CONNOR v. SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
Filing
51
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 2/23/2012. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GAIL A. CONNOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.
09-cv-1140 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
STEPHEN R. BOSIN
70 GRAND AVENUE
RIVER EDGE, NJ 07661-0201
Attorney for Plaintiff Gail A. Connor
IVAN R. NOVICH
EDWARDS, ANGELL, PALMER & DODGE, LLP
ONE GIRALDA FARMS
MADISON, NJ 07940
Attorney for Defendant PNC Corp. & Affiliates Long Term
Disability Plan
HILLMAN, District Judge
Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s
fees.
Plaintiff’s motion will be granted in part and denied in
part and the requested fee reduced as set forth below.
I.
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts were stated at length in the
Court’s previous opinion and will not be repeated here, except in
pertinent part.
See Connor v. Sedgwick Claims Management
Services, Inc., 796 F.Supp.2d 568, 570-75 (D.N.J. 2011) (granting
in part and denying in part plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment).
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking reinstatement of
her long term disability (“LTD”) benefits governed by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq..
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that defendant’s termination of her LTD benefits was
arbitrary and capricious because defendant: (1) failed to comply
with ERISA’s notice provisions, (2) resorted to ‘cherry picking’
to affirm its decision, (3) failed to consider the decision of
the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) granting plaintiff
disability benefits, (4) failed to consider the side effects of
plaintiff’s prescription medication and Dr. Burnstein’s diagnosis
of rhupus, (5) had no reasonable basis to conclude plaintiff was
no longer disabled, (6) required plaintiff to prove her
disability by objective evidence and (7) unreasonably relied on
the biased opinions of Drs. Payne and Lumpkins.
The Court agreed
with plaintiff regarding factors (1) through (5), but found for
defendant regarding factors (6) and (7).
Id. at 580-90.1
The
Court then weighed the factors together and determined that
defendant’s decision to deny benefits was not the product of
reasoned decision-making and substantial evidence.
1
Id. at 590
The Court combined factors (2) and (5) in its earlier
opinion. Id. at 583 n.35.
2
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court found that the
irregularities and errors gave the Court reason to doubt
defendant’s fiduciary neutrality, and therefore, concluded that
defendant’s improper termination of plaintiff’s benefits was an
abuse of discretion.
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorney’s fees.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
502(g)(1) of ERISA
Pursuant to 502(g)(1) of ERISA, a District Court has
discretion to award attorney’s fees to either party.
See 29
U.S.C.A. § 1132; Tomasko v. Ira H. Weinstock, P.C., 357 Fed.Appx.
472, 475 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Section 502(g)(1) of ERISA provides
that a district court ‘in its discretion may allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.’”).
The fees
claimaint need not be the “prevailing party,” but must show “some
degree of success on the merits” before a court may award
attorney’s fees.
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130
S.Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010).
“A claimant does not satisfy that
requirement by achieving trivial success on the merits or a
purely procedural victor[y], but does satisfy it if the court can
fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the
merits without conducting a lengthy inquir[y] into the question
whether a particular party’s success was substantial or occurred
on a central issue.”
Id. (citations and internal quotations
3
omitted).
Based on plaintiff’s success in being awarded summary
judgment in part on grounds that defendant: (1) failed to comply
with ERISA’s notice provisions, (2) resorted to ‘cherry picking’
to affirm its decision, (3) failed to consider the decision of
the SSA granting plaintiff disability benefits, (4) failed to
consider the side effects of plaintiff’s prescription medication
and Dr. Burnstein’s diagnosis of rhupus, and (5) had no
reasonable basis to conclude plaintiff was no longer disabled,
plaintiff has shown the requisite “some degree of success on the
merits” warranting an award attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1).
See Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2158 (finding plaintiff achieved far more
than “trivial success on the merits” or a “purely procedural
victory” even though district court denied summary judgment on
benefits claim but remanded claim for further consideration due
to evidence that the plan administrator failed to comply with
ERISA guidelines and that plaintiff did not get the kind of
review to which she was entitled).
