Quigley v. Precision Castparts Corp. et al

Filing 10

ORDER denying 8 Motion to Remand to State Court. So Ordered by Judge Paul J. Barbadoro.(jna)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Martin T. Quigley
v.

Case No. 16-cv-90-PB
Opinion No. 2016 DNH 116

Precision Castparts Corp., et al.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In January 2016, New Hampshire resident Martin Quigley
filed a lawsuit in New Hampshire state court against his former
employer, Precision Castparts Corp., an Oregon corporation.1
Along with Precision, Quigley named a host of other defendants,
including two of Precision’s subsidiaries, eight named
individuals, and ten unnamed “Doe Defendants.”

Relevant here,

all of these defendants reside outside New Hampshire except one:
Joshua Durand, the Bow, NH-based Human Resources Manager of
Precision subsidiary PCC Structurals, Inc.

Quigley appears to have worked at various times for Precision
Castparts, Wyman-Gordon Investment Castings, Inc. (Wyman), and
PCC Structurals, Inc. (Structurals), all named defendants here.
See Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-9. According to the complaint, Wyman and
Structurals are “wholly owned subsidiar[ies]” of Precision. Id.
at 4-5. For simplicity, I refer to the corporate and individual
defendants as “Precision” in this order, except where specified.
1

In March 2016, Precision removed the case to this court,
invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction.2
1332 (diversity); 1446 (removal).

See 28 U.S.C. §§

It noted that “all corporate

and individual defendants, with the sole exception of Durand,
are citizens of different states.”

Doc. No. 1 at 2.

Precision

argued that Durand’s presence in the suit did not destroy
diversity jurisdiction because there was “no reasonable
possibility that the state’s highest court would find that the
complaint states a cause of action against [Durand].”

Id.

(citing Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc.,
765 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2014)).

The next month, Quigley

moved to remand the case to state court.

I.
A.

Doc. No. 8.

BACKGROUND

Quigley’s Lawsuit
Quigley asserts a variety of state law claims related to

his prior employment at Precision and two of its subsidiaries,
Wyman-Gordon Investment Castings, Inc. (Wyman) and PCC
Structurals, Inc. (Structurals).

He alleges that he was

Removal appears to have been timely, since the notice of
removal was filed within 30 days of Precision’s receipt of
service of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The
defendants also appear to have unanimously consented to removal.
See Doc. No. 1 at 1; see also Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing the
requirement of defendant unanimity in removal cases).
2

2

subjected to a hostile environment while working as the Vice
President of Sales at Wyman’s Cleveland facility from April 2012
to March 2014.

Doc. No. 1-1 at 6.

Quigley eventually requested

a transfer to Wyman’s location in Millbury, MA.

Id.

Rather

than accommodate his request, however, Precision allegedly
forced Quigley to undergo “internal interviews and testing”
before reassigning him in March 2014 to Structurals’ Tilton, NH
facility under a six-month probationary agreement.3

Id. at 6-7.

Quigley claims that he was “routinely coerced into
partaking in business practices that he found unethical and
illegal” throughout his tenure at Precision.

Id. at 7.

For

example, Quigley alleges that Precision engaged in “extortion of
customers, sale of unqualified products, insurance fraud and
price fixing schemes.”

Id.

According to Quigley, Precision

executives condoned verbal and physical abuse towards Quigley as

The complaint does not describe in any detail the corporate
structure linking Precision – ostensibly the parent company – to
Wyman and Structurals, both of which are Precision’s “wholly
owned subsidiar[ies].” See Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-5. Nor do the
parties discuss the significance, if any, of Precision’s
corporate structure to this case. Cf. United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (Souter, J.) (Noting that
“[i]t is a general principle of corporate law . . . that a
parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries”); but see Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v.
Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918)
(allowing piercing of the corporate veil when a subsidiary is
“used as a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning
company”).
3

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a part of Precision’s “culture” as a “full contact company.”
Id. at 8.
Due to the hostile work environment he was forced to
endure, Quigley soon began suffering from high levels of stress
and anxiety.

Id.

In July 2014, his doctors recommended a six-

month leave of absence and advised him to avoid stressful
environments.

Id.

The next month, Quigley contacted defendant

John Erickson, a Senior Vice President at Precision, to discuss
his health issues and request a leave of absence.

Id. at 9.

Erickson assured Quigley that he would only share information
about Quigley’s health issues with other senior executives and
human resources personnel, but to Quigley’s dismay, Erickson and
other unnamed defendants disclosed his health information to
“other employees, to customers, and to others in the aerospace
industry.”

Id.

This disclosure humiliated Quigley and impeded

his ability to find other employment at a similar level of
compensation.

Id.

During this period, Quigley continued to pursue a leave of
absence.

Defendant Brian Keegan, Precision’s Senior Corporate

Director of Employee Relations, told Quigley that, among other
things, he qualified for six months of disability coverage
through the health insurer Cigna.

Id.

