Turcotte v. Comcast Cable Communication Management, LLC

Filing 38

///ORDER granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case. So Ordered by Judge Paul J. Barbadoro.(vln)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Brenda Turcotte
Case No. 17-cv-150-PB
Opinion No. 2019 DNH 024

v.
Comcast Cable Communications
Management, LLC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Brenda Turcotte alleges that Comcast Cable Communications
Management, LLC (“Comcast”), her former employer, violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and its state-law
analogue by failing to reassign her to a vacant position within
the company as an accommodation for her disability.

Comcast

argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Turcotte
cannot prove at trial that she was entitled to a reassignment.
I.

BACKGROUND

Turcotte worked at Comcast from November 2008 until August
2014.

She was hired as a Customer Account Executive to field

inbound telephone calls from Comcast customers.
in this job was unsatisfactory.
3).

Her performance

See Def.’s Ex. B (Doc. No. 15-

Starting in March 2010, Turcotte took an 18-month leave of

absence protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
due to work-related panic attacks and bereavement, her mother
having recently died.

Her medical providers furnished

documentation to Comcast to support her entitlement to FMLA
leave and her need for an accommodation.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1,

Attach. B1-B5 (Doc. No. 23-1).
During her leave, Comcast placed Turcotte on an extended
internal job search to explore new positions as an accommodation
for her disability.

In September 2011, she accepted a transfer

to the position of Pre-Caller.

In this role, she made outbound

calls to customers to verify service appointments and do limited
troubleshooting.

See Def.’s Ex. H at 27 (Doc. No. 15-9).

Turcotte performed satisfactorily in this job.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1

¶ 10 (Doc. No. 21-2).
After about two years, in mid-2013, Comcast automated the
Pre-Caller function and all Pre-Callers transitioned to Dispatch
positions, tasked with receiving inbound calls from field
technicians.

See Def.’s Ex. H at 92 (Doc. No. 15-9); Def.’s Ex.

J at 160-61 (Doc. No. 15-11).

Comcast trained all Pre-Callers,

including Turcotte, on how to perform the Dispatch job.
Def.’s Ex. H at 69-70 (Doc. No. 15-9).

See

Before the transition

became fully effective, Pre-Callers started fielding a small
number of inbound calls from technicians, in addition to their
outbound call duties.
11).

See Def.’s Ex. J at 118-19 (Doc. No. 15-

Turcotte struggled with inbound calls.

Id. at 116-18.

Her poor performance led Comcast to retrain her for three weeks
in the fall of 2012, which involved an experienced employee

2

sitting side-by-side with Turcotte throughout her shift.
Def.’s Ex. M (Doc. No. 15-14).

See

Turcotte either observed the

calls that the trainer fielded or had the trainer guide her
through her own calls.

See id.

Despite retraining, Turcotte’s performance did not improve.
When the transition to Dispatch was complete in mid-2013,
Turcotte’s supervisor, Bonnie Fournier, began receiving
complaints about Turcotte from field technicians.
Ex. N (Doc. No. 15-15).

See Def.’s

When Fournier sought to discuss some of

those complaints as part of Turcotte’s mid-year review in August
2013, Turcotte refused to meet with her.

See id.

Instead,

Turcotte emailed an HR rep, indicating that she was frustrated
at work and would consult her attorney.

See Def.’s Ex. O (Doc.

No. 15-16).
Within a few days of that incident, HR reps met with
Turcotte on two occasions.

See Def.’s Ex. P (Doc. No. 15-17).

During each meeting, Turcotte said that she could no longer
field inbound calls because of a medical condition.

See id.

She requested as an accommodation either a transfer to a new job
or lower inbound call volume in her Dispatch position.
Comcast asked Turcotte to provide a medical certification
to substantiate her claim and, in the interim, placed her in a
temporary light-duty assignment performing “install intercepts,”
which involved making outbound calls to customers.

3

See Def.’s

Ex. R (Doc. No. 15-19).

Turcotte requested that this be made

into a permanent position for her.

Comcast refused and told her

the assignment would end shortly due to a lack of work.

Id.

A few days later, on August 20, Comcast received a
certification from Turcotte’s healthcare provider, Nurse Tracey
Bottazzi.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. B-7 (Doc. No. 23-1).

When

asked whether Turcotte had a physical or mental impairment and
whether such an impairment substantially limited a major life
activity, Bottazzi answered “No” to both questions.

See id.

She also stated that Turcotte could do the essential functions
of her job (fielding inbound calls) without any accommodation.
See id.
In response, Comcast offered to reinstate Turcotte to her
Dispatch position and to retrain her again, which she accepted.
Fournier developed a four-week retraining program.
Ex. S (Doc. No. 15-20).

See Def.’s

Turcotte says that her retraining was

not successful and that she continued to experience anxiety and
panic attacks during that period.
No. 21-2).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 18 (Doc.

At one point, Fournier told her she should seek

another job within the company. 1

See id. ¶ 22.

1

Turcotte alleged in her complaint that Fournier harassed
her during this period in violation of the ADA and New Hampshire
Revised Statutes Section 354-A (Counts III and IV). In response
to Comcast’s motion for summary judgment, Turcotte did not
object to the dismissal of her harassment claims. Accordingly,
I do not summarize the facts relating to those claims.
4

In mid-September, toward the end of her retraining,
Turcotte stopped working and informed Comcast that she had filed
for short-term disability leave benefits.
(Doc. No. 15-21).
as FMLA leave.

