Urena v. Strafford County Department of Corrections, Superintendent et al

Filing 6

///ORDER: Court recommends dismissal of all of the claims in the Complaint, except the RLUIPA claim asserted against Strafford County, and the constitutional claims identified as Claims 2, 5, and 8 11 above, asserted against L t. Weisgarber in her individual and official capacities. In the Simultaneous Order, the Court directs service of the claims that it does not now recommend be dismissed. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Andrea K. Johnstone.(ko) Modified on 9/22/2014 to add:/// (ko).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Felix Eliezer Ureña
v.

Civil No. 14-cv-323-LM

Strafford County House of
Corrections et al.1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Felix Eliezer Ureña is a pretrial detainee at the Strafford
County House of Correction (“SCHC”).

Ureña has filed a

Complaint (doc. no. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that defendants have violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq.
(“RLUIPA”).

The matter is before the Court for preliminary

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and LR 4.3(d)(1).

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The Defendants named in the Complaint are: Strafford
County, the Strafford County Department of Corrections (“SCDC”),
the Strafford County Commissioners, SCDC Superintendent Bruce
Pelkie, and SCDC Lt. Weisgarber, whose first name is unknown.
The Defendants are sued in their individual and official
capacities.

STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY REVIEW
In determining whether a pro se pleading states a claim,
the court construes the pleading liberally.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

See Erickson v.

Disregarding any legal

conclusions, the court considers whether the factual content in
the pleading and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, taken as
true, state a claim to relief.

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723

F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)).
CLAIMS
Ureña is a federal detainee who has been incarcerated at
the SCHC since June 21, 2014.

Ureña is a practicing Muslim.

Since he has been at the SCHC, Ureña claims that he has been
denied the right to practice his religion, denied his right to
privacy, and denied equal protection of the laws as follows:
1.
The Defendants required Ureña to divulge the length of
time he has practiced his religion in order to obtain a
Halal diet.2
2.
2

Defendants denied Ureña proper Halal meals because his

Ureña claims his privacy was violated by the inquiry into
the length of time he has been a Muslim. This assertion does
not state a cognizable claim for relief for a violation of
privacy, and thus the statement is construed as background
information provided in support of Claim 1, as identified above.
2

Halal meals were delivered on the same cart as non-Halal
meals, forcing Ureña to decide not to eat the “tainted”
food for eight days for fear of what other Muslims might
think of him.
3.
On the fourth day of Ramadan, Defendants failed to
provide Ureña with a timely breakfast meal, interrupting
Ureña’s religious celebration.
4.
Defendants failed to provide Ureña with the date upon
which he was to break his Ramadan fast, or to provide him
and other Muslim inmates with a communal meal at the end of
Ramadan.
5.
Defendants have not allowed Ureña Jumu’ah, an
obligatory communal prayer for Muslims, while Christian
inmates are allowed weekly communal worship.
6.
On July 9, 2014, at 2:45 a.m., unnamed corrections
officers did not allow Ureña to pray in private in the
unit’s multi-purpose room, and Ureña thus had to pray in
his cell near a toilet, whereas non-Muslim SCHC inmates are
not made to pray near toilets.
7.
Ureña’s faith is disrespected at the SCHC as nonMuslim inmates are allowed to purchase Musal’ah, Muslim
prayer rugs, and to violate Muslim law by walking on the
Musal’ah with shoes and touching them with unwashed hands.
8.

Ureña has been denied access to a Musal’ah.

9.
Ureña has been denied a Kufi, a garment worn by
Muslims for prayer.
10. The Qur’an is not available in the SCHC library, or
for purchase through the SCHC commissary, although Bibles,
Torahs, and the Book of Mormon are available to SCHC
inmates.
11. Ureña has been denied access to an Imam for religious
counseling.
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DISCUSSION
I.

Free Exercise of Religion
Ureña asserts that defendants have violated his right to

practice his religion, as protected by the First Amendment and
RLUIPA.
In order to make out a claim under either the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA, a
plaintiff must initially demonstrate that his
sincerely held religious beliefs have been
‘substantially’ burdened by defendants’ conduct –
specifically, that the government’s action pressured
him to commit an act forbidden by his religion, or
prevented him from engaging in conduct or experiences
mandated by his faith.
Lewis v. Zon, 920 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Ureña’s allegations that he has been forced to choose
between eating tainted Halal food or not eating at all (Claim 2
above), that he has not been allowed to practice Jumu’ah (Claim
5), that he has been denied access to a Musal’ah (Claim 8), a
Kufi (Claim 9), a Qur’an (Claim 10), and an Imam (Claim 11), as
stated in the Complaint, may state claims upon which relief
could be granted under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA.
Accordingly, in an Order issued simultaneously with this Report
and Recommendation (“Simultaneous Order”), the Court directs
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service of Claims 2, 5, and 8 – 11.
Ureña’s remaining allegations: that he had to tell prison
officials how long he had been a practicing Muslim (Claim 1
above), that his breakfast was late during Ramadan on one
occasion (Claim 3), that SCHC officials failed to provide him
with the dates of Ramadan and a communal meal to break the
Ramadan fast (Claim 4), that on one occasion he was denied the
ability to pray outside of his cell and instead had to pray near
a toilet (Claim 6), and that non-Muslim inmates are allowed to
purchase prayer rugs and treat them in a manner not consistent
with Muslim law (Claim 7), neither rise to the level of a
constitutional violation nor describe a substantial burden to
religious practice.

