SMITH et al v. GRANSDEN et al
Filing
176
OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph E. Irenas on 12/10/2012. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GARRESSA SMITH as
Administratrix and prosequendum
of the estate of Kashon Smith,
a minor, deceased,
HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-4517
(JEI/KMW)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
OFFICER DEAN GRANDSEN, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
RALPH A. POWELL, ESQUIRE PC
Ralph A. Powell, Esq.
1900 Knight Circle
Yardley, PA 19067
Counsel for Plaintiff
PAUL, REICH & MYERS, P.C.
Richard P. Myers, Esq.
1608 Walnut Street, Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Plaintiff
TAYLOR AND JAY, LLC
Stuart W. Jay
20 East Centre Street
Woodbury, NJ 08096
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Frampton
IRENAS, Senior District Judge:
Following a ten-day trial, on October 19, 2012, the jury
returned a verdict of no cause for Defendants Dean Gransden and
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Jeffrey Frampton in an action brought by Plaintiff Garressa
Smith alleging that the Defendants violated the constitutional
rights of her son, Kashon Smith.
The jury found that Gransden
did not “violate[] Kashon Smith’s constitutional right not to be
subjected to excessive force” and was not “deliberately
indifferent to Kashon Smith’s risk of serious medical harm.”
The jury also found that Frampton was not “deliberately
indifferent to Kashon Smith’s risk of serious medical harm [nor]
did he cause other City of Camden police officers to be
deliberately indifferent to that risk.”
Presently before the
Court is Plaintiff’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law or, in the alternative, a new trial, solely with respect to
Defendant Frampton.
For the reasons set forth within,
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.
The Court will provide a short summary of the facts
presented to the jury in reaching their verdict, focusing on
those pertinent to Plaintiff’s claims against Frampton.
On
December 21, 2007, Plaintiff’s son, Kashon Smith, was shot two
times by Defendant Gransden outside 200 Pfeiffer Street, Camden,
NJ.
Kashon died just after midnight on December 22, 2007.
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After the shooting occurred, several Camden City police
officers responded, including Defendant Frampton, who was the
first supervisor to arrive at the scene.
scene supervisor.
Frampton was the crime
When he arrived, Frampton saw Gransden
handcuffing Kashon Smith’s hands behind his back while Kashon
lay face down on the ground.
The scene where the shooting took place was chaotic.
In
addition to a crowd of between 50 to 100 area residents,
approximately 42 law enforcement officers and medical personnel
were present at the scene.
and screaming.
Many of the residents were yelling
Further, members of Kashon’s family were trying
to reach him and had to be physically restrained by police
officers.
At the same time, the officers were trying to seal
off the crime scene and preserve evidence.
Because of the large
number of people there, Frampton requested that more officers be
sent to the scene.
When Frampton arrived at 200 Pfeiffer Street, Kashon was
conscious.
Frampton knew that Kashon had been shot and could
see him moving and moaning.
Frampton observed that Kashon was
breathing the entire time between when he arrived and when the
paramedics arrived.
During this period, Frampton did not
provide any first aid to Kashon, did he touch Kashon, and did
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not order any other officer to provide first aid to Kashon.
In
fact, none of the Camden police officers provided aid to Kashon.
At trial, there was conflicting testimony from the
paramedics who responded to the shooting.
One paramedic, Brian
Rowe, testified that Kashon was breathing normally when he
arrived and that he did not see any obstructions in Kashon’s
airway.
According to Rowe, Kashon’s condition and breathing did
not change from the time Rowe first examined him until his
arrival at Cooper University Hospital.
Although Rowe testified
that he tried to intubate Kashon, he later clarified that an
intubation was not necessary to insure that Kashon was breathing
but rather would have acted as a preventative measure should
Kashon’s airways have become obstructed.
The other paramedic, Marilyn Rodriguez, testified that
Kashon was lying face down in mulch, that his airway was blocked
with dirt and mulch, and that he was having difficulty
breathing.
She further stated that she had to clear his airways
and provide him with oxygen manually.
Contrary to Rowe’s
testimony, Rodriguez said that Smith was breathing minimally in
the ambulance.
