Anderson v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner

Filing 13

///ORDER denying 7 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner; granting 10 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. Clerk shall enter judgment and close the case. So Ordered by District Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(gla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Amanda Beth Anderson
v.

Civil No. 14-cv-15-LM
Opinion No. 2014 DNH 232

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Amanda Beth Anderson moves
to reverse the Acting Commissioner’s decision to deny her
application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382.

The Acting

Commissioner, in turn, moves for an order affirming her
decision.

For the reasons that follow, the decision of the

Acting Commissioner, as announced by the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), is affirmed.
Standard of Review
The applicable standard of review in this case provides, in
pertinent part:
The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
. . . .

1

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (setting out the standard of review for
decisions on claims for disability insurance benefits); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (establishing § 405(g) as the standard of
review for SSI decisions).

However, the court “must uphold a

denial of social security . . . benefits unless ‘the
[Commissioner] has committed a legal or factual error in
evaluating a particular claim.’”

Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of HHS,

76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Sullivan v. Hudson, 490
U.S. 877, 885 (1989)).
As for the statutory requirement that the Commissioner’s
findings of fact be supported by substantial evidence, “[t]he
substantial evidence test applies not only to findings of basic
evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn
from such facts.”

Alexandrou v. Sullivan, 764 F. Supp. 916,

917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Levine v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 727,
730 (2d Cir. 1966)).

In turn, “[s]ubstantial evidence is ‘more

than [a] mere scintilla.

It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’”

Currier v. Sec’y of HEW, 612 F.2d 594, 597 (1st

Cir. 1980) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)).

But, “[i]t is the responsibility of the [Commissioner]

to determine issues of credibility and to draw inferences from
the record evidence.

Indeed, the resolution of conflicts in the

evidence is for the [Commissioner], not the courts.”

2

Irlanda

Ortiz v. Sec’y of HHS, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted).

Moreover, the court “must uphold the

[Commissioner’s] conclusion, even if the record arguably could
justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by
substantial evidence.”
535 (1st Cir. 1988).

Tsarelka v. Sec’y of HHS, 842 F.2d 529,
Finally, when determining whether a

decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial
evidence, the court must “review[] the evidence in the record as
a whole.”

Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (quoting Rodriguez v.

Sec’y of HHS, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981)).
Background
The parties have submitted a Joint Statement of Material
Facts, document no. 12.

That statement is part of the court’s

record and will be summarized here, rather than repeated in
full.
Anderson first applied for SSI in June of 2011.

She

alleged disability due to bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety,
calcifications of the brain, scoliosis,1 and fibromyalgia.2
Administrative Transcript (hereinafter “Tr.”) 122.

Scoliosis is an “[a]bnormal lateral and rotational
curvature of the vertebral column.” Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary (“Stedman’s”) 1734 (28th ed. 2006).
1

Fibromyalgia is “[a] common syndrome of chronic
widespread soft-tissue pain accompanied by weakness, fatigue,
and sleep disturbances; the cause is unknown.” Stedman’s, supra
note 1, at 725.
2

3

In August of 2011, Anderson completed a function report in
connection with her SSI application.

In that report, she

reported difficulty interacting with other people and extreme
pain in her back, hips, shoulders, and hands.
daily migraine headaches.

She also reported

Despite those symptoms, Anderson

stated that she: (1) was able to care for her children with the
help of a roommate; (2) was able maintain her personal care,
except that she had trouble bending and balancing; and (3) could
drive, shop for groceries, and handle money.
In September 2011, two state-agency consulting doctors
rendered opinions on Anderson’s residual functional capacity3
(“RFC”).

Dr. James Trice, a physician, reviewed Anderson’s

medical records and rendered an opinion on her physical RFC.
Dr. William Jamieson, a clinical psychologist, reviewed
Anderson’s medical records and rendered an opinion on her mental
RFC.
In that same month, Anderson also saw Dr. Edouard Carignan,
a clinical psychologist, for a consultative evaluation.
Anderson told Dr. Carignan that she had no difficulty with
household activities and that she did not need assistance when
shopping or managing money.

Dr. Carignan diagnosed Anderson

Residual functional capacity is “the most a [claimant]
can do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
3

4

with anxiety and OCD.4

He noted diagnoses of scoliosis, asthma,

and migraines “by history.”