Prior the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardt, courts in
this district applied a five factor test to determine the award
of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases.
See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines,
719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff argues that pursuant
to the decision in Hardt, it is no longer necessary to apply the
five factor test outlined by the Third Circuit in Ursic.
4
The
Court agrees.
See Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2158 (finding that the
five factor test bears “no obvious relation to § 1132(g)(1)’s
text or to our fee-shifting jurisprudence,” and stating that
application of the test is not “required for channeling a court’s
discretion when awarding fees under this section.”).
However,
the Supreme Court noted that, after meeting the “some degree of
success on the merits” test, a court may also consider the five
factor test.
Id. at 2158 n.8 (citing Quesinberry v. Life Ins.
Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1029 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Since both plaintiff and defendant addressed the five factors in
their briefs, and since the Court finds that consideration of the
factors provides some guidance to our decision on whether to
award attorney’s fees, we shall address each of the five factors.
See Hewel v. Long Term Disability Income Plan for Choices
Eligible Employees, No. 09-5343, 2010 WL 2710582, at *2 (D.N.J.
July 7, 2010) (“In exercising its discretion under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(g), the Court need not expressly evaluate the Ursic factors,
but rather is free to consider any factors that it deems relevant
in exercising its discretion.”).
B.
Ursic Five Factor Test
The five factor test requires consideration of: (1) the
offending parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of
the offending parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3)
the deterrent effect of an award of attorneys’ fees against the
5
offending parties; (4) the benefit conferred on members of the
pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the
parties’ positions.
Ursic, 719 F.2d at 673.
The first factor weighs against defendant.
The Court
found defendant’s conduct to be culpable because it: (1) reversed
its initial decision that plaintiff was disabled and terminated
her benefits without receiving any additional medical evidence
that differed from the evidence it previously considered; (2)
failed to address plaintiff’s rhupus diagnosis and the decision
of the SSA awarding plaintiff SSD benefits; and (3) failed to
comply with ERISA’s notice requirements under § 503.
Connor, 796
F.Supp.2d at 590; see also McPherson v. Employees’ Pension Plan
of American Re-Insurance Co., Inc., 33 F.3d 253, 256-57 (3d Cir.
1994) (“In a civil context, culpable conduct is commonly
understood to mean conduct that is “blameable; censurable; ... at
fault; involving the breach of a legal duty or the commission of
a fault.... Such conduct normally involves something more than
simple negligence.... [On the other hand, it] implies that the
act or conduct spoken of is reprehensible or wrong, but not that
it involves malice or a guilty purpose.”) (citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).
The second factor is uncontested as defendant admits
that it has the ability to pay an award of attorney’s fees.
third factor weighs against defendant.
6
The
The award of attorney’s
fees would serve to deter the types of actions that the Court
found to be culpable on the part of the defendant, and support
compliance with notice requirements and consideration of all
available and relevant medical evidence in the future.
The
fourth factor also weighs against defendant because the members
of the pension plan would receive a common benefit if defendant
were to be deterred from future culpable conduct.
Also, the
facts in this case are not so particular to plaintiff that other
plan members would not benefit from defendant’s future compliance
with all notice requirements and consideration of all available
and relevant medical evidence.
Finally, after assessing the relative merits of the
parties’ position, the fifth factor weighs against defendant.
Although the Court denied plaintiff’s claims that defendant’s
termination of her LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious
because defendant required plaintiff to prove her disability by
objective evidence and because defendant relied on the opinions
of Drs. Payne and Lumpkins, the Court ultimately found in favor
of plaintiff.
Specifically, the Court gave significant weight to
plaintiff’s claims that defendant reversed its initial decision
of disability and terminated plaintiff’s benefits without
receiving any additional medical evidence that differed from the
evidence it previously considered, that defendant failed to
address plaintiff’s rhupus diagnosis and the decision of the SSA
7
awarding plaintiff SSD benefits, and that defendant failed to
comply with ERISA’s notice requirements under § 503.
