DURAN v. MERLINE et al
Filing
361
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/3/2016. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[Docket No. 358]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MIGUEL DURAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 07-3589 (RMB/JS)
OPINION
v.
WARDEN GERALDINE COHEN, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Miguel Duran
Pro Se Plaintiff
James T. Dugan
Atlantic County Department of Law
1333 Atlantic Avenue, 8th Floor
Atlantic City, NJ 08401
Attorney for County Defendants
Joseph Goldberg
Weber, Gallagher, Simpson, Stapleton, Fire & Newby, LLP
2000 Market Street, 13th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Wendi D. Barish
Philadelphia Housing Authority
Office of General Counsel
12 S. 23rd Street, 6th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorneys for Defendant CFG Health Systems, LLC
Colleen M. Ready
Ian Mark Sirota
Peter Cuddihy
Margolis Edelstein
100 Century Parkway, Suite 200
Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
Attorneys for Defendant Aramark Correctional Services, LLC
1
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court upon the “Motion to
reopen, Motion to recuse, Motion to remove to another venue”
(the “Motion to Reopen”) filed by Plaintiff Miguel Duran (the
“Plaintiff” or “Duran”) [Docket No. 358], filed on December 22,
2015.
Defendants Warden Geraldine Cohen, Principal Clerk Yvonne
Hickman, Captain James D. Murphy, Case Worker John Solog (the
“County Defendants”), and Aramark Correctional Services, LLC
(“Aramark”) have filed oppositions to the motion [Docket Nos.
359, 360].
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to
Reopen will be denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I.
As this Court has previously noted, this case “has besieged
the Court” with “its long and protracted history.”
Opinion [Docket No. 345].
2/8/2013
Plaintiff commenced this action nine
years ago, on August 1, 2007, as a pre-trial detainee at the
Atlantic County Justice Facility (“ACJF”), alleging that the
conditions of his confinement at ACJF violated his
constitutional rights, that he was denied medical care, that his
outgoing mail was interfered with in violation of his
constitutional rights, and that he was impermissibly retaliated
1
As the Court writes only for the parties, it assumes the
reader’s familiarity with the facts and recites only those
relevant to the decision herein.
2
against for filing grievances against ACJF personnel.
He
asserted numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
individual defendants Warden Gary Merline,2 Murphy, Hickman,
Solog, Aramark, and CFG Health Systems LLC (“CFG”).
All
defendants moved for summary judgment [Docket Nos. 266, 267,
275].
CFG’s motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 266] was
denied in its entirety.
Aramark’s motion for summary judgment
[Docket No. 267] was granted in its entirety and Aramark was
dismissed from this action on February 8, 2013.
[Docket No. 346].
2/8/2013 Order
All claims against two of the County
Defendants, Hickman and Solog, were also dismissed and these
individuals defendants were terminated from this action.
Id.
Defendant Merline’s successor as ACJF warden, Geraldine Cohen,
was automatically substituted as a party in this action.
See
id.; 2/12/2013 Letter [Docket No. 347].
A settlement conference was held before Magistrate Judge
Joel Schneider on May 10, 2013, at which Duran, counsel for the
remaining County Defendants, and counsel for CFG appeared.
5/10/2013 Minutes [Docket No. 356].
The parties reached a
settlement of all remaining claims, resolving the action in its
entirety, and the Court issued an Order of Dismissal on May 13,
2
Merline has long since retired from his position as warden
of the ACJF. As of February 2013, the warden of the ACJF is
Defendant Geraldine Cohen, who has been substituted as a party
in this action in her official capacity as warden.
3
2013, which dismissed the action as settled “without costs and
without prejudice to the right, upon motion and good cause
shown, within 60 days, to reopen this action if the settlement
is not consummated.”
[Docket No. 357].
reopen the action within sixty days.
No party moved to
In fact, nothing was
submitted to the Court in this action for over two years and
seven months.
On December 22, 2015, the Court received and
filed Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen [Docket No. 358].
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, release or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Additionally, “[a] motion under Rule
60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”
60(c)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Motions based upon subsections (1), (2), and (3) must
be made “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or
order or the date of the proceeding.”
4
Id.
Plaintiff purports to bring the Motion to Reopen under Rule
60(b)(6).
See Motion at 1 [Docket No. 358].
“Relief under Rule
60(b)(6) is appropriate ‘only in extraordinary circumstances
where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship
would occur.’”
Crawford v. United States, 611 F. App’x 47, 49
(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir.
2014)).
“But extraordinary circumstances rarely exist when a
party seeks relief from a judgment that resulted from the
party’s deliberate choices.”
F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008).
Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536
Additionally, “[r]elief under
Rule 60(b)(6) is only available where the other subsections of
Rule 60(b) do not apply.”
Williams v. City of Erie Police
Dep’t, 639 F. App’x 895, 895 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Medunic v.
Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 893 (3d Cir. 1976)); accord Stradley v.
Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1975) (“Rule 60(b)(6) is not
intended as a means by which the time limitations of 60(b)(1-3)
may be circumvented.
Rule 60(b)(6) is available . . . only when
the relief sought is based upon ‘any other reason’ than a reason
which would warrant relief under 60(b)(1-5).”).
Plaintiff’s motion is generally incoherent and it is
unclear upon what basis Plaintiff seeks to reopen this action,
which was dismissed in May 2013, over two and one half years
prior to Plaintiff’s motion being filed.
The Motion to Reopen
is largely styled as one seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
5
This Court, however, cognizant of its obligation to liberally
construe the pleadings of pro se litigants, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), will also consider the viability of the
Motion to Reopen under the other subsections of Rule 60(b), as
appropriate.
