D.O. AND M.O. v. HADDONFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION
Filing
113
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 73 Motion to Certify Class; ORDERED that pltfs' motion for class certification is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to pltfs' right to refile their motion in the future, etc. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/21/2012. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
D.O. and M.O., individually and:
on behalf of C.O., a minor
:
child,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
HADDONFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION,:
:
Defendant.
:
:
Civil Action No.
10-cv-631 (NLH)(KMW)
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
HILLMAN, District Judge
THIS MATTER having been brought before the Court by
plaintiffs, D.O. and M.O., parents of their minor child, C.O., on
their motion for class certification of their claims against
defendant, the Haddonfield Board of Education; and
This case involving the constitutionality of Haddonfield
Board of Education Policy 5132 ("24/7 policy"), and the Board’s
authority to adopt and enforce that policy, which punishes
students for their actions off-campus--i.e., involvement with
illegal drugs or alcohol--by exposing them to a range of
consequences, including community service, alcohol/drug
counseling, and exclusion from extracurricular activities; and
Plaintiffs alleging thirteen claims for violations of
C.O.’s, as a student, and D.O. and M.O.’s, as parents, rights
under the federal and New Jersey constitutions1; and
Plaintiffs now requesting that the their case be certified
as a class action pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23;
and
Rule 23(a) providing the prerequisites for a class action:
“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class”; and
Plaintiffs arguing that they meet all four of Rule 23(a)’s
prerequisites, but the Board arguing that plaintiffs do not; and
The Court recognizing that the class action is an “exception
to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf
1
On February 14, 2012, after the filing of their motion to
certify a class, plaintiffs were granted leave to file a Fourth
Amended Complaint, which adds a claim for civil conspiracy
against defendant, and expands the date range for potential class
members. Plaintiffs have not sought to modify their current
motion to seek class certification of that new civil conspiracy
claim. Because, however, the Court will deny without prejudice
plaintiffs’ motion, no issue is presented at this time by
plaintiffs’ amendment.
2
of the individual named parties only,” and “in order to justify a
departure from that rule, a class representative must be part of
the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same
injury as the class members,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted); and
The Court further recognizing that even though it must be
determined whether to certify the action as a class action “[a]t
an early practicable time,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), “[a]s a
practical matter, the court's [certification decision] usually
should be predicated on more information than the complaint
itself affords . . . [and] [t]hus, courts frequently have ruled
that discovery relating to the issue whether a class action is
appropriate needs to be undertaken before deciding whether to
allow the action to proceed on a class basis,” Oravsky v.
Encompass Ins. Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 228, 240-41 (D.N.J. 2011)
(citing 5C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure
Civil 3d § 1785.3, explaining that the practice employed in the
overwhelming majority of class actions is to resolve class
certification only after an appropriate period of discovery)
(other citations omitted); and
The Court finding that even though discovery is underway in
this case, plaintiffs’ support for each Rule 23(a) element is
3
scarce and conclusory, and that plaintiffs have not
“affirmatively demonstrate[d] their compliance” with Rule 23,
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (explaining that Rule 23 does not
set forth a mere pleading standard); and
The Court finding, for example, that plaintiffs have failed
to adequately show the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2),
that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, or
the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) that plaintiffs are the
representative parties who will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class:
Plaintiffs argue that because there is uniformity in the
trigger and enforcement of the 24/7 Policy, there is both a
question of law and fact common to everyone in the proposed
class, and that plaintiffs are proper representatives.
Defendants respond by pointing out numerous and differing ways
that students and parents are affected by the Policy, and how
those ways are different from C.O.’s situation.
Such differences
include (1) self-reporting to the administration versus
notification from police reports, (2) some students were required
to pay for mandatory drug/alcohol counseling while many did not,
(3) not all students were prohibited from participating in
extracurricular activities, (4) although perhaps the Fifth
4
Amendment, violations for which C.O. claims in her complaint, may
have been implicated for some students because of the 24/7
Policy, it does not appear that it applies to C.O., (5) although
perhaps some students’ and parents’ due process rights were
violated by the imposition of the 24/7 Policy, it does not appear
that C.O. or her parents suffered the due process allegations
alleged in her complaint, (6) C.O.’s complaint claims that
students become subject to the 24/7 Policy by simply being listed
on a police report, but she did not become subject to the Policy
in that manner, and (7) C.O. appealed the administration’s
determination that she violated the 24/7 Policy, while other
students did not.2
2
Plaintiffs argue in their reply brief that these
differences are immaterial because if the 24/7 Policy is found to
be unconstitutional, that finding affects all putative class
members, and demonstrates one common finding of law. That
argument may be true--if the 24/7 Policy is found to be
unconstitutional on its face (e.g., per plaintiffs’ first “Void
for Vagueness” count), then it would follow that it would be
unconstitutional to plaintiffs as well as the other students to
whom it was applied, regardless of the differences in
implementation. If plaintiffs were moving for class
certification solely on that narrow claim, perhaps that motion
would be successful. As noted, infra note 3, however, plaintiffs
are moving for class certification on thirteen claims
collectively, half of which are “as enforced” specific to
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not met their burden at this time to
show how those claims, or the “as written” claims, meet the
requirements of Rule 23, including commonality or class
represenatation.
5
The Court finding that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently
directed that “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same
injury,” and “[t]his does not mean merely that they have all
suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” but that the
common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution--which means that determination of its truth
or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity
of each one of the claims in one stroke,” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2551 (citations and quotations omitted); and
The Court finding that plaintiffs have not met their burden
of showing that all thirteen constitutional violations claims can
be resolved in “one stroke”3;
3
Because plaintiffs have not proven the “commonality” prong
of the Rule 23(a) class certification prerequisites, the other
three elements do not need to be considered. It may be that one
or more of plaintiffs’ claims, when individually analyzed, would
meet all four elements of Rule 23(a), and be amenable to class
certification under Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs, however, have sought
class certification on thirteen claims en masse, and wish to
abandon their other claims should those thirteen be certified.
As the Court has found, plaintiffs’ thirteen claims for
defendant’s alleged violations of students’ and parents’ various
constitutional rights present numerous factual and legal
permutations. Only if plaintiffs meet their burden of
demonstrating how each claim meets the requirements of Rule 23
can the Court certify a class on those claims.
6
Consequently,
IT IS HEREBY on this
21st
day of March
, 2012
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to plaintiffs’ right to refile their
motion in the future should they desire to do so, consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion and the Court rules.
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
7
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