HUNTER v. FILIP
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 35 Motion to Alter Judgment. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/15/2011. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARLA W. HUNTER,
Civil No. 09-758 (NLH/KMW)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
MARK FILIP, Acting Attorney
General, U.S. Department of
Justice,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Dennis L. Friedman, Esquire
1515 Market Street
Suite 714
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1907
Attorney for Plaintiff
John Andrew Ruymann, Esquire
Office of the U.S. Attorney
402 East State Street
Suite 430
Trenton, N.J. 08608
Attorney for Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Marla
Hunter's motion [Doc. No. 35] to amend findings of fact and
judgment, or in the alternative, a motion for reconsideration.
Although titled a motion to amend findings of fact and judgment,
Plaintiff's motion clearly seeks reconsideration of the Court's
April 26, 2011 Opinion and Order [Doc. Nos. 33, 34] granting
summary judgment for Defendant.
(Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Findings of
Fact & J., or in the Alternative, Mot. for Recons. [Doc. No. 351] (hereinafter, "Pl.'s Mot. for Recons."), 1).
The Court has
considered the parties submissions, and decides this matter
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiff's motion is
denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
In this action, Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated
from her employment with the United States Bureau of Prisons in
retaliation for Plaintiff filing an Equal Employment Opportunity
discrimination complaint, in violation of Title VII.1
Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 26, 27, 32, 36-37.)
(Pl.'s
Plaintiff also seeks
review of the administrative record which culminated in the
affirmance of her termination by the Merit System Protection
Board ("MSPB"), and alleges that the decision to terminate her
must be set aside because it was arbitrary and capricious,
procedurally flawed, and unsupported by substantial evidence.
(Id. ¶ 38.)
By Opinion and Order dated April 26, 2011, the Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
Specifically,
1. At the time of her termination, Plaintiff was employed at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey. (Pl.’s
Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14 .) Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity
complaint alleged discrimination related to Plaintiff’s
employment at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton,
New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.)
2
the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case for retaliation under Title VII because the record was
insufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that there was a
causal connection between Plaintiff's protected activity and her
termination. (Op. [Doc. No. 33] 11-13, Apr. 26, 2011) (noting
that Plaintiff was terminated from a different facility
approximately five years after her original Equal Employment
Opportunity complaint and that Plaintiff failed to allege any
facts illustrating antagonism, animosity, or retaliatory animus).
Although the Court concluded that Plaintiff had not met her
burden to establish a prima facie case for retaliation, the Court
assumed for the purposes of argument that such a showing was made
and went on to consider whether Defendant had articulated a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
termination.
(Id. at 13.)
The Court examined Defendant’s
asserted reasons for terminating Plaintiff: namely that Plaintiff
was terminated based on a series of impermissible communications
Plaintiff had with an inmate and his family, Plaintiff’s
dissemination of sensitive Bureau of Prisons information, and
Plaintiff’s failure to report these communications.
15.)
(Id. at 13-
After noting that Plaintiff admitted her misconduct, the
Court determined that Defendant articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s termination.
16.)
(Id. at 15-
Furthermore, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to
3
"set forth ample evidence, as a matter of law, to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to pretext."
(Id. at 13; see
also id. at 17) ("given [Plaintiff's] misconduct and the
reasonableness of [the termination] findings, [Plaintiff's]
objections to those findings are insufficient to demonstrate a
pretext sufficient to suggest retaliatory animus.")
Thus, the
Court found that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
(Id. at 19.)
Finally, the Court granted Defendant summary judgment on
Plaintiff's non-discrimination claim seeking to set aside the
Bureau of Prisons’ decision regarding Plaintiff's termination.
The Court determined that the decisions upholding Plaintiff's
termination made by both the arbitrator and the MSPB were
"reasonable and sufficiently supported by the record."
23.)
(Id. at
After carefully considering Plaintiff's arguments, the
Court concluded that "the decision to terminate was not arbitrary
or capricious, achieved through improper procedures, or
predicated upon either a discriminatory basis, or alternatively,
a total absence of evidence."
(Id. at 27.)
Thus, the Court
found that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s non-discrimination claim and affirmed the decision of
the MSPB.
II.
(Id.)
STANDARD
In this district, motions for reconsideration are governed
4
by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i),2 which provides in relevant part,
that "[a] motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed
within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the
original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge."
7.1(i).
L. CIV . R.
Rule 7.1(i) further provides that the party moving for
reconsideration must submit a "brief setting forth concisely the
matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the
Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked[.]"
