GRAVES v. ANCORA STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL
Filing
30
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 12/10/2012. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
(Doc. No. 27)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
_________________________________________
:
VERONICA GRAVES,
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil No.
:
10-369 (RBK/KMW)
v.
:
:
OPINION
ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL
:
:
:
Defendant.
:
_________________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter arises upon Plaintiff Veronica Graves’s (“Plaintiff”) suit against Defendant
Ancora Psychiatric Hospital (“Defendant”) alleging violations of the equal employment
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the Act”). Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that she was denied certification as a civil service employee and was subsequently
terminated on the basis of her race and gender. Plaintiff also alleges that she was the victim of a
hostile work environment and was subjected to policies resulting in a disparate impact.
Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the alternative,
Defendant moves for dismissal for failure to submit a more definite statement. See Fed. R. Civ.
1
P. 12(e). 1 For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s
motion.
I.
BACKGROUND 2
Plaintiff, an African-American woman, was employed as a Nursing Services Clerk at
Defendant Ancora Psychiatric Hospital. She successfully completed the probationary
employment period that would allow her to take the civil service exam, become certified in her
position, and thereby receive civil service protections. Despite these circumstances, Plaintiff was
not permitted to sit for the civil service exam. Instead, she was terminated without the
opportunity to be certified even though white and male employees were not subjected to the
same treatment.
Thereafter, Defendant recognized its apparent error and hired her back in order to remedy
the mistake. Plaintiff, however, was forced to undergo another probationary period during which
she did not receive proper training, endured harassment upon re-hiring, and was forced to
withdraw all the funds in her pension plan. Finally, Plaintiff was terminated again before the end
of the second probationary period without the requisite notice or regard for her potential civil
service seniority. 3
1
The Court may strike a pleading or issue any other appropriate order when a plaintiff has not obeyed a motion for a
more definite statement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). However, for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s More Definite Statement alleges facts giving rise to a plausible claim of race discrimination. Thus, the
Court will deny Defendant’s Rule 12(e) motion.
2
When considering the sufficiency of the factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint, the Court, for purposes of
deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), assumes such allegations to be true. See Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
3
Plaintiff makes reference to a number of dates with regard to her hiring and termination, but it is unclear exactly
when she claims the specific instances occurred. For example, Plaintiff claims she was fired on Saturday, February
5, 2007 but it is unclear if this was the first or second termination date.
2
Plaintiff first filed her Complaint in this Court on January 22, 2010. Sometime later, the
Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s Title VII claims and ordered her to submit a more
definite statement. Graves v. Ancora Psych. Hosp., No. 10-369, 2012 WL 1108505 (D.N.J. Apr.
2, 2012). Shortly after Plaintiff complied with the Court’s order, Defendant filed the instant
motion to dismiss. The motion presents multiple arguments: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
meet the plausibility pleading standard required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with respect to
her claims for race and age discrimination, as well as the hostile work environment and disparate
impact claims she raised in her more definite statement; (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII claims may be
time barred; and (3) Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination on the basis of gender, national origin
and religion are void for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Following a brief discussion
of the proper legal standard by which to consider Defendant’s motion, the Court will address
each of these arguments in turn.
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Where, as here, a plaintiff brings suit pro se, the
Court must construe the complaint liberally in her favor. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir.1992). In such cases, the Court must
“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Seen in this light, a complaint will
survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
3
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second,
the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). 4 Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible
rather than plausible. Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Legal Sufficiency of Pleadings
i. Race Discrimination Claims
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a plausible claim of race
discrimination. Stating a plausible claim of race discrimination under Title VII does not require
pleading according to a rigid formula. E.E.O.C. v. Metal Service Co., 892 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.
1990). Instead, a Title VII plaintiff has met her pleading burden when she offers “evidence
adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory
criterion illegal under the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964].” Id. With this general principle in mind,
the Court looks to recent Title VII cases decided in this Circuit bearing similar facts to the instant
claim.
4
Even under the liberal pleading standards afforded a pro se plaintiff, the Court need not credit such a party’s “bald
assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; Day, 969 F.2d at 42.
4
First, in Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Services, Inc., an Egyptian-born employee of Arab
descent was terminated from his accounting position at a moving company. Guirguis v. Movers
Specialty Services, Inc., 346 Fed. App’x 774, 775 (3d Cir. 2009). The employee filed suit,
claiming that the company had fired him due to his race and national origin. Id. In granting the
moving company’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the employee’s complaint failed to
allege facts sufficient to cross the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility threshold because it lacked any
reference to why the employee believed that race and national origin motivated his termination.
Id.
Similarly, in Baig v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, a former employee of a federal agency
brought suit claiming that he was wrongfully terminated on the basis of his nationality and age.