A
comparison of the relative merits of the party’s positions
reveals that plaintiff’s position has more merit.2
Accordingly, application of the five factor test weighs
in favor of an award of attorney’s fees.
C.
Reasonableness of Fee Award
In her motion for attorney’s fees, plaintiff requests
that the Court award attorney’s fees at the hourly rate of $375,
for 169.5 hours worked for total fees in the amount of
$63,562.50.3
In her reply to defendant’s opposition to the
motion for attorney’s fees, plaintiff’s counsel submitted an
additional affidavit requesting an additional 15.75 hours for
preparing the reply brief.
In sum, plaintiff requests an award
of 185.25 hours at the rate of $375 per hour for a total of
$69,468.75, plus costs in the amount of $350.
Defendant argues that if the Court rules that plaintiff
is entitled to attorney’s fees, that the Court should reduce the
fee award because the hourly rate and number of hours billed is
unreasonable.
Defendant argues that since plaintiff’s retainer
2
The Court notes that the Hardt test is not unlike the
fifth factor under the Ursic test.
3
Plaintiff’s counsel’s first affidavit incorrectly
states the total fee amount as $63,652.20. It appears that
counsel transposed the six and five.
8
agreement with her attorney limited his fee to $3,415 that the
Court should only award that amount.
Defendant further argues
that plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate of $375 is not reasonable,
that plaintiff’s counsel billed for clerical tasks, and that his
total number of hours is grossly inflated.
Defendant provides no legal support for his argument
that plaintiff’s counsel’s fee award under ERISA should be
limited to the amount provided in a retainer agreement.
no such requirement under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
There is
Accordingly,
defendant’s request to reduce counsel’s fee on this ground is
denied.
1.
Hourly Rate
With regard to the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly
rate of $375, the Court finds that plaintiff has not provided
adequate support that such a rate is reflective of the prevailing
market rates in the community.
Plaintiff submitted the affidavit
of Michael E. Quiat, Esquire, of Uscher, Quiat, Uscher & Russo,
in Hackensack, New Jersey, who stated that colleagues who
practice in the States of New York and New Jersey have been
awarded legal fees in ERISA claims at hourly rates between $375
and $495 per hour.
Mr. Quiat states that the hourly rate of $375
is reasonable and consistent with the current market for legal
services in ERISA benefits litigation in the NY/NJ metropolitan
area.
Plaintiff also cites to Howley v. Mellon Financial Corp.,
9
No. 06-5992, 2011 WL 2600664, at *5 (D.N.J. June 27, 2011)
involving an ERISA case in which the Court found that hourly
rates of $425 for the named partner, $400 for of-counsel, and
$350 for an associate were consistent with the prevailing rates.
Both the Quiat affidavit and Howley case, however,
refer to rates in the New York or northern New Jersey legal
market.
The rates in southern New Jersey, where counsel and
where this Court is located, have been found to be lower.
See
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79
L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (the reasonable hourly rate is to be
calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the
relevant community).
Recently, the prevailing market rate in
southern New Jersey has been found to be $250.
See L.J. ex rel.
V.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 373 Fed.Appx. 294, 298 (3d Cir.
2010) (affirming reduction in attorney’s billing rate to $250 in
IDEA case because $400 per hour was not a reasonable billing rate
in the south New Jersey market); D’Orazio v. Washington Tp., No.
07–5097, 2011 WL 6717427, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2011) (finding
the maximum reasonable hourly rate in southern New Jersey to be
$250 in civil rights and employment litigation case).4
Accordingly, the prevailing hourly attorney billing
4
There is no evidence suggesting that an ERISA case is
inherently more complex than an IDEA, civil rights or employment
litigation case.
10
rate in the southern New Jersey market is $250.5
See id.
Therefore, counsel’s hourly rate will be set at $250.
2.
