Serna et al v. Lafayette Nordic Village, Inc. et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.(gla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Adriana Serna and
Charlie Serna
v.

Civil No. 14-cv-049-JD
Opinion No. 2015 DNH 138

Lafayette Nordic
Village, Inc., et al.
O R D E R
While on visiting friends in New Hampshire, Adriana Serna
went skating at Nestlenook Farm and Resort (“Nestlenook”) and
was injured when she fell while walking to the warming gazebo.
Adriana and her husband, Charlie Serna, brought suit against the
owners and operators of Nestlenook, alleging that the defendants
were negligent in maintaining the path and failing to warn of
dangers, that they were negligent in training and supervising
the staff at Nestlenook, and that their negligence caused
Adriana’s fall and Charlie Serna’s loss of consortium.

The

defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the
release Adriana signed bars her claims.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Santangelo v. New York Life Ins. Co., 785 F.3d

65, 68 (1st Cir. 2015).

“A genuine issue is one that can be

resolved in favor of either party, and a material fact is one
which has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.”
Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 217, 223 (1st
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In deciding a

motion for summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable
factual inferences in favor of the nonmovant.

Kenney v. Floyd,

700 F.3d 604, 608 (1st Cir. 2012).

Background
On February 28, 2011, Adriana went to Nestlenook with her
friend and former employer, Melissa Rigazio, Melissa’s
daughters, and a friend of one of the daughters.

Adriana and

the girls rented ice skates to use on Nestlenook’s skating pond.
Nestlenook provided a warming gazebo near the skating pond
where renters changed into and out of their skates.

The route

between the gazebo and the pond consisted of a six-foot portion
covered by rubber mats followed by a set of stairs.
The form for renting skates at Nestlenook included a
release of liability on the reverse side.

As part of renting

the skates, Adriana signed the rental form.
After skating, Adriana walked from the pond up the stairs
to the path that led to the warming gazebo.

At the top of the

stairs, Adriana stepped onto a rubber mat that had been placed
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on the path, which she contends was icy and buckled.
no hand rail.

There was

She took several steps and then slipped and fell,

injuring her ankle, which later required surgery.
The Sernas filed suit against Lafayette Nordic Village,
Inc., Olde Jackson Village, Inc., and Robert Cyr as the owners
and operators of Nestlenook.

They alleged claims of negligence,

Count I; negligent training and supervision, Count II; and loss
of consortium, Count III.

Lafayette Nordic Village, Inc. has

been dismissed from the action by stipulation.
Discussion
The defendants contend that the release on the rental form
is enforceable against Adriana and bars her claims against them.
Alternatively, the defendants argue that even if the release
does not bar all of the claims, it bars any claim arising out of
their negligence in the installation, maintenance, selection,
adjustment, and use of the rented skates.

The plaintiffs argue

that the release does not bar their claims.
“In New Hampshire, exculpatory contracts are generally
prohibited.”
(1986).

Barnes v. N.H. Karting Ass’n, 128 N.H. 102, 106

Despite the breadth of the general rule, the New

Hampshire Supreme Court has established a significant exception
when exculpatory contracts, including releases of liability,
“(1)[] do not violate public policy; (2) the plaintiff
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understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in
his position would have understood the import of the agreement;
and (3) the plaintiff’s claims were within the contemplation of
the parties when they executed the contract.”

McGrath v. SNH

Dev., Inc., 158 N.H. 540, 542 (2009); accord Jenks v. N.H. Motor
Speedway, Inc., 2010 WL 830244, at *3 (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 2010).

If

the release does not violate public policy, the court must
decide whether the release clearly identifies which parties are
shielded from liability and the types of claims that are barred.
See Porter v. Dartmouth College, 2009 WL 3227831, at *3 (D.N.H.
Sept. 30, 2009) (citing Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107).
A.

