Mangiardi Brothers Trucking, Inc. v. Dewey Environmental, LLC et al

Filing 26

///ORDER granting 20 Motion to Dismiss; granting 21 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.(dae)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mangiardi Brothers
Trucking, Inc.
v.

Civil No. 12-cv-481-JD
Opinion No. 2013 DNH 069

Dewey Environmental, LLC,
et al.
O R D E R
Mangiardi Brothers Trucking, Inc. (“Mangiardi”) brought suit
against Dewey Environmental, LLC (“Dewey”); Francis Harvey and
Sons, Inc. (“Francis Harvey”); Babcock and Wilcox Construction
Co., Inc. (“Babcock”); and Berlin Station, LLC (“Berlin Station”)
alleging claims arising out of unpaid invoices for Mangiardi’s
services in hauling hazardous waste from a construction site.
Babcock and Berlin move to dismiss the complaint.

Mangiardi

objects to the motions.

Background
In the fall of 2011, Berlin Station hired Babcock as its
general contractor for the construction of a “biomass energy
plant” (the “Project”).

Berlin Station owns the property upon

which the Project was being constructed (the “Construction
Site”).

In November 2011, Babcock entered into an agreement with
Francis Harvey, under which Francis Harvey agreed to perform
certain site work for the Project.

Francis Harvey subcontracted

with Dewey to perform hazardous waste removal on the Project.
Dewey subsequently contacted and subcontracted with
Mangiardi to haul the hazardous waste materials from the
Construction Site.

Dewey agreed to pay Mangiardi $115 per ton of

waste hauled and payment was due within fourteen days after the
date of an invoice.

The terms of the agreement were confirmed

through an email between Dewey and Mangiardi.

Mangiardi alleges

that Dewey discussed the terms of the agreement with Francis
Harvey.
Mangiardi began performing the services required under the
contract with Dewey on December 1, 2011.

On December 5, 2011,

Mangiardi submitted its first invoice to Dewey in the amount of
$20,513.75.

Mangiardi received a check from Francis Harvey for

the full amount of the invoice on December 12, 2011.
Mangiardi continued to perform the services required under
the contract and submitted five more invoices to Dewey, totaling
$128,751.70.

When payment for the first of the five invoices was

not made within fourteen days, Mangiardi contacted both Dewey and
Francis Harvey.

Each promised that a payment would be made

shortly.
2

On January 9, 2012, Dewey wired $50,000 to Mangiardi.
Despite contacting Dewey and Francis Harvey on many occasions
since then, Mangiardi has not received any further payment from
either company.
After being unsuccessful in obtaining payment from Dewey and
Francis Harvey, Mangiardi contacted Babcock to request payment of
the outstanding invoices.

Mangiardi alleges that Babcock stated

that it had paid Francis Harvey in full for the portion of work
performed by Mangiardi and, therefore, would not pay Mangiardi
the money Mangiardi alleged it was owed.
Mangiardi subsequently contacted Cate Street Capital (“Cate
Street”), which it believed to be the owner of the Construction
Site, to request payment of its invoices.

Cate Street said that

it was not the owner of the Construction Site and refused to make
any payments to Mangiardi.1

Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must determine whether the
facts alleged, when taken as true and in the light most favorable

1

Mangiardi alleges Cate Street formed and owned Berlin
Station so that Berlin Station could take title to the
Construction Site.
3

to the plaintiff, state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2009).
Under the notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), a plaintiff need provide only a short and
plain statement that provides enough facts “‘to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . .’”

Ocasio-Hernandez v.

Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

The court takes the

well-pled allegations as true, views all of the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determines
whether the complaint alleges facts to support a claim “that is
plausible on its face.”

Downing v. Glove Direct LLC, 682 F.3d

18, 22 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009).

Discussion
Mangiardi brings claims against Dewey and Francis Harvey for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and violation of New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection
Act, RSA 358-A:2.

It also brings claims for unjust enrichment,

quantum meruit, and restitution against all the defendants.

