CONNOR v. SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
Filing
66
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/17/2012. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GAIL A. CONNOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.
09-cv-1140 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Stephen R. Bosin, Esquire
70 Grand Avenue
River Edge, New Jersey 07661-0201
Attorney for Plaintiff Gail A. Connor
Ivan R. Novich, Esquire
Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge, LLP
One Giralda Farms
Madison, New Jersey 07940
Attorney for Defendants PNC Corp. & Affiliates Long Term
Disability Plan
HILLMAN, District Judge
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration [Doc. No. 53] of this Court’s prior Opinion and
Order entered on February 23, 2012.
[Doc. Nos. 51 & 52.]
For
the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are familiar to all relevant parties
and the Court, and are detailed in the Court’s prior Opinions.
[See Doc. Nos. 38, 39, 51, & 52.]
The Court therefore only
discusses the facts and procedural history relevant to the
instant Motion.
On June 24, 2011, the Court entered an Order granting in
part and denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
[Doc. No. 39.]
Based on the partial success of her Motion,
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
requesting an award of 185.251 hours at the rate of $375.00 per
hour, for a total of $69,468.75, plus costs in the amount of
$350.00.
[Doc. Nos. 42 & 50.]
On February 23, 2012, the Court
entered an Order which granted Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’
fees, but reduced the overall amount of the award. [Doc. No. 52.]
More specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s counsel’s
claimed hourly rate of $375.00 did not reflect the prevailing
market rate in southern New Jersey.
As such, the Court set
counsel’s hourly rate at $250.00 — an amount more indicative of
the prevailing rates in the southern New Jersey region.
The
Court further reduced Plaintiff’s counsel fee by ten percent
(10%) for time spent litigating unsuccessful claims.
Finally,
the Court also deducted from the total amount 14.75 hours spent
by Plaintiff’s counsel on clerical tasks, and 73.50 hours spent
1
In Plaintiff’s initial Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc.
No. 42], Plaintiff only requested 169.5 hours. However, in her
Reply [Doc. No. 50], Plaintiff requested an additional 15.75
hours, thereby bringing the total amount of requested hours to
185.25.
2
on work that should have been delegated to a paralegal or
associate paid at a lower rate.
With regard to the latter, the
Court determined that the accepted hourly rate of an associate
attorney in southern New Jersey is $150.00, and the accepted rate
of a paralegal is $85.00.
Based on these rates, the Court
applied a blended rate of $117.50 to the 73.50 hours that
Plaintiff’s counsel should have delegated to an associate or
paralegal.
The Court thereafter applied the “Lodestar Formula”
to find the reasonable attorney fee amount due in this case,
finding as follows:
As stated above, the reasonable hourly rate to be applied
for plaintiff’s counsel is $250 per hour. The 14.75 hours
spent on clerical tasks will be deducted, and the 73.5
hours that should have been delegated will be deducted
leaving a total number of attorney hours of 97 (185.25 88.25 = 97). Thus, the lodestar for plaintiff’s counsel is
now $250 multiplied by 97, or $24,250. Added to this amount
will be the time deemed to have been delegated to a
paralegal/associate in the amount of $8,636.25, for total
fees in the amount of $32,886.25.
Subtracted from this
amount will be the 10% reduction for litigation of
unsuccessful claims resulting in a final fee amount of
$29,597.62. There is no disagreement over the request for
filing fees in the amount of $350 which will be added to
the lodestar for total of award of $29,947.62.
[Doc. No. 51.] The Court entered an Order on February 23, 2012
awarding Plaintiff’s counsel fees in the amount of $29,947.62.
[Doc. No. 52.]
Plaintiff then filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of that Order on the grounds that the attorneys’
fee award applied by the Court was erroneous.2
2
[Doc. No. 53.]
Third Circuit precedent indicates that a district court
must hold an hearing prior to reducing a claimed hourly rate.
3
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly
recognize motions for reconsideration.
See Harrison v. Smith,
No.Civ.A.08-3050, 2010 WL 715666, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2010)
(citing United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F.Supp.2d 339,
345 (D.N.J. 1999)).
