DUNMORE v. BALICKI et al
Filing
46
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/15/2011. (dmr)(n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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MIDDLETON DUNMORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN BALICKI, et al.
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
08-2708 (NLH/KMW)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Middleton Dunmore
# 531173
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, N.J. 08625
Pro Se
Daniel Michael Vannella, Esquire
New Jersey Division of Law
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
25 Market Street
P.O. Box 112
Trenton, N.J. 08625
Attorney for Defendant Sergeant Ennals
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court by way of an unopposed1
motion [Doc. No. 40] for summary judgment by Defendant, Sergeant
Calvin
Ennals
prejudice.
seeking
The
Court
to
dismiss
notes
that
Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff
complaint
did
not
with
file
an
opposition to Defendant Ennals’ motion for summary judgment and the
1.
Counsel for Defendant Ennals certified that copies of the
motion for summary judgment, brief, and supporting materials were
mailed to Plaintiff via certified mail at the address Plaintiff
provided to the Court. (Certificate of Service [Doc. No. 40-5]
1.)
time
for
opposition
has
expired.
The
Court
has
considered
Defendant’s motion and decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 78.
For
the
reasons
expressed
below,
Defendant’s
Plaintiff,
Middleton
motion
is
granted.
I.
JURISDICTION
In
this
incarcerated
action,
with
the
New
Jersey
Dunmore,
Department
of
an
inmate
Corrections
(“NJDOC”), has brought a civil rights complaint against Defendant,
Sergeant Calvin Ennals, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court
has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at New Jersey
State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey, submitted the complaint in
this action on May 30, 2008 seeking damages and injunctive relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights based on allegations of excessive force
by corrections officers and subsequent denial of medical care.2
(Pl.’s Compl. 1.)
In the complaint,3 Plaintiff alleges that on the
2. As noted in the Court’s March 28, 2011 Opinion, Plaintiff “also
appears to set forth a claim for assault and battery under New
Jersey law.” (Op. [Doc. No. 38] 3 n.2, Mar. 28, 2011.)
3. In the present motion for summary judgment, Defendant Ennals
cites to the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint, but
2
morning of November 24, 2006, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at
South
Woods
Defendant
State
Ennals
Prison
and
(“SWSP”)
other
in
Bridgeton,
corrections
officers
Plaintiff and told him to lock into his cell.
New
Jersey,
approached
(Id. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff contends that “[u]pon locking in[,]” the officers kicked
his cell door and instructed Plaintiff to show his hands and come
out of his cell.
(Id. ¶ 8.)
According to Plaintiff, the officers
then forcefully shoved Plaintiff against the wall, kicked his legs,
and frisked him, questioned him regarding the whereabouts of
weapons.
(Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was then taken to another room at
SWSP, and after twenty to twenty-five minutes passed, Defendant
Ennals instructed Plaintiff to exit the room by walking backward
with his hands on his head.
(Id. ¶ 10.)
At that point, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant Ennals “slammed” Plaintiff “face first
against the wall” and handcuffed him.
(Id.)
Plaintiff further
alleges that the corrections officers then escorted Plaintiff down
the stairs and pushed him “head first” into each door that they
passed.
(Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff asserts that he was ultimately
taken to the prison’s barber shop where he remained, handcuffed,
for about an hour and a half, and that the officers refused to
notes that these allegations “are cited solely to provide the
[C]ourt with the basis” of Plaintiff’s claims and that Defendant
does “not consider them undisputed[.]”
(Br. on Behalf of Def.
Calvin Annals in Supp. of a Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 40-1]
(hereinafter, “Def.’s Br.”), 4 n.2.)
3
grant him access to the bathroom.
(Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff contends
that upon arrival at the prison’s medical clinic, he reported to a
nurse that he had suffered injuries to his head and face as a
result of the officers’ actions.
(Id. ¶ 13.)
However, Plaintiff
alleges that he was “pulled out [of] the door” before he received
any medical treatment and was then taken to pre-hearing detention.
(Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14-16.)
By Order dated October 21, 2008, the Court dismissed “any and
all claims against defendants Karen Balicki and Chrystol Leys” a
supervisor, and a former corrections officer, respectively. (Order
[Doc. No. 4] 5, Oct. 21, 2008.)