See Def.’s Ex. T

She was approved for those benefits, as well

Nurse Bottazzi’s supporting paperwork, which was

sent to Comcast’s third-party disability leave administrator,
Sedgwick, stated that Turcotte was “[u]nable to fully perform
job functions” and noted that she was exhibiting increased blood
pressure and pulse, tearfulness, and panic attacks.
Ex. 1, Attach. B-8 (Doc. No. 23-1).

See Pl.’s

Bottazzi projected that

Turcotte could return to work in three weeks.

See id.

About

three weeks later, Bottazzi again furnished a similar form to
Sedgwick and extended Turcotte’s leave for three additional
weeks.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. B-9 (Doc. No 23-1).

Unbeknownst to Comcast, the following month Bottazzi
refused Turcotte’s request to further extend her leave and
dismissed Turcotte from her practice.
No. 16-4).

See Def.’s Ex. V (Doc.

Bottazzi did so because she believed that Turcotte

had dissembled and not followed her treatment plan. 2

See Def.’s

Ex. A at 14-17 (Doc. No. 16-1).

2

According to Bottazzi’s treatment notes, Turcotte reported
that her anxiety had not improved on medication, but the
pharmacy informed Bottazzi’s office that Turcotte never picked
up the medication. See Def.’s Ex. V (Doc. No. 16-4). In
addition, Turcotte told Bottazzi that she had scheduled a
counseling appointment in November, but the counselor’s office
5

In December 2013, while on leave, Turcotte applied for two
vacancies at Comcast using the company’s public website:
Business Services Customer Care Virtual Business Class Billing
Rep, Cycle 1 (“Virtual Rep”) and Coordinator 2, Facilities
(“Facilities Coordinator”).
No. 21-3).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A (Doc.

She did not notify Comcast that she was seeking

those jobs as an accommodation for her disability, and neither
application led to a job offer.

See id.

Comcast wrote a letter to Turcotte in January 2014,
informing her that her right to FMLA leave had expired in
December and that her short-term disability benefits had ended
in January.

See Def.’s Ex. W (Doc. No. 15-24).

The letter

explained that, if she needed an accommodation in order to
return to work, a healthcare provider should complete an
enclosed certification form on her behalf.

See id.

On January 31, 2014, a new provider, Counselor Gretchen
Grappone, supplied that certification.

She stated that Turcotte

suffered from social phobia and that this impairment
substantially limited a major life activity.
Attach. B-10 (Doc. No. 23-1).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1,

Because Turcotte had “anxiety

around high volume of inbound calls,” Grappone opined that she

confirmed that was not the case. See
Turcotte denied making the statements
untruthful and stated that there were
her and Bottazzi. See Pl.’s Ex. 2 at
6

id. In her deposition,
that Bottazzi found
miscommunications between
281-85 (Doc. No. 23-2).

could not perform the essential functions of her Dispatch job.
See id.

A reasonable accommodation, according to Grappone,

would be a “reduced inbound call requirement,” at least until
Turcotte gained confidence she could handle the work.

See id.

In response, Comcast informed Turcotte in February that
taking inbound calls was an essential function of her job and
that the company was not able to reduce or control the number of
inbound calls she would take.
26).

See Def.’s Ex. Y (Doc. No. 15-

Comcast, however, offered to engage in an interactive

process and place her on a 60-day internal job search to
identify a vacant position to which she could be reassigned as
an accommodation. 3

See id.

Comcast assigned Jim Lewis, an HR manager, to oversee and
facilitate Turcotte’s job search.
No. 15-7).

See Def.’s Ex. F ¶ 13 (Doc.

Lewis tracked down open positions within her

geographic area, compiled them into a bulleted list, and
generally emailed the list to Turcotte twice a week.

See id.;

Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 33 (Doc. No. 21-2).

They had weekly telephone

calls to discuss potential jobs.

See Def.’s Ex. F ¶ 14 (Doc.

3

Comcast acknowledged that Turcotte had “already effectively
begun the job search process” through dialogue with HR, so her
job search would “be much longer than 60 days.” See Def.’s Ex.
Y (Doc. No. 15-26). That dialogue began on February 3, when HR
Rep Lisa Southworth called Turcotte regarding the job search,
and they began exchanging emails concerning new vacancies. See
Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-3 (Doc. No. 21-6).
7

No. 15-7); Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 33 (Doc. No. 21-2).

Turcotte believes

that on some occasions Lewis did not send her every vacancy.
See Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 32 (Doc. No. 21-2).

This is because, she

explains, she found additional positions in her area that
Comcast had advertised on external websites.

See id.

On February 5, 2014, Turcotte told HR Rep Southworth that
she had applied for the position of Coordinator 1, Technical
Product Sales (BSS) (“BSS Coordinator”) through an external
website, CareerBuilder.com.
No. 21-6).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-3 (Doc.

Southworth told her not to apply through external

websites because she would “show up as an external candidate,
not a Comcast employee.”

See id.

Instead, Turcotte should

apply through Lewis so that he could work directly with the
assigned recruiter.
understood.

See id.

See id.

Turcotte replied that she

Although Southworth said she would contact

the recruiter for the BSS Coordinator position, Turcotte never
received a response. 4

See id.; Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A (Doc. No.

21-3).
A week later, on February 12, Turcotte told Lewis she was
interested in a vacancy for a Coordinator 2, Product Sales (MDU)
(“MDU Coordinator”) position.
(Doc. No. 21-7).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-4

Lewis responded on February 22 that her

4

The company says it has no record of her application.
Def.’s Ex. PP, Attach. 1 & 2 (Doc. No. 27-2).
8

See

medical restrictions precluded her from performing the essential
functions of that job because she would have to field 63-72
inbound calls per day.

