Goulette v. Service Credit Union

Filing 4

///ORDER denying 2 motion for temporary restraining order. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lat)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
William-Joseph:Goulette,
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 15-cv-379-SM
Opinion No. 2015 DNH 180

Service Credit Union,
Defendant
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiff, William-Joseph:Goulette has filed a motion
for a temporary restraining order (document no. 2), entitled
“Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief,” seeking to enjoin a
hearing scheduled for September 17, 2015, in the New Hampshire
Superior Court sitting at Hillsborough County.

That state court

action was instituted by the defendant in this case, Service
Credit Union, to obtain a writ of replevin for personal property
in plaintiff’s possession.

For reasons set forth below, the

motion for a temporary restraining order (document no. 2) is
denied.

Plaintiff asserts that this court should enjoin the state
court writ of replevin proceeding to prevent a violation of
plaintiff’s right to due process.

Plaintiff argues that: Service

Credit Union is a corporation that plaintiff believes cannot
institute a civil case; Service Credit Union has not provided

plaintiff with the “instrument” upon which it bases its claim in
the state courts; plaintiff has not had sufficient time to
respond to the state court claims, as he received notice of the
hearing only six days before the hearing; and the hearing,
scheduled for September 17, 2015, is likely to affect the
plaintiff’s interests as to the same property, which he expected
to litigate in a small claims court hearing in Hillsborough
County, scheduled for a later date.

Discussion
I.

Standard – Preliminary Injunctive Relief
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must

establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.”
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Winter v. Nat. Res.
The movant bears the

burden of proof on a motion for preliminary injunction.

See Esso

Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).

II.

Anti-Injunction Act
The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, precludes this

court from granting the relief plaintiff seeks.
Injunction Act provides, as follows:

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The Anti-

A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283.

“The Act thus constitutes ‘an absolute

prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the
injunction falls within one of [the] three specifically defined
exceptions.’”

Garcia v. Bauza-Salas, 862 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.

1988).

To the extent plaintiff relies on the exception for actions
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in arguing that his right to due
process will be violated if this court does not enjoin the state
court hearing, plaintiff has not established that a due process
violation has occurred or will occur, as the state courts provide
an adequate forum for protecting his right to due process.

The

claims asserted here can be raised in the Superior Court
proceeding, and the Superior Court can issue orders, as necessary
and appropriate, to prevent the unwarranted impairment of the
parties’ rights and interests at issue in the small claims court
proceeding.

To the extent orders are issued that are adverse to

plaintiff’s interests, plaintiff can seek review in the New
Hampshire Supreme Court.

Accordingly, § 2283, precludes

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plaintiff from obtaining the relief he seeks, and for that
reason, the motion for a temporary restraining order is denied.

III. Younger Abstention
Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
federal courts are required to abstain from enjoining
ongoing state court proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances. . . . Under Younger, a federal court
must abstain “if (1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding involving the federal plaintiff that (2)
implicates [certain] important state interests and (3)
provides an adequate opportunity for the federal
plaintiff to assert his federal claims.”
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 26 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (Younger may apply in cases
“that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts”).

When Younger applies, abstention is

mandatory, and the federal court is deprived of any discretion to
grant injunctive relief.

See Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976).

The Younger abstention doctrine applies here, insofar as the
requested injunction would target, and substantially interfere
with, a pending action in state court, implicating important
state interests in the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Moreover,

the state court proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for

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plaintiff to assert his federal claims.

Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts providing grounds for this court to find any
applicable exception to the Younger abstention doctrine.
Accordingly, abstention under Younger is mandatory.

To that end,

plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits,
and his motion for a temporary restraining order (document no. 2)
is therefore denied.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion for a
temporary restraining order (document no. 2).

SO ORDERED.

____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
September 16, 2015
cc:

William-Joseph:Goulette, pro se

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