Hajdusek v. USA

Filing 21

///ORDER granting 8 the United States' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lat)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Joseph S. Hajdusek,
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 16-cv-340-SM
Opinion No. 2017 DNH 198

United States of America,
Defendant

O R D E R

Joseph Hajdusek brings this action against the United
States of America seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.

Hajdusek was injured while taking part in an exercise and

physical training regimen, as part of the United States Marine
Corps Delayed Entry Program (“DEP”).

Hajdusek says his injuries

were proximately caused by a Marine Corps Staff Sergeant who
“excessively exercised [him] under dangerous conditions with
high intensity and long periods of time without breaks for
adequate hydration” and “carelessly, recklessly and negligently
failed to supervise [his] physical condition during the
excessive and unwarranted hours of strenuous physical exercise.”
Complaint (document no. 1) at paras. 12 and 13.

Pending before the court is the United States’ motion to
dismiss, in which it asserts that this court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Hajdusek’s claim because it arises out
of the Staff Sergeant’s performance of a discretionary function.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

Standard of Review
When faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff, as the
party invoking the court’s jurisdiction, bears the burden to
establish by competent proof that such jurisdiction exists.
See, e.g., Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.
1995).

In determining whether that burden has been met, the

court must “take as true all well-pleaded facts in the
plaintiffs’ complaint[], scrutinize them in the light most
hospitable to the plaintiffs’ theory of liability, and draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiffs favor.”
Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 251 (1st Cir. 2009).
The court may also consider evidence the parties have submitted,
such as depositions, exhibits, and affidavits, without
converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 661 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir.
2011).

Both parties have attached exhibits to their memoranda,

which the court has considered.

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Background
In August of 2010, Hajdusek enrolled in the Marine Corps
Delayed Entry Program (“DEP”).

He says he entered the DEP

rather than reporting directly to basic training because he “was
overweight and not in shape to pass basic training at that
time.”

Declaration of Joseph Hajdusek (document no. 14-1) at

para. 9.

By way of background, the Marine Corps DEP has been

helpfully described as follows:

The United States Marine Corps’ delayed-entry program
allows individuals to enlist in the Marine Corps
Reserve for up to a year before enlisting in the
regular Marine Corps. Individuals participating in
the program, referred to as “poolees,” are enlisted
into the Marine Corps Reserve. When poolees finish
the program, they are sent to recruit training (a.k.a
“boot camp”), at which time they are discharged from
the reserve component and enlisted onto active duty in
the regular Marine Corps. The delayed-entry program
helps the poolees prepare physically and mentally for
the initial strength test and recruit training itself.
The program also helps reduce the rate of attrition at
recruit training, and assists in the training of the
Marines.

Snow v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-319, 2012 WL 1150770, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2012) (citations omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1150765 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
2012).

By January of 2011, Hajdusek says he had reached his target
weight and had almost reached his strength goals, so he was

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instructed to report for basic training at Parris Island on or
around February 7, 2011.

Hajdusek Declaration at para. 13.

But, because he developed a kidney stone, his entry was again
delayed and he had to temporarily stop meeting with his fitness
instructors.

Later in February, however, Hajdusek resumed his

training regimen.

At that point, he says he had maintained his

target weight and needed only to pass a pull-up test before he
could proceed to basic training.

Id. at para. 15.

On March 1,

2011, Hajdusek reported for training exercises with the Marine
recruiters.

According to the complaint:

Staff Sergeant Mikelo was working with [Hajdusek] that
day for his training. Hajdusek and Staff Sgt. Mikelo
had not met until March 1, 2011.
During the training session on March 1, 2011, Staff
Sgt. Mikelo excessively exercised [Hajdusek] under
dangerous conditions with high intensity and long
periods of time without breaks for adequate hydration.
Staff Sgt. Mikelo of the United States Marines
carelessly, recklessly and negligently failed to
supervise [Hajdusek’s] physical condition during the
excessive and unwarranted hours of strenuous physical
exercise.

Complaint at paras. 11-13.

Hajdusek claims that although he

passed the pull-up test, Sergeant Mikelo ordered him to continue
exercising for an extended period of time (he believes Mikelo
was punishing him for having missed an earlier poolee function
due to a family commitment).

He says that during the two-hour

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training session, he was only given two brief breaks to run down
the hall to get some water.

Id. at para. 20.

And, says

Hajdusek, toward the end of the session, he was “clearly showing
signs of exhaustion and over-exertion injuries” and says he
collapsed on the floor several times while performing air
squats.

Id. at 22.