Clerical Time Entries
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s counsel billed 26.0
hours for work spent doing clerical or routine tasks.
Specifically, defendant requests that the following entries be
stricken:
3.26.09
Draft waiver of service of summons
and letter to Sedgwick serving complaint
1.75
4.30.09
File amended complaint
0.75
9.06.10
Select and locate and copy exhibits in
support of motion for summary judgment
4.25
Select and locate additional documents in
support of motion for summary judgment
3.00
Draft certification of exhibits in
support of motion for summary judgment
3.00
9.07.10
9.10.10
12.75
Defendant further requests that the following entries be reduced
by fifty percent (50%) due the clerical nature of the task:
4.28.09
5.01.09
Draft amended complaint substituting
PNC Corp for Sedwick
1.75
Serve amended complaint upon counsel for
PNC
0.75
5
Plaintiff has also submitted a 2004 opinion and order from
a Magistrate Judge in this District in which plaintiff’s counsel
was specifically awarded fees at an hourly rate of $300 in an
ERISA case. The Magistrate Judge, however, was not located in
the Camden vicinage in southern New Jersey and, thus more likely
familiar with the prevailing rates in the northern New Jersey
market rather than southern New Jersey.
11
9.14.09
Review motion to appear pro hac vice
0.50
9.17.09
Review scheduling order entered by
Magistrate Judge Donio
0.25
File motion for summary judgment via ECF
and send courtesy copy to Judge Hillman
0.75
9.30.10
4.00
As the above table indicates, the specific entries
challenged by defendant only add up to 16.75 hours6 (12.75 hours
plus 4.00 hours), not 26.0 hours.
Defendant does not provide any
objection to any specific time entries for the remaining 9.25
hours.
See Bell v. United Princeton Prop., Inc., 884 F.2d 713,
714 (3d Cir. 1989) (the burden is on the party seeking a special
adjustment to the lodestar amount); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892
F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).
Although plaintiff’s counsel states that he disagrees
with defendant’s objection that the time entries were clerical,
he does not provide any argument in opposition and merely states
that he “will leave it to the judgment of this Court to delete
6
Although specific as to description and time entry,
defendant failed to include the date of entry for the Court’s
consideration. Defendant did include a copy of plaintiff’s
counsel’s time entries with various dates circled, but there is
no cross reference to defendant’s objection and the particular
dated time entries. For the disputed clerical time entries, the
Court was able to determine what date defendant was referring to
based on defendant’s description of the time entry, but defendant
failed to provide any specific description for the remaining
disputed time entries. In the future, counsel is advised to
provide the specific detail as set forth in this Opinion.
12
compensation.”
Accordingly, the Court will grant defendant’s
unopposed objection to the above time entries and will reduce
counsel’s fee by 14.75 hours (deletion of 12.75 hours and
reduction of the 4.00 hours by 50% to 2.00 hours).
Defendant also objects that plaintiff’s counsel did not
delegate any tasks to a paralegal who would bill his or her time
at a lower rate.
Again, defendants utterly fail to provide the
Court with complete information leaving the Court to decipher
what entries are subject to reduction.
Nevertheless, the Court
has identified the following entries as those which plaintiff’s
counsel should have delegated to a paralegal or junior associate:
.507
02.23.09
Review administrative record
02.25.09
Review administrative record
4.00
02.27.09
Review administrative record
4.75
03.01.09
Prepare factual outline of
administrative record
4.00
Prepare draft of complaint
and send to client to review
2.008
03.12.09
Draft civil cover sheet
0.759
05.04.09
Review return of executed
service of summons and file
proof of service
0.50
03.10.09
7
The Court has allocated .50 hours out of 2.5 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
8
The Court has allocated 2.0 hours out of 2.25 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
9
The Court has allocated .75 hours out of 2.75 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
13
07.30.09
Legal research for authority
supporting discovery
2.0010
Draft and serve plaintiff’s
first set of interrogatories
2.7511
Legal research re: motion
for discovery beyond
administrative record
3.00
11.12.09
Prepare first draft of brief
4.00
11.13.09
Revise first draft of brief
3.00
11.30.09
Draft reply in response to
defendant’s response to
plaintiff’s opposition to
seal the record
2.00
Legal research re: summary
judgment, etc.
