D'Angelo v. NH Supreme Court et al

Filing 19

/// ORDER approving in part 8 Report and Recommendation; denying 3 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction; granting 9 Defendant New Hampshire Supreme Court's Motion to Dismiss; and granting 11 Defendant Brian Germaine's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(jab)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Stephen L. D’Angelo,
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 12-cv-411-SM
Opinion No. 2012 DNH 204

New Hampshire Supreme Court, and
Brian Germain, Esq.,
Defendants
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Stephen D’Angelo, appears pro se (although he
is an attorney).

He brings this action seeking compensatory,

declaratory, and injunctive relief, asserting that the state
courts violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during
the course of child support proceedings to which he was a party.
The Magistrate Judge has reviewed the complaint in due course and
has filed a formal Report and Recommendation, in which she
recommends dismissal of all D’Angelo’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, after applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Defendants also move to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff objects.

The Report and Recommendation is adopted in part,
defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted, and all of
plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.

Background
D’Angelo has been involved in an ongoing dispute over his
child support obligations since approximately 2006.

The New

Hampshire Circuit Court, 10th Circuit, Family Division (the
“Derry Family Court”) conducted a number of hearings and issued
several orders in an effort to resolve D’Angelo’s financial
obligations to his son.

In those various orders, the court

observed that, D’Angelo “has a well-documented history of
thwarting the discovery process and of selectively excluding
relevant financial information to the detriment of the
Petitioner,” Complaint, Exhibit H (document no. 1-8), Order dated
May 15, 2012 (“DFC Order”) at 1 (quoting a prior order).

It also

noted that it had “already found Mr. D’Angelo in Contempt of
Court on multiple occasions.”

Id. at 3.

The court went on to

observe that D’Angelo (a practicing attorney):
would represent that his gross income ranges from
$29,500 to a high of $93,387.00 while being able to
travel extensively, own two Porsche automobiles,
purchase a 40ft yacht for $190,000.00, own several
automobiles to include a Lexus, and maintain a
lifestyle that would indicate by his travel,
entertainment, and expenditures that he has disposable
monies in excess of those stated on his Financial
Affidavit.
Id. at 2.

Given those ongoing concerns, in September of 2011,

the court appointed Attorney Brian Germaine as a Commissioner, to

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investigate and report to the court with regard to D’Angelo’s
gross income from 2006 forward.

In May of 2012, the court conducted yet another hearing, to
address several pending motions.

At that hearing, Commissioner

Germaine presented his findings.

The court determined them to be

well-supported and credible, and adopted them as to D’Angelo’s
gross income from 2006 forward.

DFC Order at 10.

It also found,

“by clear and convincing evidence that [D’Angelo] had the ability
to make [past support payments] to the Petitioner and chose to
pay his own bills despite being cautioned by this Court.”
Order at 4.

DFC

It then held D’Angelo in contempt for having failed

to pay past-due child support obligations, entered judgment in
favor of D’Angelo’s former wife in the amount of more than
$110,000.00, and modified D’Angelo’s monthly child support
obligations going forward.

DFC Order at 10-12.

D’Angelo filed a

Notice of Discretionary Appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, but the court declined to hear his appeal.

This

litigation followed.

In his complaint, D’Angelo advances nine separate claims
against the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“NHSC”) and Attorney
Germaine.

They can be summarized as follows:

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1.

The Derry Family Court (over which the NHSC
has supervisory authority) violated
plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights when it refused to hold an evidentiary
hearing prior to entering an order modifying
his child support obligations;

2.

The NHSC violated plaintiff’s Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights when it declined
to grant his notice of appeal; and

3.

The court-appointed commissioner, Brian
Germaine, violated plaintiff’s federally
protected constitutional rights, and
committed a variety of state common law
torts, when he made allegedly false
statements about plaintiff to the family
court.

D’Angelo seeks the following relief: (a) an injunction to prevent
“the Derry District Court from implementing, enforcing or
otherwise taking any action” on its order of May 15, 2012,
Complaint at para. 112; (b) monetary damages against the NHSC to
“fairly and adequately compensate Plaintiff” for the court’s
“reckless and wanton” refusal to review the decisions of its
family courts, Complaint at paras. 119 and 122; and (c) monetary
damages against Attorney Germaine for having violated plaintiff’s
federally protected constitutional rights and for having
committed numerous common law torts.

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Discussion
I.

The Report and Recommendation.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine deprives this court of subject matter over each of
D’Angelo’s claims and, therefore, recommended that they be
dismissed.

In reaching that conclusion, she observed:

D’Angelo’s claims are, at their core, the claims of a
disgruntled litigant, seeking federal district court
review of state court judgments, filed after the state
proceedings have ended, and rooted in the belief that
the judgments are wrong and injurious to him. To
adjudicate D’Angelo’s claims, this court would
necessarily be called upon to review the validity of
the DFC’s order and the NHSC’s decision to decline
D’Angelo’s appeal. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes such review by this court, insofar as
D’Angelo’s federal claims are inextricably intertwined
with the state court decisions at issue.
Report and Recommendation, at 5-6.

With respect to D’Angelo’s

requests for injunctive relief, as well as his efforts to
collaterally attack various decisions of the state courts as
“unlawful” or “unconstitutional,” this court plainly lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See also The Anti Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Given his dissatisfaction with the Family Court’s order and
the NHSC’s decision not to entertain his appeal, D’Angelo should
have appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

His remedy was

not to file an action in federal court seeking to collaterally
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challenge those final state court decisions.