Generally, such motions are treated as motions
to alter or amend the judgment of the court pursuant to Rule 59(e),
or as motions for relief from the court’s judgment and/or order
under Rule 60(b).
See Harrison, 2010 WL 715666 at *2.
In the
District of New Jersey, motions for reconsideration are governed by
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i).
Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics
Assoc., 130 F.Supp.2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001).
That rule provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
[A] motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed
within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on
the original motion by the Judge. . . . A brief setting
forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions which
the party believes the Judge . . . has overlooked shall be
filed with the Notice of Motion.
L.R. 7.1(i).
A motion for reconsideration is “a device to relitigate the
original issue decided by the district court, and [it is] used to
See Levy v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., No. Civ.A.10-4229,
2011 WL 5117855, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2011) (Kugler, J.)
(citing Smith v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir.
1997) ("If hourly rates are disputed, the district court must
conduct a hearing to determine the reasonable market rates.")).
In the instant case, the Court held a hearing on this matter on
November 15, 2012. [See Doc. No. 65.]
4
allege legal error.”
Dermo v. Isaacson, No. Civ.A.11-06520, 2012
WL 4207179, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In order to prevail on a reconsideration
motion, the movant has the burden of demonstrating one of the
following:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when
the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice.
Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999)(citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The standard for reargument is considerably
high, and such motions are to be granted only sparingly.
See
Dermo, 2012 WL 4207179 at *2; Harrison, 2010 WL 715666 at *2.
Thus, a party’s difference of opinion with the court’s decision
should be dealt with through the normal appellate process.
Bowers,
130 F.Supp.2d at 612 (citations omitted); Florham Park Chevron,
Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F.Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988);
see also Chicosky v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 979 F.Supp. 316, 318
(D.N.J. 1997); NL Indus., Inc. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp.
513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (“Reconsideration motions . . . may not be
used to re-litigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.").
In other words, "[a] motion for reconsideration
should not provide the parties with an opportunity for a second
bite at the apple."
Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 511, 532
5
(D.N.J. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff avers that the Court erred in its prior Opinion by
incorrectly holding her counsel to the $250.00 hourly rate of an
attorney in southern New Jersey, rather than the $375.00 hourly
rate of an attorney in northern New Jersey, where her counsel is
located.
Plaintiff further argues that the Court reclassified
73.50 hours of time as work that should have been delegated to a
paralegal or associate, even though no objection was raised by the
Defendant on this point.
Plaintiff therefore requests that the
Court reconsider its prior attorneys’ fee award with respect to:
(1) the proper hourly rate for her attorney located in northern New
Jersey; and (2) the hours that the Court found should have been
delegated.
A.
The Court considers each argument in turn below.
Hourly Rate for the Relevant Community
Plaintiff’s initial allegation is that the Court erred when it
utilized the standard $250.00 hourly rate of an attorney in
southern New Jersey in its reasonable attorney fee determination.
More specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel avers as follows: “Neither
party had asked that southern New Jersey rates apply.
The court,
however, did so sua sponte because Camden, New Jersey was the site
of the forum and because my office was thought to be in southern
New Jersey.”
(Pl.’s Mot. Recon. at 3.)
The party requesting attorneys’ fees has the burden of proving
6
that its request is reasonable.
1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d
To meet this burden, the party must
submit to the court evidence depicting the hours worked and the
rates claimed.
(1983)).
Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
On the other hand, opposing counsel may challenge the fee
request as unreasonable through the submission of sufficiently
specific affidavits and briefs.
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (citing
Bell v. United Princeton Prop., Inc., 884 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1989));
see also Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d
694, 713 (3d Cir. 2005).
In assessing whether the requested fee is
reasonable, the district court may not decrease an award based on
factors not at all raised by the other party.
Rode, 892 F.2d at
1193 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
If the
adverse party has adequately challenged the fee request, however,
“the district court has a great deal of discretion to adjust the
fee award in light of those objections.”
Id. (internal citation
omitted).
“Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is to be calculated
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.”
(1984)).
Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
“Thus, the court should assess the experience and skill
of the prevailing party’s attorneys and compare their rates to the
rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers
of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.”
(internal citations omitted).
Id.
