PRALL v. BOCCHINI et al
Filing
150
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 11/7/2012. (dmr)(n.m.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TORMU E. PRALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH L. BOCCHINI, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 10-1228 (JBS)
O P I N I O N
APPEARANCES:
TORMU E. PRALL, Petitioner pro se
#700294B/65073
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
CHRISTINE H. KIM, ESQ.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Counsel for Defendants, Michelle R. Ricci, William J.
Moliens, Chris Holmes, Jimmy Barnes, James Drumm, Ron
Wagner, James Keil, Lt. Alaimo, and Ortiz
JOI LYNNE ORTIZ, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE MERCER COUNTY COUNSEL
McDade Administration Building
640 South Broad Street, P.O. Box 8068
Trenton, New Jersey 08650-0068
Counsel for Defendants, E. Williams, T. Wilkie, Nurse Pete
S., and John Does 1-25
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon pro se plaintiff,
Tormu E. Prall’s (“Prall”) motion to vacate the September 23,
2011 Opinion and Order that dismissed certain claims and
defendants in Prall’s civil Complaint and first amended
Complaint.
(Docket Entry Nos. 31 and 32).
Prall filed his
motion to vacate on or about April 30, 2012.
98).
(Docket Entry No.
This motion is decided without oral argument pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons stated
below, the motion will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
In an Opinion and Order filed on September 23, 2011, the
Honorable Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J., dismissed without
prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1), all claims asserted by Prall in his original and
amended Complaints that attempted to challenge Prall’s state
court conviction, sentence and/or extradition.
Likewise, Prall’s
claims against the Mercer County Prosecutor defendants, namely,
defendants Bocchini and Galuchie were dismissed.
In addition,
the original and amended Complaints were dismissed without
prejudice in their entirety as against named defendants Sypek,
Blair, Hughes, Ganges, Mair, Blakey and Crowley, because Prall
failed to state a viable claim against these defendants based on
more than mere supervisor liability.
Further, Judge Wolfson
dismissed without prejudice Prall’s claims asserting conspiracy,
retaliation, denial of access to the courts, and denial of his
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
Prall’s
claims asserting deprivation of property, denial of due process
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based on his MCU placement and classification, denial of due
process based on false disciplinary charges, denial of equal
protection, denial of his Ninth Amendment right to revolt, and
denial of his rights against self-incrimination and to a
presumption of innocence, and his claims asserted against the
AKFC defendants, were dismissed with prejudice, for failure to
state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).
However, Judge Wolfson allowed plaintiff’s claims
alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement and excessive
force in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to proceed with respect to the named NJSP defendants, Michelle R.
Ricci; William J. Moliens; Chris Holmes; Jimmy Barnes; James
Drumm; Ron Wagner; James Keil; Lt. Alaimo; Sgt. Ortiz and Captain
Ortiz; and John Roes 1-99, the unknown correctional officers and
SID investigators at NJSP; and the MCCC defendants, McCall,
Williams, Wilkie and the John Doe MCCC officers.
Plaintiff’s
claim asserting denial of free exercise of religion in violation
of RLUIPA also were allowed to proceed, but Judge Wolfson
directed that Prall must amend his Complaint to name the
appropriate NJSP defendants with respect to this claim within 30
days from entry of the accompanying Order.
Finally, Prall’s
motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Docket entry no. 18)
was denied, except with respect to his claim of ongoing physical
abuse.
As to that claim, Judge Wolfson directed that the NJSP
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defendants, namely, Michelle R. Ricci, William J. Moliens, Chris
Holmes, Jimmy Barnes, James Drumm, Ron Wagner, James Kiel, Lt.
Alaimo, Sgt. Ortiz and Captain Ortiz, respond in writing to the
Court concerning Prall’s allegations of ongoing physical abuse,
and to show cause why an injunction should not be issued against
the defendants.
(September 23, 2011 Opinion and Order, Docket
entry nos. 31 and 32).
In a motion to vacate filed on April 30, 2012, (Docket entry
no. 98), Prall attacks the character of Judge Wolfson and argues
that her decision is based on “tyranny,” “oppression” and “every
variety of injustice that satisfied her whim of the moment.”
(Motion at ¶¶ 1, 2).
Prall also appears to argue that dismissal
of his claims asserting violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1,
was “flawed” and attempts to reargue his “conscientious
objection” claims that also were dismissed because they were
challenging a state court conviction more appropriately raised in
a habeas action after exhaustion of state court remedies.
(Motion at ¶¶ 4-15).
