Coyne v. Dartmouth College Trustees
Filing
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ORDER denying 5 plaintiff's motion to remand her state law claims. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lat)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Tracy Coyne,
Plaintiff
v.
Case No. 14-cv-517-SM
Opinion No. 2015 DNH 070
The Trustees of Dartmouth College,
Defendant
O R D E R
From August of 2013 through January of 2014, Dartmouth
College employed plaintiff, Teresa Coyne, as an assistant
lacrosse coach.
After her employment was terminated, Coyne filed
a three-count writ in state court, asserting that Dartmouth
failed to pay her overtime wages to which she was entitled under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
She also advanced state
common law claims for breach of contract and negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
Dartmouth timely removed the case to federal court, invoking
the court’s federal question jurisdiction (over the FLSA claim),
as well as its supplemental jurisdiction (over the common law
claims).
Coyne now moves the court to remand her two common law
claims to state court, asserting that the court lacks
supplemental jurisdiction over them.
Dartmouth objects.
For the reasons discussed, Coyne’s motion to remand her
state law claims is denied.
Standard of Review
In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, “which granted
federal courts ‘supplemental jurisdiction’ or what had formerly
been referred to as ‘pendent jurisdiction’ and ‘ancillary
jurisdiction.”
Vera-Lozano v. International Broadcasting, 50
F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 1995).
Subject to certain exceptions not
relevant here, section 1367 provides that:
in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or
intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis supplied).
See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (providing that if a removed civil action includes
claims not within the court’s original or supplemental
jurisdiction, the court shall sever those claims “and shall
remand the severed claims to the State court from which the
action was removed”).
As the party invoking the court’s
supplemental jurisdiction, Dartmouth bears the burden of
demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists.
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See, e.g., Campbell
v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir.
2005); Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998).
In construing the scope of federal courts’ supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367, the court of appeals for this circuit
has held that, “a federal court may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a state claim whenever it is joined with a
federal claim and the two claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact’ and the plaintiff ‘would ordinarily be expected
to try them both in one judicial proceeding.’”
Pejepscot Indus.
Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 215 F.3d 195, 206 (1st Cir. 2000)
(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
Consequently, “supplemental jurisdiction has [] been exercised
where the facts underlying the federal and state claims
substantially overlap or where presentation of the federal claim
necessarily brings the facts underlying the state claim before
the court.
Conversely, supplemental jurisdiction should not be
exercised when the federal and state claims rest on essentially
unrelated facts.”
Chaluisan v. Simsmetal East LLC, 698 F. Supp.
2d 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations and internal punctuation
omitted).
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While the pertinent standard can be stated with relative
ease, its application can sometimes be vexing.
This is one such
case.
Discussion
In support of its view that the court may properly exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Coyne’s state law claims,
Dartmouth asserts that Coyne’s claim under the FLSA substantially
overlaps with her common law claims.
To resolve plaintiff’s FLSA
claim and determine whether she was exempt (or not exempt) from
the statute’s overtime provisions, a thorough analysis of her job
duties and responsibilities is required.
[T]here are three distinct types of findings involved
in determining whether an employee is exempt. First,
the court must make findings concerning the so-called
‘historical facts’ of the case, such as determining an
employee’s day-to-day duties. Second, the court must
draw factual inferences from these historical facts,
for instance, to conclude whether these day-to-day
duties require ‘invention, imagination, or talent’ as
required by applicable regulations. Finally, the trial
court must reach the ultimate conclusion of whether an
employee is exempt, based on both historical facts and
factual inferences.
Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
Similarly, says Dartmouth, resolution of
plaintiff’s wrongful termination claims requires an examination
of the nature of plaintiff’s duties, how she performed them, when
she performed them, and whether she performed them in a
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satisfactory manner.
Thus, it asserts that, “[b]y its very
nature, plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is intertwined with
her FLSA claim,” defendant’s memorandum (document no. 7-1) at 3,
and both claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.
Coyne disagrees, asserting that her FLSA claim is based on
facts entirely distinct from those underpinning her state law
claims.
In support of her position, Coyne relies primarily on an
opinion from the Court of Appeals for the Third circuit, as well
as several district court opinions that followed in its wake.
See Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 1995).
In Lyon, the
plaintiff claimed her employer failed to pay her overtime wages,
as required by the FLSA.
She also brought state common law tort
and contract claims, asserting that her employer failed to pay
her a promised bonus and then threatened to withhold a vested
bonus if she left the company.
The district court exercised
federal question jurisdiction over plaintiff’s FLSA claim, and
supplemental jurisdiction over her state common law claims.