But, he did not complain or stop exercising

“because [he] did not want to anger S.Sgt. Mikelo further.”

Id.

Four days later, Hajdusek says he couldn’t see because his
vision was blurry, he had difficulty moving, and he was
nauseated.

Id. at para. 29.

He was taken to the hospital by

ambulance, where he was diagnosed with “rhabdomyolysis, left
lumbar radiculitis, L4-5 bilateral facet spondylosis, muscle
imbalances with biomechanical deficits, gait abnormality, kidney
failure, and significant pain.”

Id.

In August of 2011, he

began receiving Social Security disability benefits and says he
has lost the ability to work a normal schedule and lives in
constant pain.

Id. at para. 31.

He asserts that his injuries

were proximately caused by Staff Sergeant Mikelo’s careless,
reckless, and negligent actions in conducting (and supervising)
Hajdusek’s training regimen.

Parenthetically, the court notes that when Hajdusek was
injured, he was a member of the United States Marines Ready

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Reserve.

Accordingly, the parties seem (implicitly) to agree

that his claim is not barred by the Feres doctrine.

See Feres

v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (barring members of the
military from suing the United States for injuries arising
during service in the military).

See also Command Order 7000.3

(document no. 15-1) at para. 4(b)(8) (“Since poolees are not
eligible for DoD type benefits and they do not fall under the
Feres Doctrine, they may file claims or suits against a Marine,
the Recruiting Command or the Marine Corps for negligence.”);
Hajdusek’s Enlistment Papers (document no. 18-2) at 2 (“I
understand that I am in a nonpay status and that I am not
entitled to any benefits or privileges as a member of the Ready
Reserve.”).

As noted above, Hajdusek’s sole claim against the United
States is brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Discussion
I.

The FTCA and the Discretionary Function Exception.
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of the

federal government’s sovereign immunity.

Federal district

courts exercise subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions
for monetary damages against the United States.
1346(b)(1).

28 U.S.C. §

Specifically, the FTCA allows civil actions against

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the United States for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.”

Id.

Critically, however, the FTCA also

contains what is known as the “discretionary function
exception.”

That exception provides that the general waiver of

sovereign immunity established in the FTCA shall not apply to:

Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis supplied).

Consequently, if the

discretionary function exception applies, Hajdusek’s claim
against the United States is not within the scope of the FTCA,
and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it.

See

generally Abreu v. United States, 468 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.
2006) (“Thus, if the discretionary function exception applies,
the jurisdictional grant of section 1346(b) does not, such that
the government is completely immune from suit, and the claim
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)
(citations and internal punctuation omitted).

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See also Santana-

Rosa v. United States, 335 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Proper
invocation of this exception means that the government will be
shielded from liability, no matter how negligently an employee
may have acted.”) (citation omitted).

To determine whether challenged conduct falls within the
scope of the discretionary function exception, courts must
engage in a two-part inquiry:

[W]e first ask whether the conduct itself is
discretionary. To be discretionary, the conduct must
involve an element of judgment or choice.
Assuming that the challenged conduct involves an
element of judgment, we next consider whether that
judgment is of the kind that the discretionary
function exception was designed to shield. In other
words we ask whether the exercise of discretion
involves (or is susceptible to) policy-related
judgments.

Abreu, 468 F.3d at 25–26 (citations and internal punctuation
omitted).

See also Fothergill, 566 F.3d at 252.

And, as the

Supreme Court has held, “when established governmental policy,
as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency
guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it
must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy
when exercising that discretion.”
U.S. 315, 324 (1991).

United States v. Gaubert, 499

Under those circumstances, the plaintiff

“must overcome the Gaubert presumption by showing that [the

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government agent’s] actions were not susceptible to policy
analysis.”

Dwyer v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159

(D.N.H. 1999) (citing Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688,
692 (1st Cir. 1999) and Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154,
168 (1st Cir. 1998)).

II.

Hajdusek’s Arguments.
Hajdusek asserts that the FTCA’s discretionary function

exception does not apply in this case for two reasons.

First,

he says Sergeant Mikelo’s conduct was not discretionary.
Instead, he claims “there appear to be regulations, Orders, and
guidelines that were specifically violated, taking this [case]
out of the ‘discretionary’ category altogether.”
Memorandum at 8.

Plaintiff’s

Second, Hajdusek asserts that even if Sergeant

Mikelo’s conduct can properly be viewed as discretionary, it did
not involve the kind of judgment that the discretionary function
exception is designed to shield.

That is, it did not involve

“the permissible exercise of policy judgment.”