Although Plaintiff explicitly seeks relief under Rule
60(b)(6), Plaintiff also claims that he was “surprised” to learn
that “the harm to their [sic] property is more severe than
originally believed.”
Motion at 38 ¶ 25-26.
For this reason,
Plaintiff also argues that relief is appropriate under Rule
60(b)(1).
Plaintiff next appears to contend that relief under
Rule 60(b)(2) is also appropriate because of newly discovered
evidence.
The Court is unable to surmise from Duran’s disparate
statements regarding his medical conditions and the treatment of
“Michele L Baxter”, among others, what newly discovered evidence
Plaintiff is referencing.
See id. at 39-40.
Plaintiff also
complains of alleged discovery violations, which appear to be
related to Civil Action No. 07-5994 before the Honorable Chief
Judge Jerome Simandle.
See, e.g., id. at 41, 43.
Next,
Plaintiff states that the attorneys in yet another case, Civil
Action No. 14-4125, committed fraud and that a purported
settlement in that action was “[c]oerced in bad faith” and
involved “intolerable conflicts of interest.”
Id. at 50.
For
these reasons, Plaintiff claims that “the settlement itself [was
6
rendered] void ab initio.”
Id. at 51 (referring to defendants
and purported settlement involved in Civil Action No. 14-4125).3
Plaintiff also references an April 2014 settlement, which he
claims was “involuntary” and “made in bad faith.”
26 ¶ 132.
See Motion at
The Court notes, however, that the settlement in this
action occurred in May 2013.
The Court presumes that Plaintiff
is referring to a settlement in a yet another action, given his
statements regarding judges and attorneys not relevant to this
matter.
See id. at 27 ¶¶ 132-35, 138.
Regardless of the grounds underlying Duran’s Rule 60(b)
motion to set aside the Court’s Order of Dismissal [Docket No.
357], dated May 13, 2013, dismissing the matter as settled, it
is untimely.4
To the extent that it is premised upon some
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” “newly
discovered evidence,” or “fraud, misrepresentation, or
3
The Court notes that, to the best of its knowledge, no
settlement was ever reached in Civil Action 14-4125. In fact,
no defendants were ever served in that matter and no attorneys
entered an appearance in the action on behalf of any party.
4 The Court is well aware that the Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se in this action. His pro se status, however, does not
excuse him from compliance with the Federal Rules. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 589 F. App’x 591,
593 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Although we liberally construe pro se
filings, Jones is not exempt from procedural rules or the
consequences of failing to comply with them.”) (citing McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)); Sykes v. Blockbuster
Video, 205 F. App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that pro se
litigant’s “ignorance of the rules would not provide good cause
to excuse his failure” to comply with timeliness requirements
set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
7
misconduct by an opposing party,” such a motion must have been
filed within a year after the entry of the Order of Dismissal.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(3), (c)(1); see also Cardona v.
Lewisburg, 600 F. App’x 821, 822 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming
district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(2) motion as untimely
where motion was filed almost three years after district court’s
judgment).
To the extent that Plaintiff claims that the
judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) or that he is entitled to
the extraordinary relief provided under Rule 6(b)(6), the motion
must have been made within a “reasonable time.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1).
Over two years and seven months have passed between the
dismissal of this action as settled on May 13, 2013 [Docket No.
357] and the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen on December
22, 2013 [Docket No. 358].
Given the passage of this lengthy
period of time, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not file his
motion within a reasonable time as required by Rule 60(c).
See,
e.g., Williams, 639 F. App’x at 895 (affirming district court’s
determination that motion to reopen filed seventeen months after
judgment was not filed within a reasonable time); Moolenaar v.
Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Rule 60(b)(6) motion brought “almost two years” after district
court’s judgment was not “made within a reasonable time”).
8
Additionally, Plaintiff failed to put forth any
“extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief under Rule
60(b)(6).
Crawford, 611 F. App’x at 49 (affirming denial of
motion to reopen under Rule 60(b)(6) because plaintiff presented
no “extraordinary circumstances” entitling him to relief).
Furthermore, Duran seeks relief from this Court’s Order
dismissing the matter as settled, an order that quite clearly
resulted from his own deliberate choice to settle his claims.5
As the Third Circuit has found, “extraordinary circumstances
rarely exist when a party seeks relief from a judgment that
resulted from the party’s deliberate choices.”
Budget Blinds,
536 F.3d at 255 (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Zoebisch, 2013 WL 5719246, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2013), aff’d,
586 F. App’x 852 (3d Cir. 2014) (denying defendant’s motion to
5
Indeed, the language of the settlement agreement in this
matter supports the Court’s conclusion. It reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
By executing this Settlement Agreement and General Release
and Covenant Not to Sue, Miguel Duran acknowledges that:
(a) He has read it;
(b) He understands it and knows he is giving up important
rights;
(c) He agrees with everything in it; . . .
(e) This Settlement Agreement and General Release and
Covenant Not to Sue was negotiated with his knowledge
and consent; . . .
(g) He has signed this Settlement Agreement and General
Release and Covenant Not to Sue knowingly and
voluntarily.
County Defendants’ Opposition, Ex. A at 5 [Docket No. 39-1].
9
reopen based on his “‘buyer’s remorse’ as to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement into which he voluntarily and clearly
stated his intention to enter”).
Even if Duran’s Rule 60(b)(6)
motion had been filed within a reasonable time, which it was
not, it presents no extraordinary circumstances warranting
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) and must be denied.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen shall be
denied.
As the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen, it
does not reach Duran’s professed motions to recuse or remove
this matter to another venue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen is
denied.
An appropriate Order shall issue on this date.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August 3, 2016
10
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