Lenentine et al v. Farm Service Agency
///ORDER granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Clerk shall enter judgment and close the case. So Ordered by Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(gla)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Halston O. Lenentine, Jr.
and Lorraine K. Downs
Civil No. 15-cv-361-LM
Opinion No. 2017 DNH 144
Farm Service Agency
O R D E R
Plaintiffs Halston Lenentine and Lorraine Downs brought
suit in state court against the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”),
seeking an ex parte restraining order and to enjoin the
foreclosure sale of their home.
FSA removed the case to this
The court granted FSA’s assented-to motion to stay the
case, to allow plaintiffs time to sell a portion of their
property for a sum sufficient to pay off the amount due to FSA
under the parties’ mortgage agreements.
Plaintiffs have been
unable to sell a portion of their property to pay off their
mortgage debt, and FSA now moves for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs do not object.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A movant is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that
it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
In reviewing the record, the court construes all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108,
115 (1st Cir. 2013).
Where a summary judgment motion is unopposed, the motion is
not automatically granted.
See Aguiar–Carrasquillo v. Agosto–
Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
Rather, “the district
court is still obliged to consider the motion on its merits, in
light of the record as constituted, in order to determine
whether judgment would be legally appropriate.”
quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).
Local Rule 56.1(b), “[a]ll properly supported material facts set
forth in the moving party’s factual statement may be deemed
admitted unless properly opposed by the adverse party.”
From June 2001 through August 2007, Lenentine and Downs
executed five promissory notes in favor of FSA in exchange for
five separate loans, each of which was secured by a mortgage on
their property in Holderness, New Hampshire.
The five loans
were as follows: (1) $82,000 on June 1, 2001; (2) $40,680 on
April 25, 2002; (3) $128,476.80 on January 2, 2003; $132,084.89
on January 26, 2005; and (5) $139,963.80 on August 9, 2007.
Plaintiffs are in default of their obligations under each
of their five mortgage agreements with FSA and their obligations
under the August 9, 2007 promissory note.1
Each of the mortgages
contains a default provision allowing FSA to, among other
remedies, foreclose on plaintiffs’ property.
FSA attempted to
foreclose on the property in September 2014, but plaintiffs
obtained a preliminary injunction from the Grafton County
Superior Court stopping the foreclosure days before it was
See Case No. 215-2014-CV-319.
After the superior court issued the preliminary injunction,
FSA and plaintiffs, who were represented by counsel, entered
into an agreement, in which FSA agreed that it would not
exercise its right to foreclose on plaintiffs’ property until
March 30, 2015 (the “Agreement”).
Under the Agreement,
plaintiffs agreed to sell their property or a subdivided portion
of the property to satisfy their debt to FSA in full.
Agreement also stated that if plaintiffs failed to sell the
property and satisfy their debt in full on or before March 30,
2015, FSA would have the unconditional right to foreclose on the
In addition, the Agreement stated that if FSA
attempted to foreclose on the property,
Plaintiffs agree not to either individually or jointly
file any bankruptcy petition, complaint or other
action with the purpose to enjoin such sale in state
or federal court; Plaintiffs will not take any other
action intended to hinder or delay any sale scheduled
by the FSA on or after March 30, 2015.
The record is unclear as to whether plaintiffs are in
default of their obligations under the other promissory notes.
Between the date of the Agreement and the deadline set
forth therein (March 30, 2015), plaintiffs failed to sell any
portion of their property or pay their mortgage debt to FSA.
FSA scheduled a foreclosure sale for September 1, 2015.
the terms of the Agreement prohibiting plaintiffs from filing an
action to enjoin the sale, plaintiffs brought this suit in
Grafton County Superior Court, seeking a temporary restraining
order and a permanent injunction to prevent FSA from foreclosing
on their property.
In their complaint, plaintiffs failed to
disclose to the superior court that they had agreed not to
challenge any foreclosure sale.
The superior court granted plaintiffs a temporary
FSA removed the case to this court and now
seeks summary judgment.
The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiffs are in
default of their obligations under their mortgage agreements and
that, as a consequence, FSA has the right to foreclose on their
Plaintiffs agreed not to challenge any foreclosure
sale by FSA.
Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to
interfere with FSA’s attempt to foreclose on the property and
FSA is entitled to summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (doc. no. 19) is granted.
The clerk of court shall
enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
Landya B. McCafferty
United States District Judge
July 26, 2017
Ernest James Ciccotelli, Esq.
Michael T. McCormack, Esq.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?