Chapin v. US Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 17

///ORDER granting 8 Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner; denying 12 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. The case is remanded pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g). The clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the case. So Ordered by Chief Judge Landya B. McCafferty.(gla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Debra Chapin
v.

Civil No. 17-cv-436-LM
Opinion No. 2018 DNH 233

Commissioner of Social Security
O R D E R
Debra Chapin seeks judicial review of the decision of the
Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,
denying her application for social security income benefits.
Chapin moves to reverse the Acting Commissioner’s decision, and
the Acting Commissioner moves to affirm.

For the reasons

discussed below, the court grants Chapin’s motion to reverse and
denies the Acting Commissioner’s motion to affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the final decision of the Acting Commissioner
in a social security case, the court “is limited to determining
whether the [Administrative Law Judge] deployed the proper legal
standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.”
Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); accord Seavey
v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001).

The court defers to

the ALJ’s factual findings as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Fischer v.

Colvin, 831 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2016).
is more than a scintilla.

“Substantial evidence

It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Astralis Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y Dep’t of Housing &

Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2010).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ
follows a five-step sequential analysis.
§ 416.920(a)(4).

20 C.F.R.

The claimant “has the burden of production and

proof at the first four steps of the process.”
Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 2001).

Freeman v.
The first three

steps are (1) determining whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) determining whether she has a
severe impairment; and (3) determining whether the impairment
meets or equals a listed impairment.

20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(iii).
At the fourth step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ
assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),
which is a determination of the most a person can do in a work
setting despite her limitations caused by impairments, id.
§ 416.945(a)(1), and her past relevant work, id.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

If the claimant can perform her past

relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not
disabled.

See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

If the claimant cannot

perform her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to Step Five,
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in which the ALJ has the burden of showing that jobs exist in
the economy which the claimant can do in light of the RFC
assessment.

See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
BACKGROUND

A detailed statement of the facts can be found in the
parties’ Joint Statement of Material Facts (doc. no. 13).

The

court provides a brief summary of the case here.
On April 2, 2014, Chapin filed an application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental social security
income benefits, alleging a disability onset date of August 25,
2008, when she was 36 years old.

She alleged a disability due

to depression, anxiety, diverticulosis, irritable bowel
syndrome, fibromyalgia, and gastroesophageal reflux disease.
After Chapin’s claim was denied, she requested a hearing in
front of an ALJ.

On January 14, 2016, the ALJ held a video

hearing, during which Chapin testified and was represented by an
attorney.

At some point prior to or during the hearing, Chapin

amended her disability onset date to April 2, 2014.

In light of

the amendment, the ALJ dismissed Chapin’s request for disability
insurance benefits because she did not have disability insured
status on her amended onset date.
On March 2, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.
He found that Chapin had the following severe impairments:

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fibromyalgia, obesity, bipolar disorder with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and alcohol use disorder.

The ALJ

also found that Chapin had the residual functional capacity to
perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), with
certain limitations as to her ability to maintain attention and
concentration and socially interact with others.
Dennis J. King, an impartial vocational expert, testified
at the hearing.

In response to hypotheticals posed by the ALJ,

King testified that a person with Chapin’s RFC could perform the
job of folding machine operator, a job that Chapin held within
the past 15 years.

Based on King’s testimony, the ALJ found at

Step Four that Chapin was not disabled.
On July 26, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Chapin’s
request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Acting
Commissioner’s final decision.

This action followed.

DISCUSSION
Chapin argues that the ALJ committed nine errors in making
his disability determination, each of which requires reversal.
She contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to explain why
he disregarded specific portions of medical opinions to which he
otherwise attributed great weight; (2) improperly weighing the
medical opinion evidence in the record; (3) failing to properly
assess Chapin’s GAF scores; (4) finding that Chapin’s anxiety

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was not a severe impairment; (5) neglecting to consider medical
opinion evidence at Step Three; (6) ignoring evidence of
Chapin’s limitations as to her mental functional capacity; (7)
failing to adequately evaluate the effect of Chapin’s obesity;
(8) relying on flawed vocational expert testimony during his
Step Four determination; and (9) failing to resolve a conflict
between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles.

The Acting Commissioner disputes each of

these arguments and contends that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
I.

Disregarding Portions of Medical Opinions
The ALJ found that Chapin had the RFC
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)
except she can occasionally climb stairs, ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds, and can occasionally perform all
of the postural maneuvers. She is limited to simple
unskilled work, and is able to maintain attention and
concentration for two hour increments throughout an
eight hour work day and forty hour workweek. She
should avoid social interaction with the general[]
public but can sustain brief and superficial social
interaction with coworkers and supervisors.

Admin. Rec. at 26 (emphasis added).

