Bodette v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner
Filing
13
///ORDER granting 9 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner; denying 11 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case. So Ordered by Chief Judge Joseph N. Laplante.(jb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Cory Bodette
v.
Case No. 15-cv-282-JL
Opinion No. 2016 DNH 131
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner, Social
Security Administration
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Cory Bodette moves for an
order reversing the Acting Commissioner’s decision to deny his
application for Social Security disability insurance benefits,
or DIB, under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 423, and for supplemental security income, or SSI, under Title
XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1382.
The Acting Commissioner, in turn, moves
for an order affirming her decision.
For the reasons that
follow, this matter is remanded to the Acting Commissioner for
further proceedings consistent with this order.
I. Standard of Review
The applicable standard of review in this case provides, in
pertinent part:
The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (setting out the standard of review for DIB
decisions); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (establishing
§ 405(g) as the standard of review for SSI decisions).
However,
the court “must uphold a denial of social security . . .
benefits unless ‘the [Acting Commissioner] has committed a legal
or factual error in evaluating a particular claim.’”
Manso-
Pizarro v. Sec’y of HHS, 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (quoting Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885 (1989)).
As for the statutory requirement that the Acting
Commissioner’s findings of fact be supported by substantial
evidence, “[t]he substantial evidence test applies not only to
findings of basic evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and
conclusions drawn from such facts.”
Alexandrou v. Sullivan, 764
F. Supp. 916, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Levine v. Gardner,
360 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir. 1966)).
In turn, “[s]ubstantial
evidence is ‘more than [a] mere scintilla.
It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’”
Currier v. Sec’y of HEW, 612 F.2d
2
594, 597 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
But, “[i]t is the responsibility of the
[Acting Commissioner] to determine issues of credibility and to
draw inferences from the record evidence.
Indeed, the
resolution of conflicts in the evidence is for the [Acting
Commissioner], not the courts.”
Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of HHS,
955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).
Moreover, the court “must uphold the [Acting
Commissioner’s] conclusion, even if the record arguably could
justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by
substantial evidence.”
Tsarelka v. Sec’y of HHS, 842 F.2d 529,
535 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
Finally, when determining
whether a decision of the Acting Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence, the court must “review[] the evidence in
the record as a whole.”
Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (quoting
Rodriguez v. Sec’y of HHS, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981)).
II. Background
The parties have submitted a Joint Statement of Material
Facts.
That statement1 is part of the court’s record and will be
summarized here, rather than repeated in full.
1
Document no. 12.
3
Moreover, the
following summary focusses on those facts relevant to the
disposition of the motions before the court.
Bodette last worked as a lot associate at Home Depot.
Before that, he worked as a cashier at Walmart.
He left his job
at Home Depot on June 13, 2012, which is the date on which he
claims to have become disabled.
Two days before he stopped
working, Bodette went to the doctor, complaining of syncope.2
He
continues to have syncopal episodes, but doctors have been
unable to determine the root cause.
About two weeks after he
stopped working, Bodette applied for SSI and DIB benefits,
claiming that he was disabled by syncope, migraine headaches,
and depression.
On September 12, 2012, Bodette was seen by a psychologist,
Dr. Cheryl Bildner, who performed a consultative examination.3
In the Mental Health Evaluation Report that resulted from her
examination, Dr. Bildner gave Bodette three relevant diagnoses:
Syncope is a “[l]oss of consciousness and postural tone
caused by diminished cerebral blood flow.” Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary 1887 (28th ed. 2006).
2
“A consultative examination is a physical or mental
examination or test purchased for [a claimant] at [the Social
Security Administration’s] request.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519 &
416.919.
3
4
(1) severe recurrent major depressive disorder with psychotic
features; (2) chronic posttraumatic stress disorder; and (3)
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, by history.
Under the
heading “Content of Thought,” Dr. Bildner noted:
Claimant reported suicidal thoughts. He reported
having a firearm at home and thoughts of killing
himself. He denied any intent and reported that he
“doesn’t want anyone to have to clean up his mess.”
He contracted for safety and contracted to bring
himself to the emergency room if he experienced
suicidal thoughts. He denied any plans to harm
others. He reported hearing voices and stated that
the voices are critical in nature. He also reported
that [the voices tell] him to hurt himself but he
“knows they are not real”. He reported experiencing
flashbacks and nightmares of past abuse. He denied
experiencing obsessions or compulsions. He reported
that he experiences hypervigilant tendencies and
experiences high anxiety including panic attacks and
racing thoughts. He checks to make sure doors are
locked and windows are shut. He was focused on his
psychological symptoms and his physical health.
Tr. 551-52.
With respect to Bodette’s level of functioning at the time
she examined him, Dr. Bildner offered the following opinions:
Claimant is predominantly able to complete activities
of daily living.
. . . .