Quigley began filling

out paperwork for Cigna and invested “large amounts of time and

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money” in the process.

Id.

At some point, however, he was told

that the “Corporate Defendants, Defendant Durand, and Defendant
Keegan, had all misinformed [Quigley] about [his] eligibility
for coverage.”

Id.

Cigna then denied his coverage.

Id.

This

“two-month long process” caused Quigley “further emotional and
physical distress and significant out-of-pocket expenses.”

Id.

In addition to misleading Quigley about his disability
coverage, the “Defendants . . . jointly decided to conduct a
sham investigation” to force him from his job.

Id. at 10.

According to Quigley, this “sham investigation” served as a
“pretext for their firing” him.

Id. at 11.

In November 2014,

Quigley was placed on unpaid leave status pending
“investigations into suspected violations of his probationary
agreement,” and the next month, Quigley’s employment was
terminated.

Id. at 10-11.

In January 2016, Quigley filed this lawsuit, bringing ten
claims under New Hampshire law.

Not all claims are directed at

each defendant; some apply to various corporate defendants,
others to “All Defendants.”

See id. at 11-16.

Quigley asserts

only four claims against Durand: breach of fiduciary duty, civil
conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.

5

See id. at 13-16.

B.

Facts Relevant to Durand
Durand is only briefly mentioned in the complaint.

He is

listed as one of several individual defendants, along with his
Bow, NH address and role as Structurals’ Human Resource Manager.
Id. at 5.

Later in the complaint, Quigley alleges that

“Defendants” – including, presumably, Durand – improperly
disclosed his confidential health information to employees,
customers, and others in the aerospace industry.

Id. at 9.

He

argues in a memorandum supporting his motion that Durand’s
position as Human Resource Manager gave him access to Quigley’s
health information, and Durand breached his duty to keep that
information private.

See Doc. No. 8-1 at 2.

Quigley further explains that “Defendant Durand” and other
Precision administrators “misinformed” him about his eligibility
for disability coverage under Cigna’s policy.
9.

Doc. No. 1-1 at

This misinformation caused him to undergo an “expensive,

stressful, and ultimately futile two-month long process,” which
led to “further emotional and physical distress and significant
out-of-pocket expenses.”

Id.

Finally, Quigley claims that the

“Defendants” – again, presumably including, but not naming,
Durand – “jointly decided to conduct a sham investigation to
force [Quigley] from his job and prevent him from becoming a
whistleblower.”

Id. at 10.

Because Durand was Structurals’

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Human Resource Manager, Quigley argues, Durand “was in a
position to participate in said civil conspiracy to accomplish
the object of unlawfully terminating [Quigley’s] employment,
either directly or indirectly.”

Doc. No. 8-1 at 5.

Beyond

these allegations, Quigley does not make any further reference
to Durand.
In its opposition to Quigley’s motion to remand, Precision
filed an affidavit from Durand.

Doc. No. 9-2.

In that

affidavit, Durand alleged that his office in Tilton did not
maintain Quigley’s medical records.

Id. at 2.

He noted that he

did not review Quigley’s medical records in connection with
Quigley’s leave of absence, and never disclosed anything about
Quigley’s health to anyone inside or outside the company.

Id.

With respect to the company’s disability policy with Cigna,
Durand alleged that Precision executive Brian Keegan asked him
to provide Keegan with a copy of the policy.
complied.

Id.

Id.

Durand

According to Durand, he made no representations

to Quigley about his eligibility for disability benefits and was
not responsible for assisting Quigley in receiving benefits.
Id.

Finally, Durand alleged that he had no discussions about

Quigley’s termination; was not aware of any investigation
conducted against Quigley; and never agreed to “act in concert”
with anyone conducting a “sham investigation.”

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Id. at 3.

II.

ANALYSIS

Quigley’s motion to remand turns on whether he properly
joined Durand as a defendant when he filed his state court
complaint.
A defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless
the court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441; Mills v. Harmon Law Offices, P.C., 344
F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2003).

Here, jurisdiction is based on the

diversity of citizenship statute, which ordinarily requires that
“the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the
citizenship of each defendant.”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519

U.S. 61, 68 (1966) (emphasis added); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
An unflinching application of the complete diversity
requirement, however, would allow any plaintiff who wanted to
keep a case in state court to defeat the removal of an otherwise
diverse case merely by adding bogus claims against a nondiverse
defendant.

To address this problem, courts developed the

doctrine of “fraudulent joinder,” which permits courts to
disregard the citizenship of a fraudulently joined defendant
when determining whether diversity of citizenship exists.

See

13F Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3641.1 (3d ed. 2009).

8

Although fraudulent joinder can be proved with evidence
that “there has been outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading
of jurisdictional facts,” Jenner v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 2011 WL
1085981, at *1 (D.R.I. March 22, 2011), it can also be
established by a showing that “there is no reasonable
possibility that the state’s highest court would find that the
complaint states a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted against the non-diverse defendant,”4 Universal Truck &
Equip. Co., 76 F.3d at 108.

