Lamy v. US Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 11

///ORDER granting, to the extent Lamy seeks an order vacating the ALJ's decision and a remand for further proceedings consistent with this order, 7 Claimant's Motion to Reverse Decision of Commissioner; and denying 9 Motion to Affirm Decision of Commissioner. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lat)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel Lamy,
Claimant
v.

Case No. 17-cv-609-SM
Opinion No. 2018 DNH 131

Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant

O R D E R

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant, Daniel Lamy,
moves to reverse or vacate the Acting Commissioner’s decision
denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act.

See 42 U.S.C. § 423.

The

Acting Commissioner objects and moves for an order affirming her
decision.

For the reasons discussed below, claimant’s motion is

granted, and the Acting Commissioner’s motion is denied.

Factual Background
I.

Procedural History.
In January of 2015, claimant applied for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), alleging that he was disabled and
had been unable to work since September 18, 2013.

Claimant was

49 years old at the time and had acquired sufficient quarters of

coverage to remain insured through September of 2017.
Claimant’s application was denied and he requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

In August of 2016, claimant, his attorney, and an impartial
vocational expert appeared before an ALJ, who considered
claimant’s application de novo.

About three months later, the

ALJ issued her written decision, concluding that claimant was
not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act, at any time
prior to the date of her decision.
review by the Appeals Council.

Claimant then requested

That request was denied.

Accordingly, the ALJ’s denial of claimant’s application for
benefits became the final decision of the Acting Commissioner,
subject to judicial review.

Subsequently, claimant filed a

timely action in this court, asserting that the ALJ’s decision
is not supported by substantial evidence.

Claimant then filed a “Motion for Order Reversing the
Decision of the Commissioner” (document no. 7).

In response,

the Acting Commissioner filed a “Motion for an Order to Affirm
the Commissioner’s Decision” (document no. 9).
are pending.

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Those motions

II.

Stipulated Facts.
Pursuant to this court’s Local Rule 9.1, the parties have

submitted a joint statement of stipulated facts which, because
it is part of the court’s record (document no. 10), need not be
recounted in this opinion.

By way of brief background, the

court notes the following.

Claimant worked as a torch brazer

for approximately 25 years at a General Electric facility in
Hooksett, New Hampshire.

He testified that he began working

there at age 21, was making “good money,” felt his co-workers
“were like family,” and, but for his disabling back pain, had
planned to retire from there.
25 years making good money.

Admin. Rec. at 56 (“I was there
But I had to leave the job after

only 25 years [while] I was still young.

I was only 47.

But I

could have went another 20 years, you know, and making good
money, too. . . .

So it was a good job and I was there 25 years

and I had to walk away from it.”).

Claimant has a long history of back pain, dating to a
motorcycle accident in the mid-1980’s.

Admin. Rec. at 384.

As

that pain became worse, General Electric tried to accommodate
him by providing a stool at his work station, so he could take
some pressure off of his legs.

Id. at 56.

And, under the FMLA,

claimant was also permitted to take various periods of time off
from work when his pain became too great for him to function

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effectively.

Id. at 57.

Eventually, his pain became so severe

that he was unable to return to work, General Electric concluded
that he was totally disabled, and he began collecting benefits
under GE’s long term disability plan.

Over the years, claimant’s pain has become progressively
more severe and disabling.

He has tried various ways to address

that pain, including spinal injections and physical therapy,
Admin. Rec. at 31, 54-55, 524; wearing a back brace, id. at 58;
using a jetted tub, id.; using a cane or walking stick when his
“legs are real weak and [his] back is real bad,” id. at 50, 458;
and, as noted by Dr. Ahn, “taking chronic pain medication for a
long time,” id. at 524.

Unfortunately, however, his long-term

use of those medications (which included 30mg of morphine twice
daily) caused stomach and liver problems and he had to
discontinue their use.

See Id. 58-59, 327, 419, 444, 524.

In 2013, claimant moved his bed from the second floor to
the first, so he could avoid using the stairs.
247, 253, 277.

Admin. Rec. at

At the hearing, claimant described an event that

happened about a month earlier when he was awakened in the
middle of the night screaming in pain, to the point that he
frightened his girlfriend and her dogs (and prompted her to
insist that he go to the emergency room for treatment -

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something he says he had never done before in his life).
66, 453-59.

Id. at

In July of 2016, following his trip to the

emergency room, claimant obtained a surgical consult with Dr.
Uri Ahn, at the New Hampshire NeuroSpine Institute.

Dr. Ahn

diagnosed claimant with “significant degeneration lateral
osteophytes loss of disc space height at L3-4. . . .
Degenerative disc disease L3-4 [and] spinal stenosis of lumbar
region.”

Admin. Rec. at 525-26.

