Miller v. NationStar Mortgage, LLC
Filing
20
///ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(vln) Modified on 8/14/2012 to add: "granting"
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mar
Luise Miller,
Plaintiff
v.
Case N o . 12-cv-180-SM
Opinion N o . 2012 DNH 130
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC;
Andrew Harmon; Joshua D. Shakun;
and George A . Karambelas,
Defendants
O R D E R
This action arises out of a dispute between pro se
plaintiff, Mary Luise Miller, and her (former) mortgage
lender, Nationstar Mortgage.
In her original complaint,
Miller “petition[ed] this court for review of the N.H. Supreme
Court order, dated February 1 0 , 2011, dismissing Miller’s
appeal, and the lawfulness of a Writ of Possession, dated
April 1 6 , 2012.”
Petition for Review (document n o . 1 ) at 1 .
Subsequently, Miller amended her complaint, to add three
individual defendants and to advance claims that defendants
violated several of her federally protected constitutional
rights, committed a fraud upon the state court(s), were
unjustly enriched at her expense, and conspired among
themselves to unlawfully deprive her of her property.
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims and, for the
reasons discussed, that motion is granted.
Standard of Review
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded
facts set out in the complaint and indulge all reasonable
inferences in favor of the pleader.”
F.3d 4 3 6 , 441 (1st Cir. 2 0 1 0 ) .
S.E.C. v . Tambone, 597
Although the complaint need
only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), it must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”
Ashcroft v . Iqbal, 556 U.S. 6 6 2 , 678 (2009) (citation
and internal punctuation omitted).
Here, in support of their motion to dismiss, defendants
rely upon written decisions issued by the New Hampshire
Superior Court (Strafford County) and the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in prior litigation between Miller and
Nationstar.
Although a court must typically decide a motion
to dismiss exclusively upon the allegations set forth in the
complaint (and any documents attached to that complaint) or
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convert the motion into one for summary judgment, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 1 2 ( b ) , there is an exception to that general rule:
[C]ourts have made narrow exceptions for documents
the authenticity of which are not disputed by the
parties; for official public records; for documents
central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for documents
sufficiently referred to in the complaint.
Watterson v . Page, 987 F.2d 1 , 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
See also Trans-Spec Truck Serv. v . Caterpillar
Inc., 524 F.3d 3 1 5 , 321 (1st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) ; Beddall v . State S t .
Bank & Trust C o . , 137 F.3d 1 2 , 17 (1st Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) .
Since
Miller does not dispute the authenticity of the judicial
opinions upon which defendants rely, the court may properly
consider those documents without converting defendants’ motion
into one for summary judgment.
Background
Based upon the allegations contained in the amended
complaint, as well as the facts set forth in the two written
decisions issued by the state courts, the pertinent background
is as follows.
Nationstar held a mortgage deed to Miller’s
home, located in Farmington, New Hampshire.
That mortgage and
the associated promissory note (in the principal amount of
$100,300) were duly recorded in the Strafford County Registry
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of Deeds.
In September of 2007, Miller defaulted on the loan.
In 2008, after efforts to restructure her loan failed,
Nationstar foreclosed on Miller’s property.
At the
foreclosure sale, it purchased the property for approximately
$107,300.
Subsequently, Nationstar brought an action in
Strafford County Superior Court seeking to evict Miller from
the property.
In response, Miller filed counterclaims against
Nationstar, seeking $1,000,000 in damages and a judicial
declaration that she retained title to the property.
Nationstar moved for summary judgment, asserting that it
had complied with New Hampshire’s statutory foreclosure
process and w a s , therefore, entitled to a declaration that it
held title to the subject property, as well as an order
compelling Miller to vacate the premises.
and granted Nationstar’s motion.
The court agreed
As to Miller’s counterclaims
against Nationstar, the court concluded that:
[E]ven construing M s . Miller’s pleadings liberally
and assuming the facts she asserts to be true, she
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Her pleadings do not sufficiently state
the factual or legal bases for her counterclaims to
put Nationstar and the court on notice of them.
Additionally, when given an opportunity during the
October 2 3 , 2009 hearing to explain the bases for
her claims, M s . Miller was unable to state a valid
claim of any sort.