3.00
Legal research re: failure
to consider impact of
SSA decision
2.75
Draft notice of motion for
summary judgment, proposed
form of order, and
certificate of service
2.00
Complete first draft of
brief
5.00
Send draft to client to
review and comment
1.00
10.02.09
11.11.09
8.26.10
8.27.10
09.13.10
09.23.10
09.26.10
11.02.10
Review defendant’s statement
of uncontested facts, and
memorandum in support of
defendant’s cross motion for
10
The Court has allocated 2.0 hours out of 2.50 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
11
The Court has allocated 2.75 hours out of 3.75 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
14
summary judgment and motion to
seal the record
3.0012
11.04.10
Draft response to defendant’s
statement of undisputed
material facts
4.00
11.06.10
Complete response to
defendant’s statement of
undisputed material facts
4.0013
Draft portions of reply
memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment
4.0014
Draft portions of reply
memorandum
4.0015
Complete draft of reply
memorandum and forward to
client, review application
for a protective order
4.0016
11.07.10
11.08.10
11.09.10
11.11.10
Draft and file response to
defendant’s request to seal
the entire administrative
record; file reply memorandum
of law and response to
defendant’s statement of
uncontested facts
1.5017
12
The Court has allocated 3.0 hours out of 4.0 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
13
The Court has allocated 4.0 hours out of 5.0 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
14
The Court has allocated 4.0 hours out of 5.0 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
15
The Court has allocated 4.0 hours out of 5.0 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
16
The Court has allocated 4.0 hours out of 5.5 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
17
The Court has allocated 1.5 hours out of 2.5 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
15
06.27.11
Prepare notice of motion for
allowance of attorney’s fees
and costs, proposed form
of order and supporting
affidavit
Total hours
2.0018
73.50
Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence in support of
the prevailing billing rate for an associate or paralegal in
southern New Jersey.
In D’Orazio, the Court affirmed the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation finding that a rate
of $150 for an associate and $85 for a paralegal in southern New
Jersey was reasonable.
See id., 2011 WL 6717427, at *4.
Given
that D’Orazio was decided by the Court in this District in the
Camden vicinage which is located in southern New Jersey only a
few weeks ago on December 21, 2011, the associate rate of $150
and paralegal rate of $85 per hour will be relied upon in this
matter.
The Court will not further parse out what should have
been delegated to a paralegal and what should have been delegated
to an associate and will instead apply a blended rate of $117.50.
Thus, multiplying a blended rate of $117.50 by 73.5 hours yields
$8,636.25.
3.
Conflict of Interest Issue
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s counsel’s should not
18
The Court has allocated 2.0 hours out of 2.75 hours
billed for this task to paralegal/associate time.
16
be entitled to time spent researching and litigating whether a
conflict of interest existed due to defendant’s payment of
medical consultants.
Defendant argues that since the Court
ultimately concluded that no conflict of interest existed, there
was no justification to pursue this issue.
Although ultimately unfruitful for plaintiff, the Court
granted plaintiff’s motion for limited discovery on this issue.
The Magistrate Judge issued an order and opinion permitting
plaintiff to seek the number of medical opinions that Dr. Payne
and Dr. Lumpkin rendered to Sedgwick that supported a claim for
benefits because “[s]uch statistical information ... is relevant
to whether the medical professionals are ‘disinterested
arbiters,’ and the District Court may consider this factor in
reviewing Defendant’s decision to deny long term disability
benefits to Plaintiff.”
Therefore, the Court does not find that
plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts in this area of inquiry were
unjustified and defendant’s request to reduce his hours spent on
this issue will be denied.
4.
