KING v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
31
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 9/24/2012. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
MAURICE KING,
:
: Civil Action No. 08-2850 (NLH)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
O P I N I O N
:
PAUL M. SCHULTZ, Warden,
:
:
Respondent.
:
________________________________:
APPEARANCES:
Maurice King, Pro Se
19392-037
Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 1000
Cumberland, MD 21501
Paul A. Blaine
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
401 Market Street, 4th Fl.
Camden, NJ 08101
Attorney for Respondent
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner, Maurice King, a federal prisoner formerly
confined at the Federal Correctional Institution, Fairton, New
Jersey, and currently confined in Cumberland, Maryland, brings
this motion to reopen his case (docket entry 27), with respect to
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, and denied by this Court on September 4, 2009.
Respondent filed opposition to the motion (docket entry 28), to
which Petitioner replied (docket entry 29).
This motion is decided without oral argument pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons stated
below, the motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
In his initial habeas petition before this Court, filed on
or about June 9, 2008, Petitioner challenged the Bureau of
Prison's (“BOP”) calculation of his sentence.
This Court held
that:
In this case, Petitioner was in custody, but
serving a previously imposed 50–year sentence at the
time of his second sentence. Petitioner appears to
argue that his second sentence should have commenced
immediately, since he was already in custody on the
first sentence. However, the sentencing judge
specifically mandated that 96 months of the second
sentence be served consecutively to the first sentence.
Thus, it appears that the BOP's calculation of the
sentence was the only possible calculation, given the
sentencing judge's mandate.
Additionally, Petitioner argues that it would be
proper for his sentences to be aggregated. While
“[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run
consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for
administrative purposes as a single aggregate term of
imprisonment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), Petitioner's
argument that the two sentences be aggregated into a
single term fails, because the sentences were for
conduct that occurred before and after the November 1,
1987 effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act, and
thus, cannot be aggregated. See Pizarro v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 2005 WL 1177942 (D.N.J. May 18,
2005) (Simandle, J.) (explaining that “the Bureau's
policy for dealing with these conflicting [sentencing]
statutes is reasonable” and noting reasonableness in
the BOP's policy “given the conflicts.”); see also BOP
Program Statement 5880.28, p. 1–5 (“A sentence imposed
for an offense that occurred prior to November 1, 1987
(“old law” sentence) shall not be aggregated with a
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sentence imposed for an offense that occurred on or
after November 1, 1987 (SRA or “new law” sentence)”).
Furthermore, this Court notes that the BOP
calculation of the sentence ensures that the second
sentencing judge's mandate is followed, and that
Petitioner's custodial term is not interrupted.
Petitioner is not entitled to have the sentences run
concurrently, where there is no danger that he would
serve more than that correct total time. See Boston v.
Attorney General, 210 Fed. Appx. 190, 193 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing Free v. Miles, 333 F.3d 550, 554–55 (5th
Cir. 2003) (finding that serving sentence in two
time-separated segments was permissible when inmate
would be serving his consecutive sentence in the
overall correct amount of time)).
Finally, this Court is without power to second
guess the BOP's determination: the Court's mandate to
overrule the BOP's decision could be utilized only if
the Court determines that the BOP abused its
discretion. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.
Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed.2d 694 (1984). In other words, the
Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's
judgment. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States,
36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“a court must defer
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute
even if the court might have preferred another”); see
also Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States, 699 F.
Supp. 938, 942 (1988) (the court must sustain an
agency's determination if it is reasonable and
supported by the record “as a whole”).
King v. Schultz, 2009 WL 2905447 at *3 (D.N.J. 2009), 08-cv-2850
(NLH) (docket entry 16).
Petitioner appealed this Court’s decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
In an unpublished opinion, the
Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s decision, holding:
To evaluate the BOP's construction of the statute,
we first must determine if “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.” See Chevron,
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984); Stiver v. Meko, 130 F.3d 574, 577 (3d Cir.
1997) (quoting Chevron ). If Congress has directly
spoken on the issue with unambiguous*551 legislative
intent, we inquire no further; if, however, a statute
leaves a gap for an agency to fill, we will uphold the
agency's interpretation if the agency chooses a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that
were committed to its care by statute. Id. However, we
only give “some deference” to program statements (as
opposed to the greater deference awarded to regulations
under Chevron ) because the statements are merely
internal agency guidelines that the BOP may alter at
will. See id. at 578.
In this case, Congress called for aggregation of
“multiple terms of imprisonment” for “administrative
purposes.” There is a gap in the statute, which does
not explicitly require aggregation of terms from crimes
under different statutory schemes nor require
aggregation for the purpose of awarding good time
credit. Because of the ambiguities, the BOP could seek
to fill the gap with its program statement. And, in
light of the differences between how good time credits
are calculated under the two schemes, compare, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (repealed) with 18 U.S.C. §
3624(b)(1), (2), the BOP's interpretation that terms
should not be aggregated for adding or subtracting good
time earned is reasonable. By not aggregating the
sentences, the BOP is able to maintain the separate
rules for calculating the length of “old law” versus
“new law” sentences.
