Bobola v. Fishing Vessel Expectation et al

Filing 15

///ORDER denying without prejudice 12 Motion to Dismiss; granting 6 Motion to Change Venue. So Ordered by Judge Paul J. Barbadoro.(jna)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Matthew D. Bobola
v.

Case No. 15-cv-296-PB
Opinion No. 2016 DNH 077

Fishing Vessel Expectation, et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Former deckhand Matthew D. Bobola allegedly suffered an
injury while on board the Fishing Vessel Expectation, a fishing
vessel based out of New Bedford, MA.

Bobola sued his former

employer, Nordic Fisheries, Inc., and several other defendants,
including the Fishing Vessel Expectation and the ship’s captain,
first mate, and engineer, bringing a variety of claims under
both federal and state law.

Bobola is presently incarcerated in

New Hampshire and is proceeding pro se.
Several months after filing his complaint, Bobola filed a
one-page handwritten motion to change venue, admitting that he
had “the wrong venue” and requesting that the case be
transferred to the Federal District Court in Boston, MA.
No. 6.

Doc.

The defendants responded with two filings: (1) an

opposition to Bobola’s motion to change venue (Doc. No. 13), and
(2) a motion to dismiss on a number of grounds, including lack
of personal jurisdiction and – interestingly – improper venue

(doc. no. 12).

Defendants contend that this court has no

jurisdiction to hear the case, but nonetheless oppose transfer.
They instead argue that I should dismiss the action outright.
The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides that:
A civil action may be brought in-(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if
all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may
otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the
court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

When a case is filed in an improper venue,

the court may either dismiss it or transfer it to a more
appropriate district if doing so serves “the interests of
justice.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a); 1406(a).

Moreover, if a court “finds that there is a want of
jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides that “the court shall,
if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or
appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal
could have been brought . . . .”

28 U.S.C. § 1631.

The Supreme

Court has recognized that a change of venue may be ordered even
when the transferor court lacks personal jurisdiction, see
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962), and the
First Circuit has noted that § 1631 creates “a presumption in
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favor of transfer.”

Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 73-

74 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Congress's use of the phrase ‘shall . . .
transfer’ in section 1631 persuasively indicates that transfer,
rather than dismissal, is the option of choice.”).1
Here, the alleged incident took place on a ship based in
Massachusetts and owned by a Massachusetts company, Nordic
Industries.

The individual defendants were all on the ship

during the incident, and worked for that same company.

Nordic

Industries is incorporated and has its principal place of
business in Massachusetts.

The defendants contend that they

have no individual or business connection to New Hampshire and
have not consented to jurisdiction here.

And they do not argue

that a court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them
in Massachusetts.

Moreover, Bobola himself has conceded that he

The defendants concede that § 1631 allows transfer when a court
lacks jurisdiction, but claim that this applies only to subject
matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 13
at 2-3. They cite several U.S. District Court cases outside
this circuit to support their contention, but their argument is
unpersuasive. The First Circuit has upheld a transfer under §
1631 where a court lacked personal jurisdiction, see Subsalve
USA Corp. v. Watson Manufacturing, Inc., 462 F.3d 41 (1st Cir.
2006), as have other circuits. See Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d
314, 328 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In light of the language of § 1631
and its purpose, we therefore conclude that the statute applies
to federal courts identifying any jurisdictional defect,
regardless of whether it involves personal or subject matter
jurisdiction.”); Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822
F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir. 1987) (same). More would be required
for me to ignore this authority and the plain text of the
statute.
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filed suit in the wrong district, and now requests that the case
be transferred to Massachusetts.
Given these facts, I agree with Bobola, and find that a
transfer serves the interests of justice here.

The defendants

argue for dismissal, not transfer, but fail to address how this
case falls within an exemption to the “presumption of transfer.”
See Britell, 318 F.3d at 74 (noting that the presumption may be
rebutted where the “transfer would unfairly benefit the
proponent, impose an unwarranted hardship on an objector, or
unduly burden the judicial system”) (internal citations
omitted).

Accordingly, I grant Bobola’s motion (Doc. No. 6) and

transfer the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.

I deny defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Doc. No. 12) without prejudice to their right to raise it again
in Massachusetts.
SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro
Paul Barbadoro
United States District Judge
April 4, 2016
cc:

Matthew D. Bobola
Seth S. Holbrook, Esq.

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