With respect to Anderson’s

functional capacity, he wrote that Anderson “would have
extensive difficulty interacting with a supervisor who would
insist that the work be completed in a manner other than the
manner in which she found acceptable.”

Tr. 350.

He also noted

that Anderson would have no psychological difficulty in
performing activities of daily living, understanding or
remembering instructions, or in concentrating or completing
tasks.
In January of 2011, Anderson saw her primary healthcare
provider, Sonya Gilbert, a physician’s assistant.
evaluated Anderson and completed a function report.

Gilbert
In that

report, Gilbert noted diagnoses of depression, anxiety,
fibromyalgia, joint pain, and asthma.

Gilbert opined that due

to Anderson’s physical limitations, she could perform sedentary
activities, but nothing more.

With respect to Anderson’s mental

impairments, Gilbert found her to be markedly limited in her

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”) is “a type of
anxiety [disorder] the essential features of which include
recurrent obsessions, persistent intrusive ideas, thoughts,
impulses or images, or compulsions (repetitive, purposeful, and
intentional behaviors performed to decrease anxiety in response
to an obsession) sufficiently severe to cause marked distress,
be time-consuming, or significantly interfere with the person’s
normal routine, occupational functioning, or usual social
activities or relationships with others.” Stedman’s, supra note
1, at 570.
4

5

ability to interact with others and to maintain attention for
extended periods of time, and found her to be mildly to
moderately limited in several other areas of mental functioning.
In October 2012, Gilbert completed a Medical Source
Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities.

Tr. 757-65.

Gilbert stated that Anderson could frequently carry and lift up
to ten pounds, and occasionally carry and lift eleven to twenty
pounds.

Gilbert also stated that Anderson could perform

activities such as: (1) shopping; (2) climbing a few steps at a
reasonable pace with the use of a single handrail; (3) preparing
a simple meal and feeding herself; and (4) caring for her
personal hygiene.

However, Gilbert also noted that Anderson

“has severe anxiety and is unable to shop alone [or] leave the
house alone.”

Tr. 766.

In addition to the above mentioned function reports,
Anderson’s record contains numerous medical records dating from
January 2011.

Those records include treatment notes from the

Alpine Clinic, Paincare Centers, Littleton Regional Hospital,
Weeks Medical Center, and Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center.
Anderson’s application for SSI benefits was denied in
September 2011, and she requested a hearing before an ALJ.

In

October 2012, ALJ Matthew Levin conducted a hearing at which he
heard testimony from Anderson and a vocational expert (“VE”).
At that hearing Anderson testified about her activities of daily

6

living and her limitations.

After the hearing, the ALJ issued a

decision that includes the following relevant findings of fact
and conclusions of law:
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments:
depression, anxiety with OCD, and fibromyalgia (20 CFR
416.920(c)).
. . . .
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
. . . .
4. After careful consideration of the entire record,
the undersigned finds that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can
occasionally perform fine manipulation bilaterally.
She is able to maintain attention and concentration
for two-hour increments throughout a workday, but
would have to do so in a low stress environment
(defined as requiring limited to no change in the work
setting and little to no judgment), the claimant can
sustain limited social contact with the general public
and coworkers, and occasional social contact with
supervisors.
. . . .
9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform (20
C.F.R. 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
Tr. 73-74, 76, 80.

Based on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ

found that Anderson could work as a “housekeeping cleaner,” a
preparer, or a surveillance system monitor.

7

The ALJ concluded

that Anderson had not been disabled from the date of her
application through the date of the decision.
Discussion
Anderson’s arguments boil down to three claims of error in
the ALJ’s decision.

Anderson argues for reversal because the

ALJ: (1) mishandled her fibromyalgia by failing to follow SSR
12-2p,5 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012); (2) failed to consider
her scoliosis a severe impairment at step two of the sequential
analysis; and (3) made a faulty RFC determination both by
failing to properly consider the medical opinion evidence and by
determining that her statements about her symptoms were not
credible.
A. The Legal Framework
To be eligible for SSI, a person must be aged, blind, or
disabled, and must meet certain requirements pertaining to
income and assets.

