SMITH et al v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
34
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 11/7/2012. (dmr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BEVERLY SMITH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action
No. 09-4268 (JBS/KMW)
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Anthony Granato
Jarve Kaplan Granato, LLC
10 Lake Center Executive Park
401 Route 73 North, suite 204
Marlton, NJ 08053
Attorney for Plaintiffs Beverly Smith and Joe Smith
Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr.
Office of the NJ Attorney General
RJ Hughes Justice Complex
25 Market Street
PO Box 112
Trenton, NJ 08625-0112
Attorney for Defendants State of New Jersey, New Jersey
State Police, and State Trooper Carlos Rodriguez
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Beverly Smith and Joe Smith filed a lawsuit
against Defendants State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State
Police, and State Trooper Carlos Rodriguez alleging violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New Jersey State Constitution, and the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act and claims for assault, battery, and
false imprisonment.
Defendants filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Docket Item 30] arguing that federal claims
against Defendants State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State
Police, and Trooper Rodriguez in his official capacity are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and
by the definition of persons who may be liable under § 1983.
For
the reasons explained herein, the Court will grant Defendants’
motion.
II.
BACKGROUND
This section outlines Plaintiffs’ factual and legal
allegations.
It also describes Defendants’ arguments in their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ arguments in
their opposition to Defendants’ motion.
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs Beverly Smith and Joe Smith filed a lawsuit
against Defendants State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State
Police, and State Trooper Carlos Rodriguez1.
(Am. Compl.) The
New Jersey State Police Department, which employs Trooper
Rodriguez, is an arm of the State of New Jersey.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶
1-2.)
Plaintiffs originally filed their Complaint in the Superior
1
The Complaint also names John Doe and/or John Doe
Corporation 1-10 Defendants. The Complaint acknowledges that
these names are “fictitious.” The John Doe Defendants are not
discussed in the present motion, and the Court has not considered
them in its Opinion.
2
Court of New Jersey Law Division, Camden County, and Defendants
removed the action to this Court.
[Docket Item 1.]
On June 24, 2007, Detective Carlos Rodriguez, a New Jersey
State Police Officer, was conducting an investigation in Camden,
NJ, when he reportedly heard “yelling, cursing, and furniture
being moved” and a voice asking someone to call the police.
(Pl.
Opp’n Ex. A, Expert Report of Timothy J. Longo, Sr.2, ¶¶ 13-15.)
Detective Rodriguez and Trooper B. Carswell, another New Jersey
State Policeman, approached the Plaintiffs’ home, from which they
believed they heard the noise.
(Id. ¶ 16.) They opened the front
door, entered the home and, after an altercation the nature of
which is disputed, arrested Joseph Smith.
(Id. ¶ 22-24.)
Plaintiffs allege that the entry into their home was unlawful and
that Trooper Rodriguez used excessive force in arresting Joseph
Smith.
The unlawful entry and excessive force purportedly caused
Joseph Smith to suffer permanent injuries, personal injuries,
pain and suffering, emotional injuries, impaired functioning,
medical expenses, and financial losses.
(Am.
Beverly Smith suffered emotional injuries.
Compl.
(Am.
Plaintiffs claimed violations of 42 U.S.C.
¶¶ 11-13.)
Compl.
¶ 14.)
§ 1983 because
the allegedly unlawful entry, unlawful arrest, and excessive
2
Longo is Plaintiffs’ expert witness. Plaintiffs
incorporated his entire report in their Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
3
force violated their constitutional rights.
(Am.
Compl.
¶¶ 17-
23.) They demanded money damages, including punitive damages and
attorney fees.
(Am.
Compl.
¶ 23.) They also asserted claims
regarding violations of the New Jersey State Constitution and the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count II) and assault, battery, and
false imprisonment (Count III).
B.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
[Docket Item 30.] They argued that federal claims against
Defendants State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State Police, and
Trooper Rodriguez in his official capacity are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
They also
argued that the § 1983 claims should be dismissed against those
Defendants because none of those parties are “persons” subject to
liability under the 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
In addition, they argued
that the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey State Police
cannot be subject to a § 1983 suit based on theories of
supervisory or vicarious liability because they were not
personally involved in the allegedly unlawful entry and forceful
arrest and because Plaintiffs have not alleged that the State or
the State Police Department failed to properly train Trooper
Rodriguez.
In short, Defendants sought to dismiss the federal §
1983 claims against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State
Police, and Trooper Rodriguez in his official capacity.
4
In their Opposition [Docket Item 32], Plaintiffs argued that
the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey State Police are
vicariously liable for the actions of the New Jersey State Police
Department and New Jersey State Troopers pursuant to the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Constitution.
