Woodley v. FCI Berlin, Warden

Filing 9

ORDER re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - 2241. For the foregoing reasons, this court dismisses Woodley's § 2241 petition without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. This order does not restrict Woodley's ability to apply in the Fifth Circuit for permission to file a successive § 2255 motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a) and 2255(h). So Ordered by District Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(ko)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

James Arthur Woodley
v.

Civil No. 13-cv-513-LM
Opinion No. 2014 DNH 138

Warden, FCI, Berlin

O R D E R
FCI-Berlin inmate James Woodley has filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the
validity of his conviction and sentence in the Southern District
of Texas for using a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), on the basis that the
conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Before the

court is Woodley’s response (doc. no. 8) to this court’s April
7, 2014, order (doc. no. 7) that directed Woodley to show, among
other things:


whether the remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 could be
deemed “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality
of his detention, for the purposes of allowing Woodley to
proceed with his § 2241 petition here, rather than
proceeding in the sentencing court on a § 2255 motion;
and



whether the interests of justice require this court to
transfer this matter to the Fifth Circuit for review
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

This court, having reviewed Woodley’s response to the April
7 order, now finds as follows:
1.

Woodley filed a prior § 2255 motion in 2003 in the
sentencing court in the Southern District of Texas,
challenging the conviction at issue here.

See Doc. No.

8, at 4-10 (describing § 2255 litigation); see also
United States v. Woodley, No. 4:99-cr-00464 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 24, 2005) (cm/ecf doc. no. 161) (denial of
certificate of appealability in United States v.
Woodley, No. 04-20565 (5th Cir. Jan. 24. 2005));
2.

Woodley filed the instant § 2241 petition more than a
decade after the challenged conviction became final;
and

3.

The claim asserted in this § 2241 petition is
substantially the same as an insufficiency of the
evidence claim Woodley asserted on direct appeal that
was rejected by the Fifth Circuit.

See United States

v. Woodley, 37 F. App’x 91, 2002 WL 1022031, at *2 (5th
Cir. May 13, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished decision).

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Discussion
I.

Restrictions Potentially Applicable to Woodley’s Claims
At least three potentially applicable restrictions could

affect Woodley’s ability to litigate a collateral challenge to
his conviction in the court where he was convicted.

First, the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires
Woodley to obtain certification from the Fifth Circuit under
§ 2255(h), before he may litigate a successive § 2255 motion in
the sentencing court.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Trenkler v.

United States, 536 F.3d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 2008); see also In re
Simpson, No. 13-40718, 2014 WL 494816, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 7,
2014).

Second, AEDPA generally imposes a one-year statute of

limitations on § 2255 motions.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

And

third, the law of the case doctrine generally bars an inmate like
Woodley from relitigating questions in a § 2255 motion that were
previously raised and rejected in the direct appeal of the
conviction.

See United States v. Jackson, 178 F.3d 1290, 1999 WL

236005, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished decision)
(issue addressed and rejected on direct appeal could not be
relitigated in § 2255 motion); Singleton v. United States, 26
F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir. 1994) (same).

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II.

Savings Clause
Woodley argues that his insufficiency of the evidence claim

should be characterized as a claim of actual innocence, and that
he therefore must be allowed to proceed in this court with his
§ 2241 petition, pursuant to the § 2255(e) savings clause, in
order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

Restrictions, such as

those listed above, which limit the ability of an inmate to
litigate a § 2255 motion in the sentencing court, are not
generally sufficient to render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective
as a means to challenge the legality of the inmate’s detention,
particularly in cases where there is no credible claim of factual
innocence.
A petition under § 2255 cannot become “inadequate or
ineffective,” thus permitting the use of § 2241, merely
because a petitioner cannot meet the AEDPA “second or
successive” requirements. Such a result would make
Congress’s AEDPA amendment of § 2255 a meaningless
gesture. Rather, recourse to the savings clause has
only been permitted in rare and exceptional
circumstances, such as those in which strict adherence
to AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions would result in a
complete miscarriage of justice[.] The Supreme Court
has defined the term “miscarriage of justice” as
encompassing only those extraordinary instances when a
constitutional violation probably has caused the
conviction of one innocent of the crime.
McKubbin v. Grondolsky, No. CIV.A. 13-11364-JGD, 2014 WL 1245881,
at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2014) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Trenkler, 536 F.3d at 98 (“mere
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inability to satisfy [AEDPA’s gatekeeping] requirements does not
afford access to [§ 2255(e)’s] savings clause”).
Woodley attempts to characterize his sufficiency of the
evidence argument as an “actual innocence” claim.

The Supreme

Court, however, has characterized a gateway actual innocence
claim as a claim asserting that “in light of new evidence ‘it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006) (citation omitted).

House v. Bell,
Woodley’s

allegations of actual innocence are not supported by “new
reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—
that was not presented at trial.”

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

324 (1995); see also Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d
95, 102 (1st Cir. 2008).
Nothing in the record suggests that Woodley’s case presents
a colorable claim of actual innocence, or that denying Woodley
access to the § 2255(e) would effect a miscarriage of justice.
Woodley has not shown, therefore, that the § 2255(e) savings
clause allows this court to exercise jurisdiction over the § 2241
petition.

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II.

Transfer or Dismissal
In light of this court’s findings regarding the potential

procedural bars affecting Woodley’s petition, including the law
of the case doctrine, this court finds that transferring this
case to the Fifth Circuit is not required by the interests of
justice.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court dismisses Woodley’s
§ 2241 petition without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.
This order does not restrict Woodley’s ability to apply in the
Fifth Circuit for permission to file a successive § 2255 motion,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a) and 2255(h).
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
June 18, 2014
cc:

James Arthur Woodley, pro se
Seth R. Aframe, Esq.

LM:nmd

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