In short, Prall simply is attempting to re-
litigate the rulings made by Judge Wolfson in the September 23,
2011 Opinion and Order.
Prall’s application to vacate, more
appropriately recharacterized as a motion for reconsideration,
does not provide any elucidation how the Court allegedly
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overlooked any legal or factual issues that would warrant
reconsideration.
It would seem that Prall chose to label his motion to vacate
because he previously filed a motion for reconsideration (Docket
entry no. 40), that was denied by this Court on March 2, 2012.
(See March 2, 2012 Opinion and Order at Docket entry nos. 75 and
76).
This Court further notes that Prall filed an appeal from
the September 23, 2011 Opinion and Order to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Docket entry no. 39),
which was later dismissed for failure to timely prosecute and pay
the requisite fee as directed.
(See May 3, 2012 Order, Docket
entry no. 102).
II.
ANALYSIS
Motions for reconsideration are not expressly recognized in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
United States v.
Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999).
Generally, a motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion to
alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), or as a motion
for relief from judgment or order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
Id.
In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs
motions for reconsideration.
Bowers v. Nat’l. Collegiate
Athletics Ass’n., 130 F. Supp.2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek
reconsideration by the Court of matters “which [it] believes the
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Court has overlooked” when it ruled on the motion.
L. Civ. R.
7.1(i); see NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance,
935 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.N.J. 1996).
The standard for reargument
is high and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.
United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994).
See
The
movant has the burden of demonstrating either: “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability
of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its
order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.”
Max’s Seafood Café v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)(citing N. River Ins.
Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration only where its
prior decision has overlooked a factual or legal issue that may
alter the disposition of the matter.
Compaction Sys. Corp., 88
F. Supp.2d at 345; see also L.Civ.R. 7.1(i); Dunn v. Reed Group,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2438 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2010)(L.Civ.R. 7.1(i)
creates a specific procedure by which a party may ask the court
to take a second look at any decision “upon a showing that
dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were
overlooked by the court in reaching its prior decision”).
word ‘overlooked’ is the operative term in the Rule.”
“The
Bowers,
130 F. Supp.2d at 612 (citation omitted); see also Compaction
Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d at 345.
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Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration may address only
those matters of fact or issues of law which were presented to,
but not considered by, the court in the course of making the
decision at issue.
See SPIRG v. Monsanto Co., 727 F. Supp. 876,
878 (D.N.J.), aff’d, 891 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1989).
Thus,
reconsideration is not to be used as a means of expanding the
record to include matters not originally before the court.
Bowers, 130 F. Supp.2d at 613; Resorts Int’l. v. Greate Bay Hotel
and Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1992);
Egloff v. New Jersey Air National Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1279
(D.N.J. 1988).
Absent unusual circumstances, a court should
reject new evidence which was not presented when the court made
the contested decision.
n.3.
See Resorts Int’l, 830 F. Supp. at 831
A party seeking to introduce new evidence on
reconsideration bears the burden of first demonstrating that
evidence was unavailable or unknown at the time of the original
hearing.
See Levinson v. Regal Ware, Inc., Civ. No. 89-1298,
1989 WL 205724 at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1989).
Moreover, L.Civ.R. 7.1(i) does not allow parties to restate
arguments which the court has already considered.
Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990).
See G-69 v.
Thus, a difference
of opinion with the court’s decision should be dealt with through
the normal appellate process.
Bowers, 130 F. Supp.2d at 612
(citations omitted); Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron
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U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988); see also
Chicosky v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 979 F. Supp. 316, 318
(D.N.J. 1997); NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (“Reconsideration motions ...
may not be used to re-litigate old matters, or to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment.”).
In other words, “[a] motion for
reconsideration should not provide the parties with an
opportunity for a second bite at the apple.”
Tishcio v. Bontex,
Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998)(citation omitted).
Here, Prall fails to allege that the Court actually
“overlooked” a factual or legal issue that may alter the
disposition of the matter, which is necessary for the Court to
entertain the motion for reconsideration.
Instead, Prall simply
disagrees with Judge Wolfson’s decision.
Consequently, Prall cannot satisfy the threshold for
granting a motion for reconsideration.
He has not presented the
Court with changes in controlling law, factual issues that were
overlooked, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law or
fact that would necessitate a different ruling in order to
prevent a manifest injustice.
Prall’s only recourse, if he
disagrees with this Court’s decision, should be via the normal
appellate process.
He may not use this second motion for
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reconsideration to re-litigate a matter that has been thoroughly
adjudicated by the Court.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons expressed above, Prall’s motion
to vacate the September 23, 2011 Opinion and Order in this matter
(Docket entry no. 98), more appropriately recharacterized as a
motion for reconsideration, will be denied for lack of merit.
appropriate Order follows.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated:
November 7, 2012
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