only

to costs incurred because of an interruption of service.

See,

e.g., Von Holdt v. A-1 Tool Corp., 714 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that any loss under the CFAA “must be
as a result of ‘interruption of service’”) (internal citation
omitted).

Other courts, however, hold that loss is defined as

During its investigation, GLN voluntarily shut down the
web portal for somewhere between five days and two weeks. GLN
does not argue that a plaintiff’s voluntary shut down of its own
system constitutes an interruption of service under the CFAA.
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costs reasonably incurred in responding to an alleged CFAA
offense, regardless of whether those costs relate to an
interruption of service.

See, e.g., AssociationVoice, Inc. v.

AtHomeNet, Inc., No. 10-cv-109-CMA-MEH, 2011 WL 63508, at *6 (D.
Colo. Jan. 6, 2011) (citing long line of cases supporting view
that “[c]osts do not need to relate to an ‘interruption of
service’ in order to fall within the ambit of ‘loss’” under the
CFAA).

For the reasons that follow, the court finds the CFAA’s

definition of “loss” is not limited to costs caused by
interruption of service.
“In determining the meaning of a statute, [the court’s]
analysis begins with the language of the statute.”
Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2009).

Saysana v.

“When the plain wording

of the statute is clear, that is the end of the matter.”

Id.

On the other hand, interpretation of statutory language may
require the court to “read the words in their context and with a
view to their place in the statutory scheme.”

King v. Burwell,

135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.

Plain Language of § 1030(e)(11)

Section 1030(e)(11) defines loss as “any reasonable cost to
any victim . . . .”

§ 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added).

“[A]ny

reasonable cost” is a broadly inclusive definition of loss that
is limited only to reasonable costs.

7

A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.

iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 646 (4th Cir. 2009) (“This
broadly worded provision plainly contemplates . . . costs
incurred as part of the response to a CFAA violation, including
the investigation of an offense.”).
The statute further defines loss as “including the cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service.”

§ 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added).

By

using “including” after “any reasonable cost,” the CFAA provides
examples, but not an exclusive or exhaustive list, of reasonable
costs.

See P.C. Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7

(1979) (“including” means the enumerated items are part of a
larger group); Black’s Law Dictionary 1120 (9th ed. 2009) (“The
term [namely] indicates what is to be included by name.

By

contrast, including implies a partial list and indicates that
something is not listed.”).
The exemplars for “any reasonable cost to any victim”
include “the cost of responding to an offense” as well as “any
. . . costs incurred . . . because of interruption of service.”
§ 1030(e)(11).

Thus, the CFAA provides even broader protection

for costs incurred because of interruption of service, since it
states that “any” such costs shall be deemed “loss” under the
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definition.

However, nothing in either the language or

structure of § 1030(e)(11) suggests that only costs caused by an
interruption of service shall be deemed “loss” under the CFAA.
Such a reading of the statute would contort the plain meaning of
its words.
In short, the plain language of § 1030(e)(11) provides a
broad definition of “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any
victim.”

That definition is not limited to costs arising out of

an interruption of service.

Rather, costs incurred due to

interruption of service are but one example of the types of
costs compensable under the CFAA.

See Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real

Estata Data Sols., Inc., No, 4:13-cv-4021-SLD-JAG, 2013 WL
5973938, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2013) (noting that “loss” in
§ 1030(e)(11) is defined as “any reasonable cost to any victim”
and is not limited to the enumerated costs set forth after the
term “including”).
B.

Section 1030(e)(11) in Context

While the words in § 1030(e)(11), read alone, reveal that
“loss” does not require interruption of service, reading those
words in the context of the statute as a whole further clarifies
their meaning.

The CFAA provides a private right of action to

“[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a
violation of [the CFAA].”

§ 1030(g).

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The violation of the CFAA

at issue here is “intentionally access[ing] a computer without
authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby
obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer
. . . .”

§ 1030(a)(2)(C).

That violation (i.e., unauthorized

access to obtain information) does not contain as an element any
sort of computer harm, data impairment, or interruption of
service.

Nor has GLS argued that any such allegation is

required to state a violation of the CFAA.
The definition of “loss” includes “the cost of responding
to an offense . . . .”

§ 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added).

The

offense in this case requires no showing of interruption of
service.