Although Dr. Ahn discussed

surgery to address claimant’s chronic pain, he discouraged
claimant from pursuing that option because the success rate
associated with such a procedure is only 66 percent, because
infection and nerve damage were a possibility, because claimant
was not suffering from constant severe pain, and because he was
concerned about claimant’s cigarette smoking.

Id.

Dr. Ahn

explained that the type of surgery they were talking about was
typically recommended only “for people for suffering on a daily
basis.”

Because claimant’s debilitating pain was episodic,

surgery was not recommended, “no matter how severe” his pain.
Id. at 525-26.

Nothing in the record suggests that claimant exaggerates
his symptoms or is anything but an accurate historian when
describing his treatment regimen, medications and their efficacy
and side effects, daily activities, and levels of pain.

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He has,

for example, been consistently forthright with his treating
physicians about his efforts to obtain some relief through the
use of “alternative” pain medications - something that obviously
causes him more than a little embarrassment.
Rec. at 59-60.

See, e.g., Admin.

See also Id. at 303, 454-55, 525.

Finally, the

evidence is undisputed that he is not a malingerer - indeed,
when asked about that topic, one of his treating physicians, Dr.
Thomas Synan (who has known claimant for more than twenty
years), responded that claimant is “absolutely not” a
malingerer.

Id. at 452.

See also Id. at 390 and 528.

Standard of Review
I.

“Substantial Evidence” and Deferential Review.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court is empowered “to

enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”

Factual findings and credibility

determinations made by the Commissioner are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence.
1383(c)(3).

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

See also Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health &

Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991).

Substantial

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

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Consolidated

Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

Importantly, it

is something less than a preponderance of the evidence, so the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.

Consolo v.

Federal Maritime Comm’n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

See also

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

II.

The Parties’ Respective Burdens.
An individual seeking DIB benefits is disabled under the

Act if he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The Act places a heavy initial burden on the claimant to
establish the existence of a disabling impairment.

See Bowen v.

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987); Santiago v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991).

To

satisfy that burden, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that his impairment prevents him from
performing his former type of work.

See Manso-Pizarro v.

Secretary of Health & Human Services, 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.
1996); Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1985).

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Here, there is no question that claimant has satisfied his
burden.

Accordingly, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to

show that there are other jobs in the national economy that he
can perform, in light of his age, education, and prior work
experience.

See Vazquez v. Secretary of Health & Human

Services, 683 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982).

See also 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1512 and 404.1560.

In assessing a disability claim, the Commissioner considers
both objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective
medical facts; (2) the claimant’s subjective claims of pain and
disability, as supported by the testimony of the claimant or
other witnesses; and (3) the claimant’s educational background,
age, and work experience.

See, e.g., Avery v. Secretary of

Health & Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986);
Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5,
6 (1st Cir. 1982).

Ultimately, a claimant is disabled only if

his:

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

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whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

With those principles in mind, the court reviews claimant’s
motion to reverse and the Acting Commissioner’s motion to affirm
her decision.

Background - The ALJ’s Findings
In concluding that claimant was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act, the ALJ properly employed the mandatory
five-step sequential evaluation process described in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.
(2003).

See generally Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24
Accordingly, she first determined that claimant had not

been engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged
onset of disability: September 18, 2013.

Admin. Rec. at 28.

Next, she concluded that claimant suffers from the following
severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and
thoracic spine, degenerative joint disease/osteoarthritis of the
knee.”

Id. at 29.

But, the ALJ determined that claimant’s

impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, did not
meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Admin. Rec. at 29.

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Next, the ALJ concluded that claimant retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the exertional demands of
“light” work, subject to the following limitations: “he can
stand and walk for 4 hours of an 8-hour day, and requires the
opportunity to change position from sitting to standing or
walking and from standing or walking to sitting, at least once
per hour for 3 to 5 minutes at a time.

Further, he can never

climb ladders and or scaffolds, can occasionally twist at the
waist, stoop and crouch and may need to use a cane to ambulate.”
Id. at 30.

In light of those restrictions, the ALJ concluded

that claimant was not capable of performing his past relevant
work as a torch brazer.

Id. at 33.

See also Id. at 76

(vocational expert’s testimony about claimant’s prior work ).

At the final step of the analysis, the ALJ considered
whether there were any jobs in the national economy that
claimant might perform.

Relying upon the testimony of the

vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that, notwithstanding
claimant’s exertional and non-exertional limitations, “there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that the claimant can perform.”

Id. at 33.

Consequently, the

ALJ concluded that claimant was not “disabled,” as that term is
defined in the Act, through the date of her decision.

