HOFFENBERG v. GRONDOLSKY et al
Filing
90
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER directing the Clerk to REOPEN this matter for examination of Pltf's motions. ORDERED that Pltf's 85 & 86 Motions are DENIED, etc. The Clerk shall CLOSE this matter. Order sent to Pltf. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 2/7/2012. (drw)n.m.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STEVEN JUDE HOFFENBERG,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFF GRONDOLSKY et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 09-4784 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM
AND
OPINION
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s
submission of two motions, one titled "Motion for
Reconsideration," see Docket Entry No. 85, and another titled
"Motion in the Recusal of Judge Bumb," see Docket Entry No. 86.
On January 14, 2011, this Court issued a memorandum opinion
and accompanying order detailing the lengthy history of this
matter and the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s fourth amended
complaint.
See Docket Entries Nos. 60 and 61.
In accordance
with the warning thrice given by this Court to Plaintiff, the
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint and imposed a
limited order of preclusion with regard to Plaintiff’s future
filings of non-emergent pro se, in forma pauperis civil
complaints.
decision.
See id.
Plaintiff timely appealed this Court’s
See Docket Entries Nos. 64 and 65.
On June 9, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s
dismissal of Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint and as well as
this Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s demands for this Court’s
recusal.
See Docket Entry No. 70.
The Court of Appeals decision
read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Hoffenberg is presently confined at FCI-Fort Dix
in New Jersey, where he is serving a twenty-year
sentence imposed by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in 1997 following
his plea of guilty to conspiracy to violate the
securities laws and other offenses. . . .
We will summarily affirm the dismissal of
Hoffenberg's fourth amended complaint with
prejudice because his appeal of that aspect of the
District Court’s order presents "no substantial
question." To the extent that certain claims for
relief can be gleaned from the language of
Hoffenberg's overwrought pleadings, the District
Court properly concluded that he failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. . . .
Hoffenberg's attempts at pleading were neither
short nor plain, and the District Court fairly
characterized them as "volumes of self-serving
patchy tirades." Hoffenberg's inexplicable failure
to plead in conformity with the rules, despite
four chances to amend, supports the denial of
further leave to amend. We conclude that the
fourth amended complaint was properly dismissed
with prejudice.
Finally, we consider the District Court's decision
to restrict Hoffenberg's right to file future
suits in the District of New Jersey. We have held
that "a continuous pattern of groundless and
vexatious litigation can, at some point, support
an order against further filings of complaints
without the permission of the court." Courts must
remain mindful, however, that "[a]ccess to the
courts is a fundamental tenet of our judicial
system," and "legitimate claims should receive a
full and fair hearing no matter how litigious the
plaintiff may be." Significantly for purposes of
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the present case, we have explained that an
injunction against future filings "should not be
imposed by a court without prior notice and some
occasion to respond." The District Court here
gave notice to Hoffenberg that his failure to
plead in compliance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure would result in "sanctions." But the
District Court did not afford notice of the
particular [limited preclusion] order that it
intended to enter placing restrictions upon
Hoffenberg's right to file suit. As a result,
Hoffenberg did not have an opportunity to object
before the order was entered. As we have
explained, "[i]f the circumstances warrant the
imposition of an injunction, the District Court
must give notice to the litigant to show cause why
the proposed injunctive relief should not issue.
This ensures that the litigant is provided with
the opportunity to oppose the court's order before
it is instituted." Given the absence of proper
notice here, we will vacate the injunction imposed
and remand so that Hoffenberg can be afforded an
opportunity to respond. We express no view on
whether Hoffenberg's conduct, in this case or in
the others cases cited by the District Court,
would support entry of an order restricting his
right to file future litigation. That issue is
best left to the District Court in the first
instance, in the sound exercise of its discretion,
after it considers Hoffenberg's objections and
weighs them against the record and the need to
curtail potentially abusive future litigation. We
do note that "Hoffenberg has had a history of
mental illness dating back to a hospitalization in
1970, which included electro-convulsive therapy,
anti-psychotic medications such as thorazine, and
the mood stabilizer lithium. He was diagnosed at
that time as manic depressive." There is no
record before this Court as to whether
Hoffenberg's mental health offers any explanation
for his actions in this proceeding, or in the two
other proceedings that the District Court cited as
evidence of his "abuse of legal process" in the
District of New Jersey. We leave it to the
District Court to determine whether Hoffenberg's
mental health is at all relevant or should have
any bearing on whether to restrict his right to
file future litigation.
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Hoffenberg v. Bumb, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11741 (3d Cir. June 9,
2011) (citations and parenthetical explanations omitted, footnote
4 incorporated in the main text).