In assessing Chapin’s RFC,

the ALJ “gave great weight to the opinions of the mental
consultative examiners, Richard Root, Ed.D., and Gregory
Korgeski, Ph.D., who evaluated the claimant in 2013 and 2014,
respectively.”

Id. at 28.

The ALJ noted that both Drs. Root

and Korgeski described Chapin as “capable of simple, routine
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tasks with limited contact with fellow employees and supervisors
and no contact with the public.”

Id.

The ALJ found that both

opinions were supported by Chapin’s “history of social anxiety
and post-traumatic stress disorder based upon interpersonal
trauma.”

Id.

Chapin contends that the ALJ erred by failing to explain
why he did not adopt certain parts of Dr. Root’s 2013 opinion
that were more restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC assessment.1
Specifically, she notes that Dr. Root opined that Chapin could
function in a work environment that was “supportive and nondemanding emotionally,” but would have difficulty working in a
setting where demands are being made, particularly by men.
Admin. Rec. at 445.

Chapin also points to Dr. Root’s opinion

that she would be able to tolerate a work environment that is “a
supportive and structured one” but would have difficulty
interacting with “supervisors who are more demanding or more
threatening.”

Id.

Chapin argues that the ALJ’s failure to

explain why he did not adopt these restrictions—which go beyond
a mere limitation of “brief and superficial social interaction
with coworkers and supervisors”—in the RFC assessment is
reversible error.

Chapin also contends separately that the ALJ erred by
failing to address Dr. Root’s 2009 opinion. For the reasons
explained below, the court need not reach that argument.
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The Acting Commissioner does not meaningfully dispute that
these parts of Dr. Root’s opinion are more restrictive than the
ALJ’s RFC assessment.

She argues, however, that the ALJ was

entitled to reject these portions of the opinion despite not
addressing them in his decision.

The Acting Commissioner

asserts that the ALJ did not err because Dr. Korgeski’s opinion
did not include the same limitations that Dr. Root found and,
therefore, the ALJ was entitled to reject those limitations.
An ALJ is entitled to give great weight to a portion of an
opinion, but lesser or no weight to another portion of an
opinion.

See Snow v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-609-SM, 2011 WL 4828656,

at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 12, 2011).

While “an ALJ need not adopt all

or any part of a particular provider’s report, he must state his
reasons for adopting only a portion of it.”

Kenerson v. Astrue,

No. 10–cv–161–SM, 2011 WL 1981609, at *5, n.7 (D.N.H. May 20,
2011); Rawson v. Astrue, Civil No. 09–469–BW, 2010 WL 2923902,
at *2 (D. Me. July 19, 2010).

“An explanation is needed

because, without it, this court cannot meaningfully review the
ALJ’s decision.”

Snow, 2011 WL 4828656, at *4; see also Boothby

v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-cv-00599-JHR, 2018 WL 1144371, at *3 (D.
Me. Mar. 2, 2018) (granting claimant’s motion to reverse because
the ALJ “erred by failing to analyze, or even acknowledge,
opinion evidence that he purported to give [great] weight,
leaving [the court] unable to conclude that he reached a
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supportable result via an acceptable analytical pathway”);
Dwyer v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-374-SM, 2012 WL 2319097, at *5
(D.N.H. June 19, 2012).
The ALJ gave great weight to some of Dr. Root’s 2013
opinion but did not adopt or explain why he declined to adopt
Dr. Root’s opinion as to Chapin’s functional limitations
regarding the type of work environment Chapin could tolerate or
the limitations on her social interactions or working for male
supervisors.

The Acting Commissioner suggests that the ALJ

might have rejected the more restrictive portions of Dr. Root’s
opinion because Dr. Korgeski’s opinion, to which the ALJ also
attributed great weight, did not include those same
restrictions.

But “the court cannot affirm an agency decision,

including a decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security, based on post hoc rationalizations that were not part
of the decision.”

Castro v. Acting Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,

No. 17-cv-399-JD, 2018 WL 1509078, at *3 (D.N.H. Mar. 27, 2018)
(citing cases); see also Lyons ex rel. X.M.K.L. v. Astrue, No.
CIV.A. 12-30013-KPN, 2012 WL 5899326, at *6 (D. Mass. Nov. 26,
2012).

Therefore, the Acting Commissioner’s argument cannot

provide substantial evidence for the ALJ’s decision.
For this reason, the court is unable to determine whether
the ALJ’s decision is based on substantial evidence.
the case must be remanded for further proceedings.
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Therefore,

II.

Remaining Issues
In light of the foregoing, the court need not address

Chapin’s remaining claims of error. The ALJ may address those
issues, if necessary, upon remand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion to
reverse (doc. no. 8) is granted, and the Acting Commissioner’s
motion to affirm (doc. no. 12) is denied.
pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g).

The case is remanded

The clerk of the court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
November 28, 2018
cc:

Counsel of Record

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