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Exhibit A to Defendant’s Memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 1 ) ,
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v . Marie Miller, Case n o . 219-2008EA-206 (N.H. Sup. C t . November 2 3 , 2009) (“Nationstar I ” ) .
Miller appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which
affirmed the superior court’s decision in all respects.
[W]e cannot conclude that the trial court erred by
granting the plaintiff summary judgment as to its
claim, and dismissing the defendant’s counterclaims.
With respect to the remaining arguments in the
defendant’s brief, including her arguments that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction and violated her
constitutional rights, the arguments are either
unsupported by the record or are without merit,
warranting no further discussion.
Exhibit B to Defendant’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 2 ) ,
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v . Marie Miller, Case n o . 2010-113
(N.H. February 1 0 , 2011) (“Nationstar II”) (citations
omitted).
Accordingly, the state courts have held that: ( 1 )
Nationstar complied with New Hampshire’s statutory foreclosure
process and now holds lawful title to the subject property;
( 2 ) Miller has been lawfully divested of any interest in that
property; and ( 3 ) Miller’s jurisdictional and constitutional
claims (at least as to Nationstar) are without merit.
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Subsequently, Miller instituted the instant proceeding
against Nationstar, as well as three attorneys who apparently
represented Nationstar during the course of its negotiations
with Miller and, subsequently, the foreclosure of its mortgage
deed to her property.
Discussion
Defendants are entitled to the dismissal of Miller’s
complaint for several reasons.
First, to the extent Miller
seeks “review of the N.H. Supreme Court order, dated February
1 0 , 2011,” as alleged in her original complaint (document n o .
1 ) , the Rooker-Feldman doctrine plainly precludes such federal
review of state court decisions.
As this court has previously
observed:
The combined effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and the res judicata doctrine precludes this court’s
consideration of Edwards’s dubious legal claims. It
is well-established under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine that the inferior federal courts are
without jurisdiction to review state court decisions
and, as a corollary, lack jurisdiction to consider
claims that are inextricably intertwined with review
of those proceedings. See District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v . Feldman, 460 U . S . 4 6 2 , 476
(1983); Rooker v . Fidelity Trust C o . , 263 U.S. 4 1 3 ,
415-16 (1923); Wang v . New Hampshire B d . of
Registration in Medicine, 55 F.3d 6 9 8 , 703 (1st Cir.
1 9 9 5 ) . Federal claims are inextricably intertwined
with a state proceeding (even if precisely the same
claims were not raised previously in state
litigation) if the party had an opportunity to raise
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those claims in state court, and if resolution of
the claims in federal court would effectively
provide a form of federal appellate review of the
state court’s decision. See Pennzoil C o . v . Texaco,
481 U . S . 1 , 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Moccio, 95 F.3d at 199-200; Ritter v . Ross, 992 F.2d
7 5 0 , 754 (7th Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) , cert. denied, 510 U . S .
1046 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; Lancellotti v . Fay, 909 F.2d 1 5 , 17
(1st Cir. 1 9 9 0 ) . Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes a party who loses in state court from
dressing his claims in federal clothing in order to
gain federal review of the disappointing state
result. Ritter, 992 F.2d at 7 5 4 .
Edwards v . City of Manchester, Case n o . 96-cv-517-SM, slip o p .
at 3-4 (D.N.H. Dec. 1 7 , 1 9 9 6 ) .
Second, with regard to her
claims that defendants deprived her of various federally
protected constitutional rights (counts o n e , t w o , four, and
f i v e ) , there is no plausible suggestion that defendants were
ever acting as agents of the State or under color of state law
- an essential element to any such claim.
See generally 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Finally, Miller’s claims against Nationstar and its
attorneys are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
“The doctrine of res judicata precludes
the litigation in a later case of matters actually litigated,
and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier
action between the same parties for the same cause of action.”
In re Alfred P., 126 N.H. 6 2 8 , 629 (1985) (citations omitted).
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“In order for res judicata to apply to a finding or ruling,
there must be ‘a final judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction [that] is conclusive upon the parties in a
subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action.’”
In re Donovan, 137 N.H. 7 8 , 81 (1993) (quoting Marston v .
United States Fidelity & Guar. C o . , 135 N.H. 7 0 6 , 710 (1992)).
“The term ‘cause of action’ means the right to recover,
regardless of the theory of recovery.”