4

Berlin Station and Babcock move to dismiss the claims
against them.

They argue that a third-tier subcontractor such as

Mangiardi (an entity who subcontracts with a sub-subcontractor)
cannot recover against an owner or a general contractor under a
quasi-contract theory.

They also contend that Mangiardi’s claims

for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and restitution, should be
considered together as one claim.
“New Hampshire cases do not clearly differentiate between
theories of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.”

Eastern Elec.

Corp. v. FERD Const. Inc., 2005 WL 3447957, at *3 n.1 (D.N.H.
Dec. 15, 2005)(citing cases).

Certain New Hampshire cases,

however, appear to set forth slightly different elements for the
claims and address them separately.

See, e.g., Gen. Insulation

Co. v. Eckman Constr., 159 N.H. 601, 611-12 (2010) (analyzing
claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit).

Therefore, the

court will assume, without deciding, that unjust enrichment and
quantum meruit are separate claims under New Hampshire law and
addresses them separately.

Restitution, however, is not a

separate cause of action under New Hampshire law and is only a
remedy for unjust enrichment.

See, e.g., Ellis v. Candia

Trailers and Snow Equip., Inc., 58 A.3d 1164, 1168 (2012) (“In
New Hampshire, a plaintiff is entitled to restitution for unjust

5

enrichment” if the plaintiff proves his claim.) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).2
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed claims of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit asserted
by a third-tier subcontractor against a general contractor, or
addressed certain arguments advanced by Mangiardi in its claims
against Berlin Station.

“Where no authoritative decision from

the state court of last resort resolves an issue of state
substantive law, [the court] must predict, as best [it] can, that
court’s resolution of the issue . . . .”
Stow, 588 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009).

Kunelius v. Town of

“In that endeavor, the

federal court may seek guidance from a wide range of sources,
including but not limited to ‘analogous state court decisions,
persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states, learned
treatises, and public policy considerations identified in state
decisional law.’”

Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 66

2

Mangiardi contends that the court should deny Berlin
Station’s and Babcock’s motions because they repeat the arguments
made in their motions to dismiss the original complaint, which
the court denied. The court, however, denied Berlin Station’s
and Babcock’s motions to dismiss the original complaint as moot
because Mangiardi filed an amended complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a). The court did not consider the merits
of the arguments in Berlin Station’s and Babcock’s motions to
dismiss the original complaint. The motions which are the
subject of this order address the allegations in the amended
complaint, which is the operative complaint, and the court
considers those arguments below.
6

(1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81
F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996)).

A.

Unjust Enrichment
“The doctrine of unjust enrichment is that one shall not be

allowed to profit or enrich himself at the expense of another
contrary to equity.”

Cohen v. Frank Developers, Inc., 118 N.H.

512, 518 (1978) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted);
see also Pella Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Faraci, 133 N.H. 585, 586
(1990).

To be entitled to restitution for unjust enrichment, a

plaintiff must show that the defendant received “a benefit which
would be unconscionable for him to retain.”

Clapp v. Goffstown

Sch. Dist., 159 N.H. 206, 210 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also R. Zoppo Co., Inc. v. City of Manchester, 122
N.H. 1109, 1113 (1982).

In other words, “[t]he party seeking

restitution must establish not only unjust enrichment, but that
the person sought to be charged had wrongfully secured a benefit
or passively received one which it would be unconscionable to
retain.”

Gen. Insulation, 159 N.H. at 611; see also Invest

Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 64 (1st
Cir. 2001).

7

1.

Berlin Station

“The circumstances under which an unjust enrichment claim
may be brought by a subcontractor against an owner, absent
privity, are limited.”

Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Const. Co., ---

A.3d ---, 2013 WL 960175, at *9 (N.H. Mar. 13, 2013) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).

“There may be special

circumstances that would justify requiring the owner to pay, such
as when the owner accepts benefits rendered under such
circumstances as reasonably notify the owner that the one
performing such services expected to be compensated therefore by
the owner.”
omitted).

