Gottier v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner
Filing
16
THIS ENTRY REPLACES DOCUMENT NO. 14. Corrected page 1, paragraph 2, to read: For the reasons discussed below, claimant's motion is granted as set forth herein, and the Acting Commissioner's motion is denied. ///ORDER granting 8 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner to the extent the Commissioner's decision is reversed and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings; and denying 11 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lat)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Doris T. Gottier,
Claimant
v.
Case No. 15-cv-355-SM
Opinion No. 2016 DNH 161
Carolyn W. Colvin,
Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), claimant,
Doris T. Gottier, moves to reverse the Acting Commissioner’s
decision denying her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”),
42 U.S.C. § 423.
The Acting Commissioner objects and moves for
an order affirming her decision.
For the reasons discussed below, claimant’s motion is
granted as set forth herein, and the Acting Commissioner’s
motion is denied.
Factual Background
I.
Procedural History.
In 2012, Gottier filed an application for Disability
Insurance Benefits, alleging that she had been unable to work
1
since August 20, 2012, due to neck strain, anxiety, a history of
cervical spine fusion, asthma, high blood pressure, degeneration
of the discs of her cervical spine, acid reflux, nerve damage,
high cholesterol, muscle spasms, arthritis, a fractured disc in
her back, leg pain and depression.
(“Admin. Rec.”) at 73, 63, 151.
Administrative Record
That application was denied
(Admin. Rec. at 73), and claimant requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Admin. Rec. at 78-79).
On January 27, 2014, Gottier, her attorney, and a
vocational expert appeared before an ALJ, who considered
claimant’s application de novo.
Admin. Rec. at 40-62.
On March
24, 2014, the ALJ issued his written decision, concluding that
Gottier was not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act, at
any time prior to the date of his decision.
Id. at 23-33.
Gottier then sought review of the ALJ’s decision by the
Appeals Council.
Admin. Rec. at 18-19.
By notice dated July
15, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Gottier’s request for
review.
Admin. Rec. at 1-6.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s denial of
Gottier’s application for benefits became the final decision of
the Acting Commissioner, subject to judicial review.
Id. at 1.
Subsequently, Gottier filed a timely action in this court,
asserting that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
2
substantial evidence.
Gottier then filed a “Motion for Order
Reversing Decision of the Commissioner” (document no. 8).
In
response, the Acting Commissioner filed a “Motion for Order
Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner” (document no. 11).
Those motions are pending.
II.
Stipulated Facts.
Pursuant to this court’s Local Rule 9.1, the parties have
submitted a statement of stipulated facts which, because it is
part of the court’s record (document no. 11), need not be
recounted in this opinion.
Those facts relevant to the
disposition of this matter are discussed as appropriate.
Standard of Review
I.
“Substantial Evidence” and Deferential Review.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court is empowered “to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”
Factual findings and credibility
determinations made by the Commissioner are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence.
1383(c)(3).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
See also Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991).
Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
3
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
Consolidated
It is something
less than a preponderance of the evidence, so the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported
by substantial evidence.
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n.,
See also Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
This court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is, therefore,
both limited and deferential.
The court is not empowered to
consider claimant’s application de novo, nor may it undertake an
independent assessment of whether she is disabled under the Act.
Rather, the court’s inquiry is “limited to determining whether
the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards and found facts upon
the proper quantum of evidence.”
35 (1st Cir. 1999).
Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31,
Provided the ALJ’s findings are properly
supported by substantial evidence, the court must sustain those
findings even when there may also be substantial evidence
supporting the contrary position.
Such is the nature of
judicial review of disability benefit determinations.
See,
e.g., Tsarelka v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 842 F.2d
529, 535 (1st Cir. 1988); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).
4
II.
The Parties’ Respective Burdens.
An individual seeking SSI benefits is disabled under the
Act if he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Act places a heavy initial burden on the claimant to
establish the existence of a disabling impairment.
See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987); Santiago v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991).
To
satisfy that burden, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that her impairment prevents her from
performing her former type of work.
See Gray v. Heckler, 760
F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1985); Paone v. Schweiker, 530 F. Supp.
808, 810-11 (D. Mass. 1982).
