Boyd et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Filing 6

///ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. So Ordered by Chief Judge Joseph N. Laplante.(jb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Leah Boyd and Glenda
Castleberry
v.

Civil No. 18-cv-253-JL
Opinion No. 2018 DNH 102

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

SUMMARY ORDER
This is Leah Boyd’s third action challenging the
foreclosure on a home in Somersworth, New Hampshire.1

Boyd and

her mother, Glenda Castleberry, proceeding pro se, sued the
mortgage-holder and servicer of the mortgage secured by her
home, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in Strafford County Superior
Court.

The defendant removed the action to this court, see 28

U.S.C. § 1441, which has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(diversity).
complaint.

The defendant then moved to dismiss Boyd’s
Boyd filed no objection.

The court dismisses Boyd’s

complaint as barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion and for
failure to state a claim for relief, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).

See Boyd v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 DNH 156 (dismissing
Boyd’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief against
Wells Fargo); Castleberry v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 2017 DNH
240 (same).
1

The court set forth the facts germane to Boyd’s claims,
drawn from her complaints and construed in her favor, see
Martino v. Forward Air, Inc., 609 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2010), in
its previous two orders.2

It does not repeat them here.

pleads no new facts in her most recent complaint.

Boyd

Instead, Boyd

merely repeats claims already raised before, and dismissed by,
this court.
Claim preclusion.

The doctrine of claim preclusion (also

called res judicata) bars a party from relitigating claims that
were or could have been addressed in a prior action, and applies
when:

“(1) there is a final judgment on the merits of an

earlier action, and (2) there is identity of the parties and
(3) identity of the claims in both suits.” Reppert v. Marvin
Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2004).

All three

elements are satisfied here.
The parties in this action are identical to the parties in
Castleberry:

Boyd and Castleberry, the plaintiffs in this

action, brought that suit against Wells Fargo, the defendant in
this action.

Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240.

The claims in this

action are also identical to the claims raised in Boyd’s 2017
action:

2

See Boyd, 2016 DNH 156, 1-3; Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 2-4.

2



Boyd alludes to loan modification discussions with
Wells Fargo.

The court previously construed these

allegations as a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 5-6.

See

Because the

plaintiffs concede default, and because “New Hampshire
imposes no duty to forebear from foreclosure in the
face of default,” Frangos v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
No. 13-CV-472-PB, 2014 WL 3699490, at *4 (D.N.H.
July 24, 2014), the court dismissed that claim.
Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 6.


Boyd also requests time to gather the paperwork
necessary to demonstrate that her interest in the
property is clear of Wells Fargo’s mortgage interest.
As the court has previously explained in dismissing
her prior complaints, she took any interest in the
property subject to the mortgage.

Id. at 6-7.

Accordingly, the court dismissed this claim, which the
court construed as one to quiet title to the property.
Id. at 7.
Finally, the court dismissed these claims, with prejudice,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), after giving the
plaintiffs additional time to respond to Wells Fargo’s motion
and to substantiate their claims, and after holding oral
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argument, which Boyd attended.

Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240.

Dismissal for failure to state a claim operates as a final
adjudication on the merits for claim preclusion purposes.

See

Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 388 (1st Cir.
1994).

Accordingly, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Boyd

and Castleberry from relitigating these claims.
Failure to state a claim for relief.

Even were Boyd’s

claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and to quiet title not barred by the doctrine of claim
preclusion, she has yet again failed to state a claim for relief
for the reasons explained this court’s order in Castleberry,
2017 DNH 240.
She has also failed to state a claim for tortious
interference with contractual relations.3

Boyd alleges in this

action that Wells Fargo has notified her tenants about upcoming
foreclosure proceedings, causing her tenants to cease paying
rent.

“To establish liability for tortious interference with

In Castleberry, Boyd included that allegation in her objection
to the motion to dismiss, not in the complaint itself. The
court interpreted it as a claim for tortious interference with
contract and afforded Boyd an opportunity to substantiate it.
Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 8-9. When Boyd failed to supplement
her objection with substantiating facts or evidence, the court
dismissed this claim. Id. at 8. It explicitly did not address
the claim’s merits, however. Id. at 8 n.14. As a result, the
dismissal in Castleberry did not operate as a final adjudication
on the merits of this claim for claim preclusion purposes.
3

4

contractual relations, a plaintiff must show that:

‘(1) the

plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party;
(2) the defendant knew of this relationship; (3) the defendant
intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship;
and (4) the plaintiff was damaged by such interference.”

City

of Keene v. Cleaveland, 167 N.H. 731, 738 (2015) (quoting Hughes
v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 40–41 (2005)).

“Mere

interference, in itself, is legally insufficient to state a
claim.

Rather, ‘[o]nly improper interference is deemed tortious

in New Hampshire.’”

Kilty v. Worth Dev. Corp., 184 F. App’x 17,

19 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Roberts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 138
N.H. 532, 540 (1994)).
Boyd and Castleberry have not alleged any improper
interference by Wells Fargo.

They allege only that Wells Fargo

notified their tenants about upcoming foreclosure proceedings -notifications that Wells Fargo is obligated to provide under
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 479:25.

Under these circumstances,

notifications mandated by New Hampshire law do not constitute
improper interference.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed

to state a claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations.
Conclusion.
claim preclusion.

Boyd’s claims are barred by the doctrine of
To the extent they are not, for the reasons

explained herein and in this court’s order in Castleberry, 2017

5

DNH 240, they must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for
relief.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint4 is

therefore GRANTED.

The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly

and close the case.
SO ORDERED.

Joseph N. Laplante
United States District Judge
Dated:
cc:

4

May 17, 2018

Leah A. Boyd, pro se
Glenda Castleberry, pro se
David D. Christensen, Esq.

Document no. 5.

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