See Def.’s Ex. II (Doc. No. 15-36); see

also Def.’s Ex. PP ¶¶ 2-3 (Doc. No. 27-2).

Turcotte rejected

Lewis’s assessment, insisted that she was qualified for the
position, and asked for a certification form so that her
healthcare provider could reassess her restrictions.
Ex. PP ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 27-2).

See Def.’s

Lewis explained that if she could

do the MDU Coordinator job, then she would likely be reinstated
to her Dispatch position because this would mean she could in
fact field a large volume of inbound calls.

See id. ¶ 5.

Two days later, Turcotte applied for the position of Rep 2,
Credit & Collections (Outbound) (“Collections Rep”).
Ex. 1, Attach. A-5 (Doc. No. 21-8).

See Pl.’s

On March 14, Lewis told her

that Comcast would consider her for this position, but she would
need to sign a medical records release form to answer concerns
about her work restrictions.
No. 21-9).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-6 (Doc.

When it sent her the release form, Comcast asked

Turcotte to “include the contact information for the medical
provider completing the Certification form on your behalf.”
Def.’s Ex. KK (Doc. No. 15-38).

See

The release form had space for

the contact information of a single provider and options to
limit the type of information disclosed, including by condition

9

and time period.

See id.

The information would be disclosed to

Comcast’s clinical review officer.

See id.

Turcotte refused to complete the release form because she
believed that Comcast had no valid reason to request it.
Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 35-38 (Doc. No. 21-2).

See

She was also concerned

that the release would have allowed Comcast to obtain medical
records from all her healthcare providers and to speak to her
providers, effectively giving the company unfettered access to
her medical history.

See id. ¶ 35.

It is unclear whether Turcotte told Comcast that she would
not complete the release form.

On March 21, however, Lewis

informed her that the Collections Rep position remained open,
but he reiterated that the company would need the release form.
See Def.’s Ex. LL (Doc. No. 15-39).
That same day, Counselor Grappone reassessed Turcotte’s
work restrictions at her request. 5
(Doc. No. 23-1).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. B-11

The certification states that Turcotte’s

social phobia did not limit any major life activities, that the
condition was “well managed with medication [and] skill use,”

5

Turcotte requested this reassessment after Lewis informed
her in February that her existing work restrictions precluded
her from applying for the MDU Coordinator job. See Pl.’s Ex. 1,
Attach. G (Doc. No. 21-25). This certification is the most
recent medical evidence in the record.
10

and that she could perform the essential functions of her job
without an accommodation. 6

See id.

Grappone’s assessment of Turcotte’s ability to work is
consistent with her treatment notes recording Turcotte’s
statements during three appointments in February and March.
Turcotte had reported that she felt “able to handle phone calls
in any new Comcast position,” was “ready to return to work with
no restrictions or need for accommodations,” and was “ready and
able to return to work.”

See Def.’s Ex. DD (Doc. No. 16-7);

Def.’s Ex. QQ (Doc. No. 27-3).

Grappone’s notes also indicate

that in March, Turcotte had asked her “not to provide any
information by phone to any Comcast representatives under the
advice of her attorney.”

See Def.’s Ex. DD (Doc. No. 16-7).

Based on Grappone’s March certification, Comcast offered to
reinstate Turcotte to her Dispatch position effective April 8.
See Def.’s Ex. BB (Doc. No. 15-29).

Turcotte refused, claiming

that she was medically incapable of performing that job and that
Grappone had been given an incorrect job description.

See

Def.’s Ex. CC (Doc. No. 15-30); Def.’s Ex. MM (Doc. No. 15-40).
Comcast’s next move was to extend Turcotte’s job search for
an additional 30 days, through May 21, 2014.

6

See Def.’s Ex. CC

It is disputed whether Grappone was referring to Turcotte’s
Dispatch job (fielding inbound calls) or her prior Pre-Caller
position (fielding outbound calls).
11

(Doc. No. 15-30).

In April, she applied for three positions: NH

Facilities / Mailroom (“Mailroom”) and two Intern/Co-op,
Administrative Services positions (“Intern 1” and “Intern 2”).
Turcotte used Comcast’s public website to apply for the Intern 1
position and did not notify Comcast that she was applying as an
accommodation candidate.
27-2).

See Def.’s Ex. PP, Attach. 1 (Doc. No.

Comcast eventually informed her via email that it

“decided to consider other candidates” for that position.
Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-12 (Doc. No. 21-15).

See

The other two

positions she pursued through the internal job search.

Comcast

determined that she was not qualified for the Mailroom position, 7
but the company offered her the Intern 2 position.
The internship, which was paid but offered no benefits, was
scheduled to run from June until August 2014.

Lewis informed

Turcotte that if she accepted it, her internal job search would
end, and she would need to go through the normal bidding process
for future positions.

See Def.’s Ex. FF (Doc. No. 15-33);

Def.’s Ex. F ¶¶ 16-17 (Doc. No. 15-7).

7

Turcotte nonetheless

Lewis informed her that she was not qualified because she
lacked experience using hand tools, a ladder, and a pallet jack.
See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-9 (Doc. No. 21-12). At the motion
hearing, Turcotte’s counsel conceded that Turcotte was not
qualified for this position and does not assert that Comcast’s
failure to hire her violated the ADA. See Jan. 23, 2019 Hearing
Tr. (“Tr.”) at 98.
12

accepted, and Lewis hired her over other, potentially more
qualified, applicants.

See Def.’s Ex. F ¶ 17 (Doc. No. 15-7).