Unsuccessful Claims
Although plaintiff’s attorney’s fees will not be
reduced based on the unsuccessful conflict of interest issue
since pursuit of such claim was specifically sanctioned by the
Court, the fee will be reduced due to plaintiff’s unsuccessful
claims that the termination of her LTD benefits was arbitrary and
17
capricious because: (1) defendant required plaintiff to prove her
disability by objective evidence and (2) because defendant relied
on the opinions of Drs. Payne and Lumpkins.
Although the success
of her other claims ultimately outweighed these two unsuccessful
claims, it is appropriate to reduce plaintiff’s counsel fee by
ten percent (10%) for time spent litigating unsuccessful claims.
See Maria C. ex rel. Camacho v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 142
Fed.Appx. 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding underlying petition
largely unsuccessful and confirming fee reduction); Abrams v.
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] court is
to consider the amount of time plaintiff’s counsel has spent on
unsuccessful claims in determining the appropriate attorneys’
fees award.”).
4.
General ERISA Research
Defendant generally complains that plaintiff’s
counsel’s entries for 11.25 hours for research of basic ERISA
principles should be reduced by half.
Although defendant states
that “[a]t least four” entries amounting to 11.25 hours, should
be reduced, defendant, again, does not provide the specific time
entries.
See Bell, 884 F.2d at 714; Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183.
Even taking into consideration defendant’s argument
that plaintiff’s counsel, who holds himself out as an experienced
ERISA attorney, should not be compensated for researching basic
issues such as the standard of review and scope of permissible
18
discovery beyond the administrative record, plaintiff argues that
the research was not conducted on so-called basic issues.
Plaintiff states that very little time was spent on basic issues
and that “it is always necessary to learn whether there have been
any recent decisions.”
Plaintiff also states that research time
“was spent on the scope of permissible discovery beyond the
administrative record in order to establish the basis for an
exception,” as well as research to determine “the right to seal
the record, the right to a protective order, the effect of the
failure to consider the impact of a decision of the Social
Security Administration, and the effect of the failure to comply
with 29 CFR § 2560.503(g)(iii).”
Defendant’s request is somewhat redundant since, as set
forth in the previous section, many of plaintiff’s counsel’s time
entries have been reduced on grounds that they should have been
performed by a paralegal or associate and billed at their respective
rates.
Time spent doing legal research were such entries and,
therefore, the Court has already reduced plaintiff’s counsel’s fee
for such research and will not further reduce the time.
D.
Lodestar
In calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee, the Court
employs the “lodestar” formula, “which requires multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.
19
2001).
As stated above, the reasonable hourly rate to be applied
for plaintiff’s counsel is $250 per hour.
The 14.75 hours spent
on clerical tasks will be deducted, and the 73.5 hours that
should have been delegated will be deducted leaving a total
number of attorney hours of 97 (185.25 - 88.25 = 97).
Thus, the
lodestar for plaintiff’s counsel is now $250 multiplied by 97, or
$24,250.
Added to this amount will be the time deemed to have
been delegated to a paralegal/associate in the amount of
$8,636.25, for total fees in the amount of $32,886.25.
Subtracted from this amount will be the 10% reduction for
litigation of unsuccessful claims resulting in a final fee amount
of $29,597.62.
There is no disagreement over the request for
filing fees in the amount of $350 which will be added to the
lodestar for total of award of $29,947.62.19
An appropriate order will be entered.
s/Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
February 23, 2012
At Camden, New Jersey
19
The Court notes that in ERISA cases, which do not
involve Congressionally mandated fee-shifting, reason may require
some rational proportionality between the value of a case and the
lawyer’s investment of time. If it were otherwise, an
enterprising lawyer might be too easily inspired to turn every
federal statutory slight into Jarndyce and Jarndyce. See Charles
Dickens, Bleak House (1853). A balance should be struck between
creating an incentive for a lawyer to invest his time in a small
case still meaningful to his client while avoiding the situation
where the case becomes one solely about fees.
20
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