Both paramedics agreed that Kashon’s handcuffs remained on
while he was in the ambulance and that no police officer
accompanied the paramedics in the ambulance when they
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transported Kashon to the hospital.
The City of Camden had a
policy that required a police officer to accompany an arrestee
in an ambulance, but that policy was not followed.
Instead,
police officers met the ambulance at the hospital, and Kashon’s
handcuffs were removed soon after he arrived there.
According to Dr. Edward S. Chmara, the forensic pathologist
who conducted Kashon’s autopsy, Kashon died from the two gunshot
wounds.
Dr. Chmara further noted that there was no evidence of
asphyxiation nor was there any evidence that Kashon’s airways
had been blocked.
Plaintiff, Garressa Smith, filed this suit, alleging that
Defendant Gransden used excessive force when he shot Kashon.
She also alleged that both Gransden and Frampton were
deliberately indifferent to Kashon’s medical needs and that
Frampton was liable for the deliberate indifference of other
Camden police officers.
The jury returned a verdict of no cause
for both defendants on all counts.
Smith has filed this post-trial motion seeking judgment as
a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial solely with
respect to her claims against Defendant Frampton.
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II.
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because the evidence presented at trial
established that Frampton was deliberately indifferent to
Kashon’s serious medical needs.
She further argues that
Frampton was deliberately indifferent because he failed to have
an officer accompany Kashon to the hospital in violation of the
Camden Police Department policy.
In the alternative, Plaintiff
argues that the verdict against Frampton was against the great
weight of evidence and that she is entitled to a new trial.
A trial court should grant judgment as a matter of law
“only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which
a jury could reasonably find liability.”
Lightning Lube v.
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).
The court is not
permitted to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for that of
the jury, in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain the verdict.
Id.
“The motion may be granted if ‘the
record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of
evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.’”
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Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
166 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28 (D.N.J. 2001).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 governs the grant of a
new trial in an action where there has been a trial before a
jury.
The rule provides that a new trial may be granted “for
any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been
granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
Generally, a trial court should grant a
motion for a new trial only when “in the opinion of the trial
court, the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the
evidence, thus making a new trial necessary to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.”
Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d
715, 736 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing 9 Charles Wright & Arthur
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2531, at 575-76 (1971)).
A trial court may not grant a new trial because it would have
come to a different conclusion than that reached by the jury.
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 802 F. Supp. 1180, 1186
(D.N.J. 1992).
Based on the evidence presented at trial, these standards
are not met.
First, the jury reasonably could have found that
Defendant Frampton’s actions did not cause any harm to Kashon.
According to one paramedic, Brian Rowe, Kashon was breathing
normally when Rowe arrived at the scene and continued to do so
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while he was transported to the hospital.
Rowe also testified
that, although no officer accompanied Kashon in the ambulance,
Kashon’s handcuffs were removed almost immediately after he
arrived at the hospital by officers who had followed the
ambulance there.
In addition, Dr. Chmara testified that the two
gunshot wounds were the cause of death.
He further testified
that Kashon’s airways were free from dirt, mulch, and mucus and
that there was no evidence of asphyxiation.
The jury also could have found that Frampton was not
deliberately indifferent given the chaos and activity at the
scene.
Frampton was the crime scene supervisor and was thus
responsible for securing the scene.
Several witnesses testified
that a large crowd formed shortly after the shooting, with many
of the people yelling and screaming.
Members of the crowd,
including Plaintiff, tried to push closer to Kashon, and the
officers on the scene had to hold them back to preserve the
crime scene and any evidence there.
Rowe testified that the
paramedics tried to remove Kashon as quickly as possible because
the scene was not safe.
In addition, Defendants’ expert,
Emanuel Kapelsohn testified that in such situations, the
officers would have had to split their attention between the
volatile crowd and Kashon.
He noted that the crowd constituted
an “exigent circumstance” that could have kept Frampton from
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turning Kashon over.
In light of this testimony, the jury
reasonably could have found that Frampton was not deliberately
indifferent.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion will be
denied.
An appropriate order accompanies this Opinion.
Date: December 10, 2012
/s/ Joseph E. Irenas________
Joseph E. Irenas, S.U.S.D.J.
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