Jones v. FCI Berlin, Warden
ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. So Ordered by Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(gla)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Civil No. 17-cv-365-LM
Opinion No. 2018 DNH 025
FCI Berlin, Warden
O R D E R
Petitioner Theodore Jones, who is presently incarcerated at
the Federal Correctional Institution in Berlin, brings a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
challenges a decision of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), which
determined that Jones should not receive presentence credit for
the time he served in state custody with the Connecticut
Department of Corrections (“DOC”).
Before the court is
respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
the following reasons, respondent’s motion is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A movant is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that
it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ.
“An issue is ‘genuine’ if it can ‘be resolved in
Neither party disputes that, in resolving respondent’s
motion, the court should employ the framework set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Nunez v. Warden, Fed.
favor of either party,’ and a fact is ‘material’ if it ‘has the
potential of affecting the outcome of the case.’”
v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 2016).
reviewing the record, the court construes all facts and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115
(1st Cir. 2013).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, a prisoner “shall be given credit
toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has
spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
In order for the prisoner to
be entitled to such credit, the time spent in official detention
must have been “as a result of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed” and cannot have been “credited against
Id. § 3585(b)(1).
The parties agree that
Jones’s petition is properly before this court, because Jones
has exhausted his administrative remedies at the BOP.
Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating that “[o]nce administrative remedies are exhausted . .
. prisoners may then seek judicial review of any jail-time
Corr. Inst., Berlin, N.H., No. 16-cv-129-JL, 2017 WL 3447128, at
*1 (D.N.H. July 24, 2017), R. & R. adopted by 2017 WL 3446778
(Aug. 10, 2017); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x 227,
231 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that courts have discretion
to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in § 2241 habeas
credit determination . . . by filing a habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241”).
The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.
In January 2012, Jones began serving a term of special parole on
a Connecticut state sentence, which was set to expire in January
Under Connecticut law, special parole is a mandatory
period of parole that the defendant must complete after serving
his term of imprisonment.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125e.
On October 2, 2012, Jones was arrested by state authorities
for a number of state charges relating to drugs and firearms.
On the same day, a parole officer issued a “remand to actual
custody order” to the Connecticut DOC.
This order directed the
Connecticut DOC to hold Jones in custody for violation of the
conditions of his special parole.
See Conn. Agencies Regs.
§§ 54-124a(j)(1)-1(15), 54-124a(j)(1)-4; Conn. Gen. Stat.
On April 10, 2013, while still in custody, Jones was
indicted on federal drug and firearm charges related to his
October 2012 arrest.
Later that year, Jones pleaded guilty to
two of the federal charges and, on October 8, 2013, he was
sentenced to 94 months imprisonment.
The federal court
recommended to the BOP “[t]hat [Jones] receive credit for time
Doc. no. 10-7 at 3 of 4.
On October 17, the state
charges arising from Jones’s October 2012 arrest were dismissed.
During this time, the proceedings relating to Jones’s
parole violation remained pending.
See Conn. Agencies Regs.
§ 54-124a(j)(1)-6 (“Parole revocation procedures premised upon
criminal misconduct that is the subject of prosecution shall be
continued until the criminal matter is disposed.”).
25, 2013, a parole revocation hearing was held before a hearing
examiner, and Jones admitted that he had violated the terms of
his special parole.
The hearing examiner made the following
recommendation: “This officer recommends revoke and reparole to
Mr. Jones’ Federal Detainer.”
Doc. no. 10-9 at 3 of 3.
On December 5, 2013, the Connecticut Board of Pardons and
Paroles (the “parole board”) appears to have accepted the
hearing officer’s recommendation, because it issued the
following “Board Action” in Jones’s case: “Revoked/Reparoled.”
Doc. no. 1-2 at 18 of 22.
Once special parole is revoked, the
parole board is required to issue a mittimus “declaring the
cause of commitment and requiring the warden of the correctional
institution . . . to receive and keep such person for the period
fixed by the judgment of the Board.”
Conn. Agencies Regs.
The mittimus issued in Jones’s case,
dated December 5, 2013, states that his parole was revoked on
December 5, 2013, and orders that Jones be confined until April
Federal authorities took custody of Jones on April 10,
Once in federal custody, Jones requested that the BOP
credit towards his federal sentence the 428 days that he spent
in state custody before his parole revocation.
The BOP denied
the request because it determined that the time in state custody
was “spent serving [the] state parole revocation sentence.”
Doc. no. 10-15 at 9 of 9.
This petition followed.
To summarize the relevant dates:
On October 2, 2012, Jones was arrested and held on
state drug and firearm charges, and a parole officer
issued a “remand to actual custody order” for Jones’s
violation of the terms of his special parole.
On October 8, 2013, Jones was sentenced on the federal
charges to which he had pleaded guilty.
On December 5, 2013, the parole board revoked Jones’s
special parole, and issued a mittimus ordering that
Jones be confined until April 4, 2014.
On April 10, 2014, federal authorities took custody of
Respondent does not argue, as a general matter, that there
is any legal barrier preventing Jones from relying on 18 U.S.C.
Respondent contends only that, based on the undisputed
facts, Jones cannot demonstrate that the time he requests “has
not been credited against another sentence.”
18 U.S.C. §
Specifically, respondent asserts that the only
reasonable inference from the record is that Jones was sentenced
to approximately eighteen months for his parole violation, with
credit for the time Jones spent detained prior to the revocation
Thus, Jones would not be entitled to credit for the
time he spent in custody between October 2012 and December 2013,
because that time has already been credited towards the sentence
for his parole violation.
Jones counters that there is a genuine dispute of material
fact as to the length of his parole revocation sentence.
Jones’s view, a reasonable inference from the record is that the
parole board sentenced him to approximately four months for his
parole violation: December 5, 2013 to April 10, 2014.
Consequently, the time he spent in state custody prior to his
parole revocation should be credited towards his federal
sentence, because it was time spent in official detention that
has not been credited against another sentence.
Assuming, as respondent appears to concede, that Jones may
otherwise be entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, the
court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to the length of Jones’s parole revocation sentence.
Therefore, the court denies respondent’s motion for summary
At bottom, respondent’s argument is that it would “not make
sense” for the parole board to sentence Jones to a term of
confinement of four months, because that would mean that Jones
would have been forced to serve “dead time”—i.e., time not
credited towards any sentence—while awaiting the revocation
Doc. no. 10 at 6 n.2.
Respondent argues that
Connecticut law and policy recognize that defendants are to be
given credit for any time served in custody prior to trial.
While respondent’s inference may be reasonable, it is not
the sole reasonable inference that may be drawn from this
As Jones points out, there is no evidence in the record
that explicitly shows that the parole board considered Jones’s
prehearing confinement when it made its decision.
decision of the board contains no information except the
following notation: “Revoked/Reparoled.”
Doc. no. 1-2 at 18 of
It is entirely unclear how the parole board fixed April 4,
2014 as the date of release.
Given that the federal court had
already sentenced Jones and ordered the BOP to credit Jones for
time served, the parole board may have declined to consider such
time in fixing Jones’s parole revocation sentence.
the parole board simply neglected to account for the period
Jones spent in prehearing confinement.
Thus, absent more information that sheds light on either
the general procedure that the parole board follows in these
situations, or the specific circumstances relating to Jones’s
sentence, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of
material fact that precludes summary judgment.
For the reasons stated herein, respondent’s motion (doc.
no. 10) is DENIED.
United States District Judge
February 7, 2018
cc: All Counsel of Record
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