Public Policy
“A defendant seeking to avoid liability must show that an

exculpatory agreement does not contravene public policy; i.e.,
that no special relationship existed between the parties and
that there was no other disparity in bargaining power.”
128 N.H. at 106.

Barnes,

A special relationship exists when “the

defendant is a common carrier, innkeeper or public utility, or
is otherwise charged with a duty of public service.”

Id.

In

addition, a release may be against public policy if “it is
injurious to the interests of the public, violates some public
statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or
safety.”

McGrath, 158 N.H. at 543.
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The plaintiffs argue, briefly, that because the defendants
are innkeepers the release violates public policy.

Whether or

not the defendants are innkeepers, the release did not pertain
to the usual activities of running an inn.

In fact, the

plaintiffs were not staying at the inn at Nestlenook, and they
assert that the inn was closed for the winter when the accident
happened.
The release was part of a rental form for ice skates.

Like

snowboarding and kart racing, skating is not an activity “of
such great importance or necessity to the public that it creates
a special relationship.”

McGrath, 158 N.H. at 544.

For similar

reasons, the single opportunity to ice skate at Nestlenook did
not create a disparity in bargaining power that implicates
public policy.

Id.

Therefore, the release does not violate

public policy.
B.

Meaning of the Release
The defendants contend that a reasonable person would have

understood that the release applied to liability of Nestlenook
for all negligence and specifically to liability arising from
the use of the skates.

They also contend that Adriana assumed

the risks of skating.

The plaintiffs argue that neither Adriana

nor a reasonable person in her position would have understood
that the rental form included a release because she was not
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given an opportunity to read it and because the release does not
state that it applies to Nestlenooks’ negligence in constructing
and maintaining the premises and in training and supervising its
staff.
1.

Opportunity to Read the Release

The plaintiffs argue that Adriana did not understand and
that no reasonable person in her position would have understood
that she had signed a release of Nestlenook’s liability.

They

assert that Adriana did not have a chance to read the release
because the Nestlenook employee who rented the skates to her
“appeared to be in a hurry” and because Adriana was not aware
that the rental form she signed was a release.

They also argue

that the rental form did not clearly show that it was release of
the defendants’ liability.
A plaintiff’s failure to read a release “does not preclude
enforcement of the release.”

Barnes, 128 N.H. at 108.

As long

as the plaintiff had an opportunity to read the release, despite
the defendant’s employees hurrying to complete the transaction,
the plaintiff’s failure to do so does not bar the release.

Id.;

cf. Jenks v. N.H. Motor Speedway, Inc., 2010 WL 830244, at *3-*4
(D.N.H. Mar. 3, 2010) (material factual dispute existed as to
whether plaintiff had opportunity to read release where

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plaintiff put his name on a sign-up sheet and release may have
been obscured).
In this case, the release was printed on the back of the
rental form.

The Nestlenook employee who rented the skates to

Adriana completed the form, including the sizes and numbers of
the skates rented and the date.

Adriana signed the form on the

front.
Just above the signature line is the following statement:
“I have read the agreement on the back of the form, releasing
the inn from liability.
that agreement.”

I voluntarily agree to the terms of

The agreement referred to is the release on

the back, which is comprised of seven paragraphs and signature
and date lines.
Although Adriana did not also sign the release on the back
of the form, she signed on the front and in doing so, she agreed
to the release on the back.

Nothing in the circumstances

Adriana describes shows that she did not have an opportunity to
read the release.

Therefore, her failure to read the release

that was provided to her does not preclude enforcement.

See,

e.g., Dean v. MacDonald, 147 N.H. 263, 270 (2001).
The plaintiffs also argue that the lease is unenforceable
because it refers to the Inn rather than to Nestlenook.

They

contend that because the Inn was closed at the time neither
Adriana nor a reasonable person in her position would have
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understood who was released from liability.

In this case, a

reasonable person would have understood that the Inn encompassed
Nestlenook and functionally referred to the entity providing the
skates and access to the pond.1

See Dean, 147 N.H. at 270; cf.