L. CIV . R. 7.1(i).
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 7.1(i) is "'an extremely
limited procedural vehicle,' and requests pursuant to th[is]
rule[] are to be granted 'sparingly.'"
Langan Eng'g & Envtl.
Servs., Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 07-2983, 2008 WL 4330048,
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (citing P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt.
2. While Plaintiff filed the present motion as a motion to amend
findings of fact and judgment, presumably made pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the motion clearly seeks
reconsideration of the Court's April 26, 2011 Opinion and Order
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and is therefore
governed by Local Rule 7.1. See Byrne v. Calastro, No. 05-CV-68,
2006 WL 2506722, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006) ("Although Rule 59
allows for a judgment to be altered, there is no express
provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a judicial
decision to be reconsidered. However, in this District, Local
Rule 7.1([i]) creates a specific procedure by which a party may,
within [14] days of the entry of an order, ask either a District
Judge, or a Magistrate Judge, to take a second look at any
decision 'upon showing that dispositive factual matters or
controlling decisions of law were overlooked by the court in
reaching its prior decision.' Consequently, Local Rule 7.1([i])
of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than Rule 59 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governs motions for
reconsideration filed in the District of New Jersey.") (citing
United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345
(D.N.J. 1999)) (additional internal citations omitted).
5
LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.J. 1992)).
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration "'is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.'"
Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
In seeking reconsideration, the moving party bears a heavy burden
and the motion can only be granted if the party "shows at least
one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was
not available when the court granted the motion for summary
judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice."
Id.
However, reconsideration is not appropriate where the motion
only raises a party's disagreement with the Court's initial
decision.
Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
680 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Schiano v. MBNA
Corp., No. 05-CV-1771, 2006 WL 3831225, *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2006)
("Mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that
the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law, ..., and
should be dealt with through the normal appellate process[.]")
(citations omitted); United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88
F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Mere disagreement with a
court's decision normally should be raised through the appellate
process and is inappropriate on a motion for
6
[reconsideration].").
Accordingly, "courts in this District
routinely deny motions for reconsideration that simply re-argue
the original motion."
Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
No. 04-2355, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
In the present motion, Plaintiff argues that reconsideration
is necessary "to correct a clear error of law and fact and to
prevent manifest injustice."
(Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. 1.)
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that reconsideration of the
Court's April 26, 2011 Opinion and Order is warranted on the
following grounds: (1) the Court "essentially adopted
[D]efendant's factual assertions and analysis without considering
material, factual assertions made by" Plaintiff; (2) the Court
"failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to
[Plaintiff] and to draw all reasonable inferences from those
facts in [Plaintiff's] favor"; (3) in weighing the facts, the
Court "totally ignored material evidence proffered by
[Plaintiff]" and inferences from such evidence; (4) the Court
"wholly embraced and adopted the factual allegations of ... the
terminating official, as true and not subject to credibility
assessments by a fact-finder"; and (5) the Court "impermissibly
determined that the factual allegations of [the terminating
official] standing alone and unsupported by independent evidence
from disinterested sources, constituted facts not in genuine
7
dispute."
(Id. at 1-2.)
Plaintiff further contends that the Court made several
errors in the April 26, 2011 Opinion, including: (1) "inject[ing]
[its] own personal opinions and ... engag[ing] in overreaching"
by assessing evidence and making credibility determinations; (2)
failing to reference whether any evidence presented a triable
issue of fact; (3) failing to address conflicting evidence; and
(4) failing to address issues of fact not in dispute.
3.)
(Id. at
Plaintiff contends that the Court simply "relied on [the]
opinion evidence from the [terminating official] whose motivation
was the prime issue in the case."
(Id.)
Plaintiff also argues
that the Court "applied the wrong standard for analyzing summary
judgment."
(Id. at 4.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration should be denied on the basis that it is untimely
by fourteen (14) days.
(Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s
Mot. for Recons. [Doc. No. 36] (hereinafter, "Def.'s Opp'n"), 6.)
Defendant notes that Plaintiff filed her motion for
reconsideration on May 24, 2011, twenty-eight (28) days after the
Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
(Id.)
Thus, Defendant argues the motion for reconsideration can be
denied on that basis alone.
(Id. at 5-6.)
Furthermore,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's motion does not meet the
standard for reconsideration under Local Rule 7.1(i) and should
8
be denied because it "amount[s] to nothing more than disagreement
with the Court's decision."
