Beaulieu v. NH Governor, et al.

Filing 77

ORDER denying 13 Motion for Injunctive Relief; denying 18 Motion for Emergency Court Order; denying 43 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; denying 45 Motion for Emergency Hearing & TRO; denying 55 Motion for Copie s; denying 56 Motion for Forms and Copies; denying 57 Motion to Dismiss Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief; denying 58 Motion to Extend Time; denying 59 Motion for Copies and Transcripts; denying 60 Motion to Amend; denying 61 Mo tion for Reconsideration; denying 62 Motion for Court Order; denying 73 Motion to Disregard the Motion to Dismiss Injunctive Relief; denying 74 Motion for Copies of Exhibits; denying 76 Motion to Extend Time. A preliminary pretrial conference will be scheduled. So Ordered by Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.(gla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Christopher Beaulieu
a/k/a Crystal Beaulieu1
v.

Civil No. 16-cv-471-JD
Opinion No. 2018 DNH 174

New Hampshire Governor et al.
O R D E R
Christopher “Crystal” Beaulieu, who is proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis, filed motions for preliminary injunctive
relief, challenging certain conditions of her confinement at the
New Hampshire State Prison for Men.
objected.

The defendants have

Beaulieu also moved to withdraw her requests for

preliminary injunctive relief, and then filed a motion to
disregard the motion to withdraw.
the motion to disregard.

The defendants objected to

In addition, Beaulieu has moved to

amend her complaint, and the defendants objected.
The defendants move for reconsideration of the court’s
order granting in part and denying in part their motion to
dismiss.

Beaulieu did not file a response to the motion for

reconsideration.

Beaulieu has filed a series of motions seeking

copies of filings and exhibits and extensions of time.

1Beaulieu

is a transsexual female who uses the name
“Crystal,” and prefers to be referred to with female pronouns.

Background
As was explained in the order granting in part and denying
in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Beaulieu is a
transsexual inmate who has been incarcerated at the New
Hampshire State Prison for Men since January 6, 2011.

Although

born a male, she identifies as female, which is reflected in her
clothing, makeup, and hair style.

She began hormone treatment

in October of 2015.
Because of her transsexual status, Beaulieu alleges that
she is particularly at risk in the prison environment.

She also

alleges that she has mental health issues and that the prison
staff is aware of those issues.

Beaulieu’s allegations reflect

her tumultuous history at the prison, including allegations of
sexual assaults and disciplinary measures imposed on multiple
occasions.
On preliminary review, the magistrate judge ordered service
of thirteen claims.

Report and Recommendation, doc. no. 16

(Nov. 30, 2017), approved, Order, doc. no. 21 (Jan. 2, 2018).
The defendants moved to dismiss most of the claims, and Beaulieu
objected.

The court granted the motion in part.

Doc. no. 54.