Porter v. Dartmouth College, 2009 WL 3227831, at *3 (D.N.H.
Sept. 30, 2009) (release was form provided by ski manufacturer
as to its liability and did not release the owner of the ski
area).
3.

Scope of the Release

The plaintiffs contend that if the release is enforceable
it applies only to the defendants’ negligence in renting the
skates and to the activity of skating on the pond.

Based on

that limitation, the plaintiffs argue that the release does not
bar their claims that allege negligence in constructing and
maintaining the path, failing to warn of dangers on the path,
and failing to properly train and supervise employees to
maintain the premises.

The defendants argue that because

Adriana fell while wearing the rented skates and walking from

Although the plaintiff’s counsel states in an affidavit that
the Inn was closed at the time of Adriana’s injury, the
plaintiffs provide no evidence that Adriana knew the Inn was
closed or that a reasonable person would have known that. In
addition, paragraph 6 of the release states: “I hereby release
the Inn and its owners, agents and employees from any and all
liability for damage . . . ,” which applies to parties other
than the Inn. (Emphasis added.)
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the skating pond, the release bars all of her claims.
Alternatively, the defendants seek to bar the claims to the
extent they arise from their negligence related to the skates.
The scope of the release depends on the language used in
the release.

McGrath, 158 N.H. at 546-47.

To be enforceable, a

release must “‘clearly and specifically indicate[] the intent to
release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused
by the defendant’s negligence.’”

Wright v. Loon Mountain

Recreation Corp., 140 N.H. 166, 170 (2995) (quoting Barnes, 128
N.H. at 107).

The language used is given “its common meaning”

and the agreement is given “the meaning that would be attached
to it by a reasonable person.”

McGrath, 158 N.H. at 545

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Pertinent to the plaintiffs’ claims in this case, the
release on the back of the skate rental form provides:

“I

understand that there are inherent and other risks involved in
the sport for which this equipment is to be used and that
injuries are a common and ordinary occurrence of the sport, and
I freely assume those risks.”

The release also states that the

signer “hereby release[s] the Inn and its owners, agents and
employees from any and all liability for damage to [the signer]
. . . resulting from negligence: installation, maintenance, the
selection, adjustment and use of the equipment, accepting myself

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the full responsibility for any and all such damage or injury
which may result.”
Taken in the context of the entire release form and the
rental agreement, the provision in which the renter assumes
responsibility for inherent risks is reasonably interpreted to
mean risks inherent in the sport of skating.

The provision that

releases liability for negligence is limited to negligence for
the specific actions listed.

As such, that provision is

reasonably interpreted to pertain to the liability for
negligence in providing the rented equipment, that is the ice
skates.

Cf. McGrath, 158 N.H. at 545 (release at a ski area

applied to negligence in using a snowmobile because it released
defendant “from any and all liability for personal injury or
property damage which results in any way from negligence”
without any limitation).
Adriana was wearing skates when she fell, but she was
walking to the gazebo, not skating on the pond.

Because of

Nestlenook’s arrangement of providing the warming gazebo for
skaters to change their footwear which was accessible only by
the path to the pond, skaters had to walk in their skates from
the pond to the gazebo.

The defendants have not shown that

Adriana was engaged in the sport of skating when she fell.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were negligent in
constructing and maintaining the rubber mat portion of the path,
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in failing to protect their patrons and to warn of dangers on
the path, and in training and supervising their employees to
properly maintain the path.

Although the plaintiffs appear to

criticize the skates provided to Adriana in the fact portion of
their complaint, their claims do not allege negligence in
providing the skates or in maintaining the skating pond.
Therefore, the defendants have not shown that the release bars
the plaintiffs’ claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (document no. 13) is denied.
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Joseph DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
July 16, 2015
cc:

Stephen E. Borofsky, Esq.
David S. Brown, Esq.
Paul B. Kleinman, Esq.
Danielle L. Santuccio, Esq.

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