However, the Court permitted
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Ennals to proceed past sua
sponte dismissal.
(Id.)
Plaintiff’s subsequent motion to amend
his complaint was denied by Opinion and Order dated July 15, 2009.
(Op. [Doc. No. 18] 7-8, July 15, 2009; Order [Doc. No. 19] 1, July
15, 2009.)
On June 10, 2010, Defendant Ennals moved to dismiss Dunmore’s
claims or, alternatively, for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s
alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
(See generally Br. by Def. Calvin Ennals
Supporting a Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), and/or for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 27].)
By Opinion dated
March 28, 2011, the Court denied Defendant Ennals’ motion without
prejudice finding that the record at the time was insufficient to
demonstrate “definitively that a suitable grievance procedure was
4
made
available
to
[Plaintiff]
so
that
he
could
pursue
an
administrative remedy for [Defendant] Ennals’ actions.” (Op. [Doc.
No. 38] 6, Mar. 28, 2011.)
The Court specifically noted the
absence from the record of “any documentation or other evidence
that enable[d] the Court to evaluate [the prison’s grievance
procedure], and to ensure that it [was] properly disclosed to
inmates and satisfie[d] the dictates of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).”
(Id.)
Accordingly, the Court found that Defendant Ennals did not
satisfy his burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies.4
(Id. at 7.)
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied
that “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing FED . R.
CIV. P. 56).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s
4. The Court noted in the March 28, 2011 Opinion that although
Defendant “Ennals’ counsel certifie[d] that [Plaintiff] was
properly served at his mailing address[,]” Plaintiff “nevertheless,
[did] not respond[] to Ennals’ motion.” (Op. [Doc. No. 38] 3, Mar.
28, 2011.)
5
favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A fact is “material” if, under the governing substantive law, a
dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit.
Id.
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may
not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of
the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be
believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.’”
Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together
with
the
affidavits,
if
any,’
which
it
believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
(citation omitted); see also Singletary v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 266
F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although the initial burden is
on the summary judgment movant to show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, ‘the burden on the moving party may be
discharged by ‘showing’ –- that is, pointing out to the district
court –- that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case’ when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate
burden of proof.”) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
6
Once the
moving
party
has
met
this
burden,
the
nonmoving
party
must
identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
Thus,
to
withstand
a
properly
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
supported
motion
for
summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and
affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving
party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
A party opposing summary
judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general
denials, or vague statements.
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d
228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
B.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In seeking summary judgment, Defendant Ennals argues that
Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 must be dismissed because
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
(Br. on
Behalf of Def. Calvin Annals in Supp. of a Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc.
No. 40-1] (hereinafter, “Def.’s Br.”), 12-15.)
Defendant Ennals
asserts that Plaintiff did not follow the requisite grievance
procedures for prisoners incarcerated within the NJDOC and thus all
federal claims in the complaint should be dismissed.
(Def.’s Br.
14-15.)
As recognized by the Third Circuit, “[u]nder the Prison[]
Litigation
Reform
Act,
a
prisoner
must
exhaust
available
administrative remedies before bringing suit concerning prison
conditions.”
Daniels v. Rosenberger, 386 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir.
7
2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
“Whether an administrative
remedy is available to the prisoner is a matter of law.”
386 F. App’x at 29.
Daniels,
To determine whether an administrative remedy
is “available”, the relevant inquiry is whether the remedy is
“‘capable of use; at hand.’”
109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Id. (citing Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d
“Proper exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires filing a timely or otherwise procedurally nondefective grievance.” Daniels, 386 F. App’x at 29 (citing Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006)).
Furthermore, “[t]he prisoner
must ‘carry the grievance through any available appeals process’
before the remedies will be deemed exhausted.” Griffin v. Samuels,
No. 06-4488, 2008 WL 961241, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2008) (citation
omitted).
“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate
suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances
or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Moreover, exhaustion of remedies under the PLRA is mandatory, and
a prisoner’s failure to exhaust such remedies directs dismissal of
the claims.
Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1352, 1355 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Finally, “[t]he burden of proving exhaustion of
administrative remedies is on the [defendant-prison officials].”