42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

The only question in

this case is whether Anderson was disabled.
For the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI,
[a]n individual shall be considered to be disabled for
purposes of this subchapter if [she] is unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or

“SSR” stands for “Social Security Ruling,” and SSR 12-2p
is titled “Evaluation of Fibromyalgia.”
5

8

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

Moreover,

[f]or purposes of subparagraph (A), an individual
shall be determined to be under a disability only if
[her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which [she] lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or
whether he [she] would be hired if [she] applied for
work . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To decide whether a claimant is disabled for the purpose of
determining eligibility for SSI benefits, an ALJ is required to
employ a five-step process.

See 20 C.F.R. § 41.920.

The steps are: 1) if the [claimant] is engaged in
substantial gainful work activity, the application is
denied; 2) if the [claimant] does not have, or has not
had within the relevant time period, a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the
application is denied; 3) if the impairment meets the
conditions for one of the “listed” impairments in the
Social Security regulations, then the application is
granted; 4) if the [claimant’s] “residual functional
capacity” is such that he or she can still perform
past relevant work, then the application is denied; 5)
if the [claimant], given his or her residual
functional capacity, education, work experience, and
age, is unable to do any other work, the application
is granted.
Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920).

9

The claimant bears the burden of proving that she is
disabled.

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987).

must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.

She

See Mandziej v.

Chater, 944 F. Supp. 121, 129 (D.N.H. 1996) (citing Paone v.
Schweiker, 530 F. Supp. 808, 810-11)(D. Mass. 1982)).

Finally,

[i]n assessing a disability claim, the [Commissioner]
considers objective and subjective factors, including:
(1) objective medical facts; (2) [claimant]’s
subjective claims of pain and disability as supported
by the testimony of the [claimant] or other witness;
and (3) the [claimant]’s educational background, age,
and work experience.
Mandziej, 944 F. Supp. at 129 (citing Avery v. Sec’y of HHS, 797
F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986); Goodermote v. Sec’y of HHS, 690
F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1982)).
B. Anderson’s Arguments
As noted above, Anderson argues that the ALJ committed
reversible error by: (1) failing to follow SSR 12-2p when
evaluating her fibromyalgia; (2) failing to consider her
scoliosis a severe impairment; and (3) rendering a faulty RFC
assessment.

The court considers each argument in turn.
1.

Fibromyalgia

Anderson argues that the ALJ’s decision “does not properly
evaluate [her] severe impairment of fibromyalgia as set forth in
SSR 12-2p.”

Anderson fails to identify, however, how the ALJ’s

10

analysis of her fibromyalgia strayed from the procedure outlined
in SSR 12-2p.

The Acting Commissioner argues, and this court

agrees, that despite the ALJ’s failure to directly cite SSR 122p, he complied with it.

As required by SSR 12-2p, when

evaluating Anderson’s claim, the ALJ considered Anderson’s
fibromyalgia at each step of the sequential evaluation process
and properly evaluated her credibility, see infra Part 2.b.
Thus, Anderson’s argument fails.
2.

Scoliosis

With regard to step two of the sequential evaluation
process, Anderson argues that the ALJ’s failure to consider her
scoliosis a severe impairment was not supported by substantial
evidence.

However, the court need not inquire into whether

Anderson’s scoliosis is a severe impairment because “[t]his
court has consistently held . . . that an error in describing a
given impairment as non-severe is harmless so long as the ALJ
found at least one severe impairment and progressed to the next
step of the sequential evaluation process.”

Chabot v. U.S. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 13-cv-126-PB, 2014 WL 2106498, at *9 (D.N.H. May
20, 2014).

Here, the ALJ found that Anderson “has the following

severe impairments: depression, anxiety with OCD, and
fibromyalgia,” Tr. 73, and proceeded to the next steps of the
sequential evaluation process.

Accordingly, any error the ALJ

11

may have made regarding his assessment of Anderson’s scoliosis
is harmless.
3.

The ALJ’s RFC Assessment

Anderson next claims that the ALJ made two errors when
determining her RFC.

First, she challenges the weight the ALJ

assigned to the opinion evidence.

Second, she takes issue with

the ALJ’s credibility assessment.
a.

Weighing the Opinion Evidence

According to Anderson, the ALJ made two errors when
weighing the medical opinions.

First, she argues that the ALJ

failed to give appropriate weight to Gilbert’s opinion, and
instead, relied primarily on the opinions of non-treating
physicians.