If the claimant demonstrates an
inability to perform her previous work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that there are other jobs in the national
economy that she can perform, in light of her age, education,
and prior work experience.
See Vazquez v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 683 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982).
C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f) and 416.912(f).
5
See also 20
In assessing a disability claim, the Commissioner considers
both objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective
medical facts; (2) the claimant’s subjective claims of pain and
disability, as supported by the testimony of the claimant or
other witnesses; and (3) the claimant’s educational background,
age, and work experience.
See, e.g., Avery v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986);
Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5,
6 (1st Cir. 1982).
Ultimately, a claimant is disabled only if
her:
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
With those principles in mind, the court reviews claimant’s
motion to reverse and the Acting Commissioner’s motion to affirm
her decision.
Background - The ALJ’s Findings
In concluding that Gottier was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act, the ALJ employed the mandatory five-step
6
sequential evaluation process described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
See generally Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
Accordingly, he first determined that Gottier had not been
engaged in substantial gainful employment since her alleged
onset of disability: August 20, 2012.
Admin. Rec. at 25.
Next,
he concluded that Gottier suffers from the following severe
impairment: “degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine
status post fusion.”
Id.
The ALJ considered Gottier’s
additional impairments, asthma, diabetes mellitus and lower back
and leg pain, id. at 26, but determined that these impairments
had been effectively controlled through medication and other
treatments and were nonsevere.
Id.
The ALJ also considered
Gottier’s mental impairment, major depressive disorder, but
determined that it “does not cause more than minimal limitation
in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work
activities, and is therefore nonsevere.”
Id. at 27.
The ALJ
then determined that Gottier’s impairments, regardless of
whether they were considered alone or in combination, did not
meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Id.
Next, the ALJ concluded that Gottier retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the exertional demands of
light work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), “allowing for
7
lifting 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently;
standing, sitting and walking about six hours in an eight-hour
workday.” 1
Admin. Rec. at 28.
He further noted that claimant
can occasionally climb “ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes and
scaffolds,” and balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl.
Id.
In light of those restrictions, and relying on the
testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that
claimant was capable of performing her past relevant work as a
cashier.
Id. at 33.
The ALJ then concluded that claimant was
not “disabled,” as that term is defined in the Act, through the
date of his decision.
11
“RFC is what an individual can still do despite his or her
functional limitations. RFC is an administrative assessment of
the extent to which an individual’s medically determinable
impairments, including any related symptoms, such as pain, may
cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may
affect his or her capacity to do work-related physical and
mental activities. Ordinarily, RFC is the individual’s maximum
remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary
work setting on a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC
assessment must include a discussion of the individual’s
abilities on that basis.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”), 968p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing
Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184
at *2 (July 2, 1996) (citation omitted).
8
Discussion
Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decision.
She argues that
the ALJ erred in determining that her asthma and degenerative
disc disease are non-severe, and by failing to properly weigh
the medical opinions in the record.
She further argues that the
ALJ failed to properly assess her credibility as required by
Social Security Ruling 96-7p and Avery v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services, 797 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986).
Claimant’s
credibility argument is persuasive, and dispositive.
Accordingly, the court need not address claimant’s two remaining
arguments.
“It is the responsibility of the Secretary to determine
issues of credibility and to draw inferences from the record
evidence.”
Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769.
The “credibility
determination by the ALJ, who observed the claimant, evaluated
his demeanor, and considered how that testimony fit in with the
rest of the evidence, is entitled to deference, especially when
supported by specific findings.”
Frustaglia v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing DaRosa
v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.
1986)).
9
Social Security Ruling 96-7p 1 sets out a multi-step inquiry
an ALJ must follow when assessing a claimant’s complaints of
pain.
First, the ALJ must find that the claimant’s impairments,
“i.e., an impairment(s) that can be shown by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,” could
“reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain or
other symptoms.”
Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in
Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual's
Statements, SSR 96-7P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996), 1996 WL 374186, at
*2.
If not, “the symptoms cannot be found to affect the
individual’s ability to do basic work activities.”
Id.
However, once an impairment that could reasonably be expected to
produce the individual’s symptoms has been shown, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant’s statements about his symptoms
are substantiated by objective medical evidence, and, if not,
the ALJ must “make a finding on credibility of the individual’s
statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.”