The claims that remain in the case are as follows:
2. SHU Sgt. Stefan Czak and Corrections Officer (“CO”) Eric
Turner committed the state law tort of negligence, by housing
Beaulieu with inmate Shawn Cook in March 2015, knowing that
Beaulieu was at particular risk of sexual victimization and that
Cook had a history of sexual assault.
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3. Defendants Capt. Michael Edmark and Lt. Scott Marshall,
knowing that Beaulieu suffers from mental health problems,
violated Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment rights, and committed the
state law tort of negligence by housing Beaulieu in a cell below
inmate Cook on May 20, 2015, while the investigation of
Beaulieu’s sexual assault claim against Cook was ongoing, and
knowingly allowing Cook to harass and threaten Beaulieu, thus
creating a substantial risk to Beaulieu’s mental health.
4. An unnamed NHSP corrections officer, identified in the
R&R as John Doe #1, on May 27, 2016, violated Beaulieu’s Eighth
Amendment rights, and committed the state law tort of
negligence, by putting Beaulieu in a cell with an inmate who the
officer knew or should have known was a member of a gang with
which Beaulieu had prior difficulties, thus placing Beaulieu at
a substantial risk of serious harm.
5(a). CO Christopher Brownlie, CO Young, and CO Dominic
Salce committed the state law tort of negligence, by placing
Beaulieu at a substantial risk of serious harm from other
inmates, in that:
a. CO Christopher Brownlie told another inmate that
Beaulieu was a “rat”.
5(b & c). CO Christopher Brownlie, CO Young, and CO
Dominic Salce violated Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment rights, and
committed the state law tort of negligence, by placing Beaulieu
at a substantial risk of serious harm from other inmates, in
that:
b. CO Young told inmates that Beaulieu was a “rat” and
a “skinner,” and
c. CO Dominic Salce yelled, where all of the inmates
on Beaulieu’s tier could hear him, that Beaulieu had
requested statement forms, which Salce knew would
cause other inmates to think Beaulieu is a “rat.”
6. Warden Zenk, Maj. Jon Fouts, Capt. Boynton, Lt. Paul
Carroll, Sgt. Gary Lydick, Sgt. Jeremiah Totten, Cpl. Stone, and
Cpl. Pat Wright, knowing that Beaulieu suffers from mental
health problems, committed the state law tort of negligence, by
allowing Brownlie to work in proximity to, and interact with,
Beaulieu during the investigation of Beaulieu’s sexual assault
accusation against Brownlie, and allowing Brownlie to harass
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Beaulieu, thus creating a substantial risk of serious harm to
Beaulieu’s mental health.
7. Sgt. Lydick, Lt. Carroll, and Capt. Edmark committed the
state law tort of negligence, in that, knowing that CO David
Dionne had previously used excessive force on Beaulieu and
harassed Beaulieu, and knowing that Beaulieu suffers from mental
health problems, those defendants allowed Dionne after July 28,
2016, to continue to work in proximity to Beaulieu, thus
creating a substantial risk of serious harm to Beaulieu’s mental
health.
8. On July 6, 2017, Sgt. Totten, CO Jason Caruso and Lt.
Marshall committed the state law tort of negligence by denying
Beaulieu’s request to see a mental health worker when Beaulieu
told the officers she was actively suicidal and instead told
Beaulieu to “just kill [her]self,” and by laughing at and
provoking Beaulieu, thus creating a substantial risk of serious
harm to Beaulieu’s mental health.
9. In retaliation for Beaulieu’s First Amendment activities
including her filing of a complaint against CO Brownlie,
accusing that officer of sexually assaulting her, as well as
Beaulieu’s oral and written grievances, and lawsuits filed
against other DOC staff members:
a. An unnamed officer, identified in the R&R as John Doe
#2, charged Beaulieu with a disciplinary violation for
disrespecting CO Chandonnet, when Beaulieu objected to
Chandonnet’s actions that Beaulieu considered to be sexual
assault;
b. Sgt. Pelletier, CO John Aulis, Lt. Andrew Newcomb, and
CO Timothy Miller, Capt. Masse, Cpl. Paz, and CO
Lamontagne, charged Beaulieu with multiple disciplinary
infractions;
c. Unnamed officers, identified in the R&R as the “Keep
Away John Does,” instituted a “Keep Away” directive
preventing Beaulieu and her boyrfriend, Steven Newcombe,
from having any type of contact with one another.
d. On May 11, 2017, Sgt. Lydick inflicted unnecessary
force on Beaulieu, causing her severe pain;
e. Cpl. Wright told Beaulieu to kill herself;