Notably, the applicable market is
7
the community where the forum court presides, and not where the
individual lawyer’s office is located.
See Interfaith Cmty., 426
F.3d at 705 (3d Cir. 2005);3 Avera v. Sec. of Health & Human
Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(applying District
of Columbia rate where court was located and rejecting market rate
of the geographic location where the attorney maintained an
office); Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc., 25 F.Supp.2d
480, 494 (D.N.J. 1998) (Greenaway, J.) (declining to apply New York
City rate where attorneys’ offices were located, and instead
applying “forum rule” dictating that the relevant market is the
place where the case was litigated).
In this case, although it is a close call, the Court finds
that defense counsel’s initial objection to Plaintiff’s requested
3
Plaintiff cites to this case to support her argument that
“[t]he relevant community is not the place of the forum but where
the services are rendered.” (Pl.’s Mot. Recon. at 4.) In
Interfaith Community, however, the Third Circuit explicitly held
that: “the relevant rate is the prevailing rate in the forum of
the litigation.” Id. at 1349. As such, contrary to Plaintiff’s
assertions, Interfaith Community does not support her argument.
Plaintiff also cites Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d
Cir. 2009) as support for her argument that the relevant community
is the location where services were rendered and not the place of
the forum. (Pl.’s Mot. Recon. at 4.) Once again, however,
Plaintiff’s cited authority does not support her argument. Rather,
in the general section of the Rode opinion laying out the
applicable standards of law, the Third Circuit merely stated that:
“Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is to be calculated according
to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. Thus,
the court should assess the experience and skill of the prevailing
party’s attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing
in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. at 1183. The
remainder of the Circuit Court’s opinion is noticeably devoid of
any mention that the site of services rendered is the applicable
benchmark for a court’s determination of “the relevant community.”
As such, Plaintiff’s reliance on Rode is likewise misplaced.
8
hourly rate was sufficiently specific.
In their initial Response
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. No.
47], Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s requested $375.00 rate on
the grounds that “[i]t is well established [] that the Third
Circuit follows the ‘forum rate rule[.]’”
12.)
(Def.’s Resp. Opp’n at
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has clearly defined the
“forum rate rule” to be “the prevailing rate in the forum of the
litigation.”
Interfaith Cmty., 426 F.3d at 705.
In this case, the
forum of the litigation was Camden, New Jersey, located in southern
New Jersey.
Although defense counsel did not explicitly state that
a southern New Jersey rate should apply here, it clearly objected
to Plaintiff’s proposed rate for similarly situated practitioners
in and around the New York City metropolitan area (i.e., northern
New Jersey), and argued that the proper forum was the District of
New Jersey.
The proper forum here was the District of New Jersey —
specifically, the District’s Camden vicinage.4
Moreover, defense counsel also articulated that a reasonable
hourly rate “for an experienced practitioner in ERISA or federal
litigation is roughly [between] $225.00 and $250.00" — the average
hourly rate associated with attorneys in southern New Jersey.
(Def.’s Resp. Opp’n at 12.)
While defense counsel did not
expressly state that this is the standard rate of an attorney in
4
As counsel is aware, the federal District of New Jersey
has three vicinages, each with its own federal courthouse, panel
of judges, and judicial resources. See United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, available at
http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/atty/CountyJurs.pdf (last visited
Nov. 20, 2012).
9
southern New Jersey, its intention was clear when reading this
point in the context of the overall objection.
Furthermore, as noted by the Court at the November 15th
hearing, all parts of the underlying Complaint and litigation took
place in southern New Jersey.
New Jersey.
Plaintiff is a resident of Sewell,
The gravamen of her grievances stem from her prior
employment at the defendant’s Haddonfield, New Jersey branch
office.
She filed her Complaint with this Court in Camden, New
Jersey.
All briefing was submitted to this Court, and all hearings
and conferences took place in Camden as well.
Sewell, Haddonfield,
and Camden are all located in what could fairly be referred to as
southern New Jersey.
Based on the above considerations, the Court
held that Plaintiff’s counsel should be held to the reasonable
hourly rate of an attorney here in southern New Jersey — $250.00.5
Plaintiff further avers that there is no recognized rate in
southern New Jersey.
