Wylder v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner

Filing 12

///ORDER denying 8 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner; granting 10 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case. So Ordered by Chief Judge Joseph N. Laplante.(jb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Summayyab Ann MNC Wylder
v.

Civil No. 17-cv-153-JL
Opinion No. 2018 DNH 135

U.S. Social Security
Administration, Commissioner
ORDER ON APPEAL
Summayyan Ann MNC Wylder has appealed the Social Security
Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits.

An

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) at the SSA ruled that, despite
several severe impairments, Wylder retains the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, and thus is not
disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).

The

Appeals Council granted Wylder’s request for review, see id.
§ 404.967, requiring the ALJ to reconsider that decision, taking
certain evidence into consideration.

Having done so, the ALJ

again concluded that Wylder is not disabled.

The Appeals

Council denied Wylder’s second request for review, with the
result that the ALJ’s second decision became the final decision
on her application, see id. § 404.981.

Wylder then appealed the

decision to this court, which has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (Social Security).

Wylder has moved to reverse the decision.

See LR 9.1(b).

The Acting Commissioner of the SSA has cross-moved for an order
affirming the ALJ’s decision.

See LR 9.1(e).

After careful

consideration, the court denies Wylder’s motion and grants the
Acting Commissioner’s motion.
Applicable legal standard
The court limits its review of a final decision of the SSA
“to determining whether the ALJ used the proper legal standards
and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.”

Ward v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2000).

It

“review[s] questions of law de novo, but defer[s] to the
Commissioner’s findings of fact, so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence,” id., that is, “such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(quotations omitted).

Though the evidence in the record may

support multiple conclusions, the court will still uphold the
ALJ’s findings “if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in
the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support
his conclusion.”

Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991).

The court therefore

“must uphold a denial of social security . . . benefits unless
‘the [Acting Commissioner] has committed a legal or factual

2

error in evaluating a particular claim.’”

Manso-Pizarro v.

Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (quoting Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885
(1989)).
Background1
The ALJ invoked the requisite five-step sequential
evaluation process in assessing Wylder’s request for disability
and disability insurance benefits.
416.920.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

After determining that Wylder had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity after the alleged onset of her
disability on June 3, 2009, the ALJ analyzed the severity of her
impairments.

At this second step, the ALJ concluded that Wylder

had several impairments:

posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),

unspecified depressive disorder, hoarding disorder, obesity,
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and
osteoarthritis of the right knee.2
At the third step, the ALJ found that Wylder’s severe
impairments did not meet or “medically equal” the severity of
one of the impairments listed in the Social Security

The court recounts here only those facts relevant to the
instant appeal. The parties’ more complete recitation in their
Joint Statement of Material Facts (doc. no. 11) is incorporated
by reference. See LR 9.1(d).
1

2

Admin. R. at 21.

3

regulations.3

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926.

After reviewing the medical

evidence of record, medical opinions, and Wylder’s own
statements, the ALJ concluded that Wylder retained the RFC to
perform light work, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),
except that she:
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; . . . must
avoid exposure to extremes of temperature and
pulmonary irritants such as fumes, dusts, and gasses;
. . . is able to perform simple, routine tasks for
two-hour blocks of time, and cannot understand,
remember, or carry out detailed instructions; . . .
can tolerate up to occasional interaction with coworkers, but cannot engage in tandem tasks; . . . can
tolerate up to occasional interaction with the public;
and . . . requires a low-stress job, defined as one
involving up to occasional decision-making.4
Finding that, even limited in this manner, Wylder was able to
perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566 and 416.966, the ALJ
concluded his analysis and found that Wylder was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

3

Id. at 21-23.

4

Admin. R. at 23.

4

Analysis
Wylder argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination with respect
to her mental limitations5 is not supported by substantial
evidence.

Specifically, Wylder contends that the ALJ failed to

account for, and his RFC determination runs contrary to, three
specific statements in Dr. Robert Prescott’s March 2016 opinion,
which the ALJ afforded “great weight.”6

In that opinion,

Dr. Prescott concluded, among other things, that Wylder:


“does not appear typically able to be around
unfamiliar or too many others without considerable
distress”;



“would not be expected to effectively maintain
concentration for extended periods as well as most
others”; and



“does not appear at this time able to effectively
manage typical levels of stress and change found in
settings outside the home on a consistent, sustained
basis.”7

She does not challenge the ALJ’s RFC determination with respect
to her physical limitations.
5

6

See Mot. to Remand (doc. no. 8-1) at 3; Admin. R. at 25.

7

Admin. R. at 1347.

5

Importantly, Wylder does not contest the weight that the ALJ
afforded to Dr. Prescott’s opinion.

Her sole complaint is that

the ALJ crafted an RFC that did not account for these three
observations.8

If he had done so, she contends, then the ALJ

would have found that she had a “moderately severe limitation in
the ability to maintain appropriate attention and concentration
through an eight-hour workday” resulting in “unsatisfactory
performance,” and thus would be unable to engage in substantial
activity.9
The ALJ did not err.
March 2016 opinion.10

He clearly considered Dr. Prescott’s

He afforded it “great weight,” finding its

conclusions “generally consistent with the contemporaneous
treatment notes from David Corriss, Ph.D., who treated the
claimant on a weekly basis from July 2014 through February
2016,” and “with the medical evidence of record as a whole.”11
Wylder identifies no evidence, opinion or otherwise, with which
Dr. Prescott’s opinion conflicts.
And, contrary to Wylder’s assertion, the RFC crafted by the
ALJ appears to reflect all three of Dr. Prescott’s conclusions.

8

See Mot. to Remand (doc. no. 8-1) at 3-5.

9

Id. at 4.

10

See Admin. R. at 25.

11

Id.

6

First, Dr. Prescott opined that Wylder “does not appear
typically able to be around unfamiliar or too many others
without considerable distress.”12

The ALJ limited her to only

occasional interaction with both co-workers and the public.13
Next, Dr. Prescott opined that Wylder “would not be expected to
effectively maintain concentration for extended periods as well
as most others.”14

The ALJ concluded that she could “perform

simple, routine tasks for two-hour blocks of time.”15

Finally,

Dr. Prescott opined that Wylder “does not appear at this time
able to effectively manage typical levels of stress and change
found in settings outside the home on a consistent, sustained
basis.”16

The ALJ concluded that she “requires a low-stress

job.”17
This is a straightforward case wherein the evidence in the
record could, theoretically, support conclusions different from
those drawn by the ALJ.

Wylder has not shown, however, that the

ALJ failed to account for the evidence or that, even if he had,

12

Id. at 1347.

13

Id. at 25.

14

Id. at 1347.

15

Id. at 25.

16

Id. at 1347.

17

Id. at 25.

7

those three statements would compel a different RFC.

Even were

that the case, the court would still uphold the ALJ’s findings
“if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a
whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion.”
Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (1st Cir. 1991).

Here, it could.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the Acting Commissioner’s motion to
affirm18 is GRANTED and Wylder’s motion to reverse and remand the
Acting Commissioner’s decision19 is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.

Joseph N. Laplante
United States District Judge
Dated:
cc:

July 2, 2018

Christopher G. Roundy, Esq.
Robert J. Rabuck, AUSA

18

Document no. 11.

19

Document no. 8.

8