DURAN v. WARNER et al

Filing 281

MEMORANDUM OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/30/16. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MIGUEL DURAN,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 07-5994 (JBS/AMD)

v.
OFFICER WILLIAM WARNER, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff
Miguel Duran’s motion to reopen the judgment in this case
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., and transfer his
case, filed on December 22, 2015. [Docket Item 278.] Plaintiff
alleges in his motion that counsel acted in bad faith, committed
fraud, and “conspired” “through threats and influenced [sic],
such retaliation and harassment to force the plaintiff to have
to settle.” (See Pl. Br. at 25.) Plaintiff also seeks to have
this case transferred to another court “due to Bias, unfair, and
Prejudice treatment In the Court in the Summary Judgment [sic].”
(Id.) All defendants oppose. [Docket Item 279.] For the reasons
set forth below, the motion to reopen will be denied.
1.

The Court need not recite this case’s lengthy factual

and procedural history for the purposes of the instant motion.
Instead, the Court notes that the parties reached a settlement

agreement in this case over two years ago, which was finally
stipulated to on September 26, 2014 after a prolonged
disagreement over the possible operation of a Medicaid/Medicaid
lien on Plaintiff’s award. [Docket Item 275.] By the terms of
the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff received payment in the amount
of $30,000 in exchange for releasing all defendants from all
claims pertaining to alleged incidents occurring on June 8,
2007, June 23, 2007, and between August 1, 2007 up to and
including September 30, 2007. (See Ex. A to Def. Br. in Opp.
[Docket Item 279-1].) This Court ordered the action dismissed
with prejudice on September 30, 2014. [Docket Item 276.]
Plaintiff then filed the instant motion on December 22, 2015 to
reopen his case, set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6), and transfer his case to a new court. [Docket Item
278.] All Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion. [Docket Item
279.] The Court will decide this motion without holding oral
argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
2.

Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party
or its legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) Newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) Fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party;
2 

(4)
(5)
(6)

The judgment is void;
The judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged . . . or
Any other reason that justifies relief.

Any motion made under Rule 60(b) “shall be made within a
reasonable time,” and motions under subsections (1)-(3) must be
made within one year from the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c).
3.

Plaintiff purports to bring his motion pursuant to

Rule 60(b)(6), a “catch-all” provision that authorizes a court
to grant relief from a final judgment for “any . . . reason”
other than those listed elsewhere in the rule. Cox v. Horn, 757
F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014). First, the Court notes that
subsection (6) is inapplicable to this motion. Plaintiff alleges
that he is entitled to relief from the final judgment entered by
stipulation in this case on September 30, 2014 [Docket Item 276]
because opposing counsel acted in bad faith, committed fraud,
and threatened him to force him to settle his claims. These
allegations fall within the definition of subsection (3), “fraud
. .

., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”

Because Plaintiff’s motion was made more than a year after the
final disposition of his case, Plaintiff’s motion is time-barred
by Rule 60(c).
4.

However, even if Rule 60(b)(6) were applicable to

Plaintiff’s claims, relieving him of the one-year limitations

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period of 60(b)(3), Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is
entitled to relief under that provision. Relief is available
under Rule 60(b)(6) “only in extraordinary circumstances where,
without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would
occur.” Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (citing Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc.,
989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). “But extraordinary
circumstances rarely exist when a party seeks relief from a
judgment that resulted from the party’s deliberate choices.”
Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008).
5.

It is clear to the Court that it was Plaintiff’s

“deliberate choice” to settle his case.
6.

His present motion rehashes his claims about

conditions of confinement and pretrial discovery disputes that
were the subject of this case (and adjudicated over the course
of more than six years) prior to his negotiation and agreement
to the settlement that he now seeks to set aside. His claim that
he was coerced into signing the settlement agreement is belied
by the number of submissions filed two years ago when he sought
this Court’s assistance in enforcing a settlement agreement
between the parties. [See Docket Items 259, 260, 264, 265, 268,
270, 271, 272 & 273.] Plaintiff, far from being coerced, was
seeking to expedite the consummation of the settlement, as
demonstrated by his correspondence with defense counsel on
various dates in September, 2014. (Exs. A, B, C & D to Def. Br.
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in Opp. [Docket Item 279].) Even if Plaintiff’s motion had been
filed within a reasonable time, which it was not, it presents no
extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule
60(b)(6) and must be denied.1
7.

An accompanying order will be entered.

August 30, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

1

As the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to reopen, it does not
reach his motion to transfer this case to another court.
5