Accordingly, Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7, as

identified above, should be dismissed as they fail to state any
claim upon which relief might be granted.
II.

Equal Protection
Ureña claims that he was discriminated against at the SCHC

because he is a Muslim, in violation of his equal protection
rights.

To state an equal protection claim, Ureña must allege

facts to show that he was treated differently than other
similarly-situated inmates, and that the reason for any
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different treatment was discrimination on the basis of some
improper classification.

See Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-

Sánchez, 715 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013).

Discrimination on the

basis of religion constitutes such an improper classification.
See id.
Ureña asserts that the Defendants’ failure to allow himself
and other Muslims to engage in Jumu’ah (Claim 5 above), failure
to provide access to the Qur’an (Claim 10 above), and failure to
allow access to an Imam (Claim 11 above), are all violations of
his equal protection rights.

The allegations in the Complaint

as to the differential treatment of other similarly-situated
non-Muslims in analogous circumstances warrant service of these
claims.

Accordingly, the Court has directed service of the

Complaint as to these claims in the Simultaneous Order.
III. Defendants
A.

RLUIPA Claims

The RLUIPA Claims are properly served on Strafford County,
an entity which subsumes its agencies and agents, including the
Strafford County Department of Corrections, the Strafford County
Commissioners, Superintendent Bruce Pelkie, and Lt. Weisgarber,
to the extent they are sued in their official capacities.
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Accordingly, Strafford County is the proper defendant to the
RLUIPA claims asserted, and in the Simultaneous Order, service
is directed upon Strafford County.

To the extent any Defendant

is sued for RLUIPA claims in an individual capacity, those
claims are not cognizable and should be dismissed.
B.

Constitutional Claims

Ureña’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims arise under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff asserting a claim in a § 1983

action based on supervisory liability must show that his or her
constitutional injury was the inexorable result of the acts or
omissions of a supervisory official, whether by direct conduct
or “indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit
authorization.”

Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 47

(1st Cir. 2012); see also Ramírez-Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced, 759
F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2014).

Similarly, a “plaintiff who brings

a section 1983 action against a municipality . . . must identify
a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s
injury.”

Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir.

2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Stripped of legal conclusions, the Complaint here fails to
state sufficient facts to support a § 1983 claim of municipal or
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supervisory liability.

Accordingly, the Court recommends that

the constitutional claims set forth in the Complaint be
dismissed to the extent they are asserted against Strafford
County, the Strafford County Department of Corrections, the
Strafford County Commissioners, and SCHC Superintendent Bruce
Pelkie, as Ureña bases his theory of those Defendants’ liability
on their supervisory authority rather than their own acts,
omissions, customs, or policies.
Ureña has stated that Lt. Weisgarber is the individual
responsible for insuring that SCHC inmates have access to the
necessary means to practice their religion, and that she has
failed to do so despite Ureña’s repeated requests for such
access.

Accordingly, the Court, in the Simultaneous Order,

directs service of the constitutional claims (Claims 2, 5, & 8–
11 above) on Lt. Weisgarber.

Because the Complaint seeks

injunctive relief as well as damages, the constitutional claims
should proceed against Weigarber in both her individual and
official capacities.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends dismissal
of all of the claims in the Complaint, except the RLUIPA claim
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asserted against Strafford County, and the constitutional claims
identified as Claims 2, 5, and 8 – 11 above, asserted against
Lt. Weisgarber in her individual and official capacities.

In

the Simultaneous Order, the Court directs service of the claims
that it does not now recommend be dismissed.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

See Fed.

Failure to file objections within the

specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s
order.

See United States v. De Jesús-Viera, 655 F.3d 52, 57

(1st Cir. 2011); Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 617
F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010) (only issues fairly raised by
objections to magistrate judge’s report are subject to review by
district court; issues not preserved by such objection are
precluded on appeal).

______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
September 22, 2014
cc:

Felix Eliezer Ureña, pro se

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