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

“However, the general rule in this area is that a

subcontractor who furnishes material or labor pursuant to an
agreement with, or upon the order and credit of, a general
contractor cannot recover against the property owner upon the
basis of an implied promise to pay arising from the owner’s
receipt and acceptance of the benefit of the material and labor
finished.”

Id. (internal citation omitted).

Mangiardi contends that it can maintain an unjust enrichment
claim against Berlin Station “because (1) Mangiardi does not have
an adequate remedy at law against Dewey and/or Francis Harvey,
and (2) Mangiardi has learned that Berlin Station may not have
paid Babcock in full for the services Mangiardi provided at the
8

Construction Site.”

Mangiardi’s contention that it does not have

an adequate remedy at law against Dewey or Francis Harvey is
premised on its allegations that Dewey and Francis Harvey have no
assets and are contemplating bankruptcy.
These arguments do not cure the deficiencies in Mangiardi’s
unjust enrichment claim against Berlin Station.

Mangiardi

alleges that it entered into an agreement with Dewey and/or
Francis Harvey, not Berlin Station.

Although Mangiardi alleges

that it reasonably expected Berlin Station to pay its invoices if
Dewey or Francis Harvey could not, Mangiardi does not allege any
circumstances that would reasonably notify Berlin Station that
Mangiardi had that expectation.3

See Axenics, 2013 WL 960175, at

*9 (“Nor is there any indication that [the owner] accepted
benefits under circumstances reasonably notifying it that [the
subcontractor] expected to be compensated directly by [the owner]
rather than by [the general contractor].”).
In addition, Mangiardi has an adequate remedy at law: its
contract claims against Dewey and Francis Harvey.

3

Eastern Elec.,

Further, Mangiardi does not allege any facts to support its
assertion that it expected to be compensated by Berlin Station,
and the court disregards such conclusory allegations. See
Silverstrand Investments v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95, 101
(1st Cir. 2013) (in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the court “first discard[s] bald assertions and
conclusory allegations”).
9

2005 WL 3447957, at *2 (The plaintiff “does not explain why the
remedy it seeks against FERD for breach of contract, seeking
damages for the amounts that it alleges have not been paid, is
not adequate.

No irreparable injury exists if the injury is

compensable in damages.”) (citing Exeter Realty Corp. v. Buck,
104 N.H. 199, 201 (1962)).

Although Mangiardi contends that it

may not be able to collect damages in a lawsuit against Francis
Harvey or Dewey because of their potential bankruptcy, that
possibility does not create an unjust enrichment claim against
Berlin Station.

See Schell v. Kent, 2009 WL 948657, at *2

(D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2009) (“[T]he doctrine [of unjust enrichment] is
not animated by some moral obligation, but rather ‘there must be
some specific legal principle or situation which equity has
established or recognized’ to justify restitution.”) (quoting
Cohen, 118 N.H. at 518); see also Restatement of Restitution §
110 (1937) (“A person who has conferred a benefit upon another as
the performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled
to restitution from the other merely because of the failure of
performance by the third person.”).
In addition, the possibility that Berlin Station did not pay
Babcock for Mangiardi’s services does not create an unjust
enrichment claim against Berlin Station.

See, e.g., Truland

Service Corp. v. McBride Elec., Inc., 2011 WL 1599543, at *6 (D.
10

Md. Apr. 27, 2011) (an owner’s liability for the unpaid invoices
of a subcontractor “do not turn on whether the owner has fully
paid the general contractor”) (quoting Bennett Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc. v. NationsBank of Md., 342 Md. 169, 183 (Md.
1996) (collecting cases)).

Accordingly, Mangiardi’s unjust

enrichment claim against Berlin Station is dismissed.

2.

Babcock

Mangiardi contends that it can maintain an unjust enrichment
claim against Babcock on the same theory it argued against Berlin
Station: “because (1) Mangiardi does not have an adequate remedy
at law against Dewey and/or Francis Harvey, and (2) Mangiardi has
learned that Babcock may not have paid Francis Harvey and/or
Dewey in full for the services Mangiardi provided at the
Construction Site.”