Cerome v. Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr./ Cornell Cos., No. 09-2070,
2010 WL 4948940, at *4 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2010).
8
C. Inmate Grievance and Tracking Program at SWSP
The NJDOC “requires all correctional institutions to provide
inmates with a departmentally-approved procedure for resolving
complaints.”
DiDiano v. Balicki, No. 10-4483, 2011 WL 1466131, at
*1 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011) (citing N.J. ADMIN . CODE § 10A:8-1.1-3.6)).
Pursuant to the requirements of the New Jersey Administrative Code,
SWSP
developed
an
Inmate
Handbook,
which
established
an
administrative grievance procedure, known as the Inmate Grievance
and Tracking Program (“IGTP”).5
(Declaration of Linda Linen [Doc.
No. 40-2] (hereinafter, “Linen Decl.”), ¶¶ 3, 5.)
As described by
Linda Linen, a Program Development Specialist employed by the NJDOC
at SWSP, the IGTP is “designed to provide a direct and confidential
route for inmates to make the Administration aware of any problems
or
concerns
and
to
allow
[the
Administration]
to
appropriate response in a timely and efficient manner.”
Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7.)
make
an
(Linen
The January 2003 edition of the SWSP Inmate
Handbook delineates the four step process that constitutes the
IGTP.
(Ex. B to Linen Decl., SWSP Inmate Handbook, January 2003,
96.)
As set forth in the Inmate Handbook, step one is an “Inmate
Request Form”; step two is an “Interview Request Form”; step three
is
an
“Administrative
Remedy
Form”;
“Administrative Remedy Form – Appeal”.
and
step
four
is
an
(Id.)
5. The IGTP is also sometimes referred to as the “Inmate Remedy
System” in the SWSP Memoranda attached as Exhibit C to the Linen
Declaration. (See generally Ex. C to Linen Decl.)
9
To utilize the IGTP, an inmate initiates the process by
completing a multi-part form, the Request System and Remedy Form,
otherwise known as an “IRF”.
¶ 8.)
(Def.’s Br. 6; see also Linen Decl.
Inmates at SWSP can obtain IRFs in the law libraries or in
their individual housing units from a housing unit officer or a
social worker, and completed IRFs are then deposited in drop boxes
in each housing unit. (Def.’s Br. 6; see also Linen Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.)
Where an inmate is being held in close custody housing or has a
limiting medical condition which prevents him from accessing a drop
box, the inmate may turn in his completed IRF to a social worker or
housing unit officer who then deposits the IRF in the drop box.
(Def.’s Br. 6; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 10.)
Upon completion, all
IRFs are directed to the inmate remedy system form coordinator, who
is responsible for forwarding each IRF to the appropriate SWSP
staff member or supervisor to provide the inmate with a response.
(Def.’s Br. 6; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 11.)
After a SWSP staff
member or supervisor provides a response, but prior to the IRF
being returned to the inmate, the IRF is reviewed by an appropriate
administrative designee to determine whether the response to the
IRF appropriately addresses the issues raised.
also
Linen
Decl.
¶
12.)
If
approved
by
(Def.’s Br. 6; see
the
administrative
designee, the IRF is signed and returned to the inmate.
Br. 6-7; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 12.)
(Def.’s
Where an inmate has a follow-
up question or is dissatisfied with the response outlined in the
IRF, the inmate may initiate the administrative appeal process by
10
completing Part Four of the same IRF and resubmitting it in the
appropriate drop box.
(Def.’s Br. 7; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 13.)
According to Defendant, the Administrator at SWSP renders all
appeals
decisions,
which
correctional facility level.
¶ 14.)
constitute
final
decisions
at
the
(Def.’s Br. 7; see also Linen Decl.
Thus, an inmate has exhausted his available administrative
remedies upon receipt of a response to an administrative appeal of
his IRF.
(Def.’s Br. 7; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 16.)
Defendant asserts that officials at SWSP inform inmates about
the IGTP through distribution of the Inmate Handbook during intake
and orientation and by bulletins posted throughout the facility.
(Def.’s Br. 6; see also Linen Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.)
Defendant points to
four separate SWSP Memoranda that were posted inside SWSP for
inmates to read between 2005 and 20086 which describe the IGTP and
provide
inmates
with
instructions
for
properly
utilizing
the
system.
