Gardner v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner
Filing
23
///ORDER denying 14 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner; granting 15 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. So Ordered by Chief Judge Joseph N. Laplante.(jb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Suzanne Gardner
v.
Civil No. 13-cv-483-JL
Opinion No. 2015 DNH 126
Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration
ORDER ON APPEAL
Suzanne Gardner appeals the Social Security Administration’s
(“SSA”) denial of her application for disability benefits.
An
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Gardner suffered from
degenerative lumbar disc disease, degeneration of the knees,
obesity, fibromyalgia, and depression with a history of posttraumatic stress disorder.
The ALJ nevertheless found that
Gardner was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act because she has sufficient residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to work at jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy.
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The SSA Appeals Council subsequently denied Gardner's request for
review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering the ALJ’s decision final.
Gardner timely appealed to this court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
In due course, Gardner moved to reverse the SSA’s
decision and SSA’s Acting Commissioner moved to affirm the denial
of benefits.
Gardner asserts two arguments.
First, she claims that the
ALJ's RFC finding did not properly consider her limitations.
Second, Gardner argues that the ALJ committed several related
legal errors when he allegedly misstated objective medical
evidence, inaccurately evaluated her credibility, and did not
properly weigh her subjective complaints of pain.
After consideration of the parties’ arguments and the
administrative record, the court finds the record evidence
sufficient to support the ALJ's decision. Therefore, Gardner's
motion is denied and the Acting Commissioner’s motion is granted.
I.
Standard of Review
The court’s review of SSA’s final decision “is limited to
determining whether the ALJ used the proper legal standards and
found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.”
of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2000).
Ward v. Comm’r
The ALJ’s
decision will be upheld if it supported by substantial evidence,
that is, “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotations omitted).
This is less evidence
than a preponderance but “more than a mere scintilla.”
Id.;
Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
The
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not preclude a finding of substantial evidence.
Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s resolution of
evidentiary conflicts must be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence, even if contrary results are supportable.
2
Rodriguez
Pagan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
1987).
II.
The court next turns to the ALJ’s decision.
Background1
In analyzing Gardner's benefit application, the ALJ invoked
the required five-step process.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
First,
he concluded that Gardner had not engaged in substantial work
activity after the alleged onset of her disability in May 2005.
Next, the ALJ determined that Gardner suffered from several
severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
spine, fibromyalgia, knee degeneration, and depression with a
history of post-traumatic stress disorder
§ 416.920(c).
See 20 C.F.R.
At the third step, the ALJ concluded that
Gardner's impairments––either individually or collectively--did
not meet or “medically equal” one of the listed impairments in
the Social Security regulations.
416.925, & 416.926.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d),
The ALJ next found that Gardner had the RFC
to perform light work with the ability to:
frequently climb
ramps, stairs, and ladders; frequently crawl; balance, stoop,
kneel, and crouch without limits; interact with supervisors and
co-workers; avoid the public except for on a very superficial and
sporadic basis, limited to one-on-one interaction with the public
1
The court recounts here only those facts relevant to the
instant appeal. The parties’ more complete recitation in their
Joint Statement of Material Facts is incorporated by reference.
See L.R. 9.1(d).
3
on a superficial level once or twice a day without any real
substance; make simple work-related decisions in a routine work
environment; and to engage in moderately complex four-to-five
step instructions with an ability to understand, remember, and
carry out those tasks.
Given that the ALJ found at step four
that Gardner could not perform any past relevant work,2 the ALJ
proceeded to step five, at which the SSA bears the burden of
showing that a claimant can perform other work that exists in the
national economy.
Cir. 2001).
Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608 (1st
Here, the ALJ, relying on Gardner's testimony and
medical records and a vocational expert's testimony, concluded
that Gardner could perform such jobs as cleaner, collator
operator, and price marker, all of which exist in the regional
and national economy.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Gardner not
disabled, within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
III.
A.
Analysis
Credibility
Undergirding much of this appeal is Gardner's claim that the
ALJ improperly assessed her credibility and erroneously
undervalued her subjective complaints of pain and impairment.
These arguments are without merit.
2
Gardner had previously worked as a classroom aide,
bartender, laborer and cashier.
4
First, the court notes that while Gardner claims that
"objective medical findings support [her] complaints of pain" in
her back, ankles, knees and "overall body aches," her argument
here merely recites her complaints, but contains few, if any,
reference to objective findings the ALJ "misstated."
Indeed, the
very next sentence of Gardner's brief notes only that "at every
office visit, [Gardner] complained of chronic pain between 2005
and 2008."
The brief then goes on to detail those subjective
complaints, but not the objective evidence that allegedly
supports them.
Gardner also argues that, "given the strong medical evidence
of [Gardner's] severe spinal pain, bilateral knee and ankle pain,
and constant fibromyalgia pain . . . the ALJ should have given
far greater credibility to the Plaintiff."
But it is well-
settled that an ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to
deference, especially when supported by specific evidence.
