HAAS v. BURLINGTON COUNTY
Filing
69
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file and serve their proposed amended complaint [Doc. No. 66-1] by no later than 11/20/2012; ORDERED that in a separate Order the Court will schedule a status conference to address scheduling deadlines in the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 11/13/2012. (tf, )
[Doc. No. 51]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
TAMMY MARIE HAAS and CONRAD
SZCZPANIAK,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 08-1102 (NLH/JS)
v.
BURLINGTON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Tammy Marie Haas (“Haas”) and Conrad Szczpaniak
(“Szczpaniak”) allege defendants violated their constitutional
rights when they were strip searched at the Burlington County Jail
after they were arrested for “minor offenses.”
Defendants argue
the claims plaintiffs are seeking to assert in their motion to
amend the complaint are futile.
The resolution of plaintiffs’
motion rises or falls on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington,
U.S.
discussed,
, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
the
Court
finds
that
For the reasons to be
plaintiffs’
proposed
amended
complaint pleads a plausible claim for relief and is not futile.
The Court will therefore grant plaintiffs’ motion to amend.1
1. This Order addresses plaintiffs’ latest proposed amended
complaint filed on October 25, 2012 [Doc. No. 66-1]. The
amendment names as defendants, “Burlington County, Burlington
County Correctional Facility, Ronald Cox, both in his individual
and representative capacity as Warden of the Burlington County
(continued...)
Background
In order to understand the background of the case it is
necessary
to
know
the
procedural
history
of
the
Florence
litigation. On July 19, 2005, Albert Florence filed a class action
complaint against Burlington County in this court.
Like the
plaintiffs in this case, Florence alleged his constitutional rights
were violated when he was strip searched after his arrest.
March
20,
2008,
the
Honorable
Florence as a class action.
Joseph
H.
Rodriguez
On
certified
Haas and Szczpaniak opted-out of the
class on December 17, 2008.
Haas filed her separate federal
complaint on February 26, 2008.
Szczpaniak’s separate state court
complaint was removed to federal court on January 13, 2010. To
assure efficient case management plaintiffs’ cases were stayed and
administratively
terminated
without
resolution of the Florence litigation.
prejudice
pending
the
Judge Rodriguez granted
summary judgment to Florence on his strip search claim on February
4, 2009.
See 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, order amended by 657 F. Supp. 2d
504 (D.N.J. 2009).2
The decision was reversed by a divided panel
1. (...continued)
Jail, and John Does, fictitious names.” Haas’s February 26, 2008
complaint [C.A. No. 08-1102, Doc. No. 1] only named Burlington
County. Her February 2, 2009 amended complaint [Doc. No. 11]
added Juel E. Cole (Warden). Szczpaniak’s complaint filed on
December 30, 2009 [C.A. No. 10-199, Doc. No. 1] named the same
defendants as plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint except for
the John Doe parties. Defendants do not specifically object to
the addition of the John Doe defendants or to the dismissal of
Juel Cole.
2. Judge Rodriguez certified for interlocutory appeal the issue
of “whether a blanket strip searching [of] all non-indictable
arrestees admitted to a jail facility without first articulating
reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution as applied to the States through the Fourteen
(continued...)
2
(2-1) in the Third Circuit.
appeal the
621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).
On
Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s decision.
132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
After
plaintiffs’
the
Supreme
cases
were
Court
issued
restored
to
the
the
Florence
active
decision
docket.
At
plaintiffs’ request, and with no objection from defendants, the
cases
were
consolidated.
Plaintiffs
now
seek
to
amend
their
complaint to avoid dismissal pursuant to the Florence holding.
Plaintiffs argue their case is distinguishable from Florence and it
fits within the strip search exception discussed in the opinion.
Defendants disagree, argue Florence controls, and ask the Court to
deny plaintiffs’ motion on the ground it is futile. The Court held
multiple oral argument sessions.
Discussion
1.
The Florence Case
Although the parties disagree on how to read Florence, they
agree the case is controlling.
In 2003, a bench warrant was issued
for Florence’s arrest after he failed to appear for an enforcement
hearing regarding a fine he did not pay.
Although Florence paid
the fine a week later, the warrant was not removed from a statewide
computer database.
Two years later Florence and his wife were
stopped by a state trooper.
Because of the warrant, the trooper
arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington County Detention
Center.
After three days Florence was transferred to the Essex
County Correctional Facility. Pursuant to their policies, Florence
2. (...continued)
Amendment.” 657 F. Supp. 2d at 510-11.
3
was “strip searched” at the Burlington and Essex County Jails. The
policies applied “regardless of the circumstances of the arrest,
suspected
offense,
criminal history.”
or
the
detainee’s
behavior,
demeanor,
or
Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1514.3
After his release Florence filed a civil action against
Burlington and Essex Counties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging
that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
Florence alleged that persons arrested for a minor offense should
not be strip searched without a reason to suspect they were
concealing a weapon, drugs, or other contraband.
As noted, the
District Court granted summary judgment for Florence but the
decision was reversed by the Third Circuit.
The Supreme Court
affirmed the Third Circuit in a 5-4 decision.