(Def.’s Br. 6; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 6; see, e.g., Ex. C
to Linen Decl. SWSP Memorandum posted on Feb. 14, 2005 re: “Inmate
Policy for Submitting the Inmate-Request Remedy Form”; Ex. C to
Linen Decl. SWSP Memorandum posted on Oct. 8, 2005 re: “Inmate
Request System Corrective Action Form”; Ex. C to Linen Decl. SWSP
Memorandum
posted
on
Dec.
20,
2007
re:
“Inmate
Policy
for
Submitting the Inmate Remedy System Form Effective January 1,
6. Each of the SWSP Memoranda attached as Exhibit C to the Linen
Declaration indicate that these Memoranda remained posted for
review by the inmate population “indefinitely” after the date of
the initial posting. (See generally Ex. C to Linen Decl.)
11
2008"; Ex. C to Linen Decl. SWSP Memorandum posted Feb. 8, 2008 re:
“Inmate Remedy System Procedure”.)7
As Defendant points out, three of these SWSP Memoranda set
forth that the Administrator’s decision on an appeal of an IRF is
considered a “final decision” at the institutional level.
(Def.’s
Br. 7; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 15; see, e.g., Feb. 14, 2005 SWSP
Memorandum, 3, ¶ E.2 (“Appeal decisions shall be rendered by the
Administrator and are therefore to be considered as final decisions
at the institutional level.”); Oct. 8, 2005 SWSP Memorandum, 3, ¶
F.4 (“Appeal decisions shall be rendered by the administrator and
are
therefore
to
be
considered
as
final
decisions
at
the
correctional facility level.”); Feb. 8, 2008 SWSP Memorandum, 3, ¶
C.4 (same).)
The December 20, 2007 and the February 8, 2008 SWSP
Memoranda specifically highlight that before an inmate may apply to
the courts for relief, he is required to utilize the IGTP, referred
to as the, Inmate Remedy System.
(See, e.g., Dec. 20, 2007 SWSP
Memorandum, 1, ¶ III (“Inmates are required to utilize the Inmate
Remedy System before applying to the courts for relief.”); Feb. 8,
2008 SWSP Memorandum,
IV.
1, ¶ II. (same).)
ANALYSIS
In denying Defendant Ennals’ prior motion to dismiss, the
Court concluded that the record at the time was insufficient to
7. In citing to the SWSP Memoranda through the remainder of this
opinion, the Court refers to each Memorandum by the date on which
it was originally posted and cites to the relevant page and/or
paragraph of each Memorandum.
12
demonstrate “definitively that a suitable grievance procedure was
made
available
to
[Plaintiff]
so
that
he
could
pursue
an
administrative remedy for [Defendant] Ennals’ actions.” (Op. [Doc.
No. 38] 6, Mar. 28, 2011.)
The Court also specifically noted that
where was no documentation or other evidence in the record through
which the Court could evaluate the prison’s grievance procedure and
to determine that it was properly disclosed to inmates.
(Id.)
In
the present motion for summary judgment, Defendant Ennals has
provided the Court with numerous documents, including the January
2003 Edition of the SWSP Inmate Handbook distributed to inmates
upon
intake
and
orientation,
as
well
as
four
separate
SWSP
Memoranda which were posted throughout the facility, all of which
describe the IGTP available to inmates at SWSP.
(See generally
Exs. B & C to Linen Decl.)
In moving for summary judgment, Defendant Ennals relies on
these documents and cites to Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347,
1348-55 (3d Cir. 2002), wherein the Third Circuit held that an
administrative grievance procedure outlined in a NJDOC inmate
handbook constituted an administrative remedy under the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement.
(Def.’s Br. 13.)
Defendant Ennals argues
that in
Third
Circuit’s
holding
properly
exhaust
Plaintiff
light
“was
of
the
obligated
to
in
all
Concepcion,
available
administrative remedies, pursuant to prison procedure, prior to ...
filing this complaint.”
(Id.)
Defendant contends that while
incarcerated at SWSP, Plaintiff was not only aware of the IGTP, but
13
utilized the system on nine separate occasions between January 19,
2006 and June 10, 2009, wherein he filed nine separate IRFs.
(Id.
at 7-8; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 17; Ex. D. to Linen Decl., IRFs
submitted to SWSP by Plaintiff.)