They
also argued that Trooper Rodriguez violated the Plaintiffs’ civil
rights and that the § 1983 claim against him should stand because
“it does not matter what capacity he was acting in.
Defendant is responsible individually.” (Pl.
The
Opp’n at 6.) They
argued that Defendants “are creating a fiction that somehow
Summary Judgment can be awarded in favor of a certain capacity an
individual is acting in at the time of the violations.” (Id.)
III. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
56(a).
A dispute is “genuine” if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.” Anderson v.
U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
A fact is “material” only if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law.
Id.
The court will “view the underlying facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
5
opposing the motion.” Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n v.
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.
IV.
Babbitt, 63
1995).
Analysis
The Motion presently before the Court does not involve a
factual analysis of the events that gave rise to this cause of
action; it requires a legal analysis of whether Plaintiffs may
sue the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State Police, and
Trooper Rodriguez in his official capacity for violations of 42
U.S.C.
may not.
§ 1983.
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that they
A state, its agencies, and its actors in their official
capacities are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.3
Plaintiffs assert one federal claim, violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
3
Defendants also argued that they are immune from suit
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, which provides that “the
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state.” U.S. Const. Amend.
XI. This argument is moot because the state, the state police,
and state actors sued in their official capacities are not
persons under § 1983. But the Court notes that Eleventh Amendment
immunity does not apply when a state has consented to federal
jurisdiction; by removing this action to federal court,
Defendants provided such consent. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (“removal is a
form of voluntary invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction
sufficient to waive the State's otherwise valid objection to
litigation of a matter . . . in a federal forum”).
6
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. . . .
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
The statute’s text is clear: a § 1983 suit
may only be brought against a defendant who is considered a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983.
In Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S.
58 (1989), the United States Supreme Court analyzed whether
states could be persons under § 1983.
The Court held that “a
State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Id.
at 64.
In that case, the Michigan Department of State Police was the
defendant, not Michigan state.
But because the Department of
State Police was an arm of the state, the analysis involved
whether the state could be sued under § 1983.
Will has thus been
held to “establish[] that the State and arms of the State .
are not subject to suit under § 1983.
Through Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S.
.
.
.
.
.” Howlett By &
356, 365 (1990).
The Court
will therefore dismiss Count I against the State of New Jersey
and the New Jersey State Police because the state and arms of the
state may not be sued under § 1983.
In addition to holding that the state was not a person under
§ 1983, the Will court also held that state actors in their
official capacities are not persons who may be sued under § 1983.
7
The Will court stated, “a suit against a state official in his or
her official capacity is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official’s office.
.
.
.
As
such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”
Id. at 71 (internal citation omitted).
The Will court concluded
that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id.
at 71.
Therefore,
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Trooper Rodriguez in his
official capacity cannot proceed.
The Court will grant
Defendants' partial summary judgment motion and dismiss Count I
against Trooper Rodriguez in his official capacity4.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants created “a fiction that
somehow Summary Judgment can be awarded in favor of a certain
capacity an individual is acting in at the time of the
violations.” (Pl.
Opp’n at 6.) The distinction between
individual and official capacities is not fictitious.
Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S.
See e.g.,
21, 31 (1991) (“state officials, sued
in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning
of § 1983”).
In their reply, Defendants did not dispute that
4
A state official in his official capacity can be sued under
§ 1983 when the action is for injunctive relief: “a state
official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the State.” Will at 71 n.10 (internal
citations omitted). Because Plaintiffs only seek monetary, and
not injunctive, relief, this exception does not apply.
8
Rodriguez remains potentially liable under § 1983 for claims
directed toward his individual capacity.
(Def.
Reply at 3.) The
Court dismisses § 1983 claims against Defendant Rodriguez acting
in his official capacity, but not in his individual capacity.5
V.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted.
As a matter of law, Count I, which alleges violations of 42
U.S.C.
§ 1983, is dismissed against Defendants State of New
Jersey, New Jersey State Police, and Trooper Carlos Rodriguez
acting in his official capacity.
Count I is not dismissed
against Trooper Carlos Rodriguez acting in his individual
capacity.
This Opinion neither considers nor impacts Plaintiffs’
claims regarding violations of the New Jersey State Constitution
and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count II) and assault,
battery, and false imprisonment (Count III).
The accompanying
Order will be entered.
November 7, 2012
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
5
Because the Court will grant Defendants’ motion on the
grounds that the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State
Police, and Trooper Rodriguez in his official capacity are not
persons under § 1983, the Court need not analyze Defendants’
arguments that § 1983 does not allow lawsuits alleging vicarious
or supervisory liability.
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?