Eastern Marine Constr.
Corp. v . First Southern Leasing, 129 N.H. 2 7 0 , 274 (1987)
(citations omitted).
In light of the decisions by both the New Hampshire
Superior Court and the Supreme Court, Miller’s claims against
Nationstar are plainly barred by both the Rooker-Feldman and
res judicata doctrines.
See generally, Dillon v . Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2009 WL 242912, DNH 12 (D.N.H.
2009) (discussing the doctrine of res judicata in a
substantially similar case that involved state court
litigation by a mortgagor to enjoin a foreclosure, followed by
federal litigation against the mortgagee), aff’d 630 F.3d 75
(1st Cir. 2 0 1 1 ) .
Any state or federal claims that Miller now
advances against Nationstar could have, and should have, been
raised and litigated in the earlier state court proceedings.
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The three individually named attorneys were n o t , however,
parties to the underlying state court litigation between
Miller and Nationstar.
Consequently, the preclusive effect of
that litigation - at least as to them - is somewhat more
complicated.
Although they say that they, t o o , are shielded
from Miller’s current claims by principles of res judicata
(because they say they were “in privity” with Nationstar), it
is probably more appropriate to focus on the application of
collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel is a related
doctrine which “precludes the relitigation by a party in a
later action of any matter actually litigated in a prior
action in which he or someone in privity with him was a
party.”
In re Alfred P., 126 N.H. at 6 2 9 .
“While collateral
estoppel does not require an identity of the earlier and later
causes of action, it precludes the relitigation only of issues
actually raised and determined in the earlier litigation.”
Morgenroth & Assocs. v . State, 126 N.H. 2 6 6 , 270 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
Three conditions must be met before collateral estoppel
can arise: “[T]he issue subject to estoppel must be identical
in each action, the first action must have resolved the issue
finally on the merits, and the party to be estopped must have
appeared as a party in the first action, or have been in
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privity with someone who did s o .
These conditions must be
understood, in turn, as particular elements of the more
general requirement, that a party against whom estoppel is
pleaded must have had a full and fair prior opportunity to
litigate the issue or fact in question.”
Daigle v . City of
Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 5 6 1 , 570 (1987).
Here, there is no doubt that each of the three essential
elements of collateral estoppel is present.
Miller was a
party to the underlying state court action.
That action was
resolved on the merits - fully and finally - when the New
Hampshire Supreme Court issued its decision affirming the
superior court’s order granting summary judgment to Nationstar
and dismissing Miller’s counterclaims (Miller did not appeal
that order to the United State Supreme Court).
And, finally,
the central, dispositive issue in the state court litigation
and this case is the same: whether Nationstar and its agents
conducted the foreclosure sale of Miller’s property in
accordance with state law.
That issue was resolved in favor
of Nationstar, and against Miller:
Nationstar now moves for summary judgment, arguing
that it complied with the foreclosure process as
laid out in RSA 479:26, and that it is therefore
entitled to a judgment declaring that title to the
property is vested in Nationstar. . . . As to the
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procedure surrounding the foreclosure sale,
Nationstar has established to the court’s
satisfaction that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law
Therefore, the court GRANTS
Nationstar’s motion for summary judgment.
Nationstar I , at 2 .
Consequently, Miller cannot relitigate
that issue (or derivative issues) in this forum.
Conclusion
Miller had a full and fair opportunity in the state court
system to litigate her various claims concerning the legality
and constitutionality of the foreclosure sale of her home by
Nationstar and its agents.
her.
Those issue were resolved against
Consequently, she cannot relitigate them in this forum,
nor does this court have jurisdiction to “review” the
decisions of the state courts.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(document n o . 1 4 ) i s , therefore granted.
Plaintiff’s motion
for entry of default based upon defendants’ alleged failure to
answer her complaint (document n o . 1 5 ) is denied.
In lieu of
an answer, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, as is
permitted by the federal rules.
1
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 . 1
Defendant George Karambelas filed an answer before
defendants submitted their joint motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, as to him, the court has treated that motion as
one for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 ( c ) .
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The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance
with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
______ n J. McAu __ iff __________
Ste ited States District Judge
August 1 4 , 2012
cc:
Kurt R. McHugh, Esq.
George A . Karambelas, Esq.
Marie Luise Miller
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