During the internship and after her internal job search had
ended, Turcotte applied for two new vacancies at Comcast:
Administrative Assistant, Hudson, NH (“Admin Assistant 1”) and
Assistant 2, Administrative Services, Customer Care (“Admin
Assistant 2”).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A (Doc. No. 21-3).

She

applied for those jobs via internal postings available to all
Comcast employees.
2).

See Def.’s Ex. PP, Attach. 2 (Doc. No. 27-

Although she had contact with the company’s recruiters for

those positions, Turcotte did not notify them, or anyone else at
Comcast, that she was requesting those positions as an
accommodation for her disability.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-11

(Doc. No. 21-14); Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-13 (Doc. No. 21-16).
She was interviewed for the Admin Assistant 2 position but was
not offered either job.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A (Doc. No.

21-3).
Turcotte separated from the company on August 29, 2014,
when her internship ended.
21-2).

See Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3, 41 (Doc. No.

That fall, she applied for two more jobs at Comcast:

Rep, Revenue Assurance (“Revenue Rep”) and Rep 2, Credit &
Collections (Outbound) (“Collections Rep 2”).
Neither application succeeded.

13

See id. ¶¶ 48-49.

Turcotte filed this suit in March 2017 in New Hampshire
Superior Court, alleging that Comcast failed to accommodate her
disability and created a hostile work environment in violation
of the ADA and the state anti-discrimination statute.
removed the action to federal court.

Comcast

In due course, Comcast

moved for summary judgment on all claims.

Turcotte objected

with respect to her failure-to-accommodate claims but agreed to
dismiss her hostile-work-environment claims.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir.
2016).

In this context, a “material fact” is one that has the

“potential to affect the outcome of the suit.”

Cherkaoui v.

City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

A “genuine dispute” exists if a jury
Ellis

could resolve the disputed fact in the nonmovant’s favor.
v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., 883 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018).

The movant bears the initial burden of presenting evidence
that “it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986); accord Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d 849, 853
(1st Cir. 2016).

Once the movant has properly carried that

14

burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to designate
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, and to “demonstrate that a
trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in its favor.”
Flovac, 817 F.3d at 853 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).

If the nonmovant fails to adduce such evidence on

which a reasonable factfinder could base a favorable verdict,
the motion must be granted.

See id.

In considering the

evidence presented by either party, all reasonable inferences
are to be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor.

See Theriault

v. Genesis HealthCare LLC, 890 F.3d 342, 348 (1st Cir. 2018).
III.

ANALYSIS

The ADA prohibits a covered employer from discriminating
against a “qualified individual,” defined as a person “who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.”

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).

Failure to

reasonably accommodate a qualified employee’s known physical or
mental impairment is a form of disability discrimination, unless
such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
employer.

Audette v. Town of Plymouth, 858 F.3d 13, 20 (1st

Cir. 2017).
Reasonable accommodation may include “reassignment to a
vacant position.”

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

15

An employer is not

required to create a new job for a disabled employee or turn a
See Phelps v. Optima

temporary position into a permanent one.

Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2001); HendricksRobinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 1998).
Rather, an employee must demonstrate that a vacant position
existed and that she was qualified for it.

Audette, 858 F.3d at

20-21 & n.10; Phelps, 251 F.3d at 27.
To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, an employee
must establish that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of
the ADA; (2) she was qualified to perform the essential
functions of either her existing position or another available
job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) the
employer knew of her disability and did not reasonably
accommodate it. 8

See Audette, 858 F.3d at 20-21.

Turcotte does not contend that she could return to her
Dispatch position with a reasonable accommodation.

8

Instead, she

With one limited exception, both parties assume that
Turcotte’s state-law claim for failure to accommodate, see N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:7, is governed by the same legal
standards as her ADA claim. The exception is Comcast’s
argument, made for the first time in a supplemental brief filed
after the motion hearing, that the definition of disability is
more stringent under Section 354-A:7. Given the lack of
thorough briefing on the issue, I assume that federal and state
law do not differ. Cf. Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813
F.3d 447, 457 (1st Cir. 2016) (assuming, without deciding, that
elements of disability discrimination claim are same under New
Hampshire statute and ADA). In any event, the sole distinction
argued by Comcast is not dispositive because I grant the summary
judgment motion on other grounds.
16

argues that she requested as an accommodation a transfer to
nearly a dozen other positions that she was qualified to perform
and that Comcast unreasonably failed to reassign her to one of
those positions.
Comcast responds by claiming that it is entitled to summary
judgment for three distinct reasons.

First, it contends that no

reasonable jury could find that Turcotte was disabled and
therefore entitled to an accommodation.

Second, Comcast

maintains that there is no evidence that Turcotte was qualified
for some of the positions she sought.

Third, says Comcast,

Turcotte cannot show that it failed to reasonably accommodate
her with respect to the remaining positions.

I address each

argument in turn.
A. Whether Turcotte was disabled
The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), having “a record of such
an impairment,” id. § 12102(1)(B), or “being regarded as having
such an impairment,” id. § 12102(1)(C).

The first definition,

referred to as the actual disability prong, is at issue here. 9

9

Turcotte makes an undeveloped argument that the “regarded
as” and “record of” prongs are also applicable here. That is
plainly wrong. First, an employer “is not required to provide a
reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the
definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4). Second, the “record of” prong
17

Comcast concedes that Turcotte has a triable claim that she
suffered from social phobia, a mental impairment, and that this
impairment can impact the major life activity of social
interaction.

The question then is whether Turcotte has

presented enough evidence for a jury to find that social phobia
“substantially limited” her social interaction.
EEOC regulations explain that the term “substantially
limits” must be “construed broadly in favor of expansive
coverage,” “is not meant to be a demanding standard,” and
“should not demand extensive analysis.”
§ 1630.2(j)(1).