Id. at 11

(citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988)).

A.

Discretionary Conduct.

As a basic matter, it probably bears noting that if a
statute, regulation, or policy mandates that a government
employee engage in specific conduct, that employee is not vested

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with discretion to ignore that mandate - he or she must comply
with its dictates.

See, e.g., Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 (“The

requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course
of action for an employee to follow because the employee has no
rightful option but to adhere to the directive.”) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted).

On the other hand, if no

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes the
employee’s course of action, and if the employee is “free to
decide what course of action he will take in a given situation,
then his conduct is discretionary.”

Dwyer, 76 F. Supp. 2d at

158 (citations omitted).

Here, Hajdusek points to the Pool Program Rules (document
no. 15), Marine Recruiting Command Order 7000.3 (document no.
15-1), The Guidebook for Recruiters (document no. 14-2), and
various other policy guides and manuals relating to the poolee
program and suggests that they mandate specific conduct and
establish certain protocols - protocols that were violated in
this case.

For example, Hajdusek asserts that:

[S]upporting the argument that the alleged acts at
issue violated these regulations or prohibitions is
paragraph 8 of [Marine Recruiting Command Order
7000.3], warning that injuries to poolees should be
avoided because as civilians they may sue under the
FTCA, and specifically mandating that “due care must

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be taken to avoid potential liability.” That very
paragraph warns that regardless of other determining
factors, “high-risk pool functions will be . . . above
all SAFE.” Indeed, Command Order 7000.3 mandates that
the training be weighed as risk vs. merits, and must
be conducted in a “productive, safe manner, injury
free and void of liability claims.” Pages 4 and 5 of
that same Order list numerous activities as high-risk,
many of which are far less risky compared to the
forced excessive exercise alleged in this case.

Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 9 (citations omitted).

Similarly,

Hajdusek points to the Pool Program Rules, which note that “Any
poolee event or activity that presents the real possibility of
serious injury should not be undertaken.

It is important to

remember that poolees are not Marines yet and special care
should be taken to prevent even the slightest possibility of
injury.”

Id. at 5-C-14.

He also relies upon a paragraph from

The Guidebook for Recruiters, which states: “Treat poolees
professionally; do not establish a Drill Instructor to recruit
relationship.

Strive for a relationship similar to that of a

teacher and student.”

Id. at 3.

According to Hajdusek,

Sergeant Mikelo violated those (and similar) directives when he
failed to conduct his training regimen in a safe manner and used
drill instructor-type tactics while training Hajdusek.

The

court is constrained to disagree.

The Command Orders and DEP guidelines cited by Hajdusek are
not mandatory.

Instead, they are instructional and

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aspirational.

For example, as Hajdusek acknowledges in his

memorandum, Command Order 7000.3 notes that each instructor
“must weigh the merits versus the risks [associated with a
particular ‘high risk’ activity] and determine, before
requesting approval, that high-risk functions will be conducted
in a productive, safe manner, injury free and void of liability
claims.”

Id. at para. 4(b)(8).1

Plainly, that directive

contemplates that each instructor will exercise discretion when
he or she: considers which specific activities the poolee will
undertake; assesses the degree to which any benefit to the
poolee might be outweighed by the risk of injury; and decides
precisely how those activities will be conducted.

Neither that

Command Order nor any of the other orders and directives cited
by plaintiff mandate particular training programs, nor do they
address the frequency, length, or intensity of specific physical
training exercises.

They are, instead, general guidelines,

issued to encourage instructors to be aware of (and account for)

1

It is not entirely clear whether Command Order 7000.3
actually applies in this instance. That document provides
guidance on obtaining funding for, and conducting, DEP
functions. Those provisions on which Hajdusek relies relate to
“high risk pool activities,” which are defined to include
activities that carry the “potential for moderate to serious
injury,” including things like white-water rafting, rappelling,
running obstacle courses, and firing weapons. Id. at para. 4(b)
(8). Nothing in the record suggests that those provisions apply
to the type of exercise regimen in which Hajdusek participated that is, one involving running, push-ups, squats, lunges, and
crunches.

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safety issues and to assist them in fashioning customized
programs that will prepare each individual poolee for the rigors
of basic training.