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Discussion
Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decision on three grounds,
asserting that she erred by: (1) erroneously giving greater
weight to the opinion of a non-examining state agency physician
than to the opinions of claimant’s treating physicians; (2)
improperly evaluating claimant’s testimony in light of the
recently-adopted Social Security Ruling concerning claimants’
credibility; and (3) failing to resolve a potential conflict
between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (concerning claimant’s possible need to rely
upon a cane to ambulate).

Because the court agrees that the ALJ

failed to give sufficient reasons for affording only limited
weight to the opinions of claimant’s treating sources, it need
only address that issue.

In discussing the weight that will be ascribed to the
opinions of “treating sources,” the pertinent regulations
provide:

Generally, we give more weight to opinions from [the
claimant’s] treating sources, since these sources are
likely to be the medical professionals most able to
provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the
claimant’s] medical impairment(s) . . . When we do
not give the treating source’s opinion controlling
weight, we apply the factors listed [in this section]
in determining the weight to give the opinion. We
will always give good reasons in our notice of

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determination or decision for the weight we give [the
claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

See also Social Security Ruling,

Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Giving
Controlling Weight to Treating Source Medical Opinions, SSR 962p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996) (when the ALJ renders an
adverse disability decision, his or her notice of decision “must
contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating
source=s medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
treating source=s medical opinion and the reasons for the
weight.”).

Importantly, however, there is no per se rule

requiring the ALJ to give greater weight to the opinion of a
treating source.

To be entitled to controlling weight, a

treating source’s opinions must be “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
[cannot be] inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the] case record.”

20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(c)(2). 1

1

The court notes that the rules addressing the weight
afforded to treating sources were changed effective March
2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. But, because the claim
issue was filed prior to that date, those new regulations
apply to this case.
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to be
27,
at
do not

Here, the record contains three treating source statements:
one from Dr. Powen Hsu (a long-time treating source), Admin.
Rec. at 389-93; one from claimant’s newest primary care
physician, Dr. Alan Stein, id. at 527-31; and one from another
long-time primary care physician, Dr. Thomas Synan, who has
known claimant for more than twenty years, id. at 448-52.
are remarkable in their consistency.

They

At least two treating

sources agree (while one did not opine) on the following facts:
claimant can walk only a single city block before needing to
rest due to severe pain; during an 8-hour workday, claimant
would need to walk around at least every hour for about five
minutes; and, because claimant’s severe pain waxes and wanes,
his impairments are likely to produce “good days and bad days.”

All three treating physicians unite in opining that:
claimant suffers from chronic severe back pain; he is not a
malingerer; emotional factors do not contribute to claimant’s
pain; his impairments are consistent with his symptoms and
physical limitations; claimant is able to sit for between 15
minutes (two opinions) and hour (one opinion) before needing to
get up; he can stand for somewhere between 5 minutes to less
than one hour before needing to sit down; claimant would need
unscheduled periods of walking around during an 8-hour workday;
he would require a job that permits him to alternate at will

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between sitting, standing, or walking; and, finally, claimant
would be absent from work “more than four days per month” due to
his impairment - the very issue that prompted his prior employer
to grant him periodic FMLA leave, before ultimately concluding
that he is totally disabled.

The explanations the ALJ offered for discounting the
opinions of claimant’s three treating source are, on balance,
insufficient.

For example, she noted that Dr. Uri Ahn observed

“no evidence of significant foraminal or central canal
stenosis.”

Admin. Rec. at 31.

What the ALJ did not mention was

Dr. Ahn’s conclusion that claimant does suffer from “spinal
stenosis of the lumbar region,” with “disc degeneration” and
“significant degeneration lateral osteophytes loss of disc space
height at L3-4.”

Id. at 525-26.

See also Id. at 338 (January,

2015, assessment of Dr. Hsu: “Lumbar disc degeneration.
Herniated thoracic disc.”).

The ALJ also noted that Dr. Ahn

reported that claimant had been off prescribed pain medications
for the past eight months.

But, as claimant testified at the

hearing (and as his various treating sources have acknowledged),
he was forced to stop taking opiates because they were causing
stomach problems and liver damage.

Id. at 58-59.

He did,

however, continue to take “800s to try to take the edge off.”

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Id. at 58 (referring to his use of prescription strength
Ibuprofen).

The ALJ describes claimant’s decision to stop taking
prescription pain medications as a “choice” that implies his
pain is not as significant as he claims.

Admin. Rec. at 31.

But, given the significant side effects those medications were
causing, that is not a reasonable inference to draw.

The ALJ also concluded that claimant’s reported activities
of daily living were inconsistent with an inability to perform
light work.

Id. at 31.

She seems to have focused on claimant’s

ability to assist his girlfriend in doing modest household
chores during his “good” days and his continued ability to hunt
deer.

But, as claimant explained in his testimony, his hunting

excursions have changed dramatically as a result of his back
pain.

While he once hunted deer in the woods from tree stands,

he was now restricted to using a blind that he constructed on
the ground in his backyard.