Mangiardi also argues in the alternative

that even if Babcock paid Francis Harvey and/or Dewey in full,
Mangiardi has pled a claim for unjust enrichment against Babcock
based on a theory of estoppel.
Courts generally analyze unjust enrichment claims of thirdtier subcontractors or sub-subcontractors against general
contractors using the same principles which guide claims of
subcontractors against owners.

See EFCO Corp. v. U.W. Marx,

Inc., 124 F.3d 394, 401 (2d Cir. 1997) (“This principle [that an
11

owner is not liable to a subcontractor for work performed in
furtherance of a subcontract] is equally applicable where . . .
the parties are a primary contractor and a second-tier
subcontractor rather than a landowner and subcontractor.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Tradesmen Int’l,
Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1205
(D. Kan. 2002) (principles preventing a subcontractor from
recovering against a property owner in unjust enrichment are
equally applicable to a sub-subcontractor’s claim of unjust
enrichment against the general contractor).

Therefore, to the

extent Mangiardi’s unjust enrichment claim against Babcock is
based on the same or similar allegations as those underlying
Mangiardi’s unjust enrichment claim against Berlin Station, it is
dismissed for the reasons discussed above.
As for Mangiardi’s estoppel theory, Mangiardi points to
paragraph 42 in its complaint, which reads as follows:
Despite being aware of Francis Harvey’s precarious
financial position and the unlikelihood that it was
paying its subcontractors, Babcock, if said payments
were actually made, continued to make these payments to
Francis Harvey without further inquiry, rather than
requiring it to post a bond, requiring lien releases
from Francis Harvey’s subcontractors to ensure that
they were getting paid, and/or paying Francis Harvey’s
subcontractors, including Mangiardi, directly for the
services they provided at the Construction Site.
Compl. § 42.

Mangiardi contends that this allegation is

12

sufficient to state a claim for unjust enrichment against Babcock
and cites Concrete Constructors, Inc. v. Harry Shapiro & Sons,
Inc., 121 N.H. 888 (1981) (per curiam) in support of its
argument.
In Concrete Constructors, a subcontractor brought several
claims, including unjust enrichment, against the property owner
and lessee owner when the subcontractor was not paid pursuant to
its contract with the general contractor.

Id. at 889.

The New

Hampshire Supreme Court held that the subcontractor could not
recover from the property owner under any theory of liability.
The court determined, however, that the lessee owner was
“estopped to deny the legitimate invoice of a subcontractor who
ha[d] not been paid the undisputed amount of his claim for labor
and materials . . . .”

Id. at 892.

The court reasoned that,

“[the lessee owner], with knowledge of [the subcontractor’s]
subcontract and [the general contractor’s] financial position,
not only failed to make a disclosure, but actually acted to [the
subcontractor’s] detriment by making direct payments to [the
general contractor], resulting in the nonpayment of the
subcontractor[], and by failing to require [the general
contractor] to post a bond which might have helped [the
subcontractor].”

Id. at 893.

The court held that the lessee

owner was liable “because the [lessee] owner, with fresh
13

knowledge of the failings of a first general contractor to a
subcontractor, and with the means available to protect the
subcontractor, failed to inform himself of the failings of a
second contractor selected by him who utilized the same
subcontractor.”

Id. at 892.

The court applied the doctrine of

estoppel, and imposed liability on the lessee owner.
Mangiardi’s reliance on the holding of Concrete Constructors
is misplaced.

The court in Concrete Constructors held that the

plaintiff could not succeed on a claim of unjust enrichment
against the defendants.

Id. at 891 (“The plaintiff’s claim of

unjust enrichment likewise fails.”).

Although the court allowed

the plaintiff to recover against the lessee owner, it did so
under an estoppel theory, which was separate from the plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment theory.4

Therefore, Mangiardi cannot use the

holding of Concrete Constructors as the basis for its unjust
enrichment claim.