Defendant Ennals thus asserts
that summary judgment is proper because Plaintiff failed to “file
an IRF at SWSP addressing any complaint against [D]efendant Sgt.
Ennals in general, or about the alleged events on November 24,
2006” which form the basis of the complaint and has therefore
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA. (Id.
at 14.)
Upon review of the January 2003 Edition of the SWSP Inmate
Handbook submitted with the present motion, the Court has evaluated
the prison’s grievance procedure and finds, in light of the holding
in Conception, that the administrative procedure set up through the
IGTP at SWSP constitutes an administrative remedy under the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement.
The Inmate Handbook describes to inmates
the four steps of the IGTP which they may utilize to resolve
grievances.
(Def.’s Br. 6, 13; see also Linen Decl. ¶¶ 3-7; Ex. B
to Linen Decl., SWSP Inmate Handbook, January 2003, 96.)
This
process includes an opportunity to make a routine request or to
request an interview, and also permits inmates with an opportunity
to appeal a response to their request to the Administrator of the
prison.
(Def.’s Br. 13; see also Linen Decl. ¶¶ 3-7; Ex. B to
Linen Decl., SWSP Inmate Handbook, January 2003, 96.)
Moreover,
the IGTP was further explained to inmates through four subsequent
14
SWSP Memoranda posted throughout the facility, which explicitly:
(1) acknowledge that appeal decisions rendered by the Administrator
constitute final decisions at the correctional facility level; and
(2) caution inmates that they are required to utilize the IGTP
system prior to applying to the courts for relief.
(See generally
Linen Decl. ¶¶ 6, 15; Feb. 14, 2005 SWSP Memorandum, 3, ¶ E.2; Oct.
8, 2005 SWSP Memorandum, 3, ¶ F.4; Dec. 20, 2007 SWSP Memorandum,
1, ¶ III; Feb. 8, 2008 SWSP Memorandum, ¶¶ II., C.4.)
Accordingly, the Court finds that the IGTP set forth in the
January 2003 Edition of the SWSP Inmate Handbook, which Plaintiff
would have received upon intake and orientation to SWSP in January
of 2006, constitutes an administrative remedy that Plaintiff was
required to exhaust prior to filing the complaint in this matter.
See Ramos v. Hayman, No. 11-259, 2011 WL 3236395, at *4 (D.N.J.
July 27, 2011) (finding that a NJDOC inmate handbook constituted an
administrative remedy under PLRA’s exhaustion requirement where (1)
the handbook set forth a two-step grievance procedure including an
opportunity
for
a
routine
request/interview
and
a
chance
to
administratively appeal resulting decisions; and (2) inmates were
specifically instructed of the requirement to utilize the inmate
remedy system before seeking relief from the courts).
Having
determine
that
the
IGTP
at
SWSP
constitutes
an
administrative remedy under the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA,
the
Court
now
considers
whether
Plaintiff
complied
with
the
requirement by properly exhausting all available administrative
15
remedies. After careful consideration of the evidence presented by
Defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to properly
exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing the
complaint
in
this
action.
Initially,
the
Court
notes
that
Plaintiff was incarcerated at SWSP from January 19, 2006 through
June 10, 2009 –- a time frame which encompasses both the date of
the incident alleged in the complaint, November 24, 2006; and the
date upon which Plaintiff filed his complaint, May 30, 2008.
(See
Def.’s Br. 12; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. A to Linen Decl.,
Inmate
Progress
Notes
for
Middleton
Dunmore.)
Plaintiff
is
therefore subject to the requirements of the PLRA because he was
incarcerated at the time he filed his complaint on May 30, 2008.
See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting
that while a plaintiff would not be subject to the requirements of
the PLRA if he filed a timely complaint after his release from
prison, a plaintiff “is bound by the PLRA” where his suit is filed
before his release).
Moreover, as evidenced by: (1) the Inmate Handbook provided to
Plaintiff upon his arrival at SWSP; (2) the four SWSP Memoranda
posted indefinitely and available for review by Plaintiff during
his incarceration at SWSP from January 2006 to June 2009; and (3)
the nine IRFs Plaintiff filed while incarcerated at SWSP, Defendant
has sufficiently demonstrated that Plaintiff had knowledge of the
IGTP and the ability to utilize this administrative remedy to
address
his
grievances.