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f. CO Young told other inmates that Beaulieu is a
“rat” and a “skinner”; and
g. On July 6, 2017, Beaulieu was subjected to unprovoked
excessive force, tazed, kicked, and placed in a restraint
chair by Sgt. Totten, CO Caruso, Lt. Carroll, Capt. Edmark,
and Lydick.
10. On an unspecified date in 2016, CO G. Nimorowski, while
escorting Beaulieu between areas of the prison while Beaulieu
was handcuffed, violated Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment right not
to be subjected to excessive force maliciously or sadistically
applied, in that Nimorwski, without provocation, pulled and
twisted Beaulieu’s arm, and then, when Beaulieu told Nimorowski
that he was hurting her, Nimorowski forcefully pushed her
handcuffs toward her elbows, causing her pain;
11. On December 5, 2016, Sgt. Totten, while escorting
Beaulieu between areas of the prison, after Beaulieu said she
refused to live on a particular tier in SHU and then stated that
she was suicidal, violated Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment right not
to be subjected to excessive force maliciously or sadistically
applied, in that:
a. Sgt. Totten slammed Beaulieu’s head against the
window, and held her against the window by her arms; and
b. After Beaulieu had smashed her own head against the
window, Sgt. Totten slammed Beaulieu against a doorframe
and then slammed her face into the floor, while Beaulieu
was not resisting Totten’s attempts to restrain her.
12. Shortly after May 11, 2017, in response to Beaulieu’s
accusation of sexual assault against CO Brownlie, Sgt. Lydick
and other unnamed officers, identified by the court in the
Report and Recommendation issued this date as “May 11 John
Does,” violated Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment right not to be
subjected to excessive force maliciously or sadistically
applied, in that, without provocation:
a. Lydick forced Beaulieu to the ground while she was in
handcuffs, without allowing her the opportunity to get down
voluntarily; and
b. The officers present then got “on” Beaulieu while
she
was on the floor in handcuffs, causing her severe pain.

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13. On May 27, 2017, in response to Beaulieu smashing her cup,
which she did because she was suicidal and had been refused
mental health care, CO Caruso, CO Young, Capt. Edmark, Lt.
Carroll, and Sgt. Lydick violated Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment
right not to be subjected to excessive force maliciously or
sadistically applied, in that:
a. CO Caruso, CO Young, Capt. Edmark, Lt. Carroll, and Sgt.
Lydick forcibly pulled Beaulieu’s arms through the tray
slot in her door and handcuffed her, and put her on the
floor in the SHU rotunda;
b. Lydick shot Beaulieu with a Tazer;
c. Edmark kicked Beaulieu in the face while she was on
the floor;
d. after Beaulieu got up, Caruso and Young pulled her arms
while she was handcuffed, then dropped her to the ground on
her shoulder;
e. CO Caruso, CO Young, Capt. Edmark, Lt. Carroll, and
Sgt. Lydick fell on top of her after Caruso and Young
dropped her on the ground; and
f. CO Caruso, CO Young, Capt. Edmark, Lt. Carroll, and Sgt.
Lydick then placed Beaulieu in a restraint chair for four
hours.
I.

Beaulieu’s Motions Related to Injunctive Relief
In her motions for preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff

seeks a court order directing the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections defendants to:
a. allow Beaulieu and other transsexual inmates to buy
makeup and other “female items,” see doc. no. 13;
b. allow transsexual inmates housed at the New Hampshire
State Prison (“NHSP”) Secure Housing Unit (“SHU”) to shave
more frequently than once a month, see id.;
c.

not house inmates in SHU dayrooms;

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d. reinstate all of the privileges Beaulieu has lost in
disciplinary sanctions, see id.;
e. remove the “Keep Away” directive prohibiting Beaulieu
and Steven Newcombe from having contact with one another,
see id.;
f. allow Beaulieu to have contact with Newcomb after
Newcombe is released from prison on parole, see id.;
g. prevent Corrections Officer (“CO”) Christopher Brownlie
and CO Dominic Salce from having any contact with Beaulieu,
see id.;
h. move CO Timothy Miller and CO Amnott out of the NHSP’s
Medium Custody South Unit (“MCS”), see doc. no. 18;
i. ensure that MCS and SHU officers do not retaliate
against Beaulieu for filing the instant lawsuit in any
manner, and in particular, prohibiting those officers from:
issuing excessive disciplinary charges against Beaulieu,
“trashing” Beaulieu’s cell and property, telling inmates
that Beaulieu likes to make sexual assault accusations
against other inmates, refusing to place Beaulieu in
housing in which Beaulieu feels safe, and subjecting
Beaulieu to unsanitary and uncomfortable conditions of
confinement, see doc. nos. 18, 43, 48.
The magistrate judge heard evidence on the motions for
injunctive relief on March 9, 2018 and April 17, 2018.