Deferring to the arguments advanced by correctional officials,
the Supreme Court’s majority opinion held that Florence’s strip
search was constitutional.
The Court reasoned that “correctional
officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to
detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities.”
132 S. Ct. at 1517.
The Court held that security imperatives
involved in jail supervision override the privacy interests “on any
suspected offender who will be admitted to the general [inmate]
population . . . .”
Id. at 1522.
The dissent disagreed and would
hold that a strip search “of an individual arrested for a minor
offense that does not involve drugs or violence--say a traffic
offense, a regulatory offense, an essentially civil matter, or any
3.
The recited facts are taken from the Supreme Court’s opinion.
4
other such misdemeanor is an unreasonable search.”
132 S. Ct.
1525.
The uncertainty of the scope of the Florence holding arises
from Part IV of the majority opinion and the concurring opinions of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
In Part IV, which was not
joined in by Justice Thomas, the Court specifically noted that it
was not ruling on whether a strip search “would be reasonable in
instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial
contact with other detainees.”
Id.
at 1522-23.
In an oft-quoted
statement, Part IV also reads:
The circumstances before the Court . . . do not present
the opportunity to consider a narrow exception of the
sort Justice ALITO describes . . . which might restrict
whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet been
reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer, and
who can be held in available facilities removed from the
general population, may be subject to the types of
searches at issue here.
Id. at 1523 (quotations omitted).
Chief
Justice
Roberts’
concurring
opinion
reflects
his
reservation about establishing a blanket rule that all arrestees
may be strip searched.
He wrote, “it is important for me that the
Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the
rule it announces.”
Id. at 1523.
He also wrote, “[t]he Court
makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the rule
it announces.
The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the
possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we not embarrass the
future.”
Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Justice Alito
also pointed out that the Court’s decision merely held:
5
[T]hat jail Administrators may require all arrestees who
are committed to the general population of a jail to
undergo visual strip searches not involving physical
contact by corrections officers.
To perform the
searches, officers may direct the arrestees to disrobe,
shower, and submit to a visual inspection. As part of
the inspection, the arrestees may be required to
manipulate their bodies.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Justice Alito also wrote:
It is important to note . . . that the Court does not
hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip
search of an arrestee whose detention has not been
reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in
available facilities apart from the general population.
. . .
The Court does not address whether it
reasonable, without regard to the offense or
for detention, to strip search an arrestee
arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by
officer.
is always
the reason
before the
a judicial
Id. at 1524-25 (emphasis in original).
Although Florence left many questions unanswered, one thing is
plain--that is, that a minimum of five Justices (Alito and the four
dissenters) did not endorse a blanket rule that all persons may be
strip searched after they are arrested.
In addition, except for
Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court appears to be receptive to an
exception to a blanket strip search policy that applies to all
arrestees.
Although the exception to the Florence holding has not
been defined, at a minimum it appears to include a situation where
a person was arrested for a “minor” offense, she/he was not
admitted to the general population, and there was no reasonable
suspicion she/he was carrying contraband.4
4. Amongst the numerous unsettled questions are: (1) what is a
“minor” offense; (2) whether a jail has a duty to create a
separate holding area for a person arrested for a minor offense
(continued...)
6
2.
Plaintiffs’ Allegations
Against the backdrop discussed above the Court will evaluate
whether plaintiffs’ claims are futile.5
In order to determine if
plaintiff’s amendment is futile the Court applies the same standard
of legal sufficiency as applies under Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6).
Am.
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Material Handling Supply, Inc., No. 06-1545
(JBS), 2007 WL 1296200, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2007).
Under the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review, the Court must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled
to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008)(citation omitted). In other words, a complaint survives
a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
determination
is
a
“context-specific
task
This plausibility
that
requires
the
4. (...continued)
if none already exists;(3) how long may an arrestee be held in a
separate area before she/he is admitted to the general
population; and (4) what type of strip search is permitted.
5. Defendants’ opposition does not address or challenge
plaintiffs’ class definition. This Order, therefore, will not
address whether plaintiffs’ class claims are futile. Similarly,
since the issue was not raised by defendants, this Order also
does not address plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim. See
Proposed Amended Complaint ¶18. (Defendants’ futility argument
focuses on plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.)
For the same reason, the Court will not specifically address
plaintiffs’ claims under the New Jersey Constitution and the New
Jersey Strip Search statute. N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-1 et. seq. This
Order is entered without prejudice to defendants’ right to assert
all appropriate defenses to these claims.
7
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A complaint cannot survive where
a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather than
plausible.
Haas
Id.
alleges
she
was
arrested
in
May
or
July
2006
at
approximately 9:00 p.m., and brought to the Burlington County Jail
under a Rule 1:10-3 civil arrest warrant that was issued after she
failed to appear in court for a hearing regarding her failure to
pay child support.
Proposed Amended Complaint ¶41.
She alleges
she had a small bail and could reasonably anticipate imminent
release.
Id.