To support her argument, Plaintiff relies on
Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 195 F. App’x.
93 (3d Cir. 2006).
Tenafly, however, is inapposite here.
The
issue presented in that case was not whether a southern New Jersey
rate should apply.
Rather, in assessing whether the requested
attorney rates were reasonable, the Third Circuit considered “the
5
The Court acknowledges that it misstated the location of
Plaintiff’s counsel’s office in its initial Opinion. The fact
that counsel maintains an office in northern New Jersey and
routinely bills rates more common to that part of the state and
the New York metropolitan area does not change the fact that this
case was litigating in, and was centered on events in, southern
New Jersey.
10
norm [rate] of New Jersey attorneys with similar positions at top
New Jersey law firms in late 2002[.]” Id. at 97.
Given that the
litigation took place in New Jersey, the Third Circuit held that
New Jersey rates — rather than New York City or Washington D.C.
where other counsel was located — should apply.
Id.
In fact, the
parties did not dispute that the relevant community was the State
of New Jersey.
Id. at 96, n.1 (“The parties agree that the
“relevant community” in this case is the State of New Jersey.”)
(further citation omitted).
As such, Tenafly in no way stands for
the proposition that there is no recognized rate of attorneys in
southern New Jersey.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s reliance on Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179(3d Cir. 1995) is
likewise misplaced.
In Windall, the Third Circuit chose not to
disturb the district court’s ruling to apply a statewide market
rate for New Jersey.
Id. at 1187.
The district court in Windall
sat in Trenton, New Jersey — a vicinage located in central New
Jersey, and which encounters lawyers from both the northern and
southern regions of the state.
Id.
Application of a state-wide
rate was therefore appropriate because, as the Third Circuit noted,
few southern New Jersey law firms were available and willing to
represent the plaintiff.
Id.
In contrast to Windall, there is no
credible evidence present here that southern New Jersey law firms
were unwilling to take on Plaintiff’s representation.6
6
While Plaintiff’s counsel did cursorily allege at the
November 15th hearing that Ms. Connor retained his services
11
Furthermore, Plaintiff also alleges that “[a]s further
evidence that there is no southern New Jersey rate[,] Judge Kugler
used the Philadelphia rate for South Jersey in Levy v. Global
Credit & Collection Corp., No. Civ.A.10-4229, 2011 WL 5117855
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2011).”
altered).)
(Pl.’s Mot. Recon. at 5 (citation format
Plaintiff’s citation to Levy for this proposition,
however, is incorrect.
In Levy, Judge Kugler, a United States
District Court Judge in this vicinage, considered five different
factors in his determination of whether or not an attorneys’ fee
award was reasonable.7
Id. at *3.
Notably, none of these factors
entailed an inquiry into whether “the relevant community” was
because “[s]he told me she couldn't find anybody where she lived
and that's why she hired me,” (11/13/12 Hr’g Trans. 11:18–19),
counsel did not make this representation in his briefing or any
of his submitted affidavits. Moreover, the Court notes that
several southern New Jersey attorneys routinely appear in ERISA
litigation venued in the Camden vicinage. See e.g. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Demedio Lime Co.,
No. Civ.A.11-2811, 2012 WL 2594346 (D.N.J. July 5, 2012)
(Hillman, J.)(party represented by large firm in Haddonfield,
N.J.); Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. Transitions
Recovery Program, No. Civ.A.10-3197, 2011 WL 2413172 (D.N.J. June
20, 2011)(Kugler, J.)(party represented by attorney in
Haddonfield, N.J.); Connolly v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 286
F.Supp.2d 391 (D.N.J. 2003)(Simandle, J.)(parties represented by
firms in Cherry Hill and Haddonfield, N.J.); Kao v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 647 F.Supp.2d 397 (D.N.J. 2009) (Irenas, J.) (parties
represented by firms in Cherry Hill and Camden, N.J.); Cooper
Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Seafarers Health & Benefits Plan, 500
F.Supp.2d 457 (D.N.J. 2007)(Irenas, J.)(party represented by firm
in Cherry Hill, N.J.).
7
The five factors considered by the court in Levy were: (1)
the customary fees charged in similar cases; (2) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (3) awards in similar
cases; (4) the time and labor required; and (5) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions presented. Levy, 2011 WL 5117855, at
*3.