Second, Anderson argues that the ALJ’s analysis

contains internal inconsistencies with respect to Dr. Carignan’s
opinion of her RFC.

The court addresses each argument in turn.
i.

Weight Given to Gilbert’s Opinion

Anderson argues that the ALJ should have given Gilbert’s
opinion controlling weight because Gilbert is Anderson’s
primary-care provider and her opinion was rendered closer in
time to the hearing than the opinions on which the ALJ
ultimately relied.

This argument fails because, as a

physician’s assistant, Gilbert is not an “acceptable medical
source.”

12

Only “acceptable medical sources” can be considered
treating sources whose medical opinions are entitled to
controlling weight.

See SSR 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2

(Aug. 9, 2006).
In contrast, . . . physicians’ assistants are defined
as “other sources” whose opinions may be considered
with respect to the severity of the claimant’s
impairment and ability to work, but need not be
assigned controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §
416.913(d)(1). Therefore, while the ALJ is certainly
free to consider the opinions of these “other sources”
in making his overall assessment of a claimant’s
impairments and residual abilities, those opinions do
not demand the same deference as those of a treating
physician.
Genier v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2008).

Thus,

while the ALJ may have considered Gilbert’s opinion, it is not
entitled to controlling weight as an opinion of a treating
physician.
Further, for Anderson to mount any kind of argument based
on the weight the ALJ gave to the medical opinions, see 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2) (describing the way in which the
Commissioner is to evaluate opinion evidence), it was incumbent
on her to produce medical opinions from which the ALJ could have
crafted a more favorable RFC.

See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146

(pointing out the claimant’s burden to demonstrate disability).

13

This she did not do.6

Without producing any opinion evidence

contrary to the opinions of the state-agency consultants, or any
opinions closer in time to her hearing, there was no
counterweight to the opinions on which the ALJ relied.
Necessarily, the ALJ relied on the only medical opinions in the
record.
ii.

Weight Given to Dr. Carignan’s Opinion

Anderson next argues that the ALJ’s decision is internally
inconsistent with respect to the weight the ALJ assigned Dr.
Carignan’s opinion.

Dr. Carignan opined that Anderson would

have “extensive difficulty interacting with a supervisor who
would insist that work be completed in a manner other than the
manner in which she found acceptable.”

Tr. 350.

Anderson

argues that the ALJ’s decision is inconsistent because despite
giving Dr. Carignan’s opinion “significant weight,”

Tr. 79, the

ALJ found that Anderson could “occasionally [have] contact with
supervisors.”

Tr. at 79.

But, as the Acting Commissioner

points out, Anderson has failed to articulate how this amounts
to an inconsistency.

Thus, her argument fails.

Anderson has produced some treatment records, but she has
produced no “statements from [treating] physicians [or]
psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect
judgments about the nature and severity of [her] impairment(s),
including [her] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [she]
can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental
restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2).
6

14

b.

The ALJ’s Credibility Assessment

Anderson’s final argument is that the ALJ’s credibility
finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

Anderson

contends that the ALJ erred by failing to give proper weight to
her testimony about her pain symptoms.
According to Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p, “an
individual’s statement(s) about his or her symptoms is not in
itself enough to establish the existence of a physical or mental
impairment or that the individual is disabled.”
at *2.

1996 WL 374186,

“A symptom is an individual’s own description of his or

her physical or mental impairment(s).”

Id.

When “symptoms, such as pain, fatigue, shortness of breath,
weakness, or nervousness,” id., are alleged, SSR 96-7p
prescribes
a specific staged inquiry that consists of the
following questions, in the following order:
(1) does the claimant have an underlying impairment
that could produce the symptoms he or she claims?; (2)
if so, are the claimant’s statements about his or her
symptoms substantiated by objective medical evidence?;
and (3) if not, are the claimant’s statements about
those symptoms credible?
Allard v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-82-JL, 2014 WL 677489, at *2 (D.N.H.
Feb. 21, 2014) (citation omitted); Valiquette v. Astrue, 498 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 434 (D. Mass. 2007) (“dissonance between the
objective medical assessments and the plaintiff’s description of
the level of pain he was experiencing . . . merely poses the

15

question of the credibility of his subjective complaints, it
does not answer it”).
If an adjudicator reaches the third step in the inquiry,
i.e., the credibility question, he or she must also consider
additional evidence, such as:
1. The individual’s daily activities;
2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
the individual’s pain or other symptoms;
3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the
symptoms;
4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects
of any medication the individual takes or has taken to
alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual
receives or has received for relief of pain or other
symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment the individual
uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms
(e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15
to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and
7. Any other factors concerning the individual’s
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or
other symptoms.
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3.