Claimant is able to interact appropriately and
communicate effectively with others. Claimant
maintained consistent employment for over four years.
. . . .
5
Claimant is able to understand and recall
instructions. No gross deficits were observed in
cognitive functioning. He is able to recall
employment procedures as evidenced by his ability to
sustain long term employment.
. . . .
Claimant is able to maintain attention and
concentration when appropriately motivated.
Currently, he is enrolled in two online computer
courses which he is engaged in. On the job, he has a
history of maintaining consistent attention and
concentration. Concentration and task completion will
be interrupted during a syncope episode.
. . . .
Claimant is currently unable to manage stress
associated with a place of employment. He is
preoccupied with physical health and feels “unsafe” to
go to work. He has no motivation to report to work.
He reported that he is currently employed by Home
Depot. He is not motivated to maintain a schedule.
He is able to interact appropriately with supervisors
and coworkers. He is able to make simple decisions.
Tr. 553-54.
On September 13, 2012, a state-agency psychological
consultant, Dr. William Jamieson, conducted a Psychiatric Review
Technique (“PRT”)4 assessment based upon the record.
In his
The Social Security Administration uses the “psychiatric
review technique” to evaluate the severity of mental
impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a & 416.920a (describing
the PRT).
4
6
assessment, Dr. Jamieson considered two mental impairments,
affective disorders and anxiety-related disorders.
In his
consideration of the so-called paragraph B criteria of the
listings for those disorders, Dr. Jamieson determined that
Bodette had no restrictions on his activities of daily living,
no difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and mild
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.
He also determined that Bodette had not had any episodes of
decompensation of extended duration.
Dr. Jamieson added this
explanation to his assessment:
Source[s] [of evidence] [are] Cheryl Bildner, Ph.D.
(Consultative examiner), White Mountain Community
Health, [claimant’s] function report and third party
function report. Most weight is given to Dr. Bildner
with the exception of [claimant’s] ability to handle
stress in the work environment. She opines that he
has no motivation to report to work. This does not
appear to be related to any psychological impairment
and therefore, this opinion is given little weight.
Tr. 79-80, 93-94.
In late September of 2012, Bodette went to the White
Mountain Community Health Center expressing suicidal ideation
and complaining of visual hallucinations.
He was transported to
the emergency room and from there, he was involuntarily
committed to New Hampshire Hospital (“NHH”).
diagnosed with:
At NHH, he was
mood disorder, not otherwise specified; anxiety
7
disorder, not otherwise specified; rule out generalized anxiety
disorder;5 rule out posttraumatic stress disorder; and psychotic
disorder, not otherwise specified.
NHH’s characterization of
the reason for Bodette’s hospitalization includes this:
He was reporting two weeks of command and derogatory
hallucinations to harm himself and others. He was
having difficulty sleeping due to these voices being
so bothersome. He began to feel suicidal as a result
of insomnia and auditory hallucination.
Tr. 556.
Bodette was released from NHH after a three-day stay.
In December of 2012, Bodette was awarded benefits from the
State of New Hampshire’s Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled (“APTD”) program.
That award resulted from a finding
by the New Hampshire Disability Determination Unit (“DDU”), that
he suffered from a disabling psychotic disorder.
The records
generated by the application process include a Psychiatric
Review Template (“PRTemp”) form completed by a physician.6
The
“‘Rule-out’ in a medical record means that the disorder is
suspected but not confirmed — i.e., there is evidence that the
criteria for a diagnosis may be met, but more information is
needed in order to rule it out.” Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913,
916 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d
591, 593 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008)).
5
While that physician signed and/or initialed several
pieces of paperwork, his signature is illegible and his name
does not appear to be printed on any of the forms included in
the record.
6
8
DDU’s Psychiatric Review Template mirrors the Psychiatric Review
Technique employed by the SSA, and refers directly to the
listings of mental impairments set out in the Social Security
regulations.
The author of PRTemp form considered one mental impairment,
psychotic disorders.
In his or her consideration of the
paragraph B criteria of the listing for that disorder, Listing
12.03, the author determined that Bodette had moderate
restrictions on his activities of daily living, moderate
difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and extreme
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.
The author of the PRTemp form also determined that Bodette had
had one or two episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration.
Based upon the finding that Bodette had extreme
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace,
the author of the PRTemp form determined that Bodette’s
psychotic disorder met Listing 12.03.
After conducting a hearing on Bodette’s claim, the ALJ
issued a decision that includes the following relevant findings
of fact and conclusions of law:
3. The claimant has the following severe impairment:
syncope of unknown unknown etiology (20 CFR
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
9
. . . .
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925
and 416.926).
. . . .
5. After careful consideration of the entire record,
the undersigned finds that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform a full range
of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: he is to avoid
hazards such as unprotected heights and machinery with
moving parts.