In accordance with the Court of Appeals mandate, on August
19, 2011, this Court issued an Order reciting to Plaintiff the
terms of its limited order of preclusion.
The Court also
directed Plaintiff to show cause as to why this limited order of
preclusion should not be entered against him.
See Docket Entry
No. 74.
On August 25, Plaintiff moved this Court for an extension of
time to submit his response to the Court’s order to show cause,
see Docket Entry No. 78; Plaintiff’s motion to that effect was
granted.
21.
See Docket Entry No. 79.
On November 9, 2011, the Clerk received Plaintiff’s
submission; that submission read, in its entirety, as
follows:
Re
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Hoffenburg v Judge Bumb et al "Appeal Mandate"
Case Number 09 civ 4784 "Settlement Offer" in the
Pending Plaintiff December 2011 Filing
the "Benefit of Justice Demands," this "Settlement
Offer," in the Plaintiff December 2011, "Filing."
That the "Filing" by the Plaintiff, in December
2011, in the Open Remand Mandate, Should Be
Settled as "Case Closed," with "No Further,"
Plaintiff December 2011 Filing.
That the Dec 2011 Filing, must "Target," the
Plaintiff DOJ Turnover, in Major Evidence, Showing
the Plaintiff Partner Jeff Epstein, "Massive Multi
Billion Dollar Hedge Fund Crimes."
"Newsweek" Was Requested by "DOJ," to Delay, the
Ready to Publish Story, Showing the Plaintiffs
Part, in Turning over Evidence, in the Plaintiffs
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Billionaire Partner, Jeff Epsteins, "Multi Billion
Dollar Hedge Fund Crime(s)."
(5) That the Instant Suit, Prison BOP Defendant Staff
Richard Herbik, the Plaintiff Unit Team Mgr., Was
"Removed," on May 5, 2011, from That Position.
(6) That the Instant Suit, Prison Bop Defendant, Ms
Hood, the "Plaintiff Counselor," at the "Prison
Unit Team," Was "Removed" from Her Position, with
the Plaintiff.
(7) That the Prison Staff, in the "Instant Suit," Are
under "Bop Investigation."
(8) That the Appeals Court Opinion "Ruling," Made, the
"Substantial Fact Record Error," Below.
(9) That Judge Bumb, "Dismissed" Without "Prejudice,"
the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. "Wrong
Point."
(10)
That the Judge Bumb First Amended Complaint,
"Order" Was "Dismissed" with "Prejudice," in Said
Lower Court Opinion, That the Appeals Court
"Opinion," Was "Wrong," in the "Mandate Remand,"
in The, "With Prejudice, Dismissal by Judge Bumb."
See, "Many Judge Bumb," Prison Suits, "Dismissed"
with "Prejudice."
(11) That the "Basis," for the Instant "Sanction," Was
the Plaintiffs, (3) Three Pro Se Law Suit,
"Ruling(s)," in this Court House.
(12) That the Plaintiff Did Appeal, "(2) Two," of the
"Three," Pro Se above Law Suits.
(13)
That the Plaintiff "Won" the "Appeal," in the
"$20 Billion Dollar," FTCA, Tort USA/BOP Lawsuit,
in this "Court House."
(14) That the Plaintiff "Third" Lawsuit, in the Judge
Bumb "Basis," for this "Sanction," Was the "2241"
Lawsuit, Petition, for "Pre Release, Plaintiff
Credit."
(15)
That Said "Credit," Will Very Soon, Be
"Provided," to the Plaintiff.
Conclusion
(1) "Wisdom" Mandates That, this Suit Be Marked
"Closed," on the "Docket," with "No Further"
Plaintiff, December 2011, "Filing."
(2) this "Settlement Offer," Is "Not Part of the
Docket."
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Docket Entry No. 82 (quotation marks, capitalization,
punctuation and lack thereof in original, underlining
removed).
On November 30, 2011, this Court issued a memorandum opinion
and order addressing Plaintiff’s above-quoted submission.
Docket Entry No. 84.
See
The Court observed that Plaintiff was
trying to relitigate, again, his claims against Defendants Herbik
and Hood that were already dismissed by this Court (and which
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals), as well as this
Court’s determination that its recusal was unwarranted (which
determination was, also, affirmed by the Court of Appeals).
id. at 8.
See
In addition, the Court stated: "Paramountly here, no
statement in Plaintiff’s submission provides this Court with a
single reason to avoid imposition of the limited order of
preclusion.
In light of the foregoing, imposition of the limited
order of preclusion is warranted."