4

The plaintiff in Concrete Constructors argued that the
Master “erred in dismissing the plaintiff subcontractor’s
petition for a mechanics lien under RSA ch. 447, in denying the
plaintiff subcontractor a right to recover payment for work,
services, and material under a theory of unjust enrichment, and
in finding that the defendants are not liable to the plaintiff
subcontractor for any claim arising out of the subcontract
between the plaintiff subcontractor and the general contractor.”
Id. at 889.
14

Even if the holding of Concrete Constructors could support
Mangiardi’s unjust enrichment claim, the court’s decision was
based on “the peculiar facts of [the] case.”

Id. at 893.

Those

facts included the defendant’s knowledge that its previous
contractor had failed to pay the plaintiff subcontractor, the
defendant’s knowledge of the relationship and agreement between
the contractor and the plaintiff subcontractor, and the
defendant’s contractual obligation to pay all expenses for
construction in excess of a certain amount.

Such “peculiar”

facts are not present here.5
Accordingly, Mangiardi’s unjust enrichment claim against
Babcock is dismissed.

B.

Quantum Meruit
A claim in quantum meruit refers to “contracts implied in

fact or to obligations imposed by law without regard to the
intention or assent of the parties bound, for reasons dictated by

5

Mangiardi points to CWM Chem. Servs. v. Berlin Station
Station, No. 218-2012-CV-00477 (N.H. Super. Ct., Rockingham
Cnty., Oct. 15, 2012), a case against Berlin Station and Babcock
involving similar claims to those Mangiardi brings here and
arising out of the same Project. In CWM, the court relied on
Concrete Constructors and denied Babcock’s motion to dismiss the
unjust enrichment claim on the basis of estoppel. For the
reasons stated above, the court declines to follow the holding of
CWM.
15

reason and justice.”

State v. Haley, 94 N.H. 69, 72 (1946).

“A

valid claim in quantum meruit requires that (1) services were
rendered to the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) with the
knowledge and consent of the defendant; and (3) under
circumstances that make it reasonable for the plaintiff to expect
payment.”

Gen. Insulation, 159 N.H. at 612 (internal quotation

marks, citation, and alterations omitted); see also Universal AmCan, Ltd. v. CSI-Concrete Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 2627764, at *1
(D.N.H. July 5, 2012).

“While damages in unjust enrichment are

measured by the value of what was inequitably retained, in
quantum meruit, by contrast, the damages . . . are based on the
value of the services provided by the plaintiff.”

Id. (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted).
As discussed above, Mangiardi alleges that it knew that
Dewey was only a “pass-through” entity, and, therefore, it
reasonably expected the other defendants, including Berlin
Station and Babcock, to pay its invoices if Dewey did not.
Mangiardi further alleges that Francis Harvey’s payment of the
first invoice confirmed Mangiardi’s expectation that the other
defendants would pay Mangiardi’s invoices if Dewey did not.

16

1.

Berlin Station

Mangiardi’s allegations do not make out a claim for quantum
meruit against Berlin Station.

Mangiardi does not allege that

Dewey or Francis Harvey ever informed Berlin Station of
Mangiardi’s involvement with the Project, and does not allege any
facts suggesting that Berlin Station was aware of Mangiardi’s
work on the Project.

Therefore, Mangiardi has not alleged that

it did work with the knowledge and consent of Berlin Station.
In addition, Mangiardi has not alleged circumstances that
would have made it reasonable for it to expect payment from
Berlin Station.