See, e.g., Guidebook for Recruiters at 5-5

(“Based on the poolee profile, tailor a program and set specific
goals for the poolee to accomplish while in the Pool Program,
(e.g., referrals, physical fitness and/or weight loss);” Pool
Program Rules at 13 of 26 (“Pool activities geared toward
physical conditioning should concentrate on developing the
following areas: (a) upper body strength; (b) abdominal
strength; (c) aerobic conditioning.”); Command Order 7000.3 at 3
(providing that if an instructor chooses to engage his or her
poolees in “high-risk pool functions,” the instructor must
exercise discretion to balance the need to avoid injury, with
the goal that such events be “well thought out, exciting, [and]
challenging.”).

See generally Snow v. United States, 2012 WL

1150770, at *3 (“the Marine Corps orders that Plaintiffs assert
were violated do not prescribe a specific course of action.
Instead, these orders appear to formulate guidelines to best
allow individuals to make well-reasoned, informed decisions, at
their discretion.”).

But, says Hajdusek, “matters of scientific and professional
judgment - particularly judgments concerning safety - are rarely
considered to be susceptible to social, economic, or political

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policy.”

Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 20 (quoting Whisnant v.

United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005)).

To the

extent that view of the discretionary function exception was not
implicitly rejected in Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.
500 (1988), it has been explicitly rejected in this circuit.
See, e.g., Shansky, 164 F.3d at 693 (“[T]here is no principled
basis for superimposing a generalized ‘safety exception’ upon
the discretionary function defense.

A case-by-case approach is

required.”); Dwyer, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (“In the absence of a
specific, established safety policy, the First Circuit has
rejected a general ‘safety exception’ to the discretionary
function.”).

In short, the various general expressions of concern for
poolee safety identified by Hajdusek do not, whether alone or in
combination, constitute a mandatory policy governing how
instructors must organize, execute, or supervise fitness
training programs for poolees.

Consequently, it cannot be said

that Sergeant Mikelo “violated” any of those aspirational policy
statements.

As the Shansky court observed:

Shansky endeavors to end the inquiry at the initial
stage by showing that the Park Service had no
discretion because existing policy mandated that it
install handrails and warning signs when it
refurbished the premises. She finds succor in a
broadly worded expression of a general policy goal

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contained in the Park Services operating manual to the
effect that “[t]he saving of human life will take
precedence over all other management actions.”
National Park Service, NPS–28: Cultural Resource
Management Guidelines (Guidelines) 46 (July, 1994).
But this passage does not specifically prescribe that
any particular safety measure be employed at any
particular place or in any particular facility. To
the contrary, it suggests that the Park Service and
its functionaries will have to make discretionary
judgments about how to apply concretely the
aspirational goal embedded in the statement.
Statements made at this level of generality do not
satisfy Gaubert’s and Berkovitz’s specific
prescription requirement. Were the law otherwise, the
discretionary function exception would be a dead
letter.

Shansky, 164 F.3d at 691 (citation and footnote omitted)
(emphasis supplied).

So it is in this case.

Based upon the record before the court, it is plain that
the conduct at issue in this case - Sergeant Mikelo’s decision
to subject Hajdusek to a series of strenuous exercises and his
alleged failure to adequately monitor Hajdusek’s condition involved elements of judgment and discretion.

The question is

not whether Mikelo was negligent, or whether he exercised poor
judgment, or whether he abused his discretion.

It is, rather,

whether he was vested with discretion to formulate and supervise
a unique exercise program to help Hajdusek reach (and maintain)
his personal weight and fitness goals.

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He was.

Next, the court must consider whether that discretion is of
the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed
to shield - that is, whether Sergeant Mikelo’s exercise of
discretion involved or was susceptible to policy-related
judgments.

See Abreu, 468 F.3d at 25–26.

See also Gaubert, 499

U.S. at 323 (“[W]hen properly construed, the exception ‘protects
only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations
of public policy.’”) (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537).

B.

Policy Judgment.

Because Sergeant Mikelo was vested with a range of
discretion to determine the most appropriate way to assist
Hajdusek in reaching his weight, strength, and stamina goals
before reporting for basic training, “it must be presumed that
[his] acts [were] grounded in policy when exercising that
discretion.”

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324.

Consequently, for

Hajdusek’s complaint to survive the government’s motion to
dismiss, “it must allege facts which would support a finding
that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can
be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.”
Id. at 324-25.

At this stage of the court’s analysis, the focus is not on
Sergeant Mikelo’s subjective intent in exercising the discretion

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with which he was vested, nor need the court determine whether
he actually engaged in any policy-based decision-making when
formulating and overseeing Hajdusek’s exercise regimen.
Instead, the court must focus “on the nature of the actions
taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.