(Id. at 6.)
Finally, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's motion fails to "establish that the Court
overlooked any fact or legal issue that would alter the Court's
decision."
(Id.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration should be denied because the Court "considered
all of the arguments and facts presented by the parties,
correctly decided [the] Motion for Summary Judgment in accordance
with well settled precedents and did not overlook dispositive
fact or law."
(Id. 6-7.)
In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's opposition lacks
substance and is "devoid of any discussion of the specific
factual allegations raised by [P]laintiff."
No. 37] 1.)
(Pl.'s Reply [Doc.
Thus, Plaintiff argues that Defendant "has admitted
that [P]laintiff ... identified numerous factual disputes that
the Court simply did not address."
(Id.)
The remainder of
Plaintiff's reply continues to allege generally that the Court
failed, among other things, to draw reasonable inferences in
favor of Plaintiff, to conduct a rigorous analysis of Defendant's
statement of material facts not in dispute, and to address
Plaintiff's challenges to those "facts."
(Id. at 2.)
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff's motion was filed
on May 24, 2011, twenty-eight (28) days after the Court entered
the April 26, 2011 Opinion and Order granting summary judgment.
9
Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is untimely and
could be denied on that basis alone.
See, e.g., Oriakhi v.
Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-264, 2009 WL 1874199, at *3 (D.N.J.
June 29, 2009) ("An untimely filed motion for reconsideration
'may be denied for that reason alone.'") (citing Morris v.
Siemens Components, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D.N.J. 1996));
Garrison v. Porch, No. 04-1114, 2008 WL 1744730, at *2 (D.N.J.,
Apr. 11, 2008) ("[A] district court may deny a motion for
reconsideration simply because it was filed beyond the [14] days
provided by Rule 7.1(i).") (citing U.S. ex rel. Malloy v.
Telephonics Corp., 68 F. App'x 270, 274 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Although Plaintiff's motion is untimely, the Court does not
deny the motion on that basis, and will consider whether
Plaintiff has meet the standard for reconsideration.
Plaintiff
does not assert that reconsideration is warranted because of an
intervening change in the controlling law or the availability of
new evidence which was not available when the Court granted
summary judgment.
In this case, Plaintiff relies solely on the
argument that reconsideration is necessary to "correct a clear
error of law and fact and to prevent manifest injustice."
Mot. for Recons. 1.)
(Pl.'s
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s present motion
reiterates the entirety of her original sixty-eight (68)
paragraph revised, amended counter-statement of material facts
submitted in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary
10
judgment.
(Compare Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. 6-16, with Pl.'s
Revised Am. Counter-Statement of Material Facts [Doc. No. 31] 114.)
Plaintiff sets forth in bold approximately thirty-one (31)
of these paragraphs which Plaintiff contends are factual
allegations that the Court failed to include in its summary
judgment analysis.
(Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. 6-16.)
However,
Plaintiff's motion does not provide a sufficient explanation of
how these factual allegations were allegedly overlooked by the
Court or how they would have altered the Court’s analysis.
Moreover, having reviewed these specific factual allegations
again, the Court finds that these allegations were fully
considered in the Court's April 26, 2011 Opinion.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion fails
to set "forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions
which" Plaintiff believes the Court overlooked.
7.1(i).
See L. CIV. R.
It is clear that the present motion for reconsideration
simply represents Plaintiff's disagreement with the Court's
initial decision and constitutes an attempt to re-argue the same
exact factual allegations considered on summary judgment.
Plaintiff’s disagreement alone is insufficient to establish that
the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law in
granting summary judgment for Defendant.
See Schiano, 2006 WL
3831225, *2 ("Mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice
to show that the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling
11
law, ..., and should be dealt with through the normal appellate
process[.]") (citations omitted).
Furthermore, denial of
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is appropriate given that
the motion simply re-argues the same contentions asserted by
Plaintiff in opposition to Defendant’s original motion for
summary judgment.
See Altana Pharma AG, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1.
In light of the recognition in this District that a motion for
reconsideration is "an extremely limited procedural vehicle" and
that such requests should be granted "sparingly", the Court finds
that Plaintiff fails to meet the standard for reconsideration,
and the motion for reconsideration must be denied.
See Langan,
2008 WL 4330048, at *1.
Accordingly,
IT IS on this
15th
day of
December
, 2011, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion [Doc. No. 35] is DENIED.
/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
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