12
Philadelphia or southern New Jersey.
In fact, the opinion makes no
reference to “the relevant community” whatsoever.
Rather, Judge
Kugler merely stated that the source of the hourly rates proposed
by the defendant — the CLS fee schedule8 — was previously found by
our sister court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to be “a
fair reflection of the prevailing market rates in Philadelphia.”
Id. at *4.
In the instant case, neither party relies upon the CLS
fee schedule.
As such, Levy is inapplicable here.
Therefore, the Court declines to alter its initial finding
that the applicable hourly rate of an attorney in this litigation
is $250.00.
The $250.00 hourly rate is not — as Plaintiff contends
— a “penalized rate,” but rather is reflective of the degree of
skill exercised in this type of case in this particular community.
As such, the Court reaffirms that part of its initial holding.
B.
Paralegal Time
Plaintiff also asks the Court to reconsider its prior findings
with respect to the time her counsel spent on tasks that could have
been delegated to a paralegal or legal assistant.
In its initial
Response in Opposition [Doc. No. 47], defense counsel was unclear
as to the scope of its objection on this point.
For example,
counsel first alleged that: “Plaintiff’s Motion seeks to recover
for an astonishing 26.0 hours . . . for work spent doing clerical
8
The CLS fee schedule is an index of proposed fees for
services rendered that is published by Community Legal Services.
Levy, 2011 WL 5117855, at *3.
13
or routine tasks that, even if handled by a paralegal or legal
assistant, should have been completed in a much more efficient
manner.”
(Def.’s Resp. Opp’n at 13.)
After listing a several
examples that Defendant considered to be clerical tasks, it then
stated: “Therefore, Defendant requests that the Court . . .
subtract 19.25 hours from Plaintiff’s counsel’s total hours.”
at 14.)
(Id.
Furthermore, Defendant attached to its motion a copy of
Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing entries.
(See id., Ex. A.) Defense
counsel “boxed” the entries that it contested, which added up to 64
hours.
This lack of consistency in the amount of time contested by
the defendant placed the Court in the difficult position of
attempting to ascertain the scope of its challenge.
After a review of the original briefs and after considering
the arguments of counsel at the hearing in this matter, the Court
will apply the following methodology.9
First, the Court will
assess which of the “boxed” billing entries challenged by Defendant
are tasks that could have been designated to a paralegal or legal
assistant.
The Court will then apply the reasonable hourly rate of
9
The Court abandons its initial application of a “blended
rate” averaging associate and paralegal rates in southern New
Jersey. Closer scrutiny of Defendant’s initial Response in
Opposition indicates that Defendant only argued that such tasks
could have been “handled by a paralegal or legal assistant.”
(Def.’s Resp. Opp’n at 13.) Furthermore, unlike its initial
Opinion, the Court here will not consider any billing entries
that were not “boxed,” i.e., actually challenged, by Defendant.
14
a paralegal in southern New Jersey to these challenged entries.10
A review of the record indicates that the following challenged
billing entries are tasks that could have been designated to a
paralegal or legal assistant:
03.12.2009
Draft civil cover sheet, finalize
1.25
03.26.2009
Draft waiver of service of summons
& letter to Sedgwick serving
Complaint
1.75
04.30.2009
File Amended Complaint
0.75
05.01.2009
Serve Amended Complaint
0.75
05.04.2009
Review return of executed waiver
of service of summons & file proof
of service
0.50
10.02.2009
Serve Plaintiff’s first set of
interrogatories in accordance with
limits set forth in Magistrates
opinion
0.75
10.26.2009
Send letter to Magistrate Donio
supporting scope of discovery
sought in Plaintiff’s first set fo
interrogatory answers
1
11.16.2009
Draft certification in opposition
to Defendants’ motion for
protective order
11
1.75
12
13
10
The Court notes that it rejects the argument made at the
hearing in this matter that, as a solo practitioner who does not
employ a paralegal, he is entitled to his full fee as an attorney
for tasks that are clerical in nature. Such a rule would create
a powerful disincentive to use para-professionals in fee-shifting
cases.