. . . .
6. The claimant is capable of performing past
relevant work as a Cashier. This work does not
require the performance of work-related activities
precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
Tr. 22, 24, 25, 29.
III. Discussion
A. The Legal Framework
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a person
must: (1) be insured for such benefits; (2) not have reached
retirement age; (3) have filed an application; and (4) be under
a disability.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A)-(D).
10
To be eligible
for supplemental security income, a person must be aged, blind,
or disabled, and must meet certain requirements pertaining to
income and assets.
42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).
The question in this
case is whether the ALJ correctly determined that Bodette was
not under a disability from June 13, 2012, through December 10,
2013.
To decide whether a claimant is disabled for the purpose of
determining eligibility for either DIB or SSI benefits, an ALJ
is required to employ a five-step process.
See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520 (DIB) & 416.920 (SSI).
The steps are: 1) if the [claimant] is engaged in
substantial gainful work activity, the application is
denied; 2) if the [claimant] does not have, or has not
had within the relevant time period, a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the
application is denied; 3) if the impairment meets the
conditions for one of the “listed” impairments in the
Social Security regulations, then the application is
granted; 4) if the [claimant’s] “residual functional
capacity” is such that he or she can still perform
past relevant work, then the application is denied; 5)
if the [claimant], given his or her residual
functional capacity, education, work experience, and
age, is unable to do any other work, the application
is granted.
Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920).
The claimant bears the burden of proving that he is
disabled.
See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987).
11
He
must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Mandziej v.
Chater, 944 F. Supp. 121, 129 (D.N.H. 1996) (citing Paone v.
Schweiker, 530 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Mass. 1982)).
Finally,
[i]n assessing a disability claim, the [Acting
Commissioner] considers objective and subjective
factors, including: (1) objective medical facts; (2)
[claimant]’s subjective claims of pain and disability
as supported by the testimony of the [claimant] or
other witness; and (3) the [claimant]’s educational
background, age, and work experience.
Mandziej, 944 F. Supp. at 129 (citing Avery v. Sec’y of HHS, 797
F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986); Goodermote v. Sec’y of HHS, 690
F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1982)).
B. Bodette’s Claims
Bodette claims that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to
properly consider his obesity;7 (2) failing to properly consider
his mental impairments when determining his RFC; and (3) using
lay knowledge to determine his RFC.
Bodette’s second argument
is persuasive, and dispositive; he is entitled to a remand
because the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical opinion
underlying the DDU’s decision to award him APTD benefits.
The point of decision in this case lies at the confluence
At his hearing, Bodette testified that he was six feet
tall and weighed 418 pounds.
7
12
of two separate Social Security regulations and an error by the
ALJ in characterizing the record before him.
The first of the two regulations applicable to Bodette’s
claim provides:
A decision by any . . . other governmental agency
about whether [a claimant is] disabled . . . is based
on its rules and is not our decision about whether
[the claimant] is disabled . . . . We must make a
disability . . . determination based on social
security law. Therefore, a determination made by
another agency that [a claimant is] disabled . . . is
not binding on us.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504 & 416.904.8
The second pertinent
regulation provides that “[r]egardless of its source, we [the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and, by extension, an
ALJ] will evaluate every medical opinion we receive.”
20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c) & 416.927(c).
Turning to the interplay between those two rules, the order
in Chapdelaine v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-30081-KAR, 2015 WL 1321480
(D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2015), is instructive.
In that case, the
magistrate judge was confronted with a decision in which an ALJ:
While decisions of other governmental agencies are not
binding on the Social Security Administration, “an
administrative law judge must explain the consideration given to
such a determination.” Boyer v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-28-JHR,
2015 WL 6123525, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 15, 2015) (citing Social
Security Ruling 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (S.S.A. Aug. 9, 2006)).
8
13
(1) “stated . . . that he did ‘not accept the [U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs] decision of disabled, as such program does
not have the same criteria as [those] of the Social Security
Administration,’” id. *2; but (2) failed to fully consider the
evidence underlying that decision.
In his order remanding the
matter, the magistrate judge explained:
[I]t is unclear from the decision what weight, if any,
[the ALJ] gave to Ms. Britton’s opinion or to the
opinions of other medical sources from the [Veterans
Affairs Medical Center]. Thus, while “merely ignoring
an administrative conclusion [may not be] error per
se,” in this case, “it is more troubling [where]
relevant evidence of disability [that] form[ed] the
basis of the [VA] finding is in the record and [was
seemingly] ignored.” Dube v. Astrue, 781 F. Supp. 2d
27, 37 n.16 (D.N.H. 2011) (citing Bickford v.
Barnhart, 242 F. Supp. 2d 39, 42 (D. Me. 2002) (error
to ignore medical evidence in VA records)).