Therefore, a plain reading of the loss provision in

the context of the whole statute supports GLN’s interpretation
of “loss” in the CFAA.
GLS nonetheless urges the court to construe the second
exemplar clause in § 1030(e)(11) to impose a requirement that
loss must include interruption of service.

To achieve such a

result, however, the court must not only ignore the broadlyworded definition of loss (i.e., “any reasonable cost to any
victim”), but it must also adopt a construction of the two
clauses in § 1030(e)(11) that renders part of the statutory
language surplusage.
“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’
that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
10

if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534

U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001)).

For that reason, the court “must read statutes,

whenever possible, to give effect to every word and phrase.”
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. R.I., 449 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir.
2006).
Section 1030(e)(11) provides that “loss” includes certain
specific costs, such as “the cost of responding to an offense,
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data . . . to
its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service.”

§ 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added).

To

read the phrase “because of interruption of service” as applying
to each cost exemplar listed above it would render the phrase
“cost of responding to an offense” surplusage.

That is, it

would be redundant to include the “costs of responding to an
offense” in the list because the latter phrase (i.e., “any costs
incurred . . . because of interruption of service”) would
necessarily capture the more specific costs listed above.
The drafters of the statute intended that where a victim
incurs costs due to an interruption of service, the victim may
recover “any . . . cost incurred” as a result.

To give meaning

to the “cost of responding to an offense,” it must include costs
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other than “any . . . cost incurred . . . because of
interruption of service.” 4

See S. Parts & Eng’g Co., LLC v. Air

Compressor Servs., LLC, No. 1:13-CV-2231-TWT, 2014 WL 667958, at
*5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2014); Dice Corp. v. Bold Techs., No. 1113578, 2012 WL 263031, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2012);
AssociationVoice, 2011 WL 63508, at *7.
For all of these reasons, the plain language of the CFAA
does not limit compensable “loss” to those costs arising out of
interruption of service.

Accordingly, to the extent GLS’s

motion seeks summary judgment on GLN’s CFAA claim because GLN’s
loss does not arise out of interruption of service, it is
denied.
II.

Loss in Excess of $5,000
GLS argues that even if GLN’s loss need not arise out of an

interruption of service, its CFAA claim still fails because the
record demonstrates that GLN did not suffer loss of at least
$5,000.

GLS asserts that GLN’s alleged loss (i.e., the cost of

In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577
(1st Cir. 2001), the First Circuit suggested that a more
expansive reading of the remedial portion of the CFAA is
consistent with the Act’s legislative history. Although the
First Circuit based its decision in EF Cultural on a prior
version of the CFAA which did not include the current definition
of “loss,” the court’s analysis of legislative intent behind the
CFAA remains sound. And, the definition of the term “loss”
subsequently added to the CFAA is consistent with the First
Circuit’s analysis of the CFAA in EF Cultural.
4

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its investigation into the unauthorized access to the web
portal) was minimal and consisted of, at most, a single day of
investigative work.
Neither party disputes, however, that GLN learned of the
invoice problem on April 1, 2010.

On April 8, 2010, Alliant

informed Van Pelt that someone had accessed GLN’s network by
capitalizing on a vulnerability in the network.

Specifically,

the intruder had used a username and password (“admin”) created
by Alliant to permit Alliant “backdoor” access into GLN’s
network.

Also on April 8, 2010, Van Pelt determined that GLS

was the suspected intruder and took the necessary steps to patch
the password vulnerability.

According to GLS, anything GLN did

after GLN discovered the intruder and patched the vulnerability
does not qualify as “loss” to meet the $5,000 threshold under
the CFAA.
To show loss, GLN submitted Van Pelt’s declaration.

In his

declaration, Van Pelt states that both he and GLN’s sales
manager, Proulx, spent the two weeks after GLN discovered the
intrusion investigating the breach on a full-time basis.

In his

deposition, Van Pelt described himself as having worked “around
the clock” for those two weeks.

Doc. no. 56-4 at 17.

In

answers to interrogatories, GLN converted Van Pelt’s and
Proulx’s salaries to hourly wages.

At the relevant time, Van

Pelt earned $24.00 per hour and Proulx earned $19.25 per hour.
13

Van Pelt described his investigation from April 1 through April
12 as “determin[ing] how the breach occurred, who was
responsible and what information may have been compromised . . .
and remedying the [breach].”