Simmons v. Astrue, 736 F. Supp. 2d 391, 401 (D.N.H. 2010) (citing
Frustaglia v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 195
(1st Cir. 1987) (“[t]he credibility determination by the ALJ, who
observed the claimant, evaluated [her] demeanor, and considered
how that testimony fit in with the rest of the evidence, is
entitled to deference, especially when supported by specific
findings”)).
5
Here, the ALJ found that while Gardner's impairments could
be expected to cause the symptoms of which she complained, she
was not credible with respect to the intensity, limiting effects
and persistence of those symptoms due to inconsistency with the
objective medical evidence of record.
For example, with respect
to Gardner's claim of disabling back pain, the ALJ noted that the
medical records indicated a diagnosis of only mild degenerative
disc disease.
Also, although Gardner frequently referenced
fibromyalgia pain, the record was bereft of a formal diagnosis.
Finally, Gardner's complaint of debilitating knee pain was offset
by medical scans showing only mild degenerative left knee joint
disease.
While "complaints of pain need not be precisely
corroborated by objective findings, [] they must be consistent
with medical findings.” Dupuis v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 869 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir. 1989)."
Thus, the ALJ's
conclusion that Gardner's complaints were inconsistent with the
medical findings is well-supported.
The ALJ further supported his conclusions with reference to
Gardner's reports of her activities of daily living, which, to
some extent, conflicted with her claims of serious physical and
non-physical limitations.
appropriate.
This evaluation is entirely
Avery v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 797 F.2d
19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986).
As the ALJ noted, Gardner reported that
she made and designed jewelry which she attempted to sell
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locally, exercised both by walking and using a video game system,
and cared for her own personal and household needs.
This
inconsistency provides sufficient support for the ALJ's
determination that Gardner's subjective complaints were not
entirely credible.
B.
Residual Functional Capacity
Gardner next argues that the ALJ failed to take all of her
limitations into account when assessing her RFC.
She claims that
pains in her back, knees and ankles, her lower extremity
limitations and overall body aches and fatigue leave her unable
to perform "light" work, as found by the ALJ, with the conditions
previously noted.
See 20 C.F.R. 404.967(b).
Boiled to its
essence, however, Gardner is doing little more than disagreeing
with the evidentiary weight given to her subjective pain
complaints, all of which the ALJ considered.
By contrast, the
ALJ's RFC finding is consistent with that of Dr. Thomas Phillips,
a state examiner who opined that Gardner could perform light work
--the only record opinion regarding plaintiff's functional
abilities.
The responsibility of weighing such evidence rests
with the ALJ.
2001).
Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
Moreover, Dr. Phillips's conclusion was bolstered by
treating nurse practitioner Todd Smith, who, in 2009, noted that
he "saw nothing that would justify" disability benefits at that
point in time.
While Smith was not an "acceptable medical
7
source," 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513, and thus his opinion was properly
given little weight, the ALJ correctly observed that Smith's
opinion supported his RFC conclusion.
20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(1)
(noting that it is permissible to use evidence from other
"medical sources," including nurse practitioners); Alcantara v.
Astrue, 257 F. App'x 333, 334-35 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The ALJ was
required to weigh all of the evidence[,]" including those not
deemed "acceptable medical sources.").
Gardner also takes issue with the ALJ's RFC finding insofar
as it allegedly failed to consider all of her anxiety-related
limitations.
While it is true that Gardner complained of
fatigue, depression and anxiety, the record does not support her
argument that the ALJ wrongly concluded that she could "engage in
moderately complex four to five step instructions with an ability
to understand, remember and carry out those tasks."
The ALJ
considered evidence from treating social worker Kim Devine, who
noted that Gardner would have some difficulty dealing with the
public, a finding that the ALJ incorporated into his RFC
determination, which limited such interactions to a "superficial
and sporadic basis."
With respect to carrying out instructions,
a non-examining state agency medical consultant, Dr. Leizer,
reported that his review of Gardner's treatment records showed
that her activities of daily living appeared intact and that she
would be able to perform the mental requirements of all levels of
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work.
See Berrios Lopez v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 951
F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that non-examining
consultants' reports are entitled to evidentiary weight); see
also Quintana v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 110 F. App'x 142, 144 (1st
Cir. 2004) (holding that “greater reliance” on consultants’
reports is warranted where consultant considered reports of
examining and treating doctors and supported conclusions with
reference to medical findings).
Against this factual backdrop, the court finds that the
ALJ's RFC determination was supported by substantial medical
evidence.
IV.
Conclusion
While the record demonstrates that Ms. Gardner suffers from
a variety of ailments, the ALJ's decision is nevertheless
supported by substantial evidence.
is DENIED.
Claimant's motion to reverse3
Defendant's motion to affirm4 is GRANTED.
The clerk
shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph N. Laplante
United States District Judge
3
Document no. 14.
4
Document no. 15.
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Dated: June 17, 2015
cc:
Christopher J. Seufert, Esq.
Daniel McKenna, Esq.
Kelie C. Schneider, Esq.
Robert J. Rabuck, AUSA
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