The next

scheduled day of the evidentiary hearing was postponed, as
Beaulieu had become unavailable for medical reasons, to be
rescheduled when those medical issues were resolved.

Prior to

rescheduling the evidentiary hearing on the motions, the court
granted the parties the opportunity to brief the question of
whether plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief had become
moot.

See Endorsed Order, June 20, 2018.

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A.

Standard of Review

“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.’”

Glossip v. Gross,

135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res.
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Voice of
the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26,
32 (1st Cir. 2011).

The likelihood of success on the merits and

irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction are the factors
that weigh most heavily in the analysis.

Id. (“perhaps the

single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not
granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm
before a decision on the merits can be rendered.” (internal
quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)); Esso Std.
Oil Co. v. Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006) (“if
the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed
in his quest,” preliminary injunctive relief is properly denied
without further analysis).
movant.

The burden of proof is on the

Id.

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B. Requests for Injunctive Relief Unrelated to Claims in
this Case
Beaulieu’s motions seek relief for claims that are not
pending against the defendants in this case.

“‘[A] party moving

for a preliminary injunction must establish a relationship
between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct
asserted in the complaint.’”

Gray v. Perkins, No. 14-cv-386-PB,

2018 WL 1998975, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 2, 2018), R. & R. adopted
2018 WL 1998915, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 27, 2018).
Specifically, in Document No. 13, Beaulieu seeks injunctive
relief related to claims concerning: access to female items, the
ability to shave more frequently while in SHU, housing in SHU
dayrooms, reinstatement of privileges Beaulieu lost as a result
of disciplinary action against her, a “Keep Away” directive and
post-parole contact concerning inmate Steven Newcombe, and
denying Beaulieu cellmates in SHU.

The claims based on those

events and circumstances have been dismissed.2

In addition, the defendants assert that the parties have
agreed, as to Beaulieu’s access to female items and her ability
to shave more than once a month while in SHU, that “those issues
have been addressed by policy changes within the [DOC] and are
now moot.” Doc. No. 44-1, at 1. Beaulieu has not disputed
either the existence of new DOC policies or the mootness of her
related claims for preliminary injunctive relief. Accordingly,
Beaulieu’s claim for access to female items and more frequent
opportunities to shave in SHU are also moot.
2

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Beaulieu cannot show that she is likely to succeed on
claims that have been dismissed.

Further, these requests for

injunctive relief are not related to the injuries alleged in the
claims presently pending in this case.
In document nos. 18, 43, and 45, Beaulieu seeks injunctive
relief relating to her allegations of events and injuries that
have arisen or occurred since Beaulieu filed this action.

As

was true in another action Beaulieu filed in this court,
Beaulieu v. Orlando, No. 15-cv-012-JD:
The only basis upon which the court can find there is
a relationship between the claims in this action and
plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against DOC
officials is that Beaulieu claims the conduct she
seeks to enjoin is retaliation for her litigation
here. However, no retaliation claim is pending in this
case. Plaintiff’s allegations do not suffice,
therefore, to establish the requisite connection
between the underlying claims and relief requested in
her motion for injunctive relief.
2017 WL 3773053, at *3 (D.N.H. July 24, 2017), R. & R. approved
sub nom. Beaulieu v. NH Dep't of Corr., 2017 WL 3822879, at *1
(D.N.H. Aug. 30, 2017).

Accordingly, Beaulieu’s requests for

injunctive relief in document no. 13, other than her requests
for an order preventing COs Brownlie and Salce from contacting
her, do not seek relief relating to the claims underlying this
case, and to that extent, plaintiff cannot obtain the relief she
seeks.

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C.

Housing in SHU and MSC

Beaulieu’s request for an injunction, concerning contact
with COs Brownlie and Salce, as well as all of the relief she
requested in documents nos. 18, 43, and 45, arise out of
conditions that existed during her previous housing placements
in SHU and in MCS.

The defendants, and other DOC officers

identified in Beaulieu’s motions for injunctive relief, whose
actions Beaulieu now seeks to enjoin, work in SHU and MCS.