Baig v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, No. 10–0842, 2011 WL 2214660 at *1 (D.N.J. June 6,
2011). The complaint contained references to the fact that the employee was a native of India
and over sixty years old but was devoid of further factual allegations. Id. The court granted the
agency’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the employee offered only “conclusory
assertions” and did not allege any specific acts that would provide a connection between his race
and age and his termination. Id. at 4.
On the other hand, in Angrand v. Paragon Village, an employee of a nursing home was
fired following an incident in which a patient’s relative complained that several employees were
“hang[ing] out” in her mother’s room. No. 09-1118, 2010 WL 1644132 at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 22,
2010). The employee, an African-American man from Haiti, alleged that of the employees
involved, only he was terminated while the other two employees, both white, were not punished.
Id. In addition, the employee alleged other incidents of disparate treatment, specifically referring
to an instance in which he was sent home early while white employees were not. Id. In denying
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the nursing home’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the employee had made specific factual
allegations that raised the inference of discrimination. Id. at 3-4.
In this case, Plaintiff, in her many submissions to the Court, alleges specific facts to
support her claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race. Unlike the
employees’ complaints in Guirguis and Haig, which laid out only bare assertions that the former
employees were fired on the basis of their race and national origin, Plaintiff’s more definite
statement includes at least three specific instances in which she claims she was treated differently
than white employees. Specifically, like the former employee in Angrand, Plaintiff alleges that
she was denied opportunities or rights given to white employees with respect to the multiple
probationary periods, her not being able to take the civil service exam, and her employer’s
forcing her to withdraw her pension savings. Pl.’s More Definite Statement 1-2. Rather than
filing a claim stating simply that she is black and that her termination was the result of her race,
as she did in her initial pleadings, Plaintiff now makes the sort of specific factual allegations that
raise at least an inference of discrimination. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination
meet the plausibility requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this
claim will be denied.
ii. Age Discrimination Claims
On the other hand, Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding discrimination on the
basis of age. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and More Definite Statement state only that she is
over forty; they do not offer any facts as to why her age is related to her termination. Plaintiff’s
age discrimination claim therefore does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
iii. Hostile Work Environment Claim
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A plaintiff bringing a hostile work environment claim under Title VII must allege
harassment that is severe or pervasive. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
Specifically, there must exist in the workplace “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”
that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment” that permeates the workplace. Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67
(1986)). The “objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances.” Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23) (internal
quotations omitted).
In this Circuit, in order to establish a prima face case for a hostile work environment
based on race, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the plaintiff experienced intentional discrimination
because of his or her race; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the
discrimination had a detrimental effect on the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would have a
detrimental effect on a reasonable person of the same race in the same position as the plaintiff;
and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Abramson v, William Paterson College of
N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2001).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege that she experienced a hostile work environment
as a result of intentional racial discrimination. In addition, her complaint is devoid of facts
showing that the discrimination was pervasive and regular. Cf. Hargrave v. County of Atlantic,
262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 416-18 (D.N.J. 2003). Rather, Plaintiff alleges that she was “written up,
harassed, denigrated, embarrassed and publically humiliated” and that such treatment resulted in
a “disparate impact.” Pl.’s More Definite Statement 2. Nowhere does Plaintiff state that the
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alleged harassment was based on racial discrimination other than to note that “whites and males”
were not treated similarly. These are the sort of broad and unspecific allegations that fail to
satisfy the particular pleading requirements of a Title VII hostile work environment claim. Thus,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.
iv. Disparate Impact Claim
The so-called “disparate impact” claim allows a plaintiff to bring suit under Title VII in
order to challenge a discriminatory employment policy without having to prove discriminatory
intent. El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 239 (3d. Cir. 2007). As part of her pleading burden, a
plaintiff must allege that the employment practice at issue has a discriminatory effect that is not
justified by the needs of the defendant’s business. Id.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint uses the term “disparate impact” to describe the result of
the various alleged incidents of discrimination. Id. (“[Plaintiff] was… required to endure yet
another additional extension of her second probationary period . . . Causing [sic] a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). However, despite
employing this terminology, Plaintiff has failed to plead properly this necessary of a prima facie
case for disparate impact discrimination under Title VII. That is, Plaintiff has not alleged that
Defendant implemented or enforced a policy that resulted in a disparate impact on a protected
class. Instead, Plaintiff uses the words “disparate impact” to describe the outcome of certain of
Defendant’s actions that were specifically directed at Plaintiff: for example, the additional
probationary period, the refusal to let Plaintiff take the civil service exam, the requirement that
Plaintiff withdraw the funds from her pension, and the refusal to train Plaintiff. Pl.’s More
Definite Statement 1-2. Thus, although she references discrete incidents, she mentions no
specific policies that resulted in discrimination against members of a protected class. The failure
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to do so is fatal to her disparate impact claim.
See SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 239. Thus, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss this claim must be granted.
B.
Timing of Claims
A Plaintiff bringing a claim under the equal employment opportunity provisions in Title
VII must abide by specific procedures. These statutory requirements are not mere guidelines for
plaintiffs in filing claims. Rather, Title VII “specifies with precision the jurisdictional
prerequisites that an individual must satisfy before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit.”
Alexander v. Garder-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); see also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109
(noting that the term “shall” in the statutory language “makes the timely filing to a charge within
the specified time period mandatory.”). One such rule reads, in relevant part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge
(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment
practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made
within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment
practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief
from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person
aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or
local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law . . . .
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
In short, as a general matter, a potential plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the commission of the
allegedly unlawful employment practice. Such practices include termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire. AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). However,
New Jersey is a so-called “deferral state,” meaning that the EEOC must initially refer
employment complaints arising in New Jersey to the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights.
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Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 391 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D.N.J. 2005) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)). In such cases, the statute provides that a complaint will be timely filed if it
is received by the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged violation. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC on August 20, 2008. Thus, under
the 300 day rule, she is barred from bringing suit concerning allegedly unlawful acts that
occurred prior to October 25, 2007. The record is unclear as to when Plaintiff was actually
terminated; Plaintiff has included several dates in her submissions without specifying which acts
occurred on which dates. For instance, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states that she was fired
on February 5, 2007. Accepting this date would render all of her claims time-barred. However,
Defendant’s filings with the Court include a copy of the charge Plaintiff filed with the EEOC.
Certif. of Ryan C. Atkinson, Exh. 3. This document lists dates of discrimination between
February and March 2008. This range does fall within the 300-day time period. Perceiving this
ambiguity, and mindful of its duty to construe pleadings liberally in favor of a pro se plaintiff,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the Court will not, at this early stage in the
proceedings, find conclusively that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Thus, it will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on this basis.
C.
Claims of Discrimination on the Basis of Gender, National Origin, and Religion
Further procedures in Title VII govern the initiation of an employment discrimination
claim. Specifically, before filing a court suit, a potential plaintiff must file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC stating the basis of her claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the
EEOC does not resolve the matter itself, it will then issue the potential plaintiff a right to sue
letter. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5).
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When submitting a charge of discrimination to the EEOC, the complaining party
indicates in checkboxes the basis for the discrimination (e.g., race, gender, religion). The scope
of that party’s employment discrimination action under Title VII will then be “defined by the
scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 398-99. This means that if a plaintiff wishes to pursue
a Title VII claim that she did not explicitly mention in her initial EEOC charge, she must show at
least that she used discriminatory terms that are interchangeable with those of her new, unlisted
claim such that the EEOC was put on proper notice. See, e.g., Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200
F.3d 73, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that “abusive,” “hostile,” “environment,” and
“atmosphere” have been used interchangeably to describe sexual harassment and that therefore
EEOC was on notice of the claim). This liberal construction helps ensure that potentially
aggrieved plaintiffs are not foreclosed from bringing a claim due to unreasonable or incomplete
investigation by the EEOC. Hicks, 572 F.2d at 966. However, a plaintiff may not bring a Title
VII in federal court based on charges she simply never alleged in her EEOC charge. In
particular, a charge based on discrimination against one protected class does not encompass other
classes merely because the investigation would reveal that the plaintiff is a member of both of
those classes. Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination form does not include specific, general, or
even inferred references to any other basis of discrimination other than race. The only checkbox
selected to describe the basis of discrimination was the one titled “race.” Certif. of Ryan C.
Atkinson, Exh. 3. More significantly, Plaintiff’s comments in the charge include only one
sentence describing the basis for discrimination; it is concerned solely with race. Id. Thus,
without additional language to put the EEOC on notice of additional bases of discrimination,
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Plaintiff did not properly file a charge for discrimination based on her gender, national origin or
religion. Accordingly, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. See
Antol, 82 F.3d at 1296. The Court will therefore dismiss these claims.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s
motion. Specifically, Plaintiff has properly plead a claim for race discrimination under Title VII,
and the Court, at this early stage in the proceedings, cannot conclusively determine that such
claim is time-barred. Thus, it will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.
However, Plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment, disparate impact, and age
discrimination are legally insufficient. Thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss them will be
granted. Finally, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of
discrimination based on age, national origin, and religion for failure by Plaintiff to exhaust her
administrative remedies. An appropriate order shall issue today.
Dated:
12/10/12
/s/ Robert B. Kugler _
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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