Id.
Moreover, pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ guidance in
Hoffenberg v. Bumb, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11741, this Court
examined Plaintiff’s prior proceedings which produced a reference
to Plaintiff’s mental health problems experienced in the past.
See id. at 8-13 (quoting, at length, and analyzing, in great
detail, the relevant statements made in Hoffenberg v. Provost,
154 Fed. App’x 307 (3d Cir. 2005); Hoffenberg v. United States,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40495 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010), Hoffenberg
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v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), Hoffenberg
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19424 (D. Mass.
Sept. 14, 2004), and United States v. Hoffenberg, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2394 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1997)).
Upon conducting that
examination, this Court concluded that Plaintiff’s past mental
problems did not prevent imposition of a limited order of
preclusion against him.
See id. at 14-16 (detailing the
rationale of that conclusion).
Correspondingly, the Court
imposed a limited order of preclusion in accordance with the
terms of which Plaintiff was expressly advised.
See id. at 17-
19.
Plaintiff has currently submitted two motions.
Entries Nos. 85 and 86.
See Docket
Although these motions bear different
headings, the substance of these motions is virtually identical.
Plaintiff asserts that this Court is biased against him and that
the Court is abusing its discretion.
again, this Court’s recusal.
Plaintiff seeks, once
Both motions are silent as to any
factual basis allowing this Court to reconsider its decision to
impose a limited order of preclusion with regard to Plaintiff’s
future non-emergent civil complaints filed pro se and in forma
pauperis.
Although both motions are rather lengthy, they are
filled only with generic statements accusing this Court of bias
and with articles and Plaintiff’s letters to various officials
with regard to the investigation of the Bernard Madoff scheme,
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and Plaintiff’s accusations against his former business partner.
See id.
A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility.
There are only four grounds upon which a motion for
reconsideration might be granted: (a) to correct manifest errors
of law or fact upon which the judgment was based; (b) to present
newly-discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (c) to
prevent manifest injustice;1 and (d) to accord the decision to an
intervening change in prevailing law.
See Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1171 (1986) (purpose of motion for reconsideration is to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence).
"To support reargument, a moving party
must show that dispositive factual matters or controlling
decisions of law were overlooked by the court in reaching its
prior decision."
Assisted Living Associates of Moorestown,
L.L.C., v. Moorestown Tp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 442 (D.N.J. 1998).
In contrast, mere disagreement with the district court's decision
is an inappropriate ground for a motion for reconsideration: such
1
In the context of a motion to reconsider, the term
"manifest injustice" "[generally . . . means that the Court
overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that was
presented to it," In re Rose, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64622, at *3
(D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007), making the definition an overlap with the
prime basis for reconsideration articulated in Harsco, that is,
the need "to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which
the judgment was based."
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disagreement should be raised through the appellate process.
See
id. (citing Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc., 820 F.
Supp. 834, 859 n.8 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir.
1994); G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990)); see
also Drysdale v. Woerth, 153 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(a motion for reconsideration may not be used as a means to
reargue unsuccessful theories).
Consequently, "[t]he Court will
only entertain such a motion where the overlooked matters, if
considered by the Court, might reasonably have resulted in a
different conclusion."
Assisted Living, 996 F. Supp. at 442; see
also Continental Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.
Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[M]otions for reconsideration
should be granted sparingly"); Edward H. Bohlin, Co. v. Banning
Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) (a district court "has
considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case
under Rule 59(e)").
Here, this Court's careful examination of
both Plaintiff's motions reveals no manifest error of law, no
error of fact, no newly-discovered or previously unavailable
evidence, no basis to detect manifest injustice and no
intervening change in prevailing law.
Therefore, Plaintiff's
motion seeking reconsideration of this Court's prior order, see
Docket Entry No. 85, will be denied.
Plaintiff's other motion
seeking this Court's recusal, see Docket Entry No. 86, will also
be denied.
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IT IS, therefore, on this 7th day of February 2012,
ORDERED that the Clerk shall reopen this matter for the
purposes of this Court's examination of Plaintiff's motions
docketed as Docket Entries Nos. 85 and 86, by making a new and
separate docket entry reading, "CIVIL CASE REOPENED"; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion docketed as Docket Entry No.
85 is denied and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion docketed as Docket Entry No.
86 is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the terms of the limited order of preclusion
shall remain as imposed by this Court's order docketed as Docket
Entry No. 84; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall close the file this matter by
making a new and separate docket entry reading, "CIVIL CASE
CLOSED"; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Order upon Plaintiff
by regular U.S. mail.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB,
United States District Judge
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