Precision does not claim that

Quigley acted with fraudulent intent in pressing his claims
against Durand.

Instead, Precision asserts that Durand was

improperly joined because there is no reasonable possibility
that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would find that Quigley has
stated a viable claim against him.

When evaluating this

argument, I “must necessarily look to the pleadings standards
applicable in state court, not the plausibility pleading
standards prevailing in federal court.”

Stillwell v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2011).

The term “fraudulent joinder” has been characterized as
“something of a misnomer” because it does not necessarily
require a removing defendant to “prove that the plaintiff
intended to mislead or deceive.” Lawrence Builders, Inc. v.
Kolodner, 414 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (D.R.I. 2006); Grennell v. W.
S. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.W. Va. 2004).
As a result, some courts employ the term “improper joinder”
instead. See, e.g., African Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Lucien, 756 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2014).
4

9

In determining whether a complaint states a viable claim
for relief, a New Hampshire state court must “rigorously
scrutinize the complaint to determine whether, on its face, it
asserts a cause of action.”
N.H. 41, 44-45 (1987).

Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130

All properly pleaded allegations are

assumed to be true and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the allegations are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
76-77 (2000).

Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73

In the end, if the pleadings “are reasonably

susceptible of an interpretation that would permit recovery,”
the case should not be dismissed.

Id.

Quigley asserts claims against Durand for breach of
fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

See Doc. No. 1-1 at 13-16.

All four claims are based

on Quigley’s contentions that Durand, either on his own or in
concert with others, (1) improperly disclosed Quigley’s
confidential health information to the public; (2) supplied
Quigley with misleading information about his eligibility for
disability benefits; and (3) conducted a “sham investigation”
into his work that ultimately served as a pretext for his
termination.

See id.

The problem with all of these contentions

is that Quigley does not plead sufficient facts in support of

10

his claims to justify anything other than a purely speculative
conclusion that Durand was a culpable participant in any
wrongdoing.
Quigley alleges that Durand was “the Human Resource
Manager” of Structurals, the Precision subsidiary where Quigley
worked immediately prior to his dismissal.

Id. at 5.

He also

claims that “the Corporate Defendants, Defendant Durand and
Defendant Keegan, had all misinformed Plaintiff about
Plaintiff’s eligibility for coverage under the Cigna disability
policy.”

Id. at 9.

To the extent that Quigley otherwise

alleges wrongdoing by Durand, he does so only with conclusory
allegations that “Defendants” as a group committed the acts that
give rise to his claims.

See generally id. at 3-11.

In a

memorandum he filed in support of his motion to remand, Quigley
then argues that it is reasonable to conclude that Durand was a
culpable participant in the defendants’ alleged misconduct
because of his position as Structurals’ Human Resource Manager.
See Doc. No. 8-1 at 4.
I am unpersuaded by Quigley’s argument.

To state a viable

claim against Durand under New Hampshire law, Quigley must do
more than merely assert that he was mistreated at his workplace
and that Durand must have been involved because he served as the
Human Resource Manager of a Precision subsidiary.

11

Although

Quigley claims that Durand is liable for breach of fiduciary
duty for leaking Durand’s confidential medical information, he
fails to cite any fact other than Durand’s job title to support
his claim that Durand either leaked the information himself or
was a culpable participant in leaking by others.

He similarly

claims that Durand participated in a conspiracy to use a “sham
investigation” to force his termination but supplies no
supporting facts that would justify his claim that Durand was a
culpable participant in the conspiracy.

Quigley does not

identify the specific conduct that supports his intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against
Durand, but to the extent that the claims are based on a
contention that Durand supplied misleading information to
Quigley about his eligibility for disability benefits, it does
not come close to alleging conduct by Durand that is sufficient
to support either claim.

Cf. Tessier v. Rockefeller, 162 N.H.

324, 341-42 (2011) (requiring “extreme and outrageous conduct”
to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and, among other things, “serious mental and emotional
harm accompanied by objective physical symptoms” to state a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
Accordingly, even under the liberal pleading standards that
prevail in New Hampshire state courts, there is no reasonable

12

possibility that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would find that
Quigley has stated a viable claim against Durand.

I therefore

agree with Precision that Durand should be dismissed as a
defendant and that Quigley’s motion to remand should be denied.

III.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Precision has met its burden of showing that
Quigley’s joinder of Durand was improper.

Accordingly, I deny

Quigley’s motion to remand (Doc. No. 8), dismiss Durand from the
suit, and retain jurisdiction over the case.

See Johnson v. Am.

Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 704 (4th Cir. 2015) (allowing
district courts to “disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the
citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume
jurisdiction over a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and
thereby retain jurisdiction”).
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro
Paul Barbadoro
United States District Judge
July 14, 2016
cc:

Earl Kalil, Jr., Esq.
William Saturley, Esq.
Joseph Russell, Esq.
Debra Weiss Ford, Esq.
Martha Van Oot, Esq.

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