I used to be able to walk a lot, hunt the power line,
go down four or five telephone poles down. Walk in
the woods. Sit, drag out a deer, whatever, back in
the day.
And now it’s gotten to the point I hunt in my own
backyard and 100, 150 yards behind my own house and I
have to stop halfway out to my blind to take a break

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with my legs from walking. And the thing is I grew up
since I was six years old hunting and fishing. My mom
hunts, my dad. We’re a hunting family and all that.
They still hunt in their 70’s and they live down the
road from us like I said and my fiancée outside hunts.
I just can’t do what I used to do. That’s the bottom
line and if they cut my legs off at the knees, I would
try to drag myself out there to hunt because number
one, I love it. I’ve always done it. That’s -- means
a lot to me. And number two, I got high cholesterol
and Dr. Stein had told me before eat all the venison
you can because it’s so lean, it’s good for you. So
if we get a deer, that’s our meat for the winter. So
the thing is I can’t do what I used to do, but like I
said, if they cut my legs off, I’d still try to drag
myself out there to hunt.

Id. at 61.

See also Id. at 63 (“Yeah, because back in the day,

I used to use tree stands.
have a ground blind.

I’d climb up in a tree stand.

I got a little zipper door.

and [there’s] a little chair.
little open window . . ..”).

Now I

You walk in

You sit down and [there’s] a
Because of his disability,

claimant was unable to continue hunting with a bow and arrow.
Instead, he obtained a special permit from the State of New
Hampshire (apparently available only to those with disabilities)
that allowed him to use a crossbow, so he would not strain his
back tensioning the bow string (he uses a special tool that he
can crank to tension the bowstring).

2

Id. at 62. 2

Dr. William Backlund, a non-examining state agency
physician, who opined that claimant was capable of light work
(an opinion to which the ALJ gave “great weight”) also seemed to
rely heavily on claimant’s ability to hunt in reaching the
conclusion that the record evidence does not support the
assertion that claimant is “significantly limited in
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The ALJ also discounted the opinions of Dr. Hsu because,
among other things, it was unclear to her “who prepared the
forms, as the handwriting appears distinct between them.”
at 32.

Id.

That, plainly, is not a reason to discount those

opinions.

Dr. Hsu signed the form (thereby fully adopting its

content).

Even if another staff person assisted him in

preparing portions of it, his endorsement makes the conclusions
his own.

The ALJ similarly discounted the opinions of Dr. Synan

(the physician who has known claimant for more than 20 years)
because his opinion that claimant would be absent for more than
four days each month was “unexplained” and contrary to “clinical
findings discussed in this decision.”

Id. at 32.

But, it

probably bears noting that the form completed by Dr. Synan (and
Dr. Stein and Dr. Hsu) does not ask for an explanation; it
simply asks for an opinion: “Please estimate, on average, how
many days per month your patient is likely to be absent from
work as a result of the impairments or treatment.”

Id. at 452.

See also Id. at 393, 531.

ambulation.” See Admin. Rec. at 94. In addition to being
cursory to the point of lacking any meaningful discussion of the
medical record (a point for which the ALJ faults various
treating source opinions), Dr. Backlund’s opinion seems to
ignore claimant’s need to switch to a backyard blind and to a
crossbow. It is also, without adequate explanation, entirely
inconsistent with the opinions of claimant’s three treating
sources.
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The point does not require repetition.

While review of an

ALJ’s disability decision is highly deferential, and while that
decision need only be supported by “substantial evidence,” the
court is constrained to conclude that the ALJ’s decision to
substantially discount the opinions of claimant’s three treating
sources is inadequately explained, and not adequately supported
by her stated reasons.

Conclusion
There is, to be sure, some evidence in the record primarily opinions from non-treating sources that are not
terribly well-supported - to support the ALJ’s decision.

And,

while the court recognizes that the governing standard of review
is quite deferential, it is not without meaning altogether.

The

court is compelled to conclude that the evidence and the
opinions upon which the ALJ relied, and her reasons for doing
so, are insufficient to constitute “substantial evidence” particularly when balanced against the significant evidence
(which includes claimant’s long work history at General Electric
and three reliable treating source opinions) strongly suggestive
of claimant’s disability.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
claimant’s memorandum, claimant’s motion to reverse the decision

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of the Commissioner (document no. 7) is granted to the extent he
seeks an order vacating the ALJ’s decision and a remand for
further proceedings consistent with this order.

The Acting

Commissioner’s motion to affirm her decision (document no. 9) is
denied.

Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the
decision of the ALJ dated November 2, 2016, is vacated and this
matter is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this order.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in

accordance with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
June 22, 2018
cc:

D. Lance Tillinghast, Esq.
Terry L. Ollila, AUSA

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