Id.
Thus, “SSR 96–7p outlines a specific staged inquiry that
consists of the following questions, in the following order: (1)
does the claimant have an underlying impairment that could
produce his or her symptoms?; (2) if so, are the claimant's
1
In March of 2016, Social Security Ruling 96-7p was
rescinded, and replaced by Social Security Ruling 16-3P.
However, in March of 2013, the time of the ALJ’s decision,
Social Security Ruling 96-7p was applicable.
10
statements about his or her symptoms substantiated by objective
medical evidence?; and (3) if not, are the claimant's statements
about those symptoms credible?”
Guziewicz v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-
310-SM, 2011 WL 128957, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan. 14, 2011).
20 CFR §§ 404.1529(c) and 416.929(c) describe the kinds of
evidence, including the factors below, that the adjudicator must
consider in addition to the objective medical evidence when
assessing the credibility of an individual's statements:
1. The individual's daily activities;
2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the
individual's pain or other symptoms;
3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication the individual takes or has taken to
alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual
receives or has received for relief of pain or other
symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or
has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying
flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes
every hour, or sleeping on a board); and
7. Any other factors concerning the individual's functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms.
See Varney v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-369-PB, 2011 WL 1885185, at *6
(D.N.H. Apr. 26, 2011), rept. and rec. adopted sub nom. Varney
11
v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, No. 10-CV-369-PB, 2011 WL
1898304 (D.N.H. May 18, 2011).
“[A]n ALJ's determination or decision must contain specific
reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the
evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements
and the reasons for that weight.”
Weaver v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-
340-SM, 2011 WL 2580766, at *6 (D.N.H. May 25, 2011), rept. and
rec. adopted sub nom. Weaver v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r,
2011 WL 2579776 (D.N.H. June 27, 2011) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
“‘An ALJ is free to disbelieve
a claimant's subjective testimony; however, he or she must make
specific findings as to the relevant evidence he considered in
determining to disbelieve the claimant,’ i.e., by identifying
‘what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the
claimant's complaints.’”
Waters v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-45-JL,
2014 WL 898639, at *2 (D.N.H. Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting Kalloch v.
Astrue, No. 11–cv–522, 2012 WL 4930986, at *6 (D.N.H. Sept. 18,
2012), rept. & rec. adopted, 2012 WL 4930983 (D.N.H. Oct. 15,
2012)) (internal brackets removed).
At the hearing, Gottier testified that she suffers from
neck pain that reaches “down into [her] shoulders and down [her]
12
whole arm,” causing her to lose “feeling in [her] fingers.”
Admin. Rec. at 43; see also Admin. Rec. at 48.
She further
testified to back pain and severe headaches caused by bending
her head down.
Id. at 43.
As a result of these symptoms,
Gottier testified that she cannot stand or sit for extended
periods of time, has trouble walking and using stairs, and
cannot bend her head down.
Id. at 43-44, 48.
Finally, Gottier
testified that, as a result of her asthma and COPD, she
frequently falls ill when she is “around people.”
Id. at 50.
According to Gottier, as a result of all these symptoms, she is
unable to work.
Id. at 43, 47-50.
And, according to a
hypothetical posed by the ALJ to the testifying vocational
expert, if the ALJ determined that Gottier’s statements
concerning her symptoms were credible, it is unlikely she could
have performed any of her prior work.
See Admin. Rec. at 60-61.
Concerning Gottier’s credibility, the ALJ states as
follows:
A trier of fact is required to determine a
witness’s credibility in consideration of all the
circumstances, including the extent to which testimony
is contradicted or corroborated by other evidence, and
any other circumstances that tend to shed light upon
credibility. Additionally, the claimant’s financial
interest in the outcome and the evidentiary
inconsistencies detract from reliance on the
claimant’s testimony. These facts in the record do
not dispute that the claimant has a condition that
causes some difficulties. What this evidence suggests
13
is that the claimant’s symptoms may not be accurately
reported, may not exist at the level of severity
assumed by the claimant’s testimony at hearing and may
have other mitigating factors against their negative
impact on the claimant’s ability to engage in work
activity.