As the Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit has observed:

In fine, an inquiring court need not ask whether
government actors decided the point explicitly or
actually discussed it, for the inquiry hinges instead
on whether some plausible policy justification could
have undergirded the challenged conduct. The critical
question is whether the acts or omissions that form
the basis of the suit are susceptible to a policydriven analysis, not whether they were the end product
of a policy-driven analysis.

Shansky, 164 F.3d at 692 (citation and footnote omitted)
(emphasis supplied).

The record is clear that instructors in the DEP, like
Sergeant Mikelo, must routinely balance poolee safety concerns
with various other interests, including:

(a)

adequately preparing poolees for the physical and
mental rigors of both basic training and life as
a United States Marine, see, e.g., Pool Program
Rules at 5-C-11 (“Too much training time is lost
and too many prospective Marines are discharged
because they arrive at recruit training
overweight and/or without the minimum levels of
strength and endurance.”); Guidebook for

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Recruiters (document no. 14-2) at 5-4 (“You must
ensure that the poolee can pass the IST [Initial
Strength Test] prior to shipping.”);
(b)

reducing attrition in the DEP and at basic
training, see Pool Program Rules at 5-C-1;

(c)

appropriately utilizing finite military
resources, see, e.g., Command Order 7000.3
(setting forth detailed instructions for
obtaining and using appropriated funds for DEP
functions and training events);

(d)

fostering in the poolees a sense of loyalty,
camaraderie, structure, and discipline, see,
e.g., Guidebook for Recruiters at 5-10 (“Organize
the pool into Rifle Squads with squad and fire
team leaders. . . . This teaches the poolee
military organization and structure.”); and

(e)

generating new recruit referrals from the
poolees, see, e.g., Guidebook for Recruiters at
5-2 (noting that one of the goals of the Pool
Program is to “get poolees to refer names of
qualified prospects” and then to have those
“prospects enlist in the Marine Corps.”).

See also Declaration of Jack Jacobs, Jr. (document no. 8-2)
(discussing the various goals of the Marine Corps Recruiting
Command and the Delayed Entry Program that must be considered
and balanced when designing individualized fitness programs for
poolees).

See generally Snow, 2012 WL 1150770, at *3 (“[T]he

decisions made regarding the training exercises balance the need
for the safety of the poolees with the necessity of conserving
scarce military resources, and the need to prepare young men and
women to succeed in boot camp, reduce attrition rates, and make
better Marines.”).

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The discretionary judgments at issue in this case are
precisely the type that courts have recognized as involving
policy-based considerations, as they require “judgment as to the
balancing of many technical, military, and even social
considerations, including specifically the trade-off between
greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.”
U.S. at 511.

Boyle, 487

See generally, Santana-Rosa, 335 F.3d at 43–44

(concluding that the bureau of prisons’ “decisions regarding
maintenance of cleaning supplies and inmate work assignments are
susceptible to policy-related analysis” and necessitate
consideration of several factors, such as “budgetary concerns,
sanitation needs, the character of the particular inmate
population, the need for a specific level of security, the
proper scheduling of cleaning assignments, the convenience or
necessity of easy access to necessary equipment, and the
available inmates’ prior work experience.”).

See also Shansky,

164 F.3d at 694–95 (noting that deciding whether to install
safety handrails at a national historic site “required the
unrestrained balancing of incommensurable values — including
safety, aesthetics, and allocation of resources — typically
associated with policy judgments.); Fothergill, 566 F.3d at 253
(holding that the United States Postal Service’s decision about
“whether to install curbs or barriers in a parking lot, when to
do so, how to array them, and the like are variables about which

19 

reasonable persons can differ.

In the last analysis, those

choices are informed by a need to balance concerns about a
myriad of factors such as efficiency, safety, aesthetics, and
cost.

In other words, those choices are readily susceptible to

policy analysis. . . . So long as there is room for differing
policy judgments, there is discretion of the type and kind
shielded by section 2680(a)”).

Conclusion
The conduct at issue in this case - a Marine Corps
recruiter’s allegedly negligent conduct in formulating an
exercise regimen for Hajdusek, and his allegedly negligent
failure to properly monitor Hajdusek as he performed that
exercise regimen - was discretionary and involved (or was, at a
minimum, susceptible to) the exercise of policy-related
judgment.

Consequently, the discretionary function exception to

the Federal Tort Claims Act applies to Hajdusek’s claim against
the United States and this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over it.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
the government’s memoranda, the United States’ Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (document no. 8) is

20 

granted.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance

with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
September 21, 2017
cc:

David N. Damick, Esq.
Thomas P. Colantuono, Esq.
Robert J. Rabuck, AUSA

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