Mangiardi does not allege any communication or

interaction with Berlin Station.6

According to the complaint,

Dewey discussed the terms of Mangiardi’s contract only with
Francis Harvey.7

Even viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Mangiardi, it was not reasonable for Mangiardi, a

6

Mangiardi alleges that it reached out to Cate Street, which
it believed to be the owner of the Construction Site, after
failing to obtain payment for its services from the other
defendants. Although Mangiardi alleges that Cate Street “formed
and owned entity Berlin Station,” Mangiardi does not allege that
it ever communicated with anyone from Berlin Station itself.
Also, communications with Cate Street occurred after Mangiardi
rendered services, not before.
7

Mangiardi alleges “[u]pon information and belief, Dewey
discussed Mangiardi’s terms with Francis Harvey and in late
November 2011, the terms of the contract were confirmed in
writing by Dewey and Francis Harvey.” Compl. § 18.
17

third-tier subcontractor, to expect payment from Berlin Station,
the property owner, for services provided pursuant to an express
agreement with Dewey, a sub-subcontractor.

See Interstate

Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, 320 F.3d 539, 543 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2003) (“In construction contracts, in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary, a subcontractor is not in
privity with the owner and thus looks to the general contractor
alone for payment.

The owner is liable for payment only to the

general contractor.”) (internal citations omitted);

Aniero

Concrete Co., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Const. Auth., 2000 WL 863208, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000).

Accordingly, Berlin Station is

entitled to judgment on Mangiardi’s quantum meruit claim.

2.

Babcock

For similar reasons, Mangiardi does not allege facts to
support a claim for quantum meruit against Babcock.

As discussed

above, Mangiardi alleges that Dewey agreed to the terms of
Mangiardi’s contract.

As with its allegations against Berlin

Station, Mangiardi does not allege that Babcock had any knowledge
of or consented to Mangiardi’s work on the Project.

Although

Mangiardi alleges that it contacted Babcock to request payment of
outstanding invoices after Francis Harvey and Dewey failed to
pay, that contact occurred after Mangiardi had performed its work
18

under its agreement with Dewey.

Therefore, the contact with

Babcock after the fact does not suggest that Babcock knew of or
consented to Mangiardi’s work on the Project before the work was
done.
In addition, Mangiardi has not alleged circumstances that
made it reasonable to expect payment from Babcock.

As discussed,

Mangiardi, a third-tier subcontractor, provided services pursuant
to a contract with Dewey, and its right to payment for services
was expressly governed by that contract.

Even if Mangiardi’s

conclusory allegation that it knew Dewey was a pass-through
entity could be credited, those circumstances would, at best,
make it reasonable to expect payment from Francis Harvey, not
Babcock or Berlin Station.10

Moreover, although Mangiardi argues

that Dewey’s and Francis Harvey’s financial situation make it
difficult or impossible to recover against those entities, that

10

Mangiardi’s allegation that Francis Harvey’s payment of
the first invoice “confirmed Mangiardi’s expectation that payment
for its services would be made by any of the Defendants,” Compl.
§ 21, is conclusory. Mangiardi provides no reasonable grounds to
expect Berlin Station or Babcock to pay simply because Francis
Harvey paid one invoice. Mangiardi also alleges that Francis
Harvey became a party to the contract between Mangiardi and
Dewey, further undermining its argument that Francis Harvey’s
payment of the first invoice confirmed Mangiardi’s expectation
that Berlin Station or Babcock, non-parties to the contract,
would pay any future invoices.
19

does not make its expectation of payment from Babcock
reasonable.11

See, e.g., Invest Almaz, 243 F.3d at 64.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Berlin Station’s motion to
dismiss (document no. 20) and Babcock’s motion to dismiss
(document no. 21) are granted.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
April 30, 2013
cc:

David Himelfarb, Esquire
Rebecca S. Kane, Esquire
Thomas J. Pappas, Esquire

11

To the extent Mangiardi argues that Babcock is responsible
for Mangiardi’s outstanding invoices because Babcock eventually
terminated its contract with Francis Harvey, that argument is
unavailing. See, e.g., Insulation Contracting and Supply v.
Kravco, Inc., 209 N.J. Super. 367, 374 (N.J. 1986) (“In the
absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, [a general
contractor], by terminating its contract with [a subcontractor],
did not incur liability to pay plaintiff on its subsubcontract.”).
20