Due consideration has been given to the
claimant’s statements about the above conditions (See
SSR 96-7p). However, no symptom or combination of
symptoms can be the basis for a finding of disability,
no matter how genuine the individual’s complaints may
appear to be, unless there are medical signs and
laboratory findings demonstrating the existence of a
medically determinable physical or mental
impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to
produce the symptoms. (Id.) The Regulations provide
that an individual’s statement as to pain or other
symptoms is not sufficient to establish the existence
of a physical or mental health impairment or that an
individual is disabled. (Id.) There must be medical
signs and findings, established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques, which show the existence of a medical
impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which
could reasonably be expected to produce the pain and
symptoms alleg3ed (42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)[)]. The
objective medical evidence in this claim falls short
of demonstrating the existence of pain and limitations
that are so severe that the claimant cannot perform
any work on a regular and continuing basis. The
claimant testified to an extremely limited range of
functional abilities. However, the objective medical
evidence of record does not fully support those
allegations. Therefore, because the claimant has
failed to establish a correlation between her
allegations and the medical evidence, I find the
claimant’s symptoms not credible to the extent
alleged.
Admin. Rec. at 30 (citing to 20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(3) and Social
Security Ruling 96-7p).
The ALJ then went on to discuss the
objective medical evidence at length.
14
The ALJ’s credibility assessment is problematic for several
reasons.
First, it is not clear from the ALJ’s decision what he
concluded with respect to SSR 96-7p’s first question: Whether
Gottier suffered from an impairment reasonably likely to cause
her symptoms?
Both Gottier and the Acting Commissioner argue
that the ALJ presumably determined that Gottier’s impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause her symptoms, since he
went on to discuss the objective medical evidence and Gottier’s
credibility.
However, in a decision cited by the Acting
Commissioner, Newton v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-585-SM, 2012 WL
1231941, at *7-8 (D.N.H. Mar. 16, 2012), the court found that
nearly identical language suggested that the ALJ in that case
had determined claimant did not, in fact, suffer from such an
impairment. 2
This matters because, if the ALJ did, in fact,
determine that Gottier does not suffer from an impairment that
could reasonably be expected to cause her symptoms, then no
further assessment was required.
However, if, as both parties’
argue, the ALJ determined that Gottier suffers from an
2
In Newton, the ALJ concluded his credibility discussion by
stating, “because the claimant has failed to establish a
correlation between his allegations and the objective medical
evidence, I find the claimant partially credible, but not to the
extent alleged.” 2012 WL 1231941, at *7. Construing this
language, the court stated: “while it is not entirely clear, the
ALJ appears to have determined that Newton did not have an
impairment that ‘could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 8.
15
impairment that could reasonably be expected to cause her
symptoms, the ALJ’s subsequent credibility assessment falls
short of complying with SSR 96-7p’s requirements.
“To perform a proper discussion and analysis, the ALJ must
identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence
undermines the claimant's complaints.”
Anderson v. Colvin, No.
14-CV-15-LM, 2014 WL 5605124, at *7 (D.N.H. Nov. 4, 2014)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Rather than
undertaking this task, however, the ALJ seemingly focused on the
claimant’s credibility generally, and discussed the objective
medical evidence generally. 3
After reporting Gottier’s
statements concerning her symptoms, the ALJ provided no analysis
or discussion that links the objective medical evidence to any
of Gottier’s statements concerning her symptoms.
Nor did the
ALJ provide any explanation as to why he found the objective
medical evidence inconsistent with any of Gottier’s statements.
As a result, the court cannot determine which of Gottier’s
3
The Acting Commissioner admits “the way the ALJ went about
the credibility determination is confusing. It began with some
boilerplate statements (Admin. Rec. at 29-30) that do not meet
SSR 96-7p’s admonition that the credibility ‘determination or
decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on
credibility supported by the evidence in the case record.’”
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Affirm at p. 16. The Acting
Commissioner argues that the credibility determination can still
stand because it is adequately supported without those reasons.
But, for the reasons discussed herein, the determination is not
adequately supported.
16
statements concerning her symptoms the ALJ found were not
substantiated by the objective medical evidence, and cannot
conclude that the ALJ’s determination is adequately supported.