29 C.F.R.

“An impairment need not prevent, or

significantly or severely restrict, the individual from
performing a major life activity in order to be considered
substantially limiting.”

Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Rather, the

inquiry is whether a person is substantially limited in
performing a major life activity “as compared to most people in
the general population.”

Id.

Whether an impairment is substantially limiting must be
judged “without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures” such as “medication, medical supplies, equipment . . .

pertains to an employee who has a history of an actual
disability and who is seeking “a reasonable accommodation if
needed and related to the past disability.” Id. § 1630.2(k)(3).
For example, an employee may need leave or a schedule change
because her past disability requires follow-up appointments with
a healthcare provider. Id.
18

or learned behavioral . . . modifications.”
§ 12102(4)(E). 10

42 U.S.C.

In other words, an impairment must be evaluated

in its unmitigated state.

See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp.,

740 F.3d 325, 330 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2014); Gogos v. AMS Mech.
Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 2013); Rohr v. Salt
River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861–62
(9th Cir. 2009).

For example, “diabetes will be assessed in

terms of its limitations on major life activities when the
diabetic does not take insulin injections or medicine and does
not require behavioral adaptations such as a strict diet.”
Rohr, 555 F.3d at 862.
With these principles in mind, a reasonable jury could find
that Turcotte’s social phobia substantially limited a major life
activity during the relevant period.

Counselor Grappone,

Turcotte’s healthcare provider, said so in her January 31, 2014
certification.

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. B-10 (Doc. No. 23-1).

Specifically, she answered “Yes” to Question 1, which asked
whether Turcotte had an impairment, and she explained that the

10

This provision was enacted as part of the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). Congress expressly abrogated the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471 (1999), which held that whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity must be determined with reference
to corrective measures. See ADAAA, § 2(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 110–
325, 122 Stat. 3553. In Congress’s view, Sutton improperly
“narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded
by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals
whom Congress intended to protect.” Id. § 2(a)(4).
19

type of impairment was social phobia.

See id.

She also

answered “Yes” to Question 2, which asked whether the
“impairment as described in response to Question 1 substantially
limits any major life activities.”

See id.

The certification

form included a list of major life activities.

See id.

Grappone’s March 21, 2014 certification, the most recent
medical evidence in the record, creates ambiguity on this score.
There, she answered “No” to Question 2, which again asked
whether Turcotte’s impairment was substantially limiting.
Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. B-11 (Doc. No. 23-1).

See

She also asserted,

however, that Turcotte’s “social phobia [is] currently well
managed with medication [and] skill use” even though the
certification form instructed her “not [to] take into
consideration any ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,
such as medication.”

Id.

Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Turcotte, a reasonable jury could conclude
that Grappone evaluated Turcotte in a medicated state despite
the contrary instruction on the form.

Therefore, the jury could

disregard Grappone’s answer to Question 2 in the March
certification and only credit her answer to the same question in
the January certification.
Comcast also points to Turcotte’s own statements that she
could handle inbound calls and did not need an accommodation,
but that argument goes to the weight of the evidence, not its

20

sufficiency.

To be sure, a jury would be amply justified in

finding that Turcotte was not disabled.

She told Grappone that

she could handle phone calls in any new position and felt ready
to return to work with no restriction or accommodation.

See

Def.’s Ex. DD (Doc. No. 16-7); Def.’s Ex. QQ (Doc. No. 27-3).
She also told Comcast that she wanted the MDU Coordinator
position even after Lewis explained that she would need to field
a high volume of inbound calls, the same function that she
allegedly could not perform in Dispatch.
¶¶ 2-4 (Doc. No. 27-2).

See Def.’s Ex. PP

But in light of the summary judgment

standard and the easily satisfied test for determining whether
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity,
Turcotte has presented minimally sufficient evidence to give
rise to a genuine dispute of material fact on this question.
B. Whether Turcotte was qualified for a vacant position
The second element of a failure-to-accommodate claim
requires an employee to identify a vacant position and
demonstrate that she was qualified for it.
20-21 & n.10; Phelps, 251 F.3d at 27.

Audette, 858 F.3d at

To show that she was

qualified, the employee must satisfy a two-part test:
[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate both that she
satisfies the prerequisites for the position, that is,
that she has the proper training, skills, and
experience, and that she could perform the essential
functions of [the] job, either with or without
reasonable accommodation.

21

Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1998);
see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
“An essential function is a fundamental job duty,” as
opposed to “marginal tasks.”

Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55

(1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Evidence of

whether a function is essential includes, inter alia, “[t]he
employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,”
“[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job,” and “[t]he amount of time
spent on the job performing the function.”
§ 1630.2(n)(3).

29 C.F.R.

Absent evidence of discriminatory animus,

courts “generally give substantial weight to the employer’s view
of job requirements.”

Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147

(1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Between December 2013 and August 2014, when her employment
ended, Turcotte applied for eight positions that she claims she
was qualified to perform. 11

See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A (Doc. No.

11

In her brief, Turcotte also argued that Comcast failed to
consider her for the position of Technical Logistic Controller
(“TLC”), previously known as Field Traffic Controller (“FTC”).
She asserted that Comcast converted Install Intercepts, a role
she performed briefly in August 2013, into permanent TLC/FTC
positions. At the hearing, however, Turcotte’s counsel conceded
that TLC/FTC was not the same job as Install Intercepts. See
Tr. at 43-44. The undisputed evidence is that the TLC position
was established in July 2018, several years after Turcotte left,
and that until 2016, its predecessor FTC required fielding a
large volume of incoming calls. See Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 56-64 (Doc.
No. 21-27); Def.’s Ex. OO ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 27-1). Because there is
22

21-3).