See
Ramos,
16
2011
WL
3236395,
at
*4
(concluding
that
plaintiff
demonstrated
his
knowledge
of
and
ability to use the administrative remedy process where he filed an
inmate remedy form).
Despite Plaintiff’s knowledge and ability to utilize the IGTP
and the requirement that this procedure be followed prior to
applying to
the
courts
for
relief,
Plaintiff
failed
in
this
instance to submit an IRF that detailed the alleged incident of
November 24, 2006 or that set forth any complaints, concerns, or
grievances regarding any actions by Defendant Ennals.
(See Def.’s
Br. 14; see also Linen Decl. ¶ 17; Ex. D. to Linen Decl., IRFs
submitted by Plaintiff to SWSP.)
In light of Plaintiff’s failure
to submit an IRF regarding the claims alleged in the complaint, the
Court finds that Plaintiff did not comply with the multi-step
process of the IGTP as set forth in the Inmate Handbook.
Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the requirements of the IGTP
constitutes a failure by Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to the claims alleged in the current action,
prior to seeking relief in court.
Therefore, Defendant Ennals’
motion for summary judgment is granted.
See, e.g., Ramos, 2011 WL
3236395, at *4 (granting defendants’ summary judgment motion where
plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as set
forth in a NJDOC inmate handbook); DiDiano v. Balicki, No. 10-4483,
2011 WL 1466131, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding defendants
were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims as a result of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust under the PLRA
17
where plaintiff failed to follow the administrative process offered
by SWSP); Gardner v. Hendricks, No. 04-3561, 2006 WL 2331102, at
*3-4
(D.N.J.
Aug.
10,
2006)
(granting
summary
judgment
for
defendant and finding plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing suit where plaintiff “failed to properly
complete and fill out an [administrative remedy form] regarding”
his grievance); see also DiGiovanni v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 232 F.
App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that plaintiff’s appeal
lacked “any arguable basis in law” where plaintiff had not begun to
pursue his
administrative
remedies
at
the time
he
filed
the
complaint and thus had not complied with the PLRA exhaustion
requirement).
Finally, in the present motion, Defendant Ennals also seeks
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s state law tort claims for
assault and battery, and further asks the Court to dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.8
(See Def.’s Br. 15-19.)
However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court, sua sponte,
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law
claims to the extent they are raised in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Under Section 1367(c)(3), “[a] district court may decline to
8. Although the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, the dismissal
of Plaintiff’s federal claims is without prejudice. See Nifas v.
Beard, 374 F. App’x 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming grant of
summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s federal claims and
noting the “dismissal of these claims, of course, [was] without
prejudice.”)
18
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if ‘the district
court
has
dismissed
jurisdiction[.]’”
all
claims
over
which
it
has
original
Oras v. City of Jersey City, 328 F. App’x 772,
775 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
Moreover, as
recognized by the Third Circuit, “[w]here the claim over which the
district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial,
the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims
unless
considerations
of
judicial
economy,
convenience,
and
fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for
doing so.”
Oras, 328 F. App’x at 775 (citing Hedges v. Musco, 204
F.3d
123
109,
(3d
Cir.
2000))
(internal
quotations
omitted)
(emphasis in original).
In this case, Plaintiff’s federal law claims under Section
1983 against Defendant Ennals are dismissed without prejudice based
on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his available administrative
remedies at SWSP before applying to the courts for relief.
As a
result, at this time there are no federal causes of action pending
before the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that considerations
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not affirmatively
justify
the
circumstances.
exercise
of
supplemental
jurisdiction
in
these
Although this case has been pending since May of
2008, the case is still in the early stages of litigation as
demonstrated by the fact that no answer has been filed and the
parties have not engaged in any discovery.
Furthermore, although
payments continue to be deducted from Plaintiff’s prison account,
19
Plaintiff did not file opposition to the present motion [Doc. No.
40] for summary judgment, nor to Defendant’s previous motion [Doc.
No. 27] to dismiss, which was originally filed in June of 2010.
Having declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court
dismisses any pending state law claims without prejudice.
V.
CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Defendant
Ennals’
Motion
for
summary judgment is granted. An Order consistent with this Opinion
will be entered.
Dated: November 15, 2011
At Camden, New Jersey
/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
20
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