See Guziewicz, 2011 WL 128957, at *6 (“The ALJ's decision does
describe some of the objective medical evidence, but not in a
discussion that compares the medical evidence to [claimant]'s
symptoms.
Absent any meaningful comparative evaluation of the
objective medical evidence and [claimant’s] allegations of
disabling pain, the ALJ's decision does not contain an adequate
determination that [claimant's] symptoms were not substantiated
by objective medical evidence.”)
Moreover, the ALJ seemingly ended his credibility analysis
following his consideration of the objective medical evidence.
This is problematic because, “according to SSR 96–7p, the lack
of objective medical substantiation is what triggers the need
for an ALJ to conduct a credibility finding, not evidence that
weighs against a claimant's credibility.”
Varney, 2011 WL
1885185, at *7; see also Guziewicz, 2011 WL 128957, at *6 (“If,
indeed, the ALJ used the lack of objective medical evidence as
his basis for finding [claimant] to be not entirely credible,
rather than treating such a finding as compelling him to conduct
a credibility assessment, that constitutes legal error on the
ALJ's part.”).
17
The Acting Commissioner concedes that “the ALJ appears to
have terminated the credibility discussion after the paragraph
dealing with the objective evidence.”
Mot. to Affirm at p. 17.
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of
However, the Acting Commissioner urges
that the ALJ’s decision should be read as a whole, and points
out that, in different parts of the ALJ’s decision, he “provided
at least two more reasons” that indicated why he was unable to
accept Gottier’s allegations of disabling pain: the improvement
of her pain with medication (Admin. Rec. at 31) and the fact
that she appeared to be in no distress (Admin. Rec. at 32).
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Affirm at p. 17.
But, “those
passing references are not part of any discussion that assesses
the credibility of [claimant’s] statements about the limiting
effects of his pain.”
Weaver, 2011 WL 2580766, at *8.
It is
not sufficiently clear from the decision that the ALJ considered
the requisite factors.
While the ALJ need not “slavishly
discuss each of the factors listed in SSR 96–7p, more analysis
is required than is provided in this case.”
Ingle v. Astrue,
No. 10-CV-103-SM, 2010 WL 5070766, at *6 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2010),
rept. & rec. adopted, No. 10-CV-103-SM, 2010 WL 5067443 (D.N.H.
Dec. 7, 2010) (citing Crocker v. Astrue, No. 07–220–P–S, 2008 WL
2775980, at *4 (D. Me. June 30, 2008)).
18
The ALJ did provide a detailed review of Gottier’s
activities of daily living in the context of his step-two
determination, and again when summarizing her Function Report.
However, missing from both discussions is any explanation as to
why the ALJ found such activities might make Gottier’s
statements concerning her pain less credible.
To the extent the
ALJ did determine that these ADLs were inconsistent with
Gottier’s allegations regarding her symptoms, he ought to have
so explained in his order.
Finally, the ALJ seemingly discounted Gottier’s credibility
based in part on her financial interest in the outcome of the
disability determination.
But, Gottier’s financial interest in
the outcome is no different than that of any other claimant
applying for benefits, and is of course inseparable from the
process – indeed it is the very point of the application
process.
Such an interest does not constitute a valid reason to
find Gottier’s testimony not credible.
See Corsi v. Astrue, No.
CV-12-2243-SP, 2013 WL 140223, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013)
(“Multiple courts have recognized the obvious, namely, that
every claimant who applies for disability benefits does so with
the intent of pecuniary gain, as that is the purpose of applying
for disability benefits, and therefore such interest in not a
19
valid basis to discount a claimant's credibility.”) (collecting
cases).
For these reasons, the ALJ’s credibility assessment fails
to address Gottier’s allegations concerning her symptoms within
the framework established by SSR 96-7p, and requires remand for
clarification.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
claimant’s memorandum, claimant’s motion to reverse the decision
of the Commissioner (document no. 8) is granted to the extent
that the Commissioner’s decision is reversed and the case is
remanded for further administrative proceedings.
The Acting
Commissioner’s motion to affirm her decision (document no. 11)
is denied.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance
with this order and close the case.
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SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
September 12, 2016
cc:
Elizabeth R. Jones, Esq.
Michael T. McCormack, Esq.
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