In short, we conclude that the District Court
properly denied King's petition because the BOP did not
err in calculating King's sentence in such a way as to
resolve a conflict between two statutory schemes and to
preserve the 96 months that King must serve
consecutively to his first federal sentence.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's
judgment.
King v. Schultz, 408 Fed. Appx. 548, 550-51 (3d Cir. Nov. 10,
2010) (unpubl.).
The Court of Appeals judgment was filed on
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November 10, 2011, with the mandate filed in this Court on
February 9, 2011.
Over a year later, on February 24, 2012, Petitioner now
files this motion to reopen his case, citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6).
He argues that this Court and Respondents overlooked
certain aspects of his case, and misinterpreted the law.
He
states: “As shown and argued above, Petitioner is asserting that
the court[‘]s previous ruling upon his § 2241 on the merits,
missed critical facts, and legal points of interest, that if
properly considered now would in all probability lead to a
different outcome judgment.”
(Motion, p. 11, docket entry 27).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s motion to reopen is another attempt to have his
case reconsidered.
In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil
Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration.
Bowers v.
Nat'l. Collegiate Athletics Ass'n., 130 F. Supp.2d 610, 612
(D.N.J. 2001).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek
reconsideration by the Court of matters “which [it] believes the
Court has overlooked” when it ruled on the motion.
L. Civ. R.
7.1(i); see NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance,
935 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.N.J. 1996).
The standard for reargument
is high and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.
United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994).
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See
The
movant has the burden of demonstrating either: “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability
of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its
order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.”
Max's Seafood Café v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N. River Ins.
Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration only where its
prior decision has overlooked a factual or legal issue that may
alter the disposition of the matter.
Compaction Sys. Corp., 88
F. Supp.2d at 345; see also L. Civ. R. 7.1(I).
“The word
‘overlooked’ is the operative term in the Rule.”
Bowers, 130 F.
Supp.2d at 612 (citation omitted); see also Compaction Sys.
Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d at 345.
Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration may address only
those matters of fact or issues of law which were presented to,
but not considered by, the court in the course of making the
decision at issue.
See SPIRG v. Monsanto Co., 727 F. Supp. 876,
878 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 891 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1989).
Thus,
reconsideration is not to be used as a means of expanding the
record to include matters not originally before the court.
Bowers, 130 F. Supp.2d at 613; Resorts Int'l. v. Greate Bay Hotel
and Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1992);
Egloff v. New Jersey Air National Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1279
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(D.N.J. 1988).
Absent unusual circumstances, a court should
reject new evidence which was not presented when the court made
the contested decision.
n.3.
See Resorts Int'l, 830 F. Supp. at 831
A party seeking to introduce new evidence on
reconsideration bears the burden of first demonstrating that
evidence was unavailable or unknown at the time of the original
hearing.
See Levinson v. Regal Ware, Inc., Civ. No. 89–1298,
1989 WL 205724 at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1989).
Moreover, L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) does not allow parties to
restate arguments which the court has already considered.
G–69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990).
See
Thus, a
difference of opinion with the court's decision should be dealt
with through the normal appellate process.
Bowers, 130 F.
Supp.2d at 612 (citations omitted); Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988); see
also Chicosky v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 979 F. Supp. 316, 318
(D.N.J. 1997); NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
935 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (“Reconsideration motions ...
may not be used to re-litigate old matters, or to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment.”).
In other words, “[a] motion for
reconsideration should not provide the parties with an
opportunity for a second bite at the apple.”
Tishcio v. Bontex,
Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998) (citation omitted).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that “the
court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding” on the grounds of:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it
is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Given the strong interest in the finality
of judgments, “relief from a judgment under Rule 60 should be
granted only in exceptional circumstances.”
Boughner v. Sec'y of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).
Here, Petitioner fails to provide any evidence to show that
this Court “overlooked” a factual or legal issue that may alter
the disposition of the matter, which is necessary for the Court
to entertain the motion for reconsideration.
Rather, Petitioner
merely restates his very same arguments addressed by this Court
in its September 4, 2009 Opinion, and by the Court of Appeals in
its November 10, 2010 Opinion.
Thus, it is evident that
Petitioner simply disagrees with this Court's ruling, and the
Third Circuit’s decision, and is seeking yet another bite at the
apple on this issue of a sentence construction.
Consequently, Petitioner fails to satisfy the threshold for
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granting a motion for reconsideration.
He has not presented the
Court with changes in controlling law, factual issues that were
overlooked, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law or
fact that would necessitate a different ruling in order to
prevent a manifest injustice.
He has already presented this case
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed this Court’s decision.
He may not use a motion for reconsideration to re-litigate a
matter that has been thoroughly adjudicated by this Court, as
well as the Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s
motion to reopen (docket entry 27) will be denied for lack of
merit.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: September 24, 2012
At Camden, New Jersey
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