Doc. no. 58-2 at ¶¶ 5-6.

Van Pelt

described Proulx’s investigation as “trying to track down
information relating to the data breach.”

Id. at ¶ 8.

Construed favorably to GLN, a reasonable jury could conclude
that Van Pelt’s and Proulx’s investigation from April 1 through
April 12, 2010, qualifies as “the cost of responding to an
offense” under § 1030(e)(11).5
GLS argues that once GLN determined how GLS obtained the
invoices it gave to Hart House and then patched the network
vulnerability at issue, all other parts of the investigation
were either unnecessary or were somehow unrelated to the
violation.

In a CFAA case, however, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of

a company's reaction to stolen data involves questions of
judgment that invoke practical, rather than legal, concerns.
And a jury might well look askance when individuals who stole

“[A] CFAA plaintiff may recover damages for its own
employees’ time spent responding to CFAA violations.” Animators
at Law, Inc. v. Capital Legal Sols., LLC, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1114,
1122 (E.D. Va. 2011); see also iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 646
(quoting with approval SuccessFactors, Inc. v. Softscape, Inc.,
544 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980-81 (N.D. Cal. 2008), in which the
district court held that the value of “many hours of valuable
time away from day-to-day responsibilities” are contemplated
within the CFAA’s definition of “loss”).
5

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from a company protest that the victim of the theft
overreacted.”

1st Rate Mortg. Corp. v. Vision Mortg. Servs.

Corp., No. 09-C-471, 2011 WL 666088, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 15,
2011) (internal parentheses omitted).

Therefore, whether GLN’s

investigation was reasonable generally is a factual question for
a jury.

See Genworth Fin. Wealth Mgmt., Inc. v. McMullan, No.

3:09-CV-1521(JCH), 2012 WL 1078011, at *13 (D. Conn. Mar. 30,
2012); Animators, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
GLS also asserts that “[t]here are no time records, phone
records, emails or any other records upon which a reasonable
fact-finder could determine that GLN’s employees actually spent
over $5,000 worth of time on the so-called investigation.”
Def.’s Reply (doc. no. 62) at 6.

Construed favorably to GLN,

however, the evidence of loss, even if limited to just the twoweek period from April 1 to April 12, 2010, exceeds the $5,000
threshold.

Van Pelt worked “around the clock” for those two

weeks, and Proulx worked on a “full-time basis.”6

Viewing this

evidence in the light most favorable to GLN, a reasonable jury

Although it is not clear what Van Pelt meant by “around
the clock,” GLN suggests that a favorable construction amounts
to 24-hour-long days. Nothing in Van Pelt’s declaration or
deposition suggests that he worked twelve days, non-stop,
without any sleep. At oral argument, GLN asserted that a
favorable but reasonable interpretation of “around the clock” is
16-hour-long days.
6

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could find Van Pelt’s and Proulx’s time spent investigating the
offense constituted a “loss” of at least $5,000.
As discussed above, the definition of “loss” means any
reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding
to an offense.

Whether GLN’s incurred costs were reasonable and

whether they totaled at least $5,000 are disputed facts.
Therefore, viewing the record evidence in a light most favorable
to GLN, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether
GLN has sustained loss under the CFAA of at least $5,000.7
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for
partial summary judgment (doc. no. 56) is denied.
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
October 20, 2015

GLN also argues that other costs and attorney’s fees
incurred during its ongoing investigation should be considered
“loss” under the CFAA. Because GLN’s employees’ time spent in
response to the CFAA violation is sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether GLN has sustained at least
$5,000 in loss under the CFAA, the court does not address GLN’s
other arguments with respect to costs. Importantly, however, to
prove at trial that costs are compensable under the CFAA, GLN
must show a sufficient causal nexus between the costs incurred
and the CFAA violation. See § 1030(g) (compensable loss is “loss
by reason of a violation”).
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cc:

Sara Yevics Beccia, Esq.
Dennis J. Kelly, Esq.
James F. Laboe, Esq.
Laura Witney Lee, Esq.
Andrea L. Martin Esq.
Paul R. Mastrocola, Esq.
Joseph Gardner Mattson, Esq.
Jeffrey C. Spear, Esq.

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