Plaintiff prevailed on all three claims at trial.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed whether the district court properly exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims,
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noting that such an inquiry is, necessarily, a fact-intensive one
that is unique to each case.
The test for a “common nucleus of operative facts” is
not self-evident. Indeed, in trying to set out
standards for supplemental jurisdiction and to apply
them consistently, we observe that, like unhappy
families, no two cases of supplemental jurisdiction are
exactly alike.
Lyon, 45 F.3d at 760 (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
After examining the discrete facts presented in that case, the
court concluded that “the only link between [plaintiff’s] FLSA
and state law claims is the general employer-employee
relationship between the parties.”
Id. at 762.
The court then
held that “there was an insufficient factual nexus between the
federal and state claims to establish a common nucleus of
operative facts,” id. at 760, for the district court to properly
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.
Lyon’s FLSA claim involved very narrow, well-defined
factual issues about hours worked during particular
weeks. The facts relevant to her state law contract
and tort claims, which involved [defendant’s] alleged
underpayment of a bonus and its refusal to pay the
bonus if Lyon started looking for another job, were
quite distinct. In these circumstances it is clear
that there is so little overlap between the evidence
relevant to the FLSA and state claims, that there is no
“common nucleus of operative fact” justifying
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
In fact, it would be charitable to characterize the
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relationship of the federal and state claims as
involving even a “loose” nexus. Thus, Article III bars
federal jurisdiction.
Lyon, 45 F.3d at 763.
There is, to be sure, support for the Third Circuit’s fairly
narrow interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction and section
1367.
See, e.g., Shupe v. DBJ Enterprises, LLC, 2015 WL 790451,
5-6 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“Federal courts have been reluctant to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and
counterclaims in the context of a FLSA suit, when the only
connection is the employee-employer relationship.”) (citations
and internal punctuation omitted).
See also Wilhelm v. TLC Lawn
Care, Inc., 2008 WL 640733, at *2-3 (D. Kan. 2008) (collecting
cases that “rejected the notion that the employer-employee
relationship single-handedly creates a common nucleus of
operative fact between the FLSA claim and peripheral state law
claims”).
Here, however, the court is persuaded that, on balance,
there is sufficient factual overlap between plaintiff’s federal
and state claims to warrant the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has not embraced the Third
Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of Article III and
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supplemental jurisdiction.
See generally, Global Naps, Inc. v.
Verizon New England Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 87 (1st Cir. 2010)
(“Courts and commentators have proposed a variety of possible
standards for supplemental jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit,
relying on Gibbs, held that a counterclaim need only have a
‘loose factual connection’ between claims to satisfy § 1367.
Scholars have proposed a variety of other boundaries.
Although
we need not adopt any of these approaches, we note that all are
broader than the transaction-or-occurrence test.”) (citations
omitted).
Indeed, in at least one recent case, the court of appeals
for this circuit concluded that supplemental jurisdiction is
fairly far-reaching.
2010).
See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st
In Godin, the plaintiff sued a school department board of
directors, alleging that her employment was terminated in
violation of her due process rights.
She also brought state
common law defamation claims against three individual school
employees.
In concluding that the district court could properly
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claims, the court of appeals held:
While it might be questioned whether Godin’s state-law
claims that her job termination was caused by
defamatory comments from the individual defendants
arise out of the same transaction as her federal claim
that the schools did not afford due process in reaching
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the termination decision, that is not the test. See
Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc., 603 F.3d
71, 88 (1st Cir. 2010) (“No Supreme Court case had ever
established the same transaction-or-occurrence test as
the boundary of Article III case-or-controversy
requirement.” (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966))). We conclude it would not
offend the Constitution to assert supplemental
jurisdiction over Godin’s state-law claims.
Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction exists over
Godin’s state-law claims under § 1367(a).
Id. at 83.
See also Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 262 (1st Cir.
1998) (in a case involving claims under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act, the district court had supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims, including one for breach of
contract, because all claims arose out of a common core of
operative facts and related in some way to claimant’s HIVpositive status).
Other district courts presented with claims similar to those
advanced in this case have held that supplemental jurisdiction
exists over plaintiff’s state law claims.
See, e.g., Chaluisan,
698 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (distinguishing/rejecting Lyon and noting
that “a thorough analysis of Plaintiff’s duties and compensation
package will be necessary to resolve his FLSA claims. . . .
Because such an analysis will be necessary here, there is far
more evidentiary overlap between Plaintiff’s FLSA claims and his
state common law claims [for breach of the employment contract
and unjust enrichment], and it can be fairly said that
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presentation of the federal claim will necessarily bring the
facts underlying the state claims before the court.”) (citation
and internal punctuation omitted); Rivera v. Ndola Pharm. Corp.,
497 F. Supp. 2d 381, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that
“[t]ypically, supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate for claims
during the employment relationship because those claims arise
from the same underlying factual basis,” and holding that it had
jurisdiction over both plaintiff’s FLSA claim and her state
sexual harassment claim).