There is no evidence in the record that she was

qualified for six of those positions.

Two of these positions

entailed a high volume of inbound calls, an essential job
function that Turcotte does not (and could not) argue she could
perform.

She has presented no evidence that she had the

credentials required for the other four positions.
1.

Positions requiring a high volume of inbound calls

Comcast has presented uncontroverted evidence that two
positions Turcotte sought had the same essential job function
that disabled Turcotte from working in Dispatch – fielding a
high volume of incoming calls.

The Virtual Rep position

required fielding around 40 inbound calls per day.
PP ¶ 6 (Doc. No. 27-2).

Def.’s Ex.

Comcast expected that Virtual Reps

would take inbound calls all day.

Id.

Similarly, the MDU

Coordinator position required fielding 63-72 inbound calls per
day.

Id. ¶¶ 2-3; Def.’s Ex. II (Doc. No. 15-36).
Turcotte’s only response is that the job descriptions for

those two positions did not mention a high inbound call volume.
She has not presented a job description for the Virtual Rep
position, however, so there is no evidence disputing Comcast’s
assessment.

Further, the MDU Coordinator job description is

no dispute that Install Intercepts was a temporary light-duty
assignment involving outbound calls and that Comcast did not
have a permanent position whose sole function was to perform
that assignment, Turcotte’s claims regarding this position fail.
23

consistent with significant inbound calling and thus cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact. 12

See Pl.’s Ex. 1,

Attach. A-4 (Doc. No. 21-7).
Because there is no dispute that the Virtual Rep and MDU
Coordinator positions entailed a large volume of inbound calls
and that Turcotte could not perform this essential job function,
her claims fail.

See Soto-Ocasio, 150 F.3d at 18.

More

importantly, given that this was the very job function that
Turcotte claims she could not perform in Dispatch, it defies
logic to argue that those jobs would have been a reasonable
accommodation.

If she could perform this function, Comcast

would have no obligation to accommodate her at all.
2.

Failure to satisfy job prerequisites

Turcotte has failed to adduce any evidence that she had the
skills, training, and experience required for four of her
desired transfer positions: Facilities Coordinator, BSS
Coordinator, Admin Assistant 1, and Admin Assistant 2. 13

12

As with many other deficiencies in this case, Turcotte
could have obtained evidence during discovery to substantiate
her claims. For example, her counsel could have deposed
employees working in those positions concerning their work
experience. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (listing “working
experience of past incumbents in the job” and “current work
experience of incumbents in similar jobs” as evidence of
essential job functions).
13

Comcast also argues that Turcotte’s claims regarding the
Admin Assistant 1 and 2 positions cannot stand because she
applied after she agreed to end her internal job search by
accepting the Intern 2 job, and by that time, she had exceeded
24

The record contains no evidence as to the job requirements
for either the BSS Coordinator or Admin Assistant 2 position.
Turcotte has not produced a job description or other evidence of
qualifications for those jobs.

Nor are the requirements

otherwise apparent from the job titles.

It would therefore be

impossible for a factfinder to conclude that Turcotte satisfied
her burden to show that she was qualified for either post. 14

Cf.

Lang, 813 F.3d at 456 (affirming summary judgment in favor of
employer on employee’s reassignment claim in part because
plaintiff’s affidavit failed to mention “specific circumstances”
of desired job opportunities and “said nothing about the
essential functions of the jobs in question”).
Although the job descriptions for the Facilities
Coordinator and Admin Assistant 1 positions are in the record,
Turcotte has made no effort to show that she had the credentials
for either job.

The only evidence of her skills, training, and

experience in the record is the job descriptions for the three
jobs she held at Comcast (Customer Account Executive, Pre-

the amount of time that Comcast was reasonably required to
engage in the interactive process. Because Turcotte has not
shown that she was qualified for those positions, I do not
address Comcast’s alternative arguments.
14

Turcotte’s conclusory statements
reviewed the job descriptions and was
position she sought are insufficient.
Providence, 909 F.3d 32, 44 (1st Cir.
that a plaintiff cannot avoid summary
on conclusory allegations.”).
25

in her affidavit that she
qualified for every
See Mancini v. City of
2018) (“It is hornbook law
judgment by relying solely

Caller, and Dispatch).

Those job functions do not match the

requirements of either position she sought.

Compare Pl.’s Ex.

1, Attach. A-2 (Doc. No. 21-5) (Facilities Coordinator,
requiring “2-5 years related experience”), and Pl.’s Ex. 1,
Attach. A-11 (Doc. No. 21-14) (Admin Assistant 1, requiring “2-5
years related experience”), with Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-7 (Doc.
No. 21-10) (Dispatch), Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. G (Doc. No. 21-25)
(Pre-Caller), and Def.’s Ex. B (Doc. No. 15-3) (Customer Account
Executive).

Turcotte’s claims thus fail because there is no

evidence from which a jury could find that she met the
prerequisites for those positions.
C. Whether Comcast failed to reasonably accommodate Turcotte
The third element of an ADA claim is that an employer
unreasonably failed to accommodate an employee’s known
disability.

Audette, 858 F.3d at 20.

Turcotte cannot satisfy

this requirement for eight positions because she (1) failed to
put Comcast on notice that she sought five of those positions as
an accommodation, (2) failed to cooperate in the interactive
process for one position, and (3) was not entitled to a
reassignment to two positions after her employment ended.
1. Failure to give notice of demand for accommodation
To trigger a duty to accommodate, an employer must be on
notice that an employee is seeking an accommodation.

