CARRATALA v. ZICKEFOOSE
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/6/2011. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALFREDO CARRATALA,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN DONNA ZICKEFOOSE,
Respondent.
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Civil No.
10-549 (JBS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
ALFREDO CARRATALA, Petitioner pro se
# 12072-004
FCI Fort Dix
P.O. Box 2000
Fort Dix, New Jersey 08640
ELIZABETH ANN PASCAL, AUSA
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
401 Market Street, P.O. Box 2098
Camden, New Jersey 08101
Counsel for Respondent
SIMANDLE, District Judge
Petitioner, Alfredo Carratala (“Carratala”), presently
confined at the FCI Fort Dix in Fort Dix, New Jersey, brings this
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3), challenging his continued placement in the Special
Housing Unit since August 26, 2009.
The named respondent is the
Warden at FCI Fort Dix, where Carratala was confined at the time
he filed his habeas petition.
This Court has reviewed the
petition and the answer and relevant record provided by
Respondent, and for the reasons stated below, finds that the
petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND
Carratala is a federal prisoner designated to the FCI Fort
Dix since March 9, 2007.
(Declaration of Tara Moran, at ¶ 5 and
Exhibit 2 (Inmate History)).
On August 26, 2009, Carratala was
issued an Incident Report No. 1912921, charging him with a Code
108 violation, Possession of a Hazardous Tool (cell phone) inside
a secure facility.
(Id., ¶ 5, Ex. 3 (Incident Report) and Ex. 4
(Inmate Discipline Data, Pending Reports)).
As a result of the
incident, Carratala was placed in the Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”) in administrative segregation (“AS”) status.
Also on
August 26, 2009, the incident report was “suspended” pending an
FBI referral and investigation.
(Id., ¶ 5, Exs. 4, 5).
Carratala has remained in the SHU since August 26, 2009, except
for two occasions when he was temporarily housed in the Health
Services Department.1
(Id., Ex. 5).
Carratala filed this habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, on or about February 1, 2010, seeking his release from
the SHU to a federal holding facility.
1
He claims that his
Carratala was in the Health Services Department’s West
Compound Health Services from December 17, 2009 through December
18, 2009, and in the East Compound Health Services from December
24, 2009 through December 28, 2009. (See Moran Decl., Ex. 5).
2
confinement in the SHU/AS was without due process.
On November
12, 2010, respondent filed an answer together with the relevant
administrative record.
(Docket entry no. 5).
Respondent informs that, while Carratala was in the SHU, he
received additional and numerous incident reports.
Consequently,
he has received disciplinary segregation (“DS”) as a sanction.
(Moran Decl., ¶ 5 and Ex. 7).
Specifically, on November 6, 2009,
Carratala was sanctioned for a Code 203 violation (threatening
bodily harm), and a Code 307 violation (refusing to obey an
order).
He was sanctioned to an aggregate time of 30 days in DS.
(Id., Ex. 7).
On November 13, 2009, Carratala was sanctioned yet
again for another Code 203 and Code 307 violation.
The sanction
imposed for the Code 203 was 30 days DS to run concurrent with
the earlier DS sanction, and a consecutive 21 days DS on the Code
307 violation.
(Id., Ex. 7).
On December 11, 2009, Carratala
was sanctioned for a third Code 307 violation and received 30
days DS to run consecutive to the earlier sanctions.
(Id.).
Respondent further informs the Court that Carratala’s August
26, 2009 Incident Report recently was released by the FBI for
administrative processing by the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“FBOP”).
The incident report currently is pending before the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for final disposition of the
Code 108 violation.
(Moran Decl., ¶ 5 and Ex. 8).
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Carratala seeks his release from SHU into general
population.
He also complains that he has limited access to the
law library while he is in AS.
The respondent contends that the
petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or in the alternative, because the petitioner does
not have a protected liberty interest in being housed in a
general population facility.
Respondent also argues that
Carratala has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
II.
A.
ANALYSIS
Standards of Review
Carratala brings his habeas petition as a pro se litigant.
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A
pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be
construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance.
See Royce
v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney
General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 912 (1970).
Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
in relevant part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not
extend to a prisoner unless– . . . He is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.
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28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3).
B.
Lack of Jurisdiction
A habeas petition is the proper mechanism for an inmate to
challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement, Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973), including challenges to
prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the length of
confinement, such as deprivation of good time credits, Muhammad
v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641 (1997).
See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
Habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism, also, for a federal
prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence.
See Coady
v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485-86 (3d Cir. 2001); Barden v.
Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990).
In addition, where
a prisoner seeks a “quantum change” in the level of custody, for
example, where a prisoner claims to be entitled to probation or
bond or parole, habeas is the appropriate form of action.
See,
e.g., Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1991) and cases
cited therein.
In this case, however, Carratala’s challenge regarding his
confinement in the SHU/AS does not affect the fact or the length
of his incarceration.
to him.
Consequently, habeas relief is unavailable
See Ganim v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 235 Fed. Appx.
882, 884 (3d Cir. 2007)(holding that Ganim’s challenge to the
BOP's failure to transfer him from FCI Fort Dix to the Federal
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Correctional Camp at Otisville, New York, was not cognizable
under § 2241 and that the district court erred by failing to
dismiss Ganim’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction);
Bronson v. Demming, 56 Fed. Appx. 551, 553-54 (3d Cir.
2002)(unpubl.).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained
that:
whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the “core of
habeas” the validity of the continued conviction or the fact
or length of the sentence challenge, however denominated and
regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a
habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is
to a condition of confinement such that a finding in
plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his
conviction, an action under § 1983 is appropriate.
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).
For example,
in Bronson, petitioner brought habeas petitions to challenge the
constitutionality of administrative decisions which placed him in
a prison restricted housing unit, similar to the petitioner here.
See Bronson, 56 Fed. Appx. at 552.
The court of appeals rejected
petitioner’s argument that he may challenge the conditions of
confinement in a habeas petition, since no matter what the
outcome of the habeas petition, the fact or length of
petitioner’s incarceration would not be affected. See id. at 554.
Also, in Jamieson v. Robinson, the Third Circuit noted that
the relief requested by petitioner “would not serve to diminish
the length of his incarceration,” but rather sought “only to
alter the conditions of his confinement.”
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641 F.2d 138, 141 (3d
Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit followed United States Supreme
Court precedent in Preiser, to note that the district court was
incorrect in finding that petitioner’s claims challenging the
availability of work release programs in prison sounded in
habeas.
See Jamieson, 641 F.2d at 141.
Nevertheless, the court
of appeals found that despite this error, petitioner’s claims
were subject to dismissal.
See id.
In the present case, Carratala’s claims plainly involve
conditions of prison life, not the fact or duration of his
incarceration.
For instance, he challenges his continued
confinement in the SHU/AS and complains that his segregation
affects his access to the prison law library and telephone, which
is permitted more frequently in general housing.
Thus, this
action is more properly brought in an action under a civil rights
complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).2
2
To the extent that Carratala argues that his AS status
deprives him of liberty without due process in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, his claims would appear to be without merit.
See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of
confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the
sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the
Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject
an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial
oversight.”); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9
(1976)(noting that prison classification and eligibility for
rehabilitative programs in the federal prison system are matters
delegated by Congress to the “full discretion” of federal prison
officials, see 18 U.S.C. § 4081, and thus implicate “no
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Therefore, upon careful review of the petition as discussed
above, this Court concludes that Carratala does not seek speedier
or immediate release from custody, nor does he challenge the
legality of his present incarceration.
Rather, Carratala simply
disputes his assignment in the SHU/AS and seeks a transfer to a
general housing facility, which is a challenge to the conditions
of his confinement more appropriately remedied in a civil rights
action under Bivens.
Consequently, the petition will be
dismissed without prejudice to any right Carratala may have to
reassert his present claim in a properly filed civil rights
complaint.3
legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to
invoke due process”); Wesson v. Atlantic County Jail Facility,
2008 WL 5062028, *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2008)(it is well established
that an inmate has no liberty interest in a particular custody
level or place of confinement). See also Sandin v. Connor, 515
U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995)(holding that a liberty interest is
implicated only where the action creates “atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life” or creates a “major disruption in his
environment”); Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454, 463 (1989)(holding that a liberty interest arises only
where a statute or regulation uses “explicitly mandatory
language” that instructs the decision-maker to reach a specific
result if certain criteria are met). See also Marti v. Nash, 227
Fed. Appx. 148, 150 (3d Cir. 2007)(inmate has no due process
right to any particular security classification and, therefore,
could not challenge his public safety factor of “greatest
severity”, which prevented his placement in a minimum security
facility).
3
The Court notes that, should Carratala decide to file a
civil rights complaint in this District Court, he must either pay
the $350.00 filing fee or submit a complete in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) application with his six month prison account statement,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
An appropriate Order accompanies
this Opinion.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
United States District Judge
Dated:
July 6, 2011
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