More recently, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts was presented with a case involving
claims for unpaid wages under the FLSA, as well as state law
claims for misrepresentation, breach of contract, wrongful
termination, and tortious interference with contractual
relations.
See Pacheco v. St. Luke’s Emergency Assocs., 879 F.
Supp. 2d 136, 142 (D. Ma. 2012).
In concluding that it had
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims, the
court held that “while the legal theories under which [plaintiff]
is proceeding under federal law are distinct and do not ‘derive
from’ the Employment Agreement, all of his claims, both federal
and state - arise from a common nucleus of operative facts.”
at 142.
In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned as
follows:
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Id.
In the instant case, as in many other similar cases,
Pacheco’s federal employment claims “are not separate
and independent from state law claims based on the same
sequence of events.” Riggs [v. Plaid Pantries, Inc.,
233 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1265-66 (D. Or. 2001)], and cases
cited. Pacheco is complaining of the same wrongs in
both his state and federal claims, the claims involve
substantially the same facts, and “there will be
substantial overlap in the witnesses and evidence
produced for each claim.” See, e.g., Saenz v. Austin
Roofer’s Supply, LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 704, 710 (W.D.
Tex. 2009) (breach of contract claim and FLSA claim are
not “separate and independent” under § 1441(c), and
court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state claims where they involve a “single wrong” and
“the parties will rely on substantially the same facts,
namely hours worked, wages owed based on hours worked
and commissions, and wages actually paid, and there
will be substantial overlap in the witnesses and
evidence produced for each claim.”).
Obviously, Pacheco’s claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
149 and the FLSA for unpaid wages (Count V) and
retaliation (Count VII) will involve the same nucleus
of facts since they are pled together and the same
facts are asserted for both the federal and state
claims. See Fox, 2011 WL 1106760, at *3 (plaintiffs’
unpaid wage claims and claims under the state wage act
“are not separate and independent from the FLSA claims”
and are based on a single injury, so that remand would
be inappropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)). The
issues raised in these statutory claims are also
incorporated in Pacheco’s other state law claims.
Thus, Pacheco’s fundamental contentions are that he was
not paid what was promised and due him and that he was
wrongfully fired. These claims will necessarily
involve, inter alia, testimony about his job
responsibilities, the hours he worked, the hours for
which he was paid, the amounts he was paid, the recordkeeping practices of the company, and the events
leading up to the termination of his employment - the
same facts as his federal claims. Under such
circumstances, this court finds that the claims are
derived from a common nucleus of operative facts and,
therefore, are not separate and independent claims.
See, e.g., Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 421,
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427 & nn. 26 & 27 (E.D. La. 2010) (state claims
alleging wrongful scheme to make improper deductions
from plaintiff’s pay “involve a single wrong and
substantially the same facts” as plaintiff’s FLSA
claim; state claims were not “separate and independent”
claims and would not be remanded under § 1441(c)), and
numerous cases cited).
Id. at 143-44 (emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted).
Whether the court may properly exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims is, to be sure, a
nuanced question.
And, because the governing legal standard is
general in character, reasonable minds could certainly differ as
to its proper application to the specific facts presented in this
case.
But, on balance, the court is persuaded that plaintiff’s
FLSA claim and her state common law claims are sufficiently
related to vest this court with supplemental jurisdiction over
those state law claims - particularly given both binding and
persuasive circuit precedent on this topic.
Here, as in Pacheco,
resolution of both Coyne’s state and federal claims will involve
testimony about her job responsibilities, the hours she worked,
the hours for which she was paid, the amounts she was paid, the
record-keeping practices of the college, and the events leading
up to the termination of her employment.
That is sufficient to
vest the court with supplemental jurisdiction over Coyne’s state
law claims.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
defendant’s memorandum (document no. 7-1), plaintiff’s motion to
remand her state law claims (document no. 5) is denied.
Of
course, merely because the court has concluded that it may
properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
state law claims, that does not preclude it from later declining
to exercise such jurisdiction if, for example, plaintiff’s FLSA
claim is resolved quickly.
See, e.g., Camelio v. American Fed’n,
137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998); O'Connor v. Commonwealth Gas
Co., 251 F.3d 262, 272-73 (1st Cir. 2001).
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
March 30, 2015
cc:
Geoffrey J. Vitt, Esq.
Kathleen C. Peahl, Esq.
Pierre A. Chabot, Esq.
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