Haas made bail within two hours and was released “at
or prior to being seen by a judge for the purpose of reviewing her
continuing detention.” Id. Haas alleges she was pregnant when she
was arrested and was strip searched “immediately” after she was
brought to the Burlington County Jail.
Id. ¶¶41-42.
Haas also
alleges she “never entered into the general population but was
placed in a holding cell during the pendency of her [two hour]
detention.”
Id. ¶45.
In addition, she alleges she “could have
been detained in a manner which would have precluded her contact
with persons who were committed to the jail, and/or committed any
felony offenses.”
Id. ¶47.
Szczpaniak alleges he was arrested on November 21, 2008,
February 3, 2009 and August 15, 2009 on warrants “for failing to
appear/pay fines.”
Id. ¶36.
He alleges, “[t]he charges which
underlied [his] . . . arrests were not criminal in nature, and the
warrants were issued to obtain his compliance at attending a
hearing/paying a fine, not as part of a determined sentence.”
8
Id.
He alleges he was “strip searched prior to being seen by a judge
for the purpose of reviewing his continuing detention . . . .” Id.
Haas and Szczpaniak both allege the Burlington County Jail “had and
has the ability to create new and/or designate existing housing
pods, and/or holding cells to segregate detainees, prior to being
seen by a judge . . . and/or to segregate detainees held on nonindictable offenses even after being seen by a judge.”
3.
Id. ¶27.
Plausibility
Because the Florence decision left many questions unanswered
the Court faces a difficult task. Nevertheless, based on the wellpleaded fact allegations in the proposed amended complaint, which
the Court must assume to be true, and the uncertainly created by
Florence, the Court finds that plaintiffs plead a plausible claim
for
relief.
The
Court
finds
that
the
facts
as
alleged
by
plaintiffs plausibly place them within the orbit of an exception to
a blanket strip search policy that the majority of the Supreme
Court appears ready to accept.
This includes the fact that both
plaintiffs were arrested for what appears to be a “minor” offense,
and both were strip searched before they were seen by a judicial
officer.
In addition, as noted, plaintiffs allege it was feasible
for them to be segregated from the general population.
Id. ¶27.
In fact, Haas alleges she did not enter the general population.
Id. ¶45.
Chief Justice Roberts noted, “[f]actual nuances have not
played a significant role as [the] case has been presented to the
Court.” 132 S. Ct. at 1523. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint targets
the factual nuances the Supreme Court did not address and the
nuances District Court’s must sort out.
9
The Court emphasizes that
this Order does not rule on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
Instead, the Court is merely ruling that the facts as alleged in
plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint set forth a plausible claim
for relief.
The record must be further developed to determine the
applicability of Florence.
Accord Flonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee
Cnty., No. 12-2115, 2012 WL 4321714, at *6, adopted, 2012 WL
4321710 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2012)(denying motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s strip search claim because “further factual development
. . . is necessary for the Court to ultimately determine the
applicability of Florence.”).
Defendants’ futility arguments are not persuasive.
First,
defendants argue they did not have separate facilities to hold
arrestees before they were seen by a judicial officer.
(“[A]t the
time plaintiffs were arrested and committed to the jail, both were
housed in general population. . . . There was no extra space in the
facility allocated for bench warrants on civil cases.” October 10,
2012 Letter Brief (“LB”) at 3, Doc. No. 56.)
Implicit in this
argument is the notion that there was no feasible alternative to
admitting plaintiffs to the general inmate population.
defendants
raise
a
fact
issue
that
disposition at this stage of the case.
facilities
were
or
could
have
been
is
not
However,
appropriate
for
Whether or not separate
made
available
to
hold
plaintiffs before their detention was reviewed by a judge is a fact
issue that is not appropriate for disposition at this time.
Second, defendants argue the case is controlled by Florence.
Defendants argue that since a judge issued an arrest warrant for
the plaintiffs, plaintiffs were strip searched after a judge had
10
already determined they should be detained.
Although Justice
Alito’s concurrence is not crystal clear, defendants are reading it
too narrowly.
The Court reads Justice Alito’s concurrence as
referring to a situation where a person is strip searched before
her/his post-arrest detention is reviewed by a judicial officer.
132 S. Ct. at 1524.
That is what plaintiffs allege here.
Although
a judge authorized plaintiffs’ arrests, their post-arrest detention
was
not
addressed
before
they
were
strip
searched.
Third,
defendants argue plaintiffs’ present the same set of facts as
Florence.
October 10, 2012 LB at 6.
This is not true.
As noted
by Chief Justice Roberts, it appears the Supreme Court assumed
there was no alternative to admitting Florence to the general
population.
132 S. Ct. at 1523.
Here, as noted, plaintiffs plead
contrary facts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, for all the reasons stated herein, the Court
finds that plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint sets forth a
plausible claim for relief. The Court therefore denies defendants’
argument that plaintiffs’ amendment is futile.
Accordingly, for
good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 13th day of November, 2012, that
plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs are granted
leave to file and serve their proposed amended complaint [Doc. No.
66-1] by no later than November 20, 2012; and
11
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in a separate Order the Court will
schedule a status conference to address scheduling deadlines in the
case.
s/Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?