Id.; cf. Johnson v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1166, 1996 WL 270956, at *3
(10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (stating that even
though a Dr. Tate “evaluated [claimant] for a worker’s
compensation claim . . . [t]he ALJ could rely on Dr. Tate’s
evaluation notwithstanding 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, which provides
that findings of other agencies are not binding on the
[Commissioner]”).9
While it is not directly relevant to this case, the court
also notes that in Pelkey v. Barnhart, the court of appeals held
that an ALJ’s failure to mention the VA’s final conclusion on a
9
14
In his decision on Bodette’s claim, the ALJ wrote:
exhibit 10F little weight.”
Tr. 28.
“I give
The problem is that the
balance of the ALJ’s discussion makes it clear that he regarded
Exhibit 10F as being nothing more than the announcement of a
decision, made by a registered nurse, on Bodette’s application
for APTD benefits.
However, Exhibit 10F also includes a
Psychiatric Review Template form signed by a physician.
That
form, in turn, memorializes a medical opinion on the severity of
Bodette’s psychotic disorder that includes specific findings on
the paragraph B criteria for Listing 12.03.10
Yet, while the ALJ
discounted the DDU’s decision to award Bodette APTD benefits, he
said nothing at all about the medical opinion underlying that
decision.
That was an error.
See Chapdelaine, 2015 WL 1321480,
at *2.
disability claim did not entitle the claimant to a remand
because the ALJ “fully considered the evidence underlying the
VA’s final conclusion,” 433 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2006). If
nothing else, Pelkey underscores the importance of evaluating
the medical opinions underlying disability determinations by
other governmental agencies.
Indeed, the author of the PRTemp form determined that
Bodette had extreme difficulties in maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace. According to the Social Security
regulations, such difficulties represent “a degree of limitation
that is incompatible with the ability to do any gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4) & 416.920a(c)(4).
10
15
In so ruling, the court is mindful that in Johnson v.
Colvin, Judge Hornby adopted a report and recommendation in
which the magistrate judge determined that the ALJ had committed
at most a harmless error by failing to address a physician’s
opinion that supported an award of disability benefits from the
VA, see No. 1:13-cv-406-DBH, 2014 WL 5394954, at *3 (D. Me. Oct.
21, 2014).
But in Johnson, the opinion at issue was a bare
conclusion that the claimant could not work, “a matter that is
reserved to the commissioner.”
Id.
Here, by contrast, the
opinion the ALJ ignored was expressed in precisely the format
described by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c) and
416.920(c).
Thus, Johnson does not counsel in favor of
affirming the ALJ in this case.
Having identified an error by the ALJ that requires a
remand, the court need say no more, but there is one final point
that may bear mentioning.
The thrust of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504
and 416.904 is that the SSA is not bound by disability
determinations made by agencies that use rules that are
different from those employed by the SSA.
That concern was
echoed by the ALJ in Chapdelaine, who pointed out that the
Veterans Affairs disability “program does not have the same
criteria as [those] of the Social Security Administration,” 2015
16
WL 1321480, at *2.
Here, however, the opinion the ALJ ignored
was expressed on a form that uses the exact same format as the
opinion by Dr. Jamieson to which the ALJ gave great weight.
In light of the similarities between the SSA’s Psychiatric
Review Technique (employed by Dr. Jamieson) and the New
Hampshire DDU’s Psychiatric Review Template (completed by the
physician with the illegible signature) it would seem difficult
to characterize the SSA disability program and the APTD
disability program as having different criteria, or as being, as
the ALJ said in his decision, “distinct . . . separate and
unrelated,” Tr. 28.
Rather, at least with regard to determining
the severity of mental impairments, it would appear that a
determination by the New Hampshire DDU is based on rules that
are all but identical to those used by the SSA, which would seem
to obviate the concern that is addressed by 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1504 and 416.904.
That said, whether or not the congruence
between the SSA’s PRT and the DDU’s PRTemp require an ALJ to
give substantial weight to determinations such as the one made
by the New Hampshire DDU in this case is a question for another
day.
The bottom line is this.
The ALJ did not necessarily err
in his determination of the amount of weight to give the DDU’s
17
decision to award Bodette APTD benefits.
The error that
requires a remand is the ALJ’s failure to evaluate, or even
acknowledge, the opinion of the physician who completed the
Psychiatric Review Template form on which the decision to award
APTD benefits was based.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, the Acting Commissioner’s
motion for an order affirming her decision11 is denied, and
Bodette’s motion to reverse that decision12 is granted to the
extent that this matter is remanded to the Acting Commissioner
for further proceedings, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in
accordance with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
_________________________ _
Joseph Laplante
United States District Judge
Dated:
cc:
August 9, 2016
Laurie Smith Young, Esq.
Robert J. Rabuck, AUSA
11
Document no. 9.
12
Document no. 11.
18
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