Freadman

v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir.

26

2007); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st
Cir. 2001).

This means the employee “must explicitly request an

accommodation, unless the employer otherwise knew one was
needed.”

Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 89

(1st Cir. 2012).

Special words, like reasonable accommodation,

are not necessary, but the employee’s request “must be
sufficiently direct and specific, and it must explain how the
accommodation is linked to [her] disability.”

Id.

“This means

not only notice of a condition, but of a causal connection
between the major life activity that is limited and the
accommodation sought.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Turcotte has not mustered sufficient evidence to show that
Comcast knew she was seeking an accommodation with respect to
five positions: Virtual Rep, Facilities Coordinator, Intern 1,
Admin Assistant 1, and Admin Assistant 2. 15
She applied for the Virtual Rep and Facilities Coordinator
positions as an external candidate in December 2013.

There is

no evidence in the record that Turcotte made a reasonably
specific and direct request for an accommodation when she
applied.

Nor is there any evidence that Comcast otherwise knew

she had applied as an accommodation.

This was more than a month

before Comcast received Counselor Grappone’s January

15

As discussed above, her claims regarding each of those
positions except Intern 1 also fail the qualifications prong.
27

certification that Turcotte needed an accommodation and promptly
started her internal job search.

The lone fact that Turcotte

was on FMLA and short-term disability leave at the time is
insufficient to show that Comcast was on notice that Turcotte
sought an accommodation when she applied. 16
Assuming Turcotte could assert a viable claim for the
Intern 1 position, which is dubious, 17 there is likewise no
evidence that Comcast knew this was a desired accommodation.
Turcotte applied in mid-April as an external candidate, as
opposed to applying through the internal job search.

See Def.’s

16

Turcotte’s argument that Comcast was on notice because
Fournier, her supervisor, told her to look for another job
before she went on leave, is likewise without merit. Nothing in
the record suggests that Fournier’s statement was in recognition
of Turcotte’s need for an accommodation, as opposed to
performance issues. Further, at the time, Nurse Bottazzi told
Comcast that Turcotte was not disabled and did not need any
accommodation.
17

Turcotte does not dispute that Intern 1 was a temporary
position comparable to the Intern 2 position that Comcast
offered her in May 2014. See Def.’s Ex. PP ¶ 8 (Doc. No. 27-2).
Her claim is that, as Intern 1, she would have returned to work
from unpaid leave a month and a half sooner. See Tr. at 96.
The viability of this claim is doubtful for three reasons.
First, it is illogical for Turcotte to maintain that this
position would have been a reasonable accommodation when she
argues that the term-limited nature of the Intern 2 position
rendered it an unreasonable accommodation. Second, there is no
evidence in the record that Turcotte would have returned to work
a month and a half sooner if given this position. Since she
applied for the two internships within a two-week period, it is
not a reasonable inference that the start dates would have been
so divergent. Third, at least one circuit has held that the ADA
does not require an employer to place a permanently disabled
employee into a temporary position. See Thompson v. E.I. DuPont
deNemours & Co., 70 F. App’x 332, 339 (6th Cir. 2003).
28

Ex. PP, Attach. 1 (Doc. No. 27-2).

She did so despite Comcast

informing her in February that she needed to apply internally
through Lewis to be considered for an accommodation position.
See Pl.’s Ex. 1, Attach. A-3 (Doc. No. 21-6).
Lastly, Turcotte applied for the Admin Assistant 1 and 2
positions after her internal job search had ended.

She applied

via Comcast’s internal job postings available to all employees.
See Def.’s Ex. PP, Attach. 2 (Doc. No. 27-2); Pl.’s Ex. 1,
Attach. A-11 (Doc. No. 21-14).

As with the other three

positions, the record contains no evidence that Turcotte
indicated in her applications or otherwise told Comcast that she
was requesting either position as an accommodation.
Comcast is entitled to summary judgment on Turcotte’s
claims concerning those five positions.

As Turcotte was well

aware, the company had a process available to employees seeking
accommodations.

Instead of utilizing that process, she

submitted the applications outside her internal job search,
without informing Comcast that those were accommodation
requests.

In fact, Turcotte ignored Comcast’s specific

instruction to notify HR when she applied as an accommodation
candidate.

As a result, Comcast had no idea the applications

were accommodation requests.

Contrary to Turcotte’s suggestion,

it is not a reasonable inference that a large company like
Comcast would intuit that her applications, submitted via

29

regular channels, doubled as requests for an accommodation.
Turcotte’s failure to alert Comcast that she was seeking those
five positions as an accommodation is fatal to her claims. 18
2. Failure to cooperative in the interactive process
Where an employer engages in an interactive process with an
employee to discuss potential accommodations, both parties have
a duty to participate in good faith.

See E.E.O.C. v. Kohl’s

Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 2014); Enica v.
Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 339 (1st Cir. 2008).

In the event a

breakdown occurs, “courts should look for signs of failure to
participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to
make reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what
specific accommodations are necessary.”

Enica, 544 F.3d at 339

(quoting Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130,
1135 (7th Cir. 1996)).

An employee’s failure to participate in

good faith precludes liability under the ADA.

Kohl’s, 774 F.3d

at 132.
An employee who refuses to comply with an employer’s
reasonable request for medical information pertaining to her

18

Turcotte argues that Comcast unreasonably terminated the
internal job search before she applied for the Admin Assistant 1
and 2 positions. To the extent she is arguing that Comcast’s
action excused her failure to request an accommodation with
respect to those positions, I need not address her undeveloped
argument. Her claims would still fail because she has proffered
no evidence that she was qualified for either job.
30

disability can be found to have obstructed the process.