In this circuit, the seven

considerations listed above are commonly referred to as the
Avery factors.

However, “[a]s a matter of law, the ALJ is not

required to address all of the Avery factors in his decision.”
Matos v. Astrue, 795 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (D. Mass. 2001)
(citing N.L.R.B. v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13, 26
(1st Cir. 1999)).
16

An ALJ’s credibility determination must be supported by
substantial evidence, see Irlanda Oritz, 955 F.2d at 769, and
“is entitled to deference, especially when supported by specific
findings,” Frustaglia v. Sec’y of HHS, 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st
Cir. 1987) (citing Da Rosa v. Sec’y of HHS, 803 F.2d 24, 26
(1986)).

That said, an ALJ’s “determination or decision must

contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility,
supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be
sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.”
96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (emphasis added).

SSR

In other words,

“[i]t is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single,
conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s allegations have
been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not)
credible.’”

Id.

To perform a proper discussion and analysis,

the ALJ “must identify what testimony is not credible and what
evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”

Balaguer v.

Astrue, 880 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D. Mass. 2012) (quoting Bazile
v. Apfel, 113 F. Supp. 2d 181, 187 (D. Mass. 2000); citing
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Here, the court can find no fault with the manner in which
the ALJ evaluated Anderson’s credibility.

The ALJ clearly

identified the statements to which he applied the credibility

17

analysis.

See Weaver v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-340-SM, 2011 WL

2580766, at *6 (D.N.H. May 25, 2011) (“As a starting point for
the following analysis, it is necessary to identify the
statement(s) at issue.”).

Then, the ALJ answered the first

question of the staged inquiry by finding “that [Anderson’s]
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the alleged symptoms.”

Tr. 77.

The ALJ then answered the second question of the staged
inquiry by finding that “[i]n terms of [Anderson’s] alleged
disabling level of fibromyalgia pain and limitation, the medical
evidence fails to fully support the allegations.”

Tr. 77.

To

bolster that finding, the ALJ pointed to several specific pieces
of objective medical evidence including reports about Anderson’s
gait and her “full range of motion and strength in all her
extremities.”

Tr. 77.

Anderson may be correct that the record contains
substantial evidence supporting her statements about pain.
However, the test for a reviewing court is not whether the
record arguably supports a claimant’s version of events.
Rather, the court “must uphold the [Acting Commissioner’s]
conclusion, even if the record arguably could justify a
different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence.”

See Tsarelka, 842 F.2d at 535.

As things stand,

there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination

18

that Anderson’s allegations of pain were not substantiated by
objective medical evidence, and that is dispositive.7

Finally,

having determined that it was necessary to assess Anderson’s
credibility pursuant to question three of the staged inquiry,
the ALJ did so with citations to evidence in the record.
Anderson responds by citing her medical record generally,
faulting the ALJ for considering her daily activities, the first
Avery factor, and asserting that her statements are credible.
She does not, however: (1) identify any Avery factor the ALJ did
not consider; or (2) demonstrate that the ALJ’s credibility
assessment was not supported by substantial evidence.

Those

failures are fatal to Anderson’s arguments.
Conclusion
Because the ALJ has committed neither a legal nor factual
error in evaluating Anderson’s claim, see Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d
at 16, Anderson’s motion for an order reversing the Acting
Commissioner’s decision, document no. 7, is denied, and the

In Johnson v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 2009),
the court found an ALJ’s credibility assessment of a claimant
with fibromyalgia was flawed because the ALJ discredited the
claimant without pointing to any “instances in which any of the
claimant’s physicians ever discredited her complaints of such
pain.” Here, however, the ALJ pointed to objective medical
evidence that tended to discredit Anderson’s statements.
7

19

Acting Commissioner’s motion for an order affirming her
decision, document no. 10, is granted.

The clerk of the court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
November 4, 2014
cc:

Christine Woodman Casa, Esq.
T. David Plourde, Esq.

20