In

their memorandum concerning the mootness of Beaulieu’s requests
for injunctive relief, the defendants assert that Beaulieu has,
since April 23, 2018, been housed in the NHSP’s Health Services
Center (“HSC”) or in the NHSP’s Residential Treatment Unit
(“RTU”).

Defendants further assert that because Beaulieu has

refused placement in protective custody in SHU, as she doesn’t
feel safe on that unit, if it becomes necessary to remove
Beaulieu from the RTU, she will be returned to the HSC, and will
not be returned to SHU or MCS.
Beaulieu agrees that she has been housed in either the HSC
or RTU since April 2018.

See doc. no. 72.

Because Beaulieu’s

requests for injunctive relief, in the four motions with which
this Order is concerned, allege harms which occurred, or which
Beaulieu feared would continue to occur, in SHU and/or MCS, by
officers who work on those units, her remaining requests for
injunctive relief in document no. 13, and all of her requests
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for such relief in Document Nos. 18, 43, and 45, have been
rendered moot by her apparently permanent transfer out of those
units.

See Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (“A

prisoner’s challenge to prison conditions or policies is
generally rendered moot by his transfer or release.”).
Accordingly, as Beaulieu’s motions for preliminary injunctive
relief concern conditions on SHU and MCS, they are denied as
moot.
D. Beaulieu’s Motions to Withdraw Her Motions for
Injunctive Relief and Motion to Disregard
Because the court denies Beaulieu’s motions for preliminary
injunctive relief as moot, her motion to withdraw those motions
is denied as moot.

As the motion to withdraw is denied, the

motion to disregard the motion to withdraw is also denied as
moot.
II.

Beaulieu’s Motion to Amend
Beaulieu filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to

further address injunctive relief and to allege “clearer facts,
new allegations, claims, and defendants.”

She also represented

that the defendants have agreed to allow her to amend.

The

defendants object to the motion to amend and demonstrate that
they did not agree to amendment.

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Beaulieu did not file a copy of her proposed amended
complaint with her motion for leave to amend or otherwise comply
with the requirements of Local Rule 15.1.

Her description of

her intended amendments, however, show that she intends to add
new claims and defendants to support her requests for injunctive
relief that are been denied.

Those claims are unrelated to the

claims that were alleged in her complaint, allowed on
preliminary review, and narrowed through the defendants’ motion
to dismiss.
This case has been pending since October of 2016.

Beaulieu

has continually attempted to move away from her original claims
to raise new issues involving new parties.

As such, she is

attempting to present a moving target by adding new matters and
defendants based on changing events and circumstances.

See

Negron v. Turco, 253 F. Supp. 3d 361, 363-64 (D. Mass. 2017).
The motion to amend is denied.
III.

Beaulieu’s Miscellaneous Motions
Beaulieu has filed motions that request copies of filings

and exhibits related to her motions for injunctive relief,
unspecified subpoenas and copies of docket sheets from other
cases, an injunction against transferring her to a facility in
another state, and relief with respect to her medications and an
extension of time to respond to unspecified motions.

13

To the

extent Beaulieu’s requests are directed to the court, the
defendants take no position on those matters.

The defendants

dispute Beaulieu’s allegations related to her various
disciplinary and placement issues and object to her requests for
extensions of time.
Beaulieu’s requests for documents and exhibits related to
her motions for injunctive relief are moot for the reasons
explained above.

Her motion for twenty subpoenas and for copies

of dockets in other cases is not sufficiently specific to allow
the court to respond.

Her most recent motion for extensions of

time does not explain what motions she needs additional time for
response.

To the extent she is requesting an injunction

pertaining to her medications, that is not a claim in this case.
The motions seeking copies of other dockets, documents,
unspecified extensions of time, and exhibits are denied.
In her “Motion for a Court Order,” Beaulieu states that
“[u]pon information and belief the Department of Corrections is
planning [sic] to Send ME Out of State.”

She says that she

would have difficulty litigating her case from a facility in
another state.

In response, the defendants contend that

Beaulieu cannot show irreparable harm based on her subjective
conjecture about what might happen.