11
The Court has allocated 1.25 out of 2.75 hours billed for
this task to paralegal/assistant time.
12
The Court has allocated 0.75 out of 3.75 hours billed for
this task to paralegal/assistant time.
13
The Court has allocated 1 out of 2 hours billed for this
task to paralegal/assistant time.
15
09.06.2010
Select and locate and copy
exhibits in support of motion for
summary judgment
4.25
09.07.2010
Select and locate additional
documents in support of motion for
summary judgment
3
09.10.2010
Draft certification of exhibits in
support of motion for summary
judgment
3
09.30.2010
File motion for summary judgment
via ECF and send courtesy copy to
Judge Hillman
0.75
TOTAL
19.00 hours
Accordingly, the Court finds that, out of the total hours that
Plaintiff’s counsel charged his client, 19 hours were dedicated to
tasks of a clerical nature that could have been delegated to a
paralegal or legal assistant.
The Court will therefore apply the
$85.00 hourly rate of a paralegal in southern New Jersey to these
19 hours.
See D’Orazio v. Washington Twp., No. Civ.A.07-5097, 2011
WL 6717427, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2011) (Irenas, J.), affirmed by
D’Orazio v. Washington Twp., No. Civ.A.12-1169, 2012 WL 4874976 (3d
Cir. Oct. 16, 2012).
C.
The Lodestar
In calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee, the Court employs
the “lodestar” formula, “which requires multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Loughner v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2001).
The
district court has the discretion to make certain adjustments to
the lodestar.
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (internal citation omitted).
The “most useful starting point” is determining the number of
16
hours reasonably expended on the litigation.
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
Id. (citing Hensley
Plaintiff’s counsel
asserts that he dedicated 185.25 hours to this litigation.14
The
Court will deduct 14.75 hours from this total for tasks that were
clerical in nature.15
The Court will further deduct from this total
19.00 hours that should have been delegated to a paralegal or legal
assistant.
This brings the number of hours reasonably expended on
this litigation to 151.50.
185.25 — 33.75 = 151.50
“After determining the number of hours reasonably expended,
the district court must examine whether the requested hourly rate
is reasonable.
Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is to be
calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.”
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 895 (1984)).
As stated above, the reasonable hourly rate
to be applied for Plaintiff’s counsel is $250.00.
151.50 x 250.00 = 37,875.00
Added to this amount will be the number of hours that should have
14
As indicated above, Plaintiff’s counsel initially only
requested 169.5 hours [Doc. No. 42]. However, in her Reply [Doc.
No. 50], Plaintiff requested an additional 15.75 hours, thereby
bringing the total amount of requested hours to 185.25.
15
In its initial Opinion, the Court deducted 14.75 hours
from the total amount of hours. The Court then proceeded to
reclassify another 73.50 hours as time spent on work that should
have been delegated to an associate or paralegal. At the
reconsideration stage, Plaintiff’s counsel does not contest the
Court’s initial deduction of 14.75 hours. Indeed, Plaintiff’s
counsel did not oppose this deduction during the initial
consideration of this motion. As such, the Court will once again
deduct this 14.75 hours from the total number of hours.
17
been delegated to a paralegal or legal assistant at the rate of
$85.00 per hour, bringing the total fee award to $39,490.00.
19.00 x 85.00 = 1,615.00
37,875 + 1,615.00 = 39,490.00
Subtracted from this amount will be the 10% reduction for
litigation of unsuccessful claims, bringing the total fee award to
$35,541.00.16
39,490.00 — 3,949.00 = 35,541.00
Finally, the Court will add to this amount Plaintiff’s undisputed
request for $350.00 in additional costs.
35,541.00 + 350.00 = 35,891.00
Accordingly, the Court finds that the total attorneys’ fee
award in the instant case is $35,891.00.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
will be granted.
Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to a reasonable
fee award of $35,891.00.
An appropriate Order follows.
/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated: 12/17/12
At Camden, New Jersey
16
In the Court’s initial Opinion, it reduced Plaintiff’s
counsel’s fees by 10% for time spent litigating unsuccessful
claims. Neither party has objected to this deduction at the
reconsideration stage of proceedings.
18
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