Count one of his

complaint is, therefore, dismissed.

But, as to D’Angelo’s remaining claims, whether the court
has subject matter jurisdiction is open to some debate.

It is

certainly arguable that the court has jurisdiction over his
constitutional challenge to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 3,
as well as his state and federal claims against Attorney
Germaine, since resolving those claims would not seem to require
the court to review the validity of the state court decisions
referenced in D’Angelo’s complaint.

Accordingly, the court turns

to defendants’ motions to dismiss.

II.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
Defendants also claim that many of D’Angelo’s claims must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

And, defendants assert that D’Angelo’s

remaining claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A.

Count Two - Supreme Court Rule 3.

In count two of his complaint, D’Angelo challenges the
constitutionality of NHSC Rule 3, which provides, in relevant
part, that the following types of appeals are not “mandatory

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appeals” (meaning that the court may, in its discretion, decline
to hear any such appeal from a lower court order):
(9) an appeal from a final decision on the merits
issued in, or arising out of, a domestic relations
matter filed under RSA Title XLIII (RSA chapters 457 to
461-A); provided, however, that an appeal from a final
divorce decree or decree of legal separation shall be a
mandatory appeal.
Rule 3, Rules of The Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire
(West 2012).

D’Angelo filed such a discretionary appeal to the

NHSC, challenging the May 15, 2012, order of the Derry Family
Court.

The NHSC declined to hear his appeal and, in so doing,

let the order of the Derry Family Court stand.

D’Angelo asserts that “Rule 3 promulgated by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court violate[s] the Fourteenth (14th) and
Fifth (5th) Amendments Due Process Rights of the United States
Constitution.”

Complaint at para. 114.

Although his complaint

and subsequent filings are unclear, it seems D’Angelo believes he
has a constitutionally protected procedural due process right to
an appeal of the Derry Family Court’s order.

He is incorrect.

See, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976)
(“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not
establish any right to an appeal.”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“[A] State is not required by the Federal

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Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate
review at all.”).

Of course, “[w]hen an appeal is afforded, . . . it cannot be
granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied
to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972).

Here, however,

nothing in D’Angelo’s complaint suggests that Rule 3 operates to
“arbitrarily” or “capriciously” deny some state court litigants
an opportunity to appeal to the NHSC, while allowing others to do
so.

Rule 3 does not unconstitutionally distinguish between

different classes or categories of litigants.

Rather, it

permissibly distinguishes between different types of family court
orders - some of which the NHSC has determined it will always
entertain on appeal, while others are subject to the court’s
exercise of discretionary appellate authority.

In other words, all similarly situated litigants in the
State’s family courts are treated equally and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution is not offended by Rule 3.
Count two of D’Angelo’s complaint is, therefore, dismissed for
failure to state a claim.

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B.

Count Three - Failure to Supervise.

In count three of his complaint, D’Angelo alleges that the
NHSC “recklessly and wantonly allowed its family courts to make
decisions without hearing, following law, and decide matters
without review or the right of appeal.”

Complaint at para. 120.

He seeks a monetary award from the NHSC “in an amount that will
fairly and adequately compensate [him] for damages.”
para. 122.

Id. at

Plainly, however, the Justices of the NHSC are

entitled to judicial immunity from any such claim.

See, e.g.,

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were
more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted
the doctrine, in [1872].

This immunity applies even when the

judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is
not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.”) (citations
and internal punctuation omitted); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11 (1991) (“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial
immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages.”).

Moreover, D’Angelo’s claim for

monetary damages against the New Hampshire Supreme Court is

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barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

See generally Pennhurst St.

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).

Count three of D’Angelo’s complaint is dismissed for failure
to state a claim.

C.

Claims Against Commissioner Brian Germaine.

In counts four through nine of his complaint, D’Angelo
advances various federal constitutional and state common law
claims against the commissioner appointed by the Derry Family
Court, Attorney Brian Germaine.

Among other things, D’Angelo

says Germaine “failed to perform a reasonable investigation,”
Complaint at para. 125, “misrepresented material facts to the
court,” id. at 128, and “under color of state law” violated
“plaintiff’s due process rights,” id. at 133.

It is beyond dispute that New Hampshire’s family court’s
have the authority to appoint commissioners in divorce
proceedings.

See In re O’Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 624 (2010); Walker

v. Walker, 119 N.H. 551, 553-54 (1979).

And, as a court-

appointed commissioner, Germaine was cloaked with absolute quasijudicial immunity - immunity that shields him from precisely the
type of claims advanced by D’Angelo.

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See, e.g., Nystedt v.

Nigro, 700 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The doctrine of quasijudicial immunity provides absolute immunity for those who
perform tasks that are inextricably intertwined with the judicial
function.

This doctrine is rooted in the wise idea that those

who perform adjudicative functions require a full exemption from
liability.”) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

See

generally Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985); Cok
v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, counts four through nine of D’Angelo’s
complaint are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
defendants’ memoranda, the court:
1.

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (document no. 8) to the extent
it recommends dismissal of D’Angelo’s efforts
to collaterally challenge orders issued by
the state courts, as well as his requests for
injunctive relief, as set forth in counts one
and two of his complaint; and

2.

grants defendants’ motions to dismiss
(documents no. 9 and 11). D’Angelo’s claims
for compensatory and declaratory relief, as
set forth in counts two through nine, are
dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with
this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
December 20, 2012
cc:

Stephen L. D’Angelo, pro se
Nancy J. Smith, Esq.
William C. Saturley, Esq.
William H. Whitney, Esq.

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