They also contend that

transfers to another facility do not implicate a liberty

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interest and that Beaulieu lacks facts to support a theory of
retaliatory transfer.
As the defendants contend, Beaulieu has not shown that she
is likely to experience irreparable harm due to a transfer to a
facility in another state.

For that reason, her motion for a

court order to enjoin a transfer is denied.
IV.

Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
The defendants move for reconsideration of the court’s

order granting in part and denying in part their motion to
dismiss.

In support, the defendants contend that, contrary to

the order, they moved to dismiss both state and federal claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), that Claim 8 should have been
dismissed for failure to allege an injury, that the negligence
claims in Claims 2 and 5(a) are barred under RSA 99-D, and that
the same claims should be dismissed for lack of supplemental
jurisdiction.
“‘[M]otions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a
limited number of circumstances:

if the moving party presents

newly discovered evidence, if there has been an intervening
change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that the
original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was
clearly unjust.’”

United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 467

(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53

15

(1st Cir. 2009)).

Reconsideration is not “a vehicle for a party

to undo its own procedural failures” or a means to “advance
arguments that could and should have been presented to the
district court prior to” the decision being issued.
City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006).

Iverson v.
Further,

reconsideration does not permit a party to “regurgitate old
arguments previously considered and rejected.”

Biltcliffe v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014).
In addition, as the court noted in the order on the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, the defendants’ challenges to
Beaulieu’s claims and their defenses are best considered in the
context of a motion for summary judgment, which is based on
evidence rather than allegation.
A.

Section 1997e(e)

The defendants assert that the court erred in failing to
dismiss Beaulieu’s negligence claims under § 1997e(e).

In their

motion to dismiss, however, the defendants relied on the
standard provided by Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th
Cir. 2005), “‘Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil
actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation,
making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries
non-recoverable, absent physical injury.’”

Doc. 25 at 8.

The

court, not surprisingly, interpreted the defendants’ motion to

16

challenge the constitutional claims under § 1997e(e).
Therefore, to the extent the defendants actually challenged the
negligence claims under § 1997e(e) in the motion to dismiss,
they have not shown that the decision is based on a manifest
error of law.
B.

Claim 8

The defendants argue that because the court dismissed the
Eighth Amendment part of Claim 8, for failure to allege harm,
the negligence part of the claim should also be dismissed.

It

does not appear that the defendants made that argument in the
motion to dismiss.
C.

No manifest error has been shown.

Official Immunity

The defendants now argue that the negligence parts of
Claims 2 and 5(a) must be dismissed based on official immunity
provided by RSA 99-D because the court concluded that Beaulieu
had not alleged facts to show deliberate indifference to support
the Eighth Amendment claims.

That argument appears to be a

response to the court’s reasoning in not dismissing the
negligence claims under RSA 99-D and does not appear to have
been made in the motion to dismiss.
have not shown a manifest error.

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Therefore, the defendants

D.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

The defendants argue for the first time in their motion for
reconsideration that the negligence claims in Claims 2 and 5(a)
should be dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

The defendants, however, never raised §

1367(a) in their motion to dismiss.

In addition, the argument

appears to be a challenge to the preliminary review of the
claims in this case, which is no longer at issue.

The

defendants have not shown a manifest error.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Beaulieu’s motions seeking
preliminary injunctive relief (doc. nos. 13, 18, 43, and 45),
motion to withdraw (doc. no. 57) her motions for preliminary
injunctive relief, and motion to disregard (doc. no. 73) her
motion to withdraw are denied.
Her motions seeking copies, extensions of time, and other
injunctive relief (doc. nos. 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 74, and 76) are
denied.
Beaulieu’s motion to amend (doc. no. 60) is denied.
The defendants’ motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 61) is
denied.
A preliminary pretrial conference will be scheduled and the
parties shall file proposed scheduling plans or a joint plan

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under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(f) and 16(b) and Local
Rule 16.1 and 26.1.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
August 30, 2018
cc:

Christopher Beaulieu, a/k/a Crystal Beaulieu, pro se
Anthony Galdieri, Esq.
Laura E. B. Lombardi, Esq.

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