See

Beck, 75 F.3d at 1136 (affirming summary judgment for employer
where employee refused to sign medical records release form that
employer requested due to insufficient information about her
work restrictions); Templeton v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d
617, 618-19 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for
employer because employee refused to authorize her physician to
release medical information that employer reasonably requested).
The employer’s request must be “job-related and consistent with
business necessity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).

EEOC

enforcement guidance provides that
when the disability or the need for the accommodation
is not known or obvious, it is job-related and
consistent with business necessity for an employer to
ask an employee for reasonable documentation about
his/her disability and its functional limitations that
require reasonable accommodation.
E.E.O.C., Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and
Medical Examinations of Employees under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (2000), 2000 WL 33407181 at *9.

Ordinarily,

the employer cannot ask for an employee’s complete medical
records.

Id. at *10.

But the employer is entitled to seek more

limited records sufficient to substantiate the claimed
disability and accommodation if the employee has presented
insufficient supporting documentation.

Id.

Documentation

provided by the employee may be insufficient where “other

31

factors indicate that the information provided is not credible
or is fraudulent.”

Id. at *11.

Turcotte cannot maintain her claims regarding the
Collections Rep position because she failed to participate in
the interactive process in good faith with respect to that job.
Comcast asked for a release of medical records, and Turcotte
refused.

Comcast’s request was reasonable, job-related, and

consistent with business necessity.

The request came in March

2014, a few weeks after Turcotte provided flatly inconsistent
information about the nature and extent of her disability.

She

told Comcast in February that she could do the MDU Coordinator
job, despite being informed that the position involved fielding
a high volume of inbound calls.

See Def.’s Ex. PP ¶¶ 2-4 (Doc.

No. 27-2); Def.’s Ex. II (Doc. No. 15-36).

This was the same

job function that she insisted she could not perform in
Dispatch.

Under those circumstances, there was sufficient

indication that the information she had provided, including
Counselor Grappone’s January certification, was not credible.
Thus, Comcast was within its rights to ask for a release of
relevant medical records.
The scope of Comcast’s request was also “no broader or more
intrusive than necessary.”

See Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of

Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2003).

Contrary to

Turcotte’s assertion, Comcast did not seek her complete medical

32

records or unfettered access to her medical providers.

Rather,

the release form had space for Turcotte to fill in the name and
address of a single provider.
38).

See Def.’s Ex. KK (Doc. No. 15-

Comcast told Turcotte that this should be “the medical

provider completing the Certification form on your behalf” (that
is, Counselor Grappone).

See id.

The release also had options

for Turcotte to limit the information disclosed by type of
condition and time period.

See id.

For example, she could have

specified that the information Grappone could disclose must
pertain to her social phobia from January 2014 (when Grappone
filled out the first certification) onward.

Lastly, the

information would be disclosed to Comcast’s clinical review
officer, further limiting the scope of the request.

Cf. Fraser

v. Avaya Inc., No. 10-CV-00800-RPM, 2013 WL 4757263, at *2 (D.
Colo. Sept. 4, 2013) (ADA “does not justify requiring the
applicant to sign a medical authorization form that would
authorize disclosure of confidential medical information to more
persons than those necessarily involved in the evaluation of the
application”).
Turcotte’s refusal to sign the release form that Comcast
reasonably requested to answer questions concerning her work
restrictions caused the breakdown in the interactive process.
Accordingly, Comcast is entitled to summary judgment on

33

Turcotte’s claims regarding the Collections Rep position for
which the company declined to consider her as a result. 19
3. Post-termination vacancies
After her employment with Comcast ended, Turcotte applied
for the Revenue Rep and Collections Rep 2 positions.

Her claims

regarding these positions fail because requests for
accommodation that post-date a termination of employment cannot
give rise to a duty to accommodate.

See, e.g., Severson v.

Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018) (discarding claims
regarding vacancies that became available after plaintiff’s
employment ended; noting that “it was [plaintiff’s] burden to
prove that there were, in fact, vacant positions available at
the time of his termination”); Johnson v. Otter Tail Cty., No.
00-3098, 2001 WL 664217, at *1 (8th Cir. June 14, 2001) (per
curiam) (employer “had no continuing duty to accommodate
[plaintiff] by reassigning her to a vacant position [requested
after] her employment . . . had terminated”); Wooten v. Farmland
Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Plaintiff’s] evidence
that he applied but was not chosen for a job that would have

19

Given Turcotte’s failure to participate in the interactive
process, Comcast would have been justified had it ended the
internal job search and terminated Turcotte at that time.
34

accommodated his limitations is not material because the job
became available only after he was terminated.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Turcotte has failed to show that she was
qualified for the Virtual Rep, MDU Coordinator, BSS Coordinator,
Facilities Coordinator, Admin Assistant 1, and Admin Assistant 2
positions.

Further, she cannot show that Comcast unreasonably

failed to accommodate her disability with respect to the Virtual
Rep, Facilities Coordinator, Intern 1, Admin Assistant 1, Admin
Assistant 2, Collections Rep, Collections Rep 2, and Revenue Rep
positions.

Lastly, she has conceded her claims regarding the

Mailroom and Install Intercepts positions.

Accordingly, I grant

Comcast’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 15) on all
claims.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and

close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul Barbadoro
Paul Barbadoro
United States District Judge
February 14, 2019

cc:

Leslie H. Johnson, Esq.